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Abstract
This dissertation evaluates claims that nationalism is rising in post-Cold War Japan by first
noting the disconnect between existent social science conceptions of nationalism and those needed to
examine how nationalism might change in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy, and stable democracies such
as postwar Japan. This study defines nationalism as a discourse that constructs and reconstructs points
of identification and differentiation that define both a political community (i.e. "nation") and the form of
its domain over a modern territorial state. It argues nationalism is best understood as reoccurring
"nation-state narratives" that tell the story of how the nation's putative qualities or past experiences
define the present nature of its territorial state. Change in nationalism is evaluated through content and
discourse analysis of five narratives expressing the relationship between the Japanese people and their
state in a sample of elite discourse drawn from the period 1952-2007.
The analysis reveals that references to all five narratives peak in the immediate postwar period
and again in the 1980s before declining to lows in the post-Cold War period, which also saw the highest
level of contestation over these narratives in the nearly sixty years of the study. In particular, the
narrative depicting Japan as an anti-militarist/pacifist nation-state as well as the narrative emphasizing
Japan as an ethnically homogeneous nation-state proved the most contested during this period, while the
narrative affirming Japan as a democratic nation-state went uncontested. Political struggles over
reforming institutions associated with the narratives were found to be the major drivers behind these
changes, although characteristics of the narratives, especially the specificity of their normative claims,
also shaped this process.
The post-Cold War period is thus one of transition in nationalist discourse in Japan, although the
scale of change is somewhat limited. For example, while the anti-militarist/pacifist narrative saw
exceptions attached to many of its normative claims, its anti-nuclear components and cognitive claims
remained unchallenged. Finally, Japanese nationalist discourse continued to legitimate democracy and
was found to shape important electoral reforms, even as it shifted away from more insular and
exclusionary forms, which may create space for more open immigration policies moving forward.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
3
4
Table of Contents
A cknow ledgem ents......................................................................................................................... 7
Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 9
Chapter Tw o: Finding N ationalism ........................................................................................... 29
Chapter Three: In the N am es of the Nation............................................................................... 65
Chapter Four: Five N ations, Five States, One Country .............................................................. 137
Chapter Five: Five Roads through the Long Postwar................................................................. 187
Chapter Six: A ll in the N am e of Peace ....................................................................................... 211
Chapter Seven: Stories upon Stories........................................................................................... 297
Chapter Eight: N arrating Politics................................................................................................ 349
Chapter N ine: Conclusion........................................................................................................... 393
Appendix A : Codebook .............................................................................................................. 417
Appendix B : Coding Rules......................................................................................................... 429
Appendix C : N otes on M ethodology .......................................................................................... 437
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 447
5
6
Acknowledgements
Although writing a dissertation is often portrayed as a solitary endeavor, this work could not
have been completed without the professional and personal support received from a large number of
individuals and organizations. First and foremost, I want to thank my thesis advisor, Richard J. Samuels.
He was the one who first encouraged me to take on this ambitious topic, and he followed up with years of
unwavering support, thoughtful comments and firm confidence in the project. In ways to numerous to
note, this work exists because of his guidance and friendship.
The other members of my committee also made essential contributions. Suzanne Berger
repeatedly pushed me to clarify my thinking about the relationships between changes in narratives and
political and policy outcomes, while also making helpful suggestions about many lower level details.
Chappell Lawson provided valuable advice on how to structure the content analysis as well as cheerful
encouragement throughout. I am extremely lucky to have had the opportunity to learn from such
wonderful scholars.
Graduate students also learn much from their fellow students. I am grateful for advice and
support from Llewelyn Hughes, Wenkai He, Boaz Atzili, Dana Brown, Reo Matsuzaki, Nathan Cisneros,
Tobias Harris, Tushar Parlikar, and Ron Nikora. I am also deeply in debt to the staff of the MIT
Department of Political Science, especially Laurie Scheffler and Susan Twarog, who provided invaluable
assistance in helping me keep my candidacy on track even when I was living and working in Tokyo.
In Japan, I am grateful for guidance and financial support from the School of International
Liberal Studies, Waseda University, especially Graham Law, Paul Bacon and Kato Norihiro, and the
Waseda University Writing Center and its director, Sadoshima Saori. I also want to thank Tanaka Aiji of
Waseda University's School of Political Science and Economics, Tanaka Akihiko of Tokyo University's
Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, and Iwama Yoshihito of Keidanren for providing valuable advice
and help in securing source material and interviews. I would also like to recognize the important
contribution of my two Waseda graduate student coders, Sugano Motoko and Takano Yfko.
I acknowledge the MIT Center for International Studies, Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science, and Boyd, Caton & Grant, Inc. for providing financial support for this project. In addition, I
am grateful for the efforts of programmers Bill Hunt and Nicholas Piazza, who helped me make sense of
the large amount of coded data.
Finally, my family has been an unending source of support and encouragement. My parents,
James and Marjorie, always offered sympathetic ears. My sister, Annabelle, and her husband, Jim Caton,
not only provided much needed encouragement but also essential financial and logistical support in data
management and analysis. Lastly, my wife, Kiyomi, who at various times served as editor, coder,
sounding board and chief cheerleader, tirelessly contributed in ways large and small, sacrificing
weekends and nights even while holding a full-time job. It is to her that I dedicate this study.
7
8
Chapter One: Introduction
One of the most powerful and pervasive political narratives which organizes personal and public
stories is that of the relationship between the individual and the nation. 1
Molly Andrews, 2007
I. A Question of Nationalism
Yoyogi Park, a storied location that once served as the site of the athletes' village during
the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, hosted a different kind of gathering on July 16, 2012. Around
100,000 demonstrators assembled on a sweltering day to protest the restarting of two reactors at
the Oi nuclear power plant. 2 These reactors had been idled along with Japan's other nuclear
power facilities following the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant caused by the
giant tsunami of the March 11, 2011 earthquake that killed nearly 20,000 people. The
demonstration, organized under the slogan "aiming for a denuclearized, sustainable, and peaceful
society" by a group led by Nobel Prize-winning author and peace activist Oe Kenzaburo, was
one of the largest anti-nuclear rallies in Japanese history. 3
Andrews, 2007, p.76.
2 Asahi Shimbun, 17 July 2012. Demonstration organizers claimed 170,000 were in attendance while sources with
the police department gave an unofficial estimate of 75,000.
3 The flyer for the event and information on the organizing group can be found at the following website:
http://sayonara-nukes.org/ (Accessed July 22, 2012).
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Walking among the demonstrators, the sociologist and scholar of nationalism Oguma
Eiji spotted some foreigners who appeared to be journalists and staff members from foreign
embassies. He later told the Asahi Shimbun that "it would be no surprise if they saw the
confrontation as one between 'an Asian democracy movement' and 'an insensitive authoritarian
state.' 4 Citing similarities with the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and
"Arab Spring" protests in Egypt, Oguma concluded, "I believe behind the protests against
resuming the Oi plant operations are a protest against the entire current state of Japan." 5
There are several aspects of this event that seem to run counter to recent appraisals of
changes in Japanese politics and society since the end of the Cold War. Most significantly,
many observers of Japan have pointed to a "rise" in Japanese nationalism over this period.6
These assertions tend to come in two overlapping forms. The first places emphasis on change
in the people, who are seen to have adopted a new sense of nationalism. This "new
nationalism" is generally portrayed as a manifestation of the need of individuals to feel identified
with a group in which one can have pride and confidence.7 It is a "growing nationalism in
search of clearer identity and greater self-esteem" prompted in part by the need to "come to
terms with history in a way that satisfies the nation's need for pride in its past."8
4 Asahi Shimbun, 19 July 2012.
' Ibid.
6 Pyle, 2007; 2006; Watanabe, 200 1; McCormack, 2002; Matthews, 2003; Nathan, 2004; Kang, 2001.
7 Nathan, 2004.
8 Togo, 2005, p.23; Pyle, 2006, p.3 1 .
The central
10
claim is thus that the Japanese are increasingly looking for pride, identity and self-esteem
fulfillment in the relationship between themselves as a people, or nation, and their state. This
change in popular mindset is also often asserted to be generational, with younger Japanese
exhibiting its effects more clearly than their elders.9
The second form of the claim that nationalism is rising in Japan places the emphasis on
change in the state and its policies. These changes are said to reflect both a new assertiveness
among policy-makers driven by "the desire to see Japan assume a preeminent global role" and a
necessary response to shifts in Japan's geopolitical position, particularly in the East Asian
region. 10 These changes are generally located in Japan's security policies and evolving
relations with regional neighbors and partners. Most authors unite these two views by arguing
that this change in state policies is possible only because "it complements a renewed nationalism
among Japanese voters and a fear that a burgeoning capitalist China threatens Japan's established
position as the leading economic power in East Asia."" In short, an increase in the importance
contemporary Japanese place on their national affiliation has freed the state to stake out more
aggressive positions in its foreign and security policies.
11
9 Pyle, 2006.
'0 Matthews, 2003.
" Johnson, 2005.
However, it is difficult to reconcile the events in Yoyogi Park described above with
these views of post-Cold War Japan. First, the demonstration reflected a broad disquiet with
state policies and a far-reaching call for these policies to better reflect the demands of the people
rather than those of government insiders or corporate interests. As Oguma argues, just as other
movements focused their animus at what they saw as the forces most directly damaging their
livelihoods, such as the Occupy movement and the locus between Wall Street and Washington,
the Yoyogi demonstrators targeted the "political-bureaucratic-business complex" protecting the
status quo in the nuclear power industry, even though their objections extend well beyond these
particular government-industry relationships. 2 In this light, it is difficult to see the Japanese
people as increasingly satisfied with the overall direction of state policies or as one whose
renewed sense of nationalism allows them to more comfortably locate their identity and
self-esteem in the current relationship between nation and state.
Second, the event was organized by a peace activist, Oe, who has long opposed
assertive shifts in Japanese security policy and linked opposition to nuclear power with
opposition to nuclear weapons.' 3 This inclusion of anti-nuclear and pacifist claims with calls
for the deepening of Japanese democracy and renewed attention to the people's livelihood is
12 Asahi Shimbun, 19 July 2012.
13 Oe is a noted peace activist and prominent member of the Article 9 Association (kyfi5 no kai), a civic action
group to protect Article Nine, the "peace "clause of Japan's postwar constitution. To see Oe link his
non-proliferation and anti-nuclear power stances with post-earthquake Japanese energy policy, see Oe (2011).
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broadly inconsistent with the picture of a "rising" Japanese nationalism driven purely by the
desire for a greater role in global affairs and fear of newly emerging regional threats. Indeed,
although nationalism was indeed on display among the Yoyogi demonstrators, the major target
of its focus was the Japanese state rather than an external power and the central demand
advanced was for the state to honor the fundamentally anti-nuclear nature of the Japanese people
by extending its non-nuclear policy from nuclear weapons to nuclear power. This latter claim,
in particular, is clearly incongruent with the view of rising nationalism freeing the state to adopt
more aggressive security policies. Further, the demand that specific state policies be changed
to better reflect the nature and interests of the citizenry belies the view of a fundamental
complementariness in recent changes in the people and state policies.
Finally, as Oguma and other observers noted, the Yoyogi demonstration was widely
attended by young people. 4 While the great protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s in
Japan were driven largely first by unions and college student organizations and then later mostly
by college students, subsequent movements had failed to attract as much youth participation.
Oguma argues that the return of young people to protest movements is driven largely by their
current precarious position in Japanese society, with many unemployed or under-employed and
13
14 Asahi Shimbun, 19 July 2012.
most living less stable lives than their parents did at their age.15  Whatever the reasons behind
this change, the presence of so many young people at an event broadly condemning state policies
also does not coincide with the view that young people are more likely than their elders to see
their identity and self-esteem demands satisfied by the current relationship between the nation
and the state. While they may have been expressing themselves in "nationalistic" terms, their
nationalism was not directed at investing more power in the state to better advance their interest
vis-A-vis those of neighboring countries.
Although a single event does not necessarily call into question the "rising nationalism"
view of post-Cold War Japan, examining commonly-cited claims offered as evidence of this rise
reveals the case is far from clear. For example, longitudinal surveys of the public have actually
failed to show major increases in national pride or love of country since the end of the Cold
War.16 In addition, although the public has taken an increasingly negative view of China and
North Korea, the percentage of those viewing the US and Russia negatively has hardly changed
and the percentage of the public that views South Korea negatively is now smaller than at any
"5 Ibid.
16 According to the World Values Survey, which asks respondents to rate their level of national pride, this
self-evaluation changes relatively little in post-Cold War Japan and is actually less positive in 2005 than in 1990.
Compared with the responses from 23 other countries that are also democracies and members of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Japanese come in last in those positively
evaluating their level of national pride and first in negative evaluations. Accessed at:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (August 31, 2012)
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time since the 1970s."1 Similarly, claims of the emergence of a new "nationalistic" generation
are undermined by surveys that show younger Japanese are less likely to claim a strong love of
country than their elders.' 8 Further, commonly-cited as acts of "nationalism," Prime Minister
Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring Japan's war dead divided the public and were
promptly dropped by his successors.19 Evaluations of recent efforts to introduce more
patriotism in Japan's school curriculum are mixed at best. 20 The drive to revise the postwar
constitution, which many feel was imposed on Japan by the US, has stalled in recent years.
Finally, many of Japan's recent changes toward more robust security policies began as demands
from the United States.2 ' Policy changes made under foreign pressure are not generally
considered unambiguous indicators of rising nationalism.
In addition, it should be noted that many self-proclaimed nationalists as well as other
observers of nationalism in Japan have a long history of arguing that the Japanese are not
"nationalistic" enough. As early as the 1970s, Ishihara Shintar6, the renowned nationalist
17 See Cabinet Office (naikaku seifu kdhdshitsu), Survey on Foreign Policy (gaik6 ni kan suru chosa), 2007.
Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index.html (August 31, 2012). For attitudes on the DPRK, see Asahi
Shimbun (1996, 2004, 2005).
18 Among both men and women, the younger the respondents, the less likely they were to claim a strong feeling of
love for the country. In fact, those in the oldest bracket (70+) were more than twice as likely to claim such a strong
love than those in the youngest. See Cabinet Office (naikakufl daijinkanb5 seifu kohdshitsu), Public Opinion Survey
on Social Consciousness (shakai ishiki ni kansuru yoron chosa), 2007. Accessed at:
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index.html (August 31, 2012).
1 For example, in the waning months of Koizumi's tenure, an Asahi Shimbun poll found that 60% of respondents
opposed Yasukuni visits by the next prime minister, while only 20% approved. Asahi Shimbun, 25 July 2006.
See also, Pyle, 2006.
20 Kondo & Wu, 2011.
21 For specific examples, see Chapter Six.
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writer and current governor of Tokyo, argued that there was "a void at the core" of Japan and
condemned Japan's materialism and lack of national purpose.22  More recently, debates over
revising the postwar constitution and educational practices have been at least in part driven by an
underlying critique that present-day Japanese lack a strong sense of nationalism or patriotism.
For example, addressing the Constitutional Research Council of the lower house of national Diet
in 2004, Oda Haruto of the Liberal Democratic Party prefaced his criticism of the constitution's
preamble for promoting an "unidentified nationality" that failed "to cultivate a healthy sense of
patriotism and respect for Japan's unique history, traditions and culture" by first asserting that
postwar generations "have a relatively thin sense of the importance of patriotism and Japanese
history, traditions and culture."23  Appearing as a witness at a public hearing in the upper house
of the Diet in 2001, the former diplomat and Japan-based educator Gregory Clark observed that,
in his experiences teaching young Japanese, they have a "weak sense of identity" and "clearly do
not take much pride in their own culture."24 In this way, many in Japan, especially those who
advocate state measures to strengthen the commitment to the nation-state relationship among the
populace, view current levels of nationalism as "thin" or "weak."
2 New York Times, 22 May 1974.
23 Oda Haruto, Liberal Democratic Party, Constitution Research Council, House of Representatives, March 18,
2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 2012).
24 Gregory Clark, Pubic Hearing of the Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 15, 2001. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 2012).
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Beginning in Yoyogi Park, the picture painted here of the state of nationalism in
contemporary Japan thus questions the simple assertion of "nationalism on the rise." However,
it also raises some important questions: How has Japanese nationalism changed since the end of
the Cold War?
policy-making?
What explains these changes? What do they mean for Japan's politics and
These are the main questions that animate this inquiry.
II. Approaching Nationalism
Nearly sixty years ago, Delmer Myers Brown began a history of Japanese nationalism
by pointing out the troubling contrast between nationalism's importance and the lack of an
agreed-upon definition for the term. 25 More recently, Christopher Hood has lamented the lack
of methods for measuring changes in nationalism in post-Cold War Japan, concluding, "[T]here
is no easy, reliable and accurate method for measuring nationalism and changes in levels of
nationalism." 26 Understanding what has happened to Japanese nationalism since the end of the
Cold War thus requires first finding a suitable conception of what nationalism is and then
adopting of a method that allows for measuring how it changes over time.
This dissertation evaluates the claim that nationalism is rising in post-Cold War Japan
by first noting the disconnect between existent social science conceptions of nationalism and
17
25 Brown, 1955.
26 Hood, 1999, p.5.
those needed to examine how nationalism might change in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy, and
stable democracies such as postwar Japan. Rather than treating nationalism as an ideology, an
emotional reaction, or the political agenda of a particular group, this study defines nationalism as
a discursive process of constructing and reconstructing points of identification
differentiation that define a political community (i.e. "nation") and assert the form of its domain
over a modem territorial state. Nationalism is thus a form of discourse best understood as a
series of reoccurring "nation-state narratives" that tell the story of how the nation's putative
qualities or past experiences define the present nature of its territorial state.
Viewing nationalism in this way has two key consequences. First, it allows one to
conceive of change in nationalism in terms of qualitative or quantitative changes in these
recurring narratives. These changes may take many forms, including change in a narrative's
cognitive claims, which form its core of constitutive assumptions about the nation and the world,
and changes in its normative claims, which assert direct links between the nation and the state in
the form of demands on state institutions or behaviors. Second, it opens up nationalism to new
avenues of positivist inquiry. Specifically, change in nationalism can be measured using the
techniques of content and discourse analyses.
This project applies the above insights to measure and explain change in postwar
Japanese nationalism, and by extension, to address the question of how and why nationalism can
18
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change in contemporary, peaceful, and wealthy democracies with stable regimes. In the
process, it also seeks to better understand why some individual components of nation-state
narratives, especially their normative claims, change while others do not.
Why focus on contemporary Japanese nationalism? First and foremost, Japan has the
third-largest economy and one of the top five defense budgets in the world, and nationalism has
been linked to both its economic and security policies. 27
past that still shapes its image in East Asia. Indication
Second, Japan has an ultra-nationalist
s of change in Japanese nationalism are
closely watched by regional neighbors and continue to create difficulties for Japan's foreign
relations. Further, East Asia, plagued by arms build-ups, numerous territorial disputes, a lack
of regional institutionalization, nuclear proliferation, and a history of conflict, has been cited as
the most likely site for great power war in the near future. 28 Against this background,
improving understandings of Japanese nationalism, a possible catalyst for such a conflagration,
is vital. Finally, although progress has been made in the study of nationalism over the last
decade, there have been few empirical studies of nationalisms in contemporary, wealthy
democracies with stable regimes in peacetime. Since nationalism played such an important part
in the formation and early development of such states, the current tendency to overlook it in
contemporary cases seems unwarranted. This dissertation will address this omission by
27 McVeigh, 2004; Samuels, 1994; Trevor, 2001.
28 Christensen, 1999; Friedberg, 1993-94.
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providing a detailed profile of how nationalism has changed in a prime example of this
under-examined subset of cases.
The central method employed in this study is the content and discourse analysis of a
large sample of political discourse-the speeches and responses given at the Diet inaugural
This approach is open to certain criticisms. First, nationalism is a broad-ranging
phenomenon, and analysis of nationalist discourse does not always do a good job of capturing
some forms that nationalism can take, such as short-lived but intense emotional responses to
international events that can prompt the populace to emphasize their differences with other
countries. To counter this limitation, wherever possible, the results of the content analysis are
placed in context and subjected to discourse analysis designed to highlight the sources of
changes and uncover the strategies behind the rhetoric. Second, the focus on the discourse of
political and media elites invites the criticism of being too "elite-centric" and ignoring broader
indications of how nationalism is reproduced in the minds of everyday Japanese. The main
response to this criticism is that elite discourse of this kind is worth prioritizing because it is just
as likely to reflect the "popular mood" as the attitudes of particular elites when the subject of
study is a democratic society with free elections and a free press. In addition, other indicators,
such as public opinion polls, are also utilized, especially when considering how narratives can
have effects on policy outcomes.
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ceremony.
III. Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter Two develops a critique of the literature
on nationalism that shows how certain theoretical and empirical tendencies prove problematic
for the study of how nationalisms may change in contemporary democracies with wealthy
post-industrial economies and stable regimes. It then shows how this literature nonetheless
provides strong reasons for why this subset of cases should be seen as distinct and why Japan
belongs in this group. The chapter concludes by considering common conceptualizations of
nationalism and their limitations when applied to cases like postwar Japan.
Chapter Three utilizes the preceding critique of the nationalism literature to develop and
justifies a way of examining nationalism capable of both identifying its presence and assessing
degrees of its change over time in cases such as postwar Japan. The central assertion is that
nationalism should be viewed as a discourse that incorporates competing claims made in the
name of the "nation" on the state. The chief form these claims take are "nation-state
narratives," oft-repeated stories that establish the "nation" as an historical protagonist, advance
cognitive claims about both the nation and the world, and make normative demands on the state.
Changes in these stories and the claims they incorporate may thus be viewed as changes in
nationalism and explaining these changes is thus the key to understanding how nationalism
21
evolves in contemporary cases in which both complex economies and democratic governments
are well-established.
The chapter then outlines a method for putting this conception of nationalism into
practice by applying a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse
analysis to a large rhetoric sample from a political ceremony especially chosen for its unique
position in the nationalist discourse. This allows the examination of both the frequency with
which relevant claims are advanced and the level of contestation they evoke among political
elites. The chapter concludes by introducing the concepts of narrative change, discursive
strategies, and institutional association to generate three hypotheses for why the nation-state
narratives may experience declines in prominence over time: banalization, in which narratives
achieve broad consensus and uncontested, comprehensive or partial transformations, in which
part or all of a narrative is transformed via a process of contestation, and denationalization, in
which a narrative is completely contested but not transformed into a new one.
Chapter Four introduces the five nation-state narratives that have occupied central
places in the nationalist discourse of postwar Japan-the trading state,29 organic state, peace
29 Confined to a few small islands with little natural resources, the Japanese people are a trading nation that must
rely on their innate abilities (mercantile acumen and technological prowess) to add value to imported raw materials
and export in order to survive. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Amaya, 1980;
Gao, 1998; Samuels, 1994; Yamada, 2001.
30 The Japanese people are a single descent-based ("ethnic") nation whose natural bond is symbolized by the
Imperial family and manifested in a common moral code and set of religious traditions. They demand that their state
and its policies reflect this organic unity. Oguma, 2002a; Befu, 2001; Takahashi, 2005; Hardacre, 1989.
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state, civilized state, and democratic state33 narratives. In doing so, the chapter addresses
the same three issues with regard to each narrative: 1) translations of archetype examples; 2) the
key elements of the narrative, including its naming conventions, related cognitive elements,
normative claims on state policy, and sub-narratives; and 3) the grounds for its inclusion in the
study, including references to scholarly support.
Chapter Five analyzes the aggregate results from the quantitative content analysis of the
chosen rhetoric sample: the inaugural speeches given by prime ministers at the opening sessions
of the Diet and their responses from the leaders of the largest opposition party and editorial
boards of the three largest daily newspapers between 1952 and 2007. The chapter then assesses
the validity of these results by comparing them to the findings of prior scholarship on Japanese
nationalism and politics in the postwar period. This analysis uncovers several key findings,
chief among them the question of why all five nation-state narratives have experienced long-term
declines in prominence over the entire fifty-five year period under review. Two additional
findings of interest are the strong correlation between the prominence scores of the trading and
3' The Japanese people are a peace-loving nation that regrets the actions of the Japanese state during World War
Two, mourns its own tragic losses, and vows never again to allow its state to freely use violence as a means of
settling international disputes. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Katzenstein,
1996a; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004; Orr, 2001.
32 The Japanese people are a highly civilized nation and place great weight on ensuring their cultural and artistic
development. They expect their state both to promote artistic endeavors and to guarantee the basic welfare of its
people. Yoshino, 1997.
3 The Japanese people are a "civic" nation that loves freedom and naturally follow democratic principles. Their
state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Oguma, 2002b; Kersten, 1996.
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democratic state narratives and the relatively low level of prominence of the organic state
narrative throughout the period of the study.
Chapter Six applies further content and discourse analysis to address the questions of
how and why political elites in Japan changed the frequency and manner with which they
referenced the peace state narrative during periods of pronounced declines in prominence in both
the 1970s and after the end of the Cold War. This analysis identifies distinctive patterns of
change across the two periods. Whereas the peace state narrative declined in the 1970s due to a
process of banalization in which its cognitive and normative components went uncontested and
its institutional associations broadened, its fall after the end of the Cold War was due to a still
ongoing process of partial transformation driven by political struggles to reform institutions
commonly associated with specific normative claims of the narrative. The observed changes
appear contingent on multiple factors, including the number of institutional associations of
individual sub-narratives, the level of specificity of the association between normative claims
and state institutions, and the types of discursive strategies employed.
Chapter Seven begins by considering whether the secular decline in prominence among
all the narratives in the study is consistent with some form of denationalization. It finds no
evidence of denationalization at work. Instead, while the democratic and civilized state
narratives have clearly achieved "banal" states during the post-Cold War period, the trading and
24
organic state narratives joined the peace state narrative in undergoing partial transformations.
These transformations have shifted the focus of the trading state narrative from an emphasis on
trade to one on technology while the organic state has seen its normative claims regarding state
support for the Yasukuni shrine and enforcement of traditional morality strongly challenged.
Next, the strong and positive correlation between the trading state narrative, which
specifies the means to improve the economic welfare of the nation, and the democratic state
narrative, which focuses on maintaining the political rights of the nation, is considered in view of
its significance for theories that link the level of economic security among the citizenry to the
level of legitimacy of democratic regimes. 34 It finds that although this correlation did appear to
indicate a mutually reinforcing dynamic between the two narratives during the Cold War, this
relationship has broken down in the post-Cold War period, indicating the broad consensus over
the democratic state narrative seems sufficient to independently maintain its prominence in the
nationalist discourse.
The chapter then concludes by examining the consistently low level of prominence
achieved by the organic state narrative relative to other narratives in all periods of this study.
Advocated most strongly by the postwar right-wing in Japan, the organic state narrative is
34 The correlation co-efficient here is 0.869. On the general question of a causal link between the level of
economic development and the legitimacy and stability of democracies, see Przeworski, et al. (2000) and Robinson
(2006). With regard to how this issue may be applied to postwar Japan, see Johnson (1994) and Fouse (2002).
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perhaps the best known of the five nation-state narratives examined here and arguably has the
longest history in the nationalist discourse of modem Japan. Despite the efforts of multiple
generations of conservatives in positions of power to promote and institutionalize its components,
the organic state narrative persisted at stable but low levels of prominence due to a number of
factors, including an adversarial dynamic that developed with the peace state narrative. Since
the end of the Cold War, the narrative also saw its cognitive claim of ethno-national
homogeneity fall into almost complete disuse.
Chapter Eight considers what some of the changes in the uses of nation-state narratives
have meant for Japanese politics and policy outcomes. It finds that the democratic state
narrative played an important role in determining both the focus and the extent of Japan's 1994
reform of the electoral system to elect the lower house of the Diet. The chapter also raises
questions about the importance of contestation in transforming narrative components by
considering if the organic state narrative's claim of ethno-national homogeneity has continued to
influence immigration policy. Despite being completely absent from debate, the chapter finds
indirect evidence that it remains an unspoken restraint on policy change. Since this claim has
yet to be seriously contested in ceremonies such as the Diet inaugural, contestation may thus be a
necessary ingredient in the process of transforming narrative components.
26
Chapter Nine summarizes the findings of this study and considers what they mean for a
mid-level theory of change in nationalism in cases of contemporary, wealthy democracies with
stable regimes. Viewed as a discourse, nationalism can in fact change in significant ways in
such cases. Although cognitive claims appear to be more resistant to change and thus serve as
strong foundations for the persistence of nation-state narratives over time, normative claims do
in fact see change as their significance for the particular state institutions with which they are
associated are debated during the course of political fights over institutional reform. However,
the pattern and extent of this change appears to be contingent on the number of institutional
associations involved, the specificity of the normative claim on those institutions, and the
discursive strategies employed. The overall picture of Japan's nationalist discourse at the end
of the first decade of the twenty-first century is thus one of gradual rather than radical
transformation over a strong foundation of stable commitments to democracy, social welfare,
technological development, and anti-nuclear principles. The study concludes with some brief
speculation about how future individual actions or international events might alter the present
course of Japanese nationalist discourse and thus nationalism.
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Chapter Two: Finding Nationalism
'Nationalism' is one of the most loosely used words in the English language, and yet it refers to
one of the most potent forces in the modern world. 35
Delmer Myers Brown, 1955
I. Introduction
Scholars have grappled with nationalism for more than two centuries in a debate that
began among philosophers and historians and eventually spilled across all established lines
dividing the modern social sciences. Viewing nationalism as an essential ingredient of the
modern socio-economic order as well as a central animating force in many costly interstate and
intrastate wars, scholars and intellectuals have long debated the definition of the term, the origins
of nations and nationalism, and its impact on interstate relations, especially in cases of
large-scale war. Although there is much to be learned from this expansive literature, a critical
review reveals difficulties in applying its lessons to the problem of how nationalisms may
change in contemporary wealthy democracies with stable regimes. This chapter develops a
critique of this literature in order to make the case that a new approach to conceptualizing and
measuring nationalism is necessary when examining this important subset of cases.
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The chapter proceeds in three parts. The
conventional approaches to nationalism and identifies the major problems encountered when
applying them to cases like postwar Japan. These problems include the use of static and/or
overly-generalized conceptions that obstruct the assessment of how nationalisms can change
over time and disallow the possibility of that multiple nationalisms may co-exist in a single state
over time, a failure to sufficiently examine the processes of reproduction in cases in which initial
nationalisms have been long-established, the relatively scarce examination of cases of
nationalism in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy and stable democracies in favor of historical
cases or cases featuring large-scale violence, and the tendency of scholars to theorize on
world-historical time scales that remove nationalism from the realm of particular public policy
debates. The third section then shows how the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings
of this literature provide good reasons for treating contemporary, wealthy, and
democracies as a distinct subset of cases and that postwar Japan rightly belongs among this
group. The final section then evaluates the relative merits of common conceptualizations of
nationalism as an ideology, a movement and an identity, pointing out the limitations of applying
them to cases like postwar Japan.
II. Nationalism Studies and Its Discontents
30
stable
next section briefly introduces the
From 1945 through to the end of the Cold War in the early 1.990s, different paradigms
for understanding nationalism emerged around distinct claims regarding its historical origin and
path of diffusion, with most of this activity focused on the ultimate goal of developing a
comprehensive theory of nationalism. At the same time, scholars of nationalism also expanded
the horizon of empirical work to examine cases from areas outside of Europe and North America,
especially in the newly de-colonized regions of Africa and Asia. Finally, the disciplinary
make-up of the field shifted to include sociologists, anthropologists, area studies specialists, and
political scientists, in addition to the continued presence of historians and philosophers, who had
pioneered work on the topic. As a result of these developments, especially the new
contributions from social scientists, the half-century following the end of the Second World War
has been called "the most intense and prolific period of research on nationalism." 36
The breadth and depth of this output make the postwar period exceedingly difficult to
review in brief. Ozkirimli helpfully suggests a binary classification scheme, essentialism and
constructivism, which are based on differing views of the nature of ethnic and national
categories. 37 This classification facilitates the difficult task of summarizing a vast literature
while keeping the spotlight on differing views of how nationalisms may change over time.
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36 Ozkirimli, 2000, p.4 8.
37 Ozkirimli, 2000, pp.213-219.
Drawing on the work of Craig Calhoun, Ozkirimli defines essentialism as the tendency
to reduce the diversity of a given population to a single criterion that is elevated as essential to
understanding it as a social category. The tendency is usually accompanied by claims that the
'essence' involved is either natural or the inevitable product of history. In addition, the cultural
categories so identified are assumed to represent existing groups that can be identified with some
specificity. Finally, any single social category, such as nationality, is generally seen to be
exhaustive, in the sense that everyone is assumed to identify with one, and mutually-exclusive,
in the sense that no one identifies with more than one possibility within a single category type.
In other words, everyone is seen to have a nationality, but no one is believed to be able to belong
to more than one national category. 38
The definition of essentialism adopted here refers to the entire family of approaches to
nationalism that view nationality as constituted either in total or in part by a natural or enduring
'essence' intrinsic to human beings. Depending on the approach, the essential material of the
nation may be cultural, biological, psychological or some combination, but usually the centrality
of ethnicity and the importance of the emotional ties and feelings of attachment ethnic
conceptions engender are emphasized. Essentialist approaches include the socio-biological
approach associated with the work of sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, which posits a
38 Ibid., pp.2 15-216; See also a similar discussion confined to ethnicity in Chandra & Wilkinson (2008).
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biological foundation to ethnicity and nationality, what might be called the "provisional
primordialist" approach of law and politics scholar Donald Horowitz, which acknowledges the
contingent and socially constructed nature of ethnic and national categories but assumes for the
purposes of the analysis at hand that they are fixed and unchanging, and the ethno-symbolist
approach of sociologist Anthony Smith, which emphasizes the importance of long-enduring
ethnic myths and symbols in the creation of nations. 39
In contrast to essentialist approaches, constructivists stress the inter-subjectivity and
contingency of the process of ethnic and national identity formation. In this view, ethnic
groups, rather than fixed to some durable core, are viewed "as fluid and endogenous to a set of
social, economic and political processes."40 In the case of nationality, the "meanings (and
values) attributed to various constituents of the national culture, that is myths, symbols, and
traditions, are interminably negotiated, revised and redefined." 4' Social categories such as
ethnicity and nationality are thus neither exogenously determined nor permanently fixed.
Rather, they are determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the members of the relevant
populations themselves depending on a variety of contingent circumstances. In contrast with
' Van den Berghe, 1978, 2000, 2005; Horowitz, 1985, 2004; Smith, 1986, 1991, 2005. The classification of
ethno-symbolism as an essentialist approach is generally consistent with Ozkirimli (2000), Hearn (2006), Breuilly
(1996), and Gellner (1996), who included ethno-symbolism in the same category as other primordialist approaches.
However, it should be noted that the tri-partite classification of primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism is
common in reviews of nationalism studies. For examples, see Smith (1998) and Ichijo & Uzelac, eds. (2005).
40 Chandra, 2001, p.7
41 Ozkirimli, 2000, p.2 17 .
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essentialist assumptions, constructivists argue that individuals can both identify with multiple
possibilities within a single social category (e.g. Irish and American) or identify with none,
depending on some causal variable to be specified.
Although the introduction of constructivist terminology imported from other disciplines
is relatively new to nationalism studies, it is possible to identify scholars whose approaches to
ethnicity and nationality fit this description throughout the postwar period. As Ozkirimli points
out, many scholars conventionally labeled as "modernists" fit this description because they argue
that "it became possible and necessary to 'imagine' or 'invent' nations as a result of changing
economic, political or social conditions." 4 3 Understood this way, different constructivist
approaches are largely distinguished by the different factors they emphasize in their explanations
of the origins of nationalism. These include a variety of structural, ideational and instrumental
approaches.
Structural approaches differ in their emphasis on economic, political and cultural
variables. Those emphasizing purely economic factors include the modernization approaches
of scholars such as the economist and economic historian Walt Rostow, which argue that
societies develop or "modernize" by passing through a common sequence of development in
which an intermediate stage fosters nationalism, and the neo-Marxist approaches of scholars
42 Chandra, 2001; Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008.
41 Ozkirimli, 2000, pp.2 1 7 -2 18 .
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such as Scottish theorist Tom Nairn and sociologist Michael Hechter, which argue that the
uneven pace of economic development both across countries and within them fosters nationalism
as an undeveloped periphery mobilizes in the face of exploitation from a more developed core. 44
Structural approaches emphasizing political factors, such as those offered by the historian John
Breuilly and sociologist Michael Mann, reject or de-emphasize economic development as the
central causal force behind the emergence and subsequent change of nationalism and focus
instead on the role of the modern state and the process of state-building.45
Perhaps the most influential structural approaches, offered by the anthropologist Ernest
Gellner and sociologist and philosopher Benedict Anderson, argue nationalism developed as a
cultural response to pressures caused by factors such as industrialization, capitalism, the spread
of literacy, and the decline of ecclesiastical authority.46 In particular, Gellner emphasizes the
role of industrialization, which he claims requires a level of cultural homogeneity that generated
nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national
[cultural] unit be congruent," while Anderson argues that all the above factors opened up a space
for people to see themselves as members of a single nation or an "imagined community." 47
44 Rostow, 1960; Nairn, 1973, 1975, 1981; Hechter, 1975, 2000. For a modernization approach by a political
scientist, see Deutsch (1953).
45 Breuilly, 1993 [1982], 1996; Mann, 1995.
46 Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991 [1983].
47 Gellner, 1983, p.1.; Anderson, 1991 [1983].
35
Constructivist approaches also include ones that emphasize the role of ideas and
ideology. For example, the sociologist Liah Greenfeld finds the origins of nationalism in the
emergence of the idea of the nation in sixteenth century England and the manner in which this
idea spread throughout the world.48 This echoes earlier work on the roots of nationalism by
interwar historians such as Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn, and E.H. Carr. 49 Finally, constructivists
also offer various forms of instrumental approaches. Found in the work of political scientists
such as Paul Brass, who finds nationalism emerging from the power struggles among elites who
appeal to people in ethnic and nationalist terms for their own instrumental reasons, and Robert
Bates, who argues that joining ethnic and national groups is a rational response of individuals
facing competition over the desired but scarce benefits of modernization, especially control of
land, markets and jobs. 50
Although the works cited above have greatly increased understanding of nationalism,
certain theoretical and empirical tendencies have proven problematic for applying their lessons
to the study of how nationalisms may change in contemporary democracies with post-industrial
economies and stable regimes. These tendencies, which can be found among both essentialist
and constructivist approaches, include scant attention devoted to contemporary cases in favor or
48 Greenfeld, 1992.
49 Hayes, 1931; Kohn, 1944, Carr, 1945.
50 Brass, 1991; Bates, 1974. Bates, 1983.
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historical ones, a corresponding lack of consideration given to explaining how ethnic and
national categories are reproduced and change over time once established, the use of static and/or
overly-generalized understandings of key conceptions such as the nation; the tendency to
theorize only over extremely long time horizons, a failure to account for the role of historical
context and contingency in the evolution of nationalisms, the tendency assume away the
possibility multiple nationalisms co-existing over long periods of time within a single case, bias
in case selection in favor of cases involving large-scale violence; and an under-appreciation of
how politics, and specific policy debates, relate to the content of national categories and
nationalist discourse.
These deficiencies may be attributed to a number of factors, including an excessive
focus on the origins of nationalism, problems associated with the pursuit of a universal theory of
nationalism, the assumption of a natural link between nationalism and ethnic politics to violent
outcomes, and the level and manner of participation from political scientists.
Reviewing the major theoretical contributions of this period, one is struck by their
general backward-looking orientation. Of the authors cited above, only a few extend their
analysis to the present, and, among these, fewer still choose to examine contemporary cases in
their own societies. This tendency is largely attributable to the focus of these scholars on
explaining the origins of nationalism. Although understandable, the field-wide devotion to this
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question at the expense of other areas of inquiry has contributed to two negative outcomes.
First, the proliferation of historical studies of the first appearances of nationalisms in particular
regions has to some extent crowded out work on contemporary cases, thereby stunting the
development of theoretical concepts and measurement techniques best suited for the conditions
found in these cases. Second, focusing the debate on explaining the initial production of
national categories has tended to leave questions regarding how these categories are reproduced
or transformed once established under-explored. Of course, this is not a problem if the same
factors cited as causes of the production of national categories are also responsible for their
reproduction and change, but this is an empirical question that can only be answered by further
work on contemporary cases.
A second observation about the work of this period is that scholars from all theoretical
perspectives generally shared the goal of developing a universal theory of nationalism. Although
some, such as Breuilly, declined to take up this mantle, the focus of most other theorists on
developing a "general theory" has led to a number of complications that often make applying
their work to specific cases difficult and unproductive. Explaining nationalism with a single
theory requires concepts to be highly generalized so they may be widely applied across time and
space. As a result, fitting them to specific cases can be difficult, especially if the case differs
greatly from the contexts of the historical ones used to derive and explain the theory.
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A good example of this is the difficulty encountered when Smith attempts to apply
ethno-symbolist analysis to modem Japan.5 In short, he argues that aristocratic elites from the
samurai class in combined Confucian and peasant traditions with the dominant myth of the
emperor system and to create a Japanese national identity which they promoted through their
control of the modernizing Japanese state to gradually transform a politically passive and
economically divided ethnic community into a more cohesive, economically centralized and
mobilized political community, thus creating the Japanese nation. After World War Two,
Smith argues that the emperor system was deprived of its former mystique and position and the
foundation of prewar Japanese national political identity was shaken. Although he notes a
resurgence of interest in national cultural identity among intellectuals and business elites, he
conclude that it remains to be seen if this can serve as a durable basis for a new comprehensive
Japanese national identity.
There are several problems with this account. First, Smith's theory is dependent on
highly generalized models drawn from work on early European nationalisms as well as
hard-to-specify concepts such as "lateral ethnie" that do not translate well to Japan's experience.
Second, when nationalism began to emerge in Japan, the samurai elite were in fact divided over
the meaning of the emperor system. Indeed, opposing forces in the initial struggle that led to
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51 Smith, 1991, pp. 10 0 -10 6 .
the collapse of the Shogunate and the later Boshin War emphasized these differences as central
their causes. Third, as Oguma Eiji has noted, the meanings attached to the emperor system
have clearly changed over time, even before World War Two. 52 Finally, deprived of his central
myth-symbol complex, Smith has very little to say about how nationalism has changed in
postwar Japan.
The drive for a general theory has had other negative consequences. First, it encouraged
postwar scholars to theorize on world-historical time scales of hundreds and even thousands of
years. Considering the subject across such broad spans of time tends to limit explanations to
"big, slow-moving" factors, such as structural (e.g. changes in the means of production, levels of
development, etc.) or essentialist variables (e.g. crude rational choice or genetic predispositions)
at the expense of other types of explanations, especially human agency, which may play critical
roles. 5 In addition, the mere intent of developing a general theory predisposes theorists to
discount the significance of social and political contexts and historical contingencies in the
formation of nationalisms. As Breuilly and the sociologist Rogers Brubaker have both stressed,
the "world of nations" as we know it today could have been very different and thus there is no
theoretical justification for disregarding the likely role of historical contingency in the
52 Oguma, 2002a. For an account of how views of the emperor system changed after the war, see Ruoff, 2001.
5 The phrase "big, slow moving" is taken from Pierson (2003).
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Finally, the requirement to collapse cells inherent in
general theorizing tends to discount even the possibility that distinct nationalisms may exist
side-by-side within the same state for long periods of time. However, the level of national
consensus or contention in any particular case is an empirical matter that cannot be resolved
through assumption or definitional fiat.
Another facet of the scholarship of this period is the tendency to focus empirical
research on cases involving interstate or intrastate conflict. Found surprisingly in both
essentialist and constructivist approaches, this tendency complicates efforts to utilize these
approaches in cases of contemporary post-industrial democracies for several reasons. First, the
universe of cases has become increasingly drawn from Africa, the Middle East, the Indian
subcontinent, Southeast Asia, South America and the post-Soviet republics because these are the
regions that hosted the most violent conflicts over the last half-century. 55 This has moved the
empirical focus of the field from an excessively Eurocentric one to one that largely ignores the
post-industrial democracies of contemporary North America, Europe, and Japan. In this way,
much of the important theoretical work during this period has been drawn from cases that differ
greatly from these contemporary democracies in such theoretically relevant aspects as level of
development, regime type, and state stability.
5 Breuilly, 1993 [1982]; Brubaker, 1996, 2004.
* Marshall & Cole, 2009, p.6.
Second, cases are selected because the states are
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development of particular nationalisms. 54
experiencing ongoing conflict, a condition that may in and of itself differentiate them
theoretically in important ways from states that have experienced long periods of peace, such as
those in North America, Europe and Japan over much or all of the last half-century.
There are other consequences associated with this shift in the focus of empirical work.
First, it has encouraged some scholars to draw sharp distinctions between the nationalisms of
their home societies in advanced post-industrial democracies and those that are now the main
subject of study in the field. This has prompted a renewed interest in dichotomous typologies
such as patriotism versus nationalism, and especially civic versus ethnic nationalism. An
influential categorization derived from Kohn's division of nationalism into "Western" and
"Eastern" variants, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism underlies the
ethno-symbolist and ideational approaches introduced above. 56  Civic nationalism, which is
associated with the thinking of Renan and supposedly exemplified in the nationalisms of Kohn's
"Western" countries, particularly the United States, calls for "a community of equal,
rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and
56 Kohn argues that nationalism first appeared in Western countries, such as England, France and the United States,
either before or during the formation of their current territorial states. The nationalism that developed in this
region was thus "based upon liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in a democratic world
society." Kohn, 1944, p.4 5 7 . In Eastern and Central Europe and parts of Asia, however, nationalism emerged later
under less developed economic and political conditions. Its initial sponsors were largely intellectuals and members
of the lower aristocracy, who fashioned nationalist doctrines centering on cultural, linguistic and putative kinship
ties. Since the envisioned lines of the nation did not coincide with the borders of the dynastic empires of the region,
the nation was presented as more of an emotional ideal, rather than the more rational political reality prevalent in the
West. Kohn, 1944, pp.329-334; See summaries of the distinction in Smith, 1998, p.182; Hearn, 2006, pp.8 8-9 1. For
relatively recent examples, see Smith (1991), Brubaker (1992), Greenfeld (1992), Ignatieff, (1993), Kupchan (1995),
Zubrzycki (2001) and Williams and Mobrand (2010).
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Civic nations are voluntary and inclusive, since they are composed of "all
those--regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity--who subscribed to the
nation's political creed." 58 Civic nationalism is thus necessarily democratic because it invests
sovereignty in the people.
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, locates the source of national unity in some set of
ethnic characteristics such as language, religion, and traditions. It stresses that nationality is a
product of inheritance rather than individual choice: "It is the national community that defines
the individual, not the individuals who define the national community." 59 Associated with the
writings of Herder and nineteenth century German Romanticism, this form of "Eastern"
nationalism is thus seen as exclusive and adverse to democratic ideals.
However, drawing a sharp distinction along these lines can unnecessarily complicate the
analysis of change in nationalism in cases such as postwar Japan. As Brubaker has noted, the
distinction is utterly dependant on how one defines the concept of "culture."60 As will be seen
in the discussion of nation-state narratives in the next two chapters, if one chose to define the
"culture" attributed to ethnicity in broad terms, all prominent nation-state narratives in postwar
Japan could be considered variants of ethnic nationalism, including one that idealizes the "civic"
" Ignatieff, 1993, p.6. Renan, 1996 [1882].
58 Ibid., p.6.
60 Ibid., pp.7-8.
60 Brubaker, 2004, pp. 136-140.
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values." 57
nature of the Japanese nation in support of the cognitive claim that Japan is a "democratic state."
However, the more narrow understanding of ethnicity utilized here, which focuses on
descent-based attributes, excludes many elements others might consider as cultural aspects of
ethnicity, and, in so doing, locates most "ethnic" claims in the one narrative whose cognitive
foundation is most dependent on this claim.
In addition, it should be remembered that this typology contains moral valuations that
sometimes portray the nationalisms of the subject states as normative 'bads' that must be
contained, further distancing them from putatively healthy conceptions of 'patriotism' associated
with similar styles of politics in post-industrial democracies. This may also work in reverse.
For example, scholars studying cases in Africa sometimes treat instances of what might be
deemed nationalism in a post-industrial democratic context (e.g. conflict over state control or
secession waged by a minority group) as "ethnic" conflict in their case, thus obscuring the
connection with nationalist forms of identity politics in developed democracies.
A final observation about the scholarship of this period involves the contribution of
political scientists. When political scientists do approach the topic of nationalism, they tend
either to focus on its consequences, or, when causes are examined, to shy away from developing
exclusively political explanations. As political scientist Patrick Hossay succinctly notes,
"Political scientists have displayed more interest in the political consequences of nationalism;
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notions of nationhood as themselves
politically-constructed." 6' Political scientist Rogers Smith agrees, asserting that when it comes
to explaining the general class of identities that include nationality, "Against what one would
think to be their disciplinary self-interest, political scientists have also tended to draw on
economic, sociological, cultural and psychological theories rather than formulating explicitly
political ones."62 Although there are exceptions, the tendency to avoid political explanations
for the production, reproduction and change of national categories is a somewhat surprising
feature of political scientists' contribution to scholarship on nationalism in the postwar period.
The combined impact of the relatively low participation of political scientists and their
reticence to employ political explanations in scholarship on nationalism has been an overall
under-appreciation of how politics, and specific struggles over state institutions and policies,
may affect the content of national categories and thus the points of identification to which large
groups of people turn when thinking of their nationality.
III. Casing the Middle Ground
A starting point for the approach taken to nationalism here is the assertion that a general
or universal theory of nationalism-one that purports to apply equally to all cases across space
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61 Hossay, 2001, pp.165-166.
62 Smith, 2003, p.12.
but they largely decline to problematize
and time-is neither possible nor advisable. 63 As the review of nationalism studies in the
preceding section reveals, seeking a single set of explanations or master variables for all time
periods and instances of nationalism's existence has created problems, especially for applying
the resultant theories to contemporary cases. These problems are thus both theoretical, as seen
in the difficulty encountered in applying Smith's framework to postwar Japan, and empirical, as
is apparent when one considers the range in the ideological content of nationalisms across time
and space, the not uncommon situation in which competing nationalist ideas and doctrines
co-exist within a single political environment for long periods of time, and the relative
importance of historical contingency in the development and change of nationalisms in particular
cases.
Acknowledging this state of affairs does not, as sociologist John Hall makes clear,
imply a counter-reaction "from universalism to complete particularism, from a general theory to
national histories." 64 Rather, it highlights the need to focus theory-building on the fertile middle
ground, in which theorists focus on developing concepts best suited for analyzing how
nationalisms develop and change in a set of comparable cases that share key characteristics, such
as time periods and political and economic structures. This section focuses on the theoretical
justifications for assigning a case to a subset of comparable cases suitable for use in
63 Other scholars studying nationalism share this view, including Hall (1993) and Ozkirimli (2000)
64 Hall, 1993, p.1 .
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theory-building about nationalism in postwar Japan. The final section will then take up the
equally important task of evaluating the utility of three commonly-used conceptions of
nationalism (and their operationalizations) for theorizing about how nationalism may develop
and change in this subset of cases.
It is argued here that postwar Japan is one of a group of cases that share key
theoretically-relevant characteristics but are rarely examined by nationalism scholars.
the first considerations for categorizing comparable cases is chronological division.
Among
Separating
cases by time periods is important for several reasons. First, it allows the separation of
instances of "first-generation nationalisms," or the first appearances of nationalisms in a
particular state or geographic area, from cases in which the time period under examination
begins after the original development of nationalism. This is important because there is no a
priori reason to assume that the same forces that initially give birth to nationalism also serve to
sustain, develop or diminish it in latter periods. Second, as is particularly apparent in the
chronologies of interwar scholars such as E.H. Carr and Carlton Hayes, the content of nationalist
ideologies and movements changes over time, and the order in which new terms and ideas enter
nationalist discourse and the manner in which they react to each other can have a significant
impact on the trajectory of a nationalism's development. Finally, focusing on shorter time
periods (e.g. decades) than those typically examined by scholars pursuing universal theories of
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nationalism (e.g. centuries) allows the theorist to examine the content of nationalist discourse
and its relationship to political and policy outcomes, areas of particular interest to political
scientists.
Although it is essential to consider the history of nationalism prior to the start date of a
particular case study, the tendency of those pursuing universal theories to focus excessively on
determining origins to the exclusion of subsequent change and development has left many
contemporary nationalisms under-studied. This lapse is particularly surprising when one
considers that it is the current state of these nationalisms, including contemporary Japanese
nationalism, which will have the most lasting impact on global politics in the future. The time
period examined here is thus the postwar period, with the focus placed on the second half of the
Cold War and first two decades of the post-Cold War era. Although a brief survey of prewar
nationalisms in Japan will be provided, the emphasis will be on how new nationalisms became
established and changed following the end of the U.S. occupation.
A second characteristic that postwar Japan
under-examined by nationalism scholars is regime type.
shares with the group of cases
The review in the previous section
reveals many scholars who draw links between nationalism and democracy. For example,
democracy is a key characteristic in Hayes' typology of nationalism and in Carr's chronology of
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For Mann, among other scholars, democratic federalism is
portrayed as a key conditioning variable capable of determining whether the nationalism of a
particular state will be aggressive or mild.66 Finally, both Kohn and Greenfeld, to varying
degrees, portray nationalism as a central factor in the spread and development of modern
democracy. 67 Thus, depending on the theorist, the relationship between nationalism and
democracy can be conceptual, causal or both.
Since adopting its current constitution in 1947, Japan has been a parliamentary
democracy with a symbolic monarchy. Although occupation authorities interfered in various
ways with the workings of this new regime during the first five years of its operation, Japan
regained its full sovereignty in 1952. Since that time, it has had regular, relatively free and fair
elections, a private and fairly independent media, an independent judiciary, security forces under
civilian control and a constitution that protects civil liberties such as freedom of expression and
association and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, creed, social status or sex.
It is a fact that nearly every item listed among Japan's democratic institutions above has
come under criticism for perceived failings. 68 It is also true that the quality and effectiveness of
65 Hayes, 1931; Carr, 1945.
66 Mann, 1995.
67 Kohn, 1944; Greenfeld, 1992.
68 For examples of scholars who question the quality of Japanese democracy, see Bowen, 2003; Hayes, 2001;
Herzog, 1993; Freeman, 2000; and Pyle, 1996. For arguments placing Japanese democracy with the general range of
Western democracies, see Beer & Maki, 2002; Curtis, 1999; Reed, 1993; Richardson, 1997; and Stockwin, 1999.
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nationalism's march through time. 65
these institutions have likely changed over the period in question. However, democracy is
always a work in progress, and both criticisms and changes are to be expected. Judged by an
absolute standard, Japan's postwar regime meets Samuel Huntington's procedural definition of
democracy: Japanese leaders have been selected through free competition in regular and
relatively fair elections under universal adult suffrage. 69 Assessed from a comparative standard
that includes measures for both procedural democracy and civil liberties, Japan has received a
rating of "Free" in Freedom House's evaluation of political rights and civil liberties for all
countries and disputed territories around the world since the organization began publishing
comparative ratings in 1973.70 In addition, the range of fluctuation in this measure over the
period has been low, with Japan never receiving a score lower than 2 on the 7 point-scale. It is
thus argued here that Japan belongs in the subset of cases considered democracies for the entire
postwar period.
Economic structure is also often cited by theorists as an important factor when
considering nationalism. Carr points to structural shifts in the world economy, from largely
mercantilist to more open trade to the "economic nationalism" of the 1930s as key characteristics
in his periodization of nationalism, while Kohn cites the initial level of development as an
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69 Huntington, 1993, p.7 .
70 Freedom House, 2010.
important causal variable in the development of Western and Eastern nationalisms.71 Varying
levels of economic development are also central to Narin's "uneven development" and Hechter's
"internal colonialism." 72
economic development.73
Rostow associates nationalism with particular stages in his model of
Finally, Gellner, Anderson and Smith, the most influential postwar
theorists, while disagreeing on many important points regarding the origin of nationalism,
nonetheless all cite level of development, particularly industrialization, as a central factor in their
theories. 74 The need to control for differences in economic structure in cross-case comparisons
is thus a well-grounded theoretical concern.
The postwar Japanese economy has been far from a static entity. In the early years
after regaining sovereignty, Japan equaled its prewar economic output after being devastated in
the final years of World War Two. The next two decades saw "the Japanese miracle," in which
double-digit annual growth and economic boom became the new norms, a period followed by
two more decades of lower but still relatively high levels of growth and increased economic
influence in the world. This long stretch of widely-shared prosperity then came to a sudden
halt, leaving the Japanese economy largely stagnant in the post-Cold War era. One may thus
71 Carr, 1945; Kohn, 1944.
72 Nairn, 1981; Hechter, 1975.
73 Rostow, 1960. Deutsch also cites the increased communication born of economic development as the central
building block of his theory of nationalism. Deutsch, 1953.
74 Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991 [1983]; Smith, 1986.
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ask how such variation in economic performance allows for the postwar period to be examined
as a single case.
The answer to this question has two parts. First, it is important to emphasize that
Japan was a relatively wealthy and industrialized economy at the time it entered into World War
Two and after defeat it quickly regained its prewar status in the early postwar years. By 1960,
it was among the top quintile among all countries in GDP per capita, a threshold under which it
has never fallen in subsequent years.75 With regard to examining nationalism, Japan may thus
be considered a case of a wealthy country for the bulk of the period under review. Second, if
economic structure is expressed as the common three-sector model including primary
(agricultural and extractive activities), secondary (manufacturing and heavy-industrial activities)
and territory (services and information-intensive activities) sectors, then it can be said that the
Japanese economy has followed a similar trajectory as that of other wealthy democracies in the
postwar period. Although Japan experienced rapid growth in the manufacturing sector during
the boom years of the initial recovery and economic miracle, since the early 1970s, structural
shifts in the Japanese economy have mirrored that of other rich democracies. 76 As expressed in
terms of employment by sector, this pattern includes sharp declines in manufacturing, continued
75 See data from the World Development Indicators database and CIA World Factbook.
http://www.nationmaster.com/statistics (September 1, 2012)
76 See data from the US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accessed at:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (September 1, 2012)
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Accessed at:
long-term declines in primary industries and a dramatic increase in workers employed in the
tertiary or services sector. 77 Since the focus of analysis here is on the latter half of the Cold
War and post-Cold War periods, it is thus possible to consider Japan as a post-industrial
economy, an economic structure in which services represent the
employment. 78
dominant sector of
This is also the case with the economies of other contemporary, wealthy
democracies.
Another important characteristic that postwar Japan shares with other under-studied
cases of nationalism is the relative stability of its regime and state. As noted earlier, most
empirical work on nationalism has focused on cases of regime breakdown or inter-state or
intra-state conflict. While these studies have generated theoretical arguments linking
nationalism to large-scale violence and a tendency for nationalism to take a more central place in
the public sphere during periods of conflict, they often have little to say about how nationalism
may or may not change during prolonged periods of regime stability and peace.
If measured from the return of sovereignty, Japan's current democratic regime has been
stable for nearly sixty years. In addition, with the exception of the peaceful return of Okinawa
and other islands by the United States during the first half of the postwar period, the area
77 Ibid.
78 "Post-industrial" is used here to refer to an economy has shifted from a manufacturing-base to one in which the
tertiary sector is the largest employer. The concept of the post-industrial society originates with Bell (1973).
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administered by Japan's territorial state has also remained unchanged during this period. The
result of this continuity of regime and state fits postwar Japan into what Michael Billig cites as
the most under-examined set of nationalism cases, the "established nations," which he defines
broadly "those states that have confidence in their own continuity." 79
to specify regime and state stability more specifically.
There are various ways
One widely used measure is the State
Fragility Index developed by Monty Marshall. By this measure, which covers only the period
from 1995 to 2009, Japan has received the lowest rating for state fragility, a score it shares with
the countries of North America, Western Europe and Oceania.80 A different but related measure
is the Polity score from the Polity IV database. This measure rates the quality of political
institutions in democracies and autocracies for the entire postwar period. Japan receives the
highest measure on this evaluation from the mid-1950s to the present.8' It is thus fair to say
that postwar Japan belongs in the subset of cases with stable, reasonably well-functioning
regimes in place.
The above arguments support the notion that postwar Japan should be seen as a prime
example of one of the most ignored sets of cases in nationalism scholarship: a contemporary
democratic state with a stable regime and a wealthy, post-industrial economy. The discussion
79 Billig, 1995, p.8 .
80 Marshall & Cole, 2009.
81 See Polity IV database. Accessed at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (September 1, 2012).
Please note that this high rating also supports the categorizing Japan as a democracy for the entire postwar period.
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now turns to assessing which concepts and basic assumptions are best suited for examining how
nationalism may change in such an environment.
IV. Problems with Common Conceptions of Nationalism
Before considering solutions to the problems encountered when attempting to apply the
approaches to nationalism reviewed earlier to cases of contemporary post-industrial democracies,
it is first necessary to point out that different theorists follow differing a priori assumptions
about what nationalism actually is as an empirical manifestation. These assumptions reveal
themselves in both their formal definitions of nationalism and their operationalizations in
casework. For the most part, theorists characterize nationalism as a general phenomenon in one
of three different ways: 1) as an ideology, or system of normative and cognitive beliefs; 2) as a
type of movement, or collection action by individuals organized to realize certain political
objectives; or 3) as a form of identity, which is usually described as a way of categorizing
oneself and others that satisfies a fundamental psychological need or emotional desire for
viewing the world in this particular fashion. The problems associated with beginning analysis
with each of these fundamental assumptions about nationalism are considered below.
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Nationalism is sometimes viewed as an ideology.82 Here, ideology is understood as a
system of collectively-held normative and cognitive beliefs about the nation, its relationship to
the state and place in the world.83 This approach is grounded in three main assumptions. First,
nationalist beliefs form a system, meaning that central concepts are interlocking and combine
into a consistent whole. Second, these beliefs are imparted through socialization processes that
occur through young adulthood in the household, education system and workplace. In this way,
change in nationalism is by assumption related to changes or disruptions in these socialization
processes. Third, a uniformity of conviction is assumed among the adherents of a particular
nationalist ideology. So conceived, nationalism is thus viewed as "the most successful
ideology in human history," one that has captured more adherents than liberalism or even
Christianity or Islam. 84
This approach can, however, prove problematic. For one, to assume nationalism is a
system of beliefs with goodness-of-fit between key concepts and internal consistency makes it
difficult for one to allow for the fact that competing, even conflicting, national conceptions can
exist side-by-side in the same state for long periods of time. Attempting to find a "system," a
82 Examples include Carr, 1945; Greenfield, 1992; Hayes, 1931; Kohn, 1944.
83 It should be noted that ideology has been variously defined in the social sciences. The definition used here is
drawn from Hamilton: "An ideology is a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and
beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at
justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote realize, pursue or maintain."
Hamilton, 1987, p.3 8 .
84 Birch, 1989, p.3; cited in Billig, 1995, p. 2 2 .
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researcher acting on this assumption will tend to ignore inconsistent or contradictory elements
and instead focus on what he or she perceives to be the best set of interlocking ideas that are
broadly expressed. While the results of such an analysis are not necessarily inaccurate, they
will almost certainly be incomplete. Particularly in the context of a stable democracy with a
free press and open public sphere, conflicting notions about the nation and its relationship to the
state are likely to be widespread. Some of these notions will conflict and there is no need for
them to combine into a single consistent whole. In fact, the coexistence of conflicting notions
and inconsistencies may themselves by important sources of change in nationalism over time.
Those assuming nationalism to be a system of beliefs are thus likely to ignore the variation
present in any particular state at a given time. In the case of postwar Japan, for instance,
scholars studying nationalism as an ideology almost always focus on rightwing notions of the
Japanese nation to the exclusion of conflicting but nonetheless important conceptions that
emerged from the left.85
Second, conceiving of nationalism as a belief system inculcated only through
socialization processes greatly limits the types of explanations for change that can be brought to
bear. For example, many scholars argue that leaders make nationalist pleas for instrumental
purposes and that these actions often can change the ways receiving publics understand their
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85 Takekawa, 2007, p.59 .
ethnicity or nationality. 86  Still others describe how adult followers rationally join newly
formed nationalist movements in order to secure places in what they think will be a winning
coalition. 87 Neither of these explanations can be applied if nationalism is viewed as a belief
system because they require a level of autonomy between actors and beliefs. Leaders are able
to promote beliefs in ways they were not previously socialized to and may not even hold
themselves, while followers are able to select or reject these conceptions using rational
calculation. Such autonomy is not possible if nationalism is understood only as beliefs
internalized by pre-adult socialization processes because adult actors are seen as rarely, if ever,
capable of consciously shaping change in their own deeply-held beliefs or those of others. As a
result, change becomes largely a structural affair that privileges exogenous factors such as
international war or regime collapse over the endogenous impact of human agency. To take
this approach thus greatly reduces by assumptive fiat the possibility that human agency,
intentional or otherwise, might affect change in nationalism.
In addition to downplaying the potential role of agency, viewing nationalism as a belief
system obscures the possibility of endogenous change. Assuming shared belief often leads one
to assume individuals hold in their minds the same interpretations of the nationalism in question.
86 Richard Samuels, in particular, has utilized Claude Levi-Strauss' concept of bricoleur-a leader who assembles
often heterogeneous fragments of available cultural materials in new ways to legitimate and promote new political
understandings-to show how leaders have played important roles in affecting change in the contemporary national
identities of Italy and Japan. Samuels, 2003a. See also Brass (1991).
87 Laitin, 1998; Bates, 1974. Bates, 1983.
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As Cruz has pointed out, this is rarely the case. In practice, nationalists often hold contending
beliefs. These views may vary across domains (e.g. more cultural than political, more military
than economic, etc.) and may even include disagreements on fundamental questions such as who
is to be included in the "nation" and what is required for national autonomy.89 This variation
opens the door for an important potential source of endogenous change: the rhetorical
manipulations of political leaders. Beginning with the assumption of uniformity of beliefs,
however, encourages theorists to overlook rhetorical politics and leaves them largely dependent
on exogenous factors in their efforts to explain change.
Treating nationalism as a movement places the focus on organizations and groups, with
nationalism generally treated as the defining ideological characteristic of these substantive
entities. 90 This approach has disadvantages that are particularly apparent in cases such as
postwar Japan. For one, change is viewed as the success or failure of a particular nationalist
movement to achieve its objectives, usually defined in terms of separation from, unification with
or reform of a state. 9 However, in a case in which the regime and state are stable for the entire
period under review, the only form of change conceivable is state reform, and it is just this type
of change that scholars employing this approach tend to avoid. Breuilly, for example, examines
88 Cruz, 2000.
89 McVeigh, 2004.
90 Breuilly, 1993 [1982]; Hechter, 2000, Van Evera, 1996-97.
91 For example, see Breuilly (1993 [1982]).
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very few such cases and is openly doubtful of the utility of his approach in cases in which state
power has already been attained by a nationalist movement.92
Another problem involves the overly-generalized conception of nationalism's
ideological content adopted by scholars using the movement approach. For example, in the
accounts of both Breuilly and the political scientist Stephen Van Evera, nationalism's ideological
content is defined as a cognitive understanding that the nation exists and a normative
commitment to prioritizing its interests, values and sovereignty. 93 Understood in this way, it is
difficult to find a major social or political organization that does not in some way subscribe to
these principles in a contemporary democracy with a stable regime. This complication is
compounded by the presence of apex organizations, such as large political parties or trade unions,
which represent varied factions with differing and often competing objectives vis-a-vis the state.
For example, although the Liberal Democratic Party is often viewed as the main political vehicle
for rightwing nationalism in postwar Japan, in reality, throughout its existence, the party has
consisted of a number of competing factions, many of which roundly reject important aspects of
the rightwing nationalist agenda. 94 Thus, even if a more narrow understanding of nationalism
is adopted, the internal variations inherent in the large organizational bodies of a contemporary,
92 Breuilly, 1993 [1982], p.9 .
93 Breuillly, 1993 [1982], Van Evera, 1996-7.
94 Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
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post-industrial society can sometimes complicate their categorization as part of a "nationalist"
movement.
Another approach is to place the emphasis on nationalism as a form of identity.
Although this approach has become common place in post-Cold War scholarship on nationalism,
it is also apparent in the works critiqued earlier, including that of theorists such as Smith and
Greenfeld, who incorporate identity conceptions into what are essentially ideological approaches.
Thus, to the degree that the identity approach also emphasizes collectively-held beliefs, it shares
the problems highlighted for the ideological approach above, including the tendency to view
identity conceptions as composed of interlocking and consistent cognitive and normative
elements, the proclivity to underestimate the possibility that agents, such as politicians or
opinion leaders in the media, are capable of affecting important change in the ways the nation is
understood, and the often unwarranted assumption that identity conceptions are held uniformly
among a population of adherents.
In a review of the diverse usages of "identity" in the social sciences, Rogers Brubaker
and Frederick Cooper reject the term as "hopelessly ambiguous" for an analytical concept.95
They argue that identity, particularly in the study of ethnicity and nationalism, is often
under-specified, and, as a result, has come to be used in various ways, some of which are
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95 Brubaker, 2004a, p.33.
They conclude that any term that is widely used both to designate "sameness"
across individuals over time or to capture core aspects of selfhood, while also being used to
highlight the development of self-understandings as a process or the fluid, multiple and
fragmented nature of these understandings, has too many contradictions to fit under a single
rubric. 96 This stark contrast is apparent in the differing treatments of identity in the work of
scholars reviewed above, particularly in the differences in the way the term is used by
essentialists and constructivists. While the former see ethnic and national identity as composed
of core, relatively stable and persistent elements that are uniformly shared across particular
populations, the latter, to varying degrees, portray them as fluid conceptions that can vary across
time and the populations to which they are exposed.
The discussion to this point is not intended to imply that ideology, movements and
identity have nothing to do with nationalism or how it changes. Rather, the point is simply that
adopting approaches that privilege these elements as analytical starting points
assumptions that close off matters best left open for empirical inquiry. Thus, for example,
instead of initially assuming that nationalist ideology or national identity in a particular case at a
particular point in time is best expressed as a single set of interlocking beliefs that are uniformly
and deeply held and can only be changed through alternations in the socialization process, a
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96 Ibid., p.35.
contradictory.
researcher might begin by looking for competing claims regarding the nation and then attempt to
assess how these notions relate to one another, the degree to which they are contested, and what
factors, including but not limited to the socialization process, might bring about changes in their
content or level of contestation among the populace. The advantages of moving beyond the
starting assumptions of the above approaches, especially when studying contemporary, wealthy
democracies such as postwar Japan, become apparent once a fourth approach is considered in the
next chapter.
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Chapter Three: In the Names of the Nation
Nationalism then is not the solution to the puzzle but the discourse within which struggles to
settle the question are most commonly waged. 97
Craig Calhoun, 1997
I. Introduction
The previous chapter reveals the surprising difficulties of applying the concepts and
frameworks of nationalism studies to understanding how nationalism may change in a peaceful,
stable, and wealthy democracy such as postwar Japan. Utilizing insights from scholars
critiquing the nationalism literature since the end of the Cold War, this chapter develops and
justifies a way of examining nationalism capable of both identifying its presence and assessing
degrees of its change over time in this important subset of cases. The central assertion is that
nationalism should be viewed as a discourse that incorporates competing claims made in the
name of the "nation" on the state. The chief form these claims take is narrative and in practice
may be observed as oft-repeated stories that establish the "nation" as an historical protagonist
that makes normative demands on the state. Changes in these stories and the claims they
incorporate may thus be viewed as change in nationalism and explaining these changes is thus
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the key to understanding how nationalism evolves in contemporary cases in which both complex
economies and democratic governments are well-established.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces and justifies the
approach to nationalism adopted here to examine its change in postwar Japan. The key aspect
of this approach is conceptionalizing nationalism as a discursive form with multiple strands that
can change over time, which allows it to be viewed as a set of competing narratives that make
different claims on state power and serve as varying points of identification for their target
audiences. The third section develops a method for operationalizing nationalism by assessing
change in the frequency with which these claims are advanced in specific areas of the public
sphere as well as the level of contestation they evoke among key opinion-makers. The fourth
section introduces the key concepts of narrative change, discursive strategies, and institutional
association and the final section applies them to generate three hypotheses for understanding one
type of change in nation-state narratives, declines in prominence over time.
II. Nationalism as a Discourse
The approach to nationalism adopted in this study treats it as a discourse. In general, a
discourse can be understood as "language enacted in time, with an empirical subject, referent and
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More specifically, a particular strand of discourse is distinguished by the
specific conventions that govern it, including common terminology, linguistic structures,
standards for argumentation, and frequently-made assumptions about the world and its problems.
Discourses should not be seen as mere "language" or a set of isolated statements. Instead,
"they are statements that are enacted within the social context and determined by that social
context." 99 Discourses are thus not only conventions of language and the ideas they express but
also "institutions and structures, every day practices as well as specialized rituals, all of which
constitute social relationships." 100 Through institutionalization and the repetition of daily
practice, discourses become rooted in social life and organization and thus a source of legitimacy.
It is this grounding in institutions, organizations and practices that thwarts powerful groups from
freely creating and altering discourses to suit their interests and goals. Although the powerful
can at times use discourse as a tool to further their influence or interests, as Michel Foucault
observes, discourses are also "a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting
point for an opposing strategy."' 0 The need to conserve the legitimacy of the discourse, which
at any time is the product of inputs from and past compromises among various sectors of society,
98 Schull, 1992, p.73 1.
99 Ozkirimli, 2010.
100 Ozkirimli, 2010, p.2 0 7 . Here, Ozkirimli cites a paraphrase of Joan Scott from Roseberry, 1996, p. 7 2 .
10' Foucault cited in Ozkirimli, 2010, p.2 13 .
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interlocutor. "98
is thus a constraining factor on its manipulation.
tangible, measurable indicator of the status quo of social-constructed reality.
Although discourses do indicate underlying ways of thinking about and interpreting the
world and tend to be presented as a set of "common sense" notions, it is argued here that they do
not have a comprehensive power to structure and limit thought. Rather, following Joseph Schull,
"A discourse is not necessarily prior to and constitutive of individual beliefs. The relationship
between the two is rather a matter for empirical investigation, which...demonstrates the
possibility of thinking and believing outside of the terms of given discourse."o
10 2 In this view, a
discourse is thus "something with which its adherents must contend, rather than a force which
subjects them to its implacable 'will.""103
Drawing on the work of Foucault, Craig Calhoun was among the first scholars to argue
that nationalism is best treated as a discursive formation, or "a way of speaking that shapes our
consciousness." 10
4 To Calhoun, the elements of this discourse reflects a way of thinking:
"'Nation,' is a particular way of thinking about what it means to be a people, and how the people
thus defined might fit into a broader world-system. The nationalist way of thinking and
speaking helps to make nations."10 5
102 Schull, 1992, p. 7 2 9 .
103 Ibid.
104 Calhoun, 1997, p.3 . For examples of other scholars who advocate this approach to nationalism, see Ozkirimli,
2000, 2005, 2010; Finlayson, 1998; Suny, 200 1; and Somers, 1994.
105 Calhoun, 1997, p.9 9 .
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It is for this reason that discourses represent a
Adopting the discourse approach opens up possibilities for relocating the place of social
identity conceptions in nationalism. Billig pithily summarizes his view of the relationship
between nationalism, identity and discourse: "To have a national identity is to possess ways of
talking about nationhood."10 6 In their critique of the use of identity in the social sciences,
Brubaker and Cooper argue for the need to break down the concept into three clusters of terms,
the first of which they label "Identification and Categorization."1 07 Identification means "to
characterize oneself, to locate oneself vis-a-vis known others, to situate oneself in a narrative, to
place oneself in a category-in any number of different contexts." 0
8 In addition, Brubaker and
Cooper specify nationality as a categorical mode of identification, whereby one identifies oneself
or another person "by membership in a class of persons, sharing some categorical attribute."10 9
In addition to nationality, identifications with such categories, referred to here as social
categories, include race, ethnicity, and citizenship, among others. According to Brubaker, the
'nation' is a categorical term in which one may classify oneself (i.e. identity with) or be so
classified by others (i.e. identified as) rather than a collectivity or communal entity, and
nationalism is "a particular language, a political idiom, a way of using that word or category."" 0
Put succinctly, "nationhood is not an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact; it is a political
106 Billig, 1995, p. 7 .
107 Brubaker, 2004a, p.41.
18 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p.42.
"0 Ibid.
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claim."' In this view, nationalism is therefore a means of political argumentation that seeks to
advance and legitimize claims on both its target members and their governing institutions.
Following the above logic, in the context of a contemporary, post-industrial democracy
like Japan, nationalist claims might take the form of a demand to reassess or reaffirm the
boundaries of the social category known as the 'nation,' for example, by allowing the
incorporation of a new immigrant group or alternately emphasizing the legitimacy of their
continued exclusion. In addition, claims might be made vis-A-vis the state, including demands
that governing institutions or policies better reflect the character, values or interests of the
'nation.' As the social category of the 'nation' does not exist outside of the words used to
describe it, the approach adopted here treats it not as a category of analysis but rather as the
object of analysis. In this way, nationalism can be viewed as a discourse, an ongoing argument
over the boundaries of and meaning for political action of a particular social category.
To differentiate nationalism, or nationalist discourse, from other forms of discourse, it is
first necessary to specify what type of discourse it is.
and reconstructs a social category. Expanding
Nationalism is discourse that constructs
on the discussion above, categorical
identification/differentiation occurs when, after being exposed through language, symbols or
rituals, one either identifies with or differentiates oneself from a social category-a set of claims
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that the possession of a certain attribute or attributes qualifies one for membership in a specific
social grouping within a larger universe of such possible classification. Social categories are
thus composed of claims about what constitutes a categorical attribute. These claims may take
several forms: normative claims, cognitive claims, relational comparisons and social purposes.
Much of the content of social categories is inherently normative and value-laden and
should thus be regarded as idealized rules of social life, or norms.12 Irrespective of their
impact on thought or action, norms may be analyzed as words that can be distinguished by their
structure, content and targets. 113 First, as linguistic conventions, norms have the formal
structure of a syllogism. 114 Second, norms have three varieties of content. Prescriptions
demand a state or action. 1 5 Proscriptions rule out a state or action."i 6 Permissions declare
that a state or action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, as in the case of a right.1 "7 While the
first two varieties are associated with highly exclusive social categories such as nationality or
ethnicity, permissions are more likely to appear in discourses of more inclusive categories, such
as citizenship, although, as will be discussed below, these discourses overlap. Finally, as with
112 This definition is adapted from Goertz (2003).
"3 This definition is adapted from Goertz (2003) and Kratochwil (1989).
"4 This follows Goertz (2003). A syllogism is a three-part logical construction beginning with a general
proposition (major premise) followed by a specific assertion (minor premise) and then a conclusion that combines
the two in a valid statement. In practice, they are often abbreviated as "if-then" statements in which the "if' is
followed by a specific assertion and the "then" by a combination of a general proposition and conclusion.
115 Examples include "If one's mother is Japanese, one is (should be considered) Japanese" and "If one is Japanese,
one eats (should eat) with chopsticks."
116 Examples include "If one's mother is American, one is (should not be considered) Japanese" and "If one is
Japanese, one does not (should not) eat with a fork."
117 One example is "If one is an American, one may vote in US presidential elections."
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all elements of discourse, norms are directed at particular target actors. In the case of
nationalist discourse, a normative claim will always be directed at one of two possible targets
and sometimes both simultaneously: Individuals that the claimant asserts should identify with
the category being constructed (e.g. "co-nationals) and/or a territorial state (e.g. "nation-state")
over which the claimant demands domain in the name of the same category."18
Adopting terminology developed by Gary Goertz, two types of normative claims may
constitute a social category. "9
social categories.
First, ontological norms specify the existential attributes of
With regard to ethnic or national categories, for example, Chandra has noted,
these attributes tend to be "associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent, rather than
those [attributes] adopted voluntarily in one's lifetime." 2 0 They may derive from genetic
legacies (skin color, height, hair type, etc.) or from the real or imagined pasts of one's parents
(their religion, place of origin, etc.). As linguistic conventions, ontological norms often contain
some form of the verb "to be" in their conclusion. For example, "if one's mother is Japanese,
one is (should be considered) Japanese" might be offered as an ontological claim specifying a
categorical attribute for the national category "Japanese." Second, behavioral norms assign
standards of behavior that also define membership in social categories. For example, "If one is
118 Please note that a single normative claim may be directed at multiple targets. For example, the assertion that if
one is Japanese, one should serve in Japan's Self-Defense Force may be simultaneous directed at putative
co-nationals to join the armed services as well as to the Japanese government to reintroduce universal conscription.
119 Goertz, 2003.
120 Chandra, 2004a, p.11.
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French, one speaks (should speak) French fluently" is an example of a behavioral norm that
might be presented as a categorical attribute for the national category "French." With regard to
national categories, behavioral norms may range from relatively simple claims on putative
members of a particular national category to take part in specific ceremonial activities (e.g. sing
the national anthem, salute the flag, etc.) to complex claims on the state to pursue policies or take
actions that reflect the asserted character, interests and values of the national category in
question.
Cognitive claims comprise a second integral element in the construction of social
categories. Sometimes referred to as "cognitive models," these claims establish ontological and
epistemological frameworks that interpret or "make sense" of social and material conditions by
providing "explanations of how the world works as well as descriptions of the social reality"
confronting those who identify with the social category in question. 21 For example, a central
cognitive component common to all national categories is the understanding that everyone is a
member of "a nation in a world of nations."122 In this way, the very claim to being "Japanese"
thus simultaneously places the claimant in a national category while necessarily recognizing the
existence of other such categories. 2 3 As an object of study, national categories are thus
121 Abdelal, et.al, 2006, p.13.
122 Billig, 1995, p.61; Smith 2001, p. 2 2 .
123 It is for this reason that various "naming conventions" observed in the nationalist discourse, such as the ways of
referring to the nation-state (e.g. "peace state," "civilized state," etc.) in the narratives explored in this study, are
treated as cognitive components.
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distinguished by their cognitive claims to be both exclusive, in that membership in one national
category precludes membership in another, and exhaustive, in that all humans must be a member
of one such category. 124 It is through this cognitive operation, as well as the cognitive claims
about the past discussed below, that national categories attain their claims to "naturalness."
A second type of cognitive claim, sometimes referred to as a "cultural schema,"
presents a narrative account of a past (real or imagined) event or sequence of events, especially
those that are thought pivotal to the social category in question.125 The account of the past here
is meant to provide a causal model for thinking about and interpreting current and future
developments of relevance to the social category. With regard to nationalist discourse, one
such example is Roger Petersen's account of "Lithuanian martyrdom," a recurring Cold War
narrative in which Lithuanians are portrayed as a small people whose only recourse is to
continue to resist Soviet oppression in order to awaken the West into action. Here, a causal
sequence is established whereby, despite past failures, continued Lithuanian sacrifice leads to
their eventual emancipation, allowing the "dwarf to become a giant."126 Causal attribution is
thus the essential cognitive element here. Klandermans concludes, "[T]his element [causal
124 Note that Abdelal, et. al (2006, p.1 1) cite scholarship arguing that relational comparisons (see below) are the
means through which the degree of exclusivity is determined for social categories. The assertion here is that the
claim of exclusivity is a cognitive component of national categories that relational comparisons may be used to
highlight. For related discussion on this point regarding ethnicity as a social category, see Chandra & Wilkinson
(2008, p. 5 17).
125 Petersen, 2005, p. 13 2 .
126 Petersen, 2005, p. 13 6 .
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attribution] is related to the construction of a cognitive schema which comprises causes and
solutions for the adverse situation."1 27
A third form that nationalist discourse can take involves comparisons across social
categories and has been described as the "discursive formulations of the relations between
groups of people that compose social reality." 128 These comparisons may include such
rhetorical conventions as statements about the relative inferiority or superiority (in status terms)
of one category in relation to another (priority) and the level of friendliness or antagonism
between two social categories (valence).129  In nationalist discourse, national categories are
generally portrayed superior to all other categories (national or otherwise), and often feature
recurring portrayals of "other" social categories, including but not limited to "other" national
categories, as allies or enemies. In particular, the claim of ultimate superiority vis-A-vis other
social categories is one of the factors that helps distinguish nationalist discourse from other types
of social category-building discourses.
The final convention highlighted here is what has been called "social purposes."1 30  In
short, these are goals that are rhetorically attached to social categories. In discursive terms,
127 Cited in Abdelal, et al., (2006, p.14). Japanese nationalist discourse abounds with historical narratives that
make claims on both co-nationals and the state. For example, one prominent such convention is the narrative
linking of the suffering caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the claim that the Japanese
nation, and thus its state, have a special mission to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world. See the discussion of
the peace state narrative in the next chapter.
128 Abdelal, et al., 2006, p. 11.
129 Ibid.
10 Ibid., pp.9-l1.
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social purposes are often expressed as common sense notions about what the members of the
social category in question want to accomplish together. Rawi Abdelal and his coauthors argue
that social purposes differ from norms in that norms (behavioral) make claims on members to
engage in activities that constitute the social category in question (and thus qualify them as
members), while social purposes call on members to do things to make the achievement of a goal
associated with the category more likely. 131 In practice, especially when examining nationalist
discourses, the more specific the goal, the more difficult it becomes to make this distinction.
This is because the normative claims made in the name of national category construction are
generally presented as idealized notions whose obligations are valued as goals in and of
themselves. To maintain this distinction, the social purposes examined in the case of postwar
Japan are limited to highly-generalized goals such as peace, prosperity, or security. In addition,
it should be noted that nationalist discourse tends to stress the importance of social purposes
such as autonomy, which reflects the discourse's pervasive concern for national independence
and state sovereignty, and status, which reflects its emphasis on the superiority of the national
category over other social categories.
What makes a social category "national" and the discourse that supports it "nationalist?"
As shown in the review of nationalism studies, attempts to define nationalism always encounter
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problems specifying the root concept of 'nation.'
term as a set of objective criteria, while others specify it in purely subjective, voluntary terms
(Renan) and still others a combination of both (Smith). The failure of over a hundred years of
scholarship to arrive at a widely agreed upon definition suggests the benefit of taking a different
path. Following Brubaker, the approach here rejects such attempts to define the 'nation' as an
"ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact." 32
Instead, the nation is understood here as the social category (hereafter referred to as a
national category) that is continually produced and reproduced via the discourse of nationalism
(hereafter referred to as nationalist discourse). In this way, nationalism may be defined by the
characteristic features of its discourse. More specifically, nationalism is defined here as the
discursive process in which a social category is continually constructed and reconstructed
primarily from cognitive claims about the present and past of the category as well as
prescriptive and proscriptive normative claims on the behavioral and existential attributes of
both the individuals claimants target to identify with the category and a territorial state over
which claimants demand domain in the name of the category. The resulting category is
asserted by claimants to be highly exclusive, superior to all other categories, and strongly
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132 Brubaker, 2004a, 2004b.
Some (Van den Berghe) insist on defining the
associated with the social purposes of autonomy and status. In this approach, nationalism, as a
discourse, makes nations, as a social category.
Especially with regard to casework on contemporary, post-industrial democracies with
stable regimes, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between nationalist discourse and the
overlapping discourses of citizenship and ethnicity. These latter two discourses both construct
social categories whose normative claims may also be incorporated in national categories. For
example, Kanchan Chandra, among other scholars of ethnicity, argues that ethnicity is a subset
of the social categories "in which membership is determined by descent-based attributes." 3 3 In
her understanding, these attributes "are restricted to one's own genetically transmitted features or
to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one's
parents and ancestors."134 Although offered here as a categorical attribute of ethnicity, this is
also consistent with the "Japanese mother" syllogism cited above as an example of an
ontological norm used to determine membership in a national category. Similarly, although
Margaret Somers argues that citizenship should mainly be seen as a discourse about "the right to
have rights" that focuses on the rights of membership in a political community and inclusion in
civil society, she also notes that civic discourse can be a "cold instrument of exclusion" to those
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134 Ibid., emphasis added.
outside the borders of the nation-state as a consequence of its intimate relationship with
nationalism and xenophobia. 135
The fact of this overlap has been acknowledged at least since Kohn developed the
blueprint for the typology of civic and ethnic nationalism. Brubaker, among other scholars,
argues against the usefulness of this typology as it is entirely dependent on how one treats
culture in making the distinction.136 For instance, if ethnicity is strictly defined as pertaining
only to descent, then there are virtually no empirical cases of ethnic nationalism. However, if
an allowance is made for ethno-cultural factors, then nearly all nationalisms in the world are of
the ethnic variety. Accordingly, if cultural elements are excluded from understandings of civic
nationalism, the phenomenon is defined out of existence. The key problem is the inherent
ambiguity of ethnicity, citizenship and their relationships with nationalism.
In the approach adopted here, nationalism is neither exclusively civic nor ethnic. The
degree to which the discourses of nationalism, citizenship and ethnicity overlap in any particular
case is left as a matter of empirical inquiry. However, to the extent that distinctions can be
made, Table 1 below summarizes the major differences and similarities among the key
conventions used to specify social categories in the three discourses. Although this does not
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1 Somers, 2008, pp.5-6.
136 Brubaker, 2004a, pp.136-138.
extricate nationalism from the other two discourses, it does provide a guide to assess where their
overlap is most likely to occur.
Table 3.1: Nationality, Citizenship and Ethnicity
Convention Social Category
Nationality Citizenship Ethnicity
Norm Content Prescriptions, Permissions, Prescriptions,
Proscriptions Prescriptions, Proscriptions
Proscriptions
Norm Target Individual & State Individual & State Individual
Norm Type Ontological, Ontological, Ontological
Behavioral Behavioral
Cognitive Exclusive Varies Varies
Exclusivity13 7
Cognitive Exhaustive Varies Varies
Exhaustiveness 38
Cognitive Varies Varies Varies
137 This term refers to the cognitive claim that national categories are exclusive.
138 This term refers to the cognitive claim that everyone has a nationality.
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Causality'39
Relational Priority 14 Highest Varies Varies
Associated Purpose Autonomy, Status Equality Varies
Nationalism may be studied as a discourse in a variety of ways. The approach
introduced here focuses on narratives within the nationalist discourse. This emphasis on
narratives is explained and justified as follows.
A narrative is a story that orders "events" into an understandable causal sequence.
According to Schudson, a narrative is "a story with a beginning, middle and end, with an original
state of equilibrium, a disruption, and a resolution, with a protagonist and obstacles in his or her
way and efforts to overcome them."14 ' Narratives differ from other discursive conventions in
that they combine the following elements: 1) defined actors (collective or individual); 2) roles
associated with these actors; 3) a putatively causal sequence of events; and 4) a narrator's
perspective.142 The teller of a narrative fulfills the same part as the narrator of a play, including
introducing characters and describing events and the characters' responses to them, while all the
time presenting normative claims as matters of fact or the judgments of history. Aesop's fables
139 This term refers to the presence or absence of causal attribution through the use of cognitive claims such as
"cultural schema."
140 This term refers to the level of priority assigned the social category in relation to other social categories by
discursive conventions (e.g. through relational comparisons, etc.).
141 Schudson, 1995, p.355; cited in Petersen (2005, p.135).
142 This understanding of narratives is adapted from Patterson & Monroe (1998, pp. 3 15-6); Somers (1994,
pp.616-7). It has also been influenced by Cruz's (2000) concept of a dominant rhetorical frame and Petersen's
(2005) concept of a cultural schema.
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are examples of narratives, as are many biblical stories (Good Samaritan, Tower of Babel, etc.).
Most importantly for the purposes of this project, narratives are also one of the most prominent
conventions used in nationalist discourse.
Social science scholarship on narratives has identified several types, but the focus here
will be on "collective" or "public" narratives. 143 Public narratives are "stories attached to
cultural or institutional formations larger than a single individual."1 44  The most commonly
cited public narratives are those that tell the story of a "nation." 145  The protagonists of these
stories are collective actors ("the nation") with a common origin and history. The stories often
(although not always) begin with the origin of the nation and then proceed to relate the story of
how it responded to one or more historical challenges. Nationalist narratives generally
conclude with the nation in one of two conditions: 1) an improved position presented by the
narrator as proper and admirable; or 2) a worsened position presented by the narrator as unjust
and deplorable. Designed to mobilize target audiences around collective goals, nationalist
narratives seek to elicit emotional responses. These include pride in the nation's past or
ongoing achievements, anger at the nation's past or ongoing mistreatment, and fear that past
negative outcomes may be revisited on the nation if it is not sufficiently vigilant.
143 For a discussion of other types of narratives, see Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p.325-6; Somers, 1994, p. 6 1 8.
144 Somers, 1994, p.6 18 .
145 Steinmetz, 1992, p. 4 9 1 .
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Sociologists argue narratives help constitute national categories by making cognitive and
normative claims on their audiences.146 Weaved throughout nationalist narratives, these claims
are usually readily apparent to the audience as either the "lessons" of the story or "common
sense" notions presented as beyond dispute by the narrator. In this way, narratives constitute
national categories in three ways: 1) they contain/impart cognitive claims about how the world
works in relation to the national category, including claims of exclusivity and exhaustiveness and
understandings about causality; 2) they contain/impart normative claims specifying the
existential attributes and standards of behavior defining membership in the national category;
and 3) they contain/impart normative claims on state institutions made in the name of the
national category. Put more colloquially, narratives answer the following questions for their
audiences: 1) What is/should be a nation? 2) Who is/should be our nation and what does/should
it do?; and 3) How does/should the state reflect our nation? The third question, in particular, is
a prominent feature of narratives defining the "nation-state" and represents the principle
rhetorical opening through which national categories are projected onto the institutions of the
state.
Three things make narratives a particularly attractive focal point for studying changes in
the nationalist discourse of a contemporary democracy like postwar Japan. First, a single
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146 Somers, 1994; Sewell, 1992.
narrative can contain multiple aspects of the content of nationalist discourse outlined above,
especially the cognitive and normative claims of national categories. In this sense, examining
changes in a set of frequently referenced nationalist narratives is an efficient way to grasp how
the broader discourse of nationalism may be changing for cases in which open public spheres
generate enormous amounts of potentially relevant discourse. Second, nationalist narratives are
in essence representations of the national category as a complete short story with a beginning,
middle, and end. Brevity thus limits their focus to only a few related topics. This limitation
frees the speaker from having to reconcile the story with competing or conflicting elements of
other narratives and thus makes the narrative form a likely place to find both inconsistencies and
points of contestation within the nationalist discourse of a single state. Finally, the common
structure of the narrative form facilitates comparisons across different narratives, even in
instances where there seems little in common between the narratives in question.
The discourse approach adopted here differs from the other approaches introduced above
in important ways. First, it takes nationalism out of the realm of psychology. Much recent
scholarship has argued that identification with a national category is not a single psychological
state. This leads to the conclusion that understanding how such national categories change
requires first breaking them down into their constitutive parts.14 7
147 Billig, 1995, p.60; Brubaker, 2004a, pp.42-8; Abdelal, et al., 2006.
To do this, it is necessary to
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explore their concrete manifestations, such as the specific meanings given them as social
categories. A discourse is one of the most concrete manifestations of these "inter-subjective"
categories available to the social sciences.
individual's mind.
Discourse simply cannot be the property of a single
Instead, it is a set of rhetorical practices that only occur in social space, thus
rendering them easily observable and accessible to analysis.
Second, treating nationalism as a discourse frees one from the need to assign normative or
cognitive beliefs to actors merely by assumption. Which beliefs are held by particular actors
and to what extent they have been internalized then become empirical questions. This move
presents several advantages. First, it allows the examination of hypotheses about change that
differ on the importance of belief. For example, one could consider how diverse factions may
support the same strand of nationalist discourse even though they hold different beliefs and even
different interpretations of the discourse itself. Similarly, this approach allows for the
possibility that change may emerge from the debates held among nationalists themselves.
Freed from the assumption of shared belief, one can explore the possibility of endogenous
change by analyzing how actors reformulate and shape nationalist discourse, particularly in
specifying how narratives constitute national categories. Even if one assumes internalization is
essential for nationalism to affect political outcomes, it seems reasonable to consider the
possibility that efforts to reshape national categories may occur during periods in which
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nationalist beliefs have yet to be internalized or have somehow failed to reproduce themselves
successfully.
Third, recent scholarship argues forcefully that beliefs are less important than public
discourse in shaping both social categories and action. For example, referring to social
identities, Chandra asserts, "it is the names that we give ourselves, or are given by others, which
give our identity a concrete reality and also becomes the basis for social action." 1 48 Viewed
this way, the relationship between national categories and nationalists is transformed. Rather
than assuming that internalized beliefs are the primary impetus for social action, the discursive
approach views social action as constrained by the rhetorical conventions commonly applied to
public discussions of social identities. These conventions are thus seen as placing constraints
on how actors may promote their visions of the nation. As Skinner notes, "[T]he problem
facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is doing at the same time as gaining what he
wants cannot simply be the instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to
fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects to fit the available
normative language."1 49 In other words, in order to be taken seriously, a would-be reformer
must show respect for the existing rhetorical conventions of the nationalist discourse. Although
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148 Chandra, 2004a, p.3.
149 Skinner, 1978, pp.xii-xiii.
this does not preclude challenging some of those conventions, it does place limits on the ability
of reformers to push for wholesale change.
Since actors need not "believe" in the conventions of the nationalist discourse to
participate in it, innovation from within the ranks of these participants should be viewed as a
likely potential avenue for change. Although participants may be affected by the need to
respect certain conventions, they are free to think "outside the box" and may thus attempt to
manipulate nationalist discourse in response to concerns or beliefs that have nothing to do with
the discourse i
autonomy. 150
tself. In sum, the relationship between discourse and actor is one of relative
Actors are limited in their ability to affect wholesale change in discursive
conventions and these conventions are likewise limited in their capacity to constrain the thinking
and actions of actors. Recognizing this relative autonomy opens the door to two forms of
endogenous change that are either ruled out or unnecessarily complicated in other approaches to
nationalism. The first may be called intentional innovation, in which agents fluent in a
particular nationalist discourse are able to manipulate its conventions in ways that alter the social
category itself. 5 1 This form of innovation is constrained by the fact that innovating agents
must draw from the same reservoir of conventions available to potential followers in order to
craft credible alternatives. If innovators depart too far from past conventions, potential
150 The idea of relative autonomy comes from Schull (1992); see also Cruz (2000, p.280).
151 This technique itself is referred to as bricolage by Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss, 1974 [1966]; Samuels, 2004.
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followers will reject their new discursive formations as unauthentic or illegitimate.
without the intervention of the exogenous factors, category innovation is constrained. The
second type of endogenous change, unintentional innovation, occurs when national categories
change as a consequence of rhetorical conflicts that cannot be attributed to the designs of
particular participants. New national categories can thus emerge from the interaction of
competing actors struggling to reformulate past conventions into new ways of categorizing the
"people" and their relation to the state. It should thus be noted that unintended consequences
can be as important in shaping national categories as the best-laid plans of skilled manipulators
of the discourse.
Finally, it should be noted that behavioral norms are sometimes excluded or
downplayed by scholars studying social categories. 53 This is likely because they see cognitive
models or ontological norms as the defining elements of the social categories in which they are
interested and fear the inclusion of behavioral norms adds unnecessary ambiguity. This view is
rejected here for several reasons. First, while cognitive claims are important in initially
establishing boundary lines, a function which can in and of itself shape attitudes toward social
action (e.g. attitudes toward those defined as outsiders, views on immigration or minority
protection policies, etc.), behavioral norms establish an even more direct connection between
152 This type of endogenous change is discussed in Cruz (2000) and Brubaker (2004a).
13 Ibid.
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In this way,
some social categories, especially national ones, and social action.
behavior of individuals, state institutions, or both, behavioral norms do much of the work that
fleshes out the categorical place-holders established by cognitive claims and place them in
motion. In essence, their role in constituting social categories gives them the symbolic power
to legitimate certain actions or to de-legitimate others. Usually presenting behavioral norms as
the appropriate actions demanded by the cognitive "lessons" of their narratives, advocates argue
violating them is tantamount to denying one's membership in the national category when the
target is the co-national or to denying the fundamental nature of the nation when the target is the
state. When nationalist narratives affect political outcomes, behavioral norms can thus be
essential links.
Second, and more importantly, behavioral norms often carry meaning that ontological
norms do not. Ontological norms are often claims about descent-based attributes that, while
placing an individual inside a social category, do not necessarily offer a full picture of what that
membership means. For example, is the national category "warlike" or "peaceful?" Are "we"
"hard-working" or "fun-loving?" These questions cannot be answered directly by reference to
ontological norms but can be derived from the behavioral norms embedded in nationalist
narratives.
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Whether aimed at the
III. Methodology
Viewing nationalism as a discourse with specific characteristics and narratives as its
preferred vehicle helps narrow the focus somewhat, but the nationalist discourse of a
contemporary, post-industrial democracy like postwar Japan is both broad and deep. For
example, one recent work on Japanese nationalism, anthropologist Brian McVeigh's
Nationalisms of Japan, identified over fifteen different domains of Japanese nationalism, each
containing multiple national identity conceptions, for a total of more than sixty recognizable
identity categories.
Theoretical considerations and research interests can help reduce this unmanageable
number. For example, theorists have categorized two broad types of nationalism, formal and
informal: "Formal nationalism is connected with the demands of the modem nation-state,
including bureaucratic organization and meritocratic ideology, cultural uniformity and political
consensus among the inhabitants. Informal nationalism is identified in collective events, such
as ritual celebrations and international sports competitions, taking place in civil society." 5 5 As
a work of political science, the main interest here is in how nationalism relates to political
outcomes, and the focus thus limited to cases of formal nationalism, which place the nexus of
nation-state interaction in the policies and structures of the state.
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154 McVeigh, 2004, p.5.
155 Eriksen, 1993, p.1.
Transcribed into the terms of this study, the focus is placed on narratives of national
categories that make at least some cognitive and normative claims on the state. In this regard,
these narratives are best referred to as nation-state narratives, as they focus on explicating a set
of demands on the state in the name of the national category. For example, one sub-narrative
examined here builds on the cognitive claim that Japan as "the world's only nuclear-victim state"
(yalitsu no hibakukoku) to forward to normative claims on the Japanese state's security policy
institutions: the proscription against the state acquiring/developing/ introducing nuclear weapons
and the prescription for the state to push nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Both
claims target state behavior in the name of the national category. Limiting the focus to
nation-state narratives eliminates more than half of the entries on McVeigh's list of national
categories.
The next obvious move is to try to narrow down the remaining list to the most "salient."
To do this, two types of sources were surveyed. First, works by self-proclaimed nationalists
from across the political spectrum were reviewed.'156
the left to Ishihara Shintar6 on the right. In additio
These ranged from Murayama Masao on
n, the secondary literature on postwar and
156 Abe, 2006; Amaya, 1980; Asahi Shimbun, 2006; Et, 1991; Fujiwara, 2005; Funabashi, 1991-2; Hatoyama,
1957; Ishihara, 1999, 2006; Ishihara & Morita, 1989; Ito, 2001; KatO, 1997; Kawakatsu, 1997, 2000, 2006;
Keidanren, 2007; Kishi, 1983; Kitaoka, 1999a; Kobayashi, 1999; Kobayashi & Nishibe, eds., 2002; Murayama,
1953, 1963, 1995 [1961], 2000 [1986]; Matsumoto, 1995, 1999; Mishima, 1969, 1990 [1966]; Miyazawa, 1997;
Nakasone, 1997; Nishio, 1999; Oe, 1981; Okamoto & Tahara, 2003; Okazaki, 2001, 2004, 2006; Ozawa, 2005
[1993]; Tamogami, 2008; Umesao, 2003.
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prewar Japanese nationalism was consulted, including works by historians, political scientists,
anthropologists and sociologists.1 57 Among those found present in these materials, nation-state
narratives were selected for study based on the following criteria: 1) Each pertains to a set of
state institutions that exert authority over symbols or objects commonly cited as important in the
construction of systems of national identification in the nationalism literature, such as the
monarchy or ethnic affiliation, exports and technology, the military and nuclear weapons, social
protection and traditional culture, and the constitution and regime type; 2) Each links the
national category to the state in a policy-relevant area of interest to political science, such as
immigration policy, trade policy, technology policy, security policy, welfare policy, electoral
policy, and constitutional practice; and 3) The chosen narratives provide variation in terms of
pre-war legacies, with some having longer histories in Japan than others, a distinction that makes
it possible to consider if such longevity is a factor in sustaining the narratives over time.
These reviews uncovered five often recurring nation-state narratives that leverage forms
of the national category "Japanese" to make normative claims on the postwar Japanese state.
Within these five narratives, some may be broken down further into related but slightly distinct
157 Asaba, 2004; Befu, 1992, 2001; Berger, 1993, 1998; Breen, 2008; Brown, 1955; Bukh, 2010; Clammer, 2001;
Coming, 2004; Doak, 1994, 1996, 2007; Dower, 1995, 1999, 2003; Eizawa, 2001; Fukuoka, 2000; Gao, 1998;
Gayle, 2002; Hara, 2001; Hashikawa, 1968; Hein, 2008; lenaga, 1979, 1993-1994; lida, 2001; Inoue, 2007; Kang,
2001; Katzenstein, 1996a; Kayama, 2004; Kersten, 1996; Kingston, 2004, 2011; Kisala, 1999; Kitada, 2005; Leheny,
2006; Matthews, 2003; McCormack, 2002, 2007; McVeigh, 2001, 2004; Mizuno, 2009; Morris, 1960;
Morris-Suzuki, 1998; Nathan, 2004; Noguchi, 1976; Oguma, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; Orr, 2001; Pyle, 2007; Samuels,
1994, 2003a, 2007; Siniawer, 2008; Skya, 2009; Smethurst, 1974; Takahashi, 2005; Tamamoto, 2001, 2003; Togo,
2005; Watanabe, 2001; Winkler, 2011; Yamada, 2001; Yoshino, 1992, 1997a, 1998.
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sub-narratives (such as "nuclear-victim state" above).
below.
Japan is a trading state.158 Confined to a few small islands with little natural resources, the
Japanese people are a trading nation that must rely on their innate abilities (mercantile acumen
and technological prowess) to add value to imported raw materials and export in order to survive.
Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. This narrative contains two
sub-narratives, the merchant state, which emphasizes the need for trade, and the
technology-based country, which emphasizes the need for domestic technological development.
Japan is an organic state.159 The Japanese people are a single descent-based ("ethnic")
nation whose natural bond is symbolized by the Imperial family and manifested in a common
moral code and set of religious traditions. They demand that their state and its policies reflect
this organic unity. This is the predominant narrative of rightwing politics in postwar Japan.
Japan is a peace state.160 The Japanese people are a peace-loving nation that regrets the
actions of the Japanese state during World War Two, mourns its own tragic losses, and vows
never again to allow its state to freely use violence as a means of settling international disputes.
Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. This narrative contains two
5 Amaya, 1980; Gao, 1998; Samuels, 1994; Yamada, 2001.
159 Oguma, 2002a; Befu, 2001; Takahashi, 2005; Hardacre, 1989.
160 Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004; Orr, 2001.
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The narratives are summarized briefly
sub-narratives, the peace-loving state, which emphasizes war regret and the need to constrain the
state from military pursuits and, the anti-nuclear state, which emphasizes the uniqueness of
Japan's experience as the world's only victim of a nuclear attack and demands on the state to
refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons on the one hand and to promote worldwide nuclear
disarmament on the other.
Japan is a civilized state.161 The Japanese people are a highly civilized nation and place
great weight on ensuring their cultural and artistic development. They expect their state both to
promote artistic endeavors and to guarantee the basic welfare of its people. This narrative
comprises two sub-narratives, the cultured state, which emphasizes the high level of Japanese
culture and the need to encourage the state to support cultural exchange, and the welfare state,
which emphasizes the need for the state to guarantee the basic welfare of its people.
Japan is a democratic state. 162 The Japanese people are a "civic" nation that loves freedom
and naturally follow democratic principles. Their state and its policies should reflect this
fundamental nature.
Although this list should not be considered exhaustive, it captures the major nation-state
narratives of nationalist discourse in postwar Japan. It should also be noted all except
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161 Yoshino, 1997a.
162 Oguma, 2002b; Kersten, 1996.
democratic state appear in some form on McVeigh's list of Japanese national
conceptions.163
With a set of national categories and their corresponding nation-state narratives selected,
the next task is to develop a means of measuring their change over time. The main
methodology adopted for this analysis is a niched approach that uses quantitative and qualitative
content analysis on a representative sample of discourse to uncover major trends and
developments over the postwar period and then in-depth case study methods to search for the
causes of observed changes.
For the purposes of content analysis, each nation-state narrative can be broken down
into three constitutive parts. The first, and most obvious, are terms used to name the
nation-state.164 In Japanese, these terms usually involve adding modifiers to nouns, such as
"state" (kokka) or "founding/basis of a country" (rikkoku). "Peace state" (heiwa kokka),
"technology-based state" (giutsu rikkoku) and "civilized state" (bunka kokka) all fit this pattern.
A second element are cognitive schema that include assumptions about the world the Japanese
nation currently confronts and/or refer to a particular challenge it faced in the past. Although
postwar narratives are dominated by allusions to Japan's experiences in World War Two, they
also include assertions about the putative origins of the Japanese as an ancient nation (i.e.
163 McVeigh, 2004, p.5 .
164 As noted above, these naming conventions are themselves a form of cognitive claim.
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identity
homogenous nation) and the challenges of occupying a resource-poor environment (i.e.
technology-based state). The final elements are the norms weaved throughout the narratives,
most of which target the state and its policies. Each of these elements was modeled into simple
codes, some of which are limited to key-word lists while others are left open for interpretation by
human coders.165
In addition, codes are included to capture other conventions of nationalist discourse.
First, five codes model "social purposes," here understood as the ultimate goals assigned to the
nation-state (e.g. prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy).166 Second, other codes
cover points of differentiation and images of the Other in order to recover assessments of Japan's
relative position vis-A-vis other states (i.e. great power, etc.) as well as perceptions of
international organizations, neighboring states (including long-standing bilateral issues such as
territorial disputes), and other countries by region. All the draft codes were assembled along
with a set of coding rules into the codebook used to train coders to conduct the analysis.
The next step is to find a representative sample of nationalist discourse. Who speaks
for the nation and when and where do they do so? Various answers can be given to this
question, but scholars studying the construction of national categories tend to agree on at least
165 The individual elements of the five nation-state narratives examined here and their corresponding codes are
introduced in detail in the next chapter.
166 Adelal, et al., 2006.
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the following. First, nationalist discourse is largely the domain of "political elites." 167  In
contemporary democratic societies with stable regimes, politicians are the most prominent
purveyors of nationalist discourse, and "top-down" approaches to national category construction
must be considered. However, in democratic societies, "bottom-up" routes to social category
construction may also be observed by examining public debates among national political elites,
as the national categories offered by politicians must pass muster with their constituencies.'68
In addition, a free press can be expected to vigorously interject itself in such debates, adding key
"non-official" voices, which may also reflect those of leaders from both industry and civil
society. Thus, the discourses of political leaders, from both the government and opposition,
and opinion leaders in the media are vital sources for assessing the status quo of the major
nation-state narratives at even given point as well as how they change over time.
Second, there is broad consensus among nationalism scholars that the most widely
disseminated discourses should receive the bulk of researchers' attention. 169  For example, if
167 For agreement on the notion that elite discourse is the central stage of national identity construction, see Hroch
(1985), Art (2006), and Samuels (2003a). My understanding of "political elite" follows the loose definition offered
by Putnam (1971, p. 6 5 1): "those who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely inter-correlated)
dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics." Although national politicians (both holders of high
offices and leaders of political parties) represent the most important component, a country's political elite also
includes opinion leaders in the media (editorialists, editors, political reporters, media company owners and
executives, etc.) industry (chief executives of major firms, chairmen of peak industry associations, etc.), and civil
society (leaders of civil action groups, etc.). This wider definition will be employed in later chapters as
explanations for observed changes in national identities are considered. For the purposes of measuring these
changes, however, I will focus on the discourse of a more limited range of elites (see the further discussion on this
topic below).
168 Stuckey, 2004, p.8 .169
169 For an example of this technique applied, see Hopf (2002). For guidelines of its use in textual analysis, see
Krippendorff (2004, p. 116).
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novels are seen as a relevant discourse, researchers generally select the best-selling ones for
review. Fringe groups often generate interesting and innovative ideas, but when they lack a
platform to communicate them to wide audiences, it is difficult to argue that their ideas represent
anything that approaches either the societal consensus or the key points of contestation. Even
among political elites, the "bully pulpits" afforded by high elective office
readerships/viewerships, are usually necessary to be a major participant in nationalist discourse.
Still, even if limited to the most broadly disseminated discourses of the national political
elite, the amount of potential material for review in a contemporary democracy remains
staggering. At this point, random sampling is favored by statistical logics. However, as
Krippendorff notes, random sampling techniques should only be employed under the assumption
that all units are equally informative regarding the issue under investigation, a situation which is
far less likely in textual analysis than in survey research. 170 Are nation-state narratives equally
likely to appear in all types of elite discourse? The position adopted here is that they are not
and that the recognition of this fundamental inequality points the way to a more economical
sampling strategy.
To sample discourses most likely to reflect the status quo of postwar Japanese
nationalism, a cluster sampling approach is utilized to take advantage of the natural intersection
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or large
170 Krippendorff, 2004, pp.113-4.
of institutional interests with the ceremonial nature of politics. 171
were chosen based on a priori assumptions about two things: Whose discourse is most likely to
reflect the status quo on national categories (represented by nation-state narratives) at any given
time and when this discourse is most likely to occur on a regular basis.
The institutional interests most relevant to nationalist discourse are attached to three key
positions in the political marketplace: the leader of the majority coalition in the government, the
leader of the minority coalition in the opposition, and the opinion editors of the largest media
groups. The individuals who occupy each of these posts in a democratic society face certain
incentives when it comes to discussing national categories.
For leaders of the majority coalition (usually a president or prime minister), the
institutional incentives of their position generally encourage caution in their use of nationalist
discourse. As managers of the majority (both in government and in society more broadly), they
must be careful not to move beyond national categories that are widely shared among the diverse
elements of their coalitions. As Mary Stuckey has argued about the American presidency, the
demands of managing the majority make them a "repository of a certain amount of cultural
consensus."
172 This is not to say that particularly creative prime ministers or presidents will not
171 Cluster sampling is a technique employed when units of analysis are considered unequally informative and
cannot be easily enumerated. It involves identifying large clusters of units of analysis and then sampling them
randomly, systematically, stratificationally, or completely (census). See Krippendorff (2004, p. 1 16-117).
172 Stuckey, 2004, p. 8 .
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The clusters of elite discourse
try to forge new societal bonds with their nationalist rhetoric, it is only to note that the incentives
they face argue against radical departures from the national categories already adhered to by
their winning coalitions. This inherent conservatism makes the speech of the holders of these
offices important sources of information on the status quo of nationalist discourse.
Leaders of the minority coalition (usually the leader of the largest opposition party in
the national legislature), however, face different institutional incentives. They must promote
the national categories particular to their minority base while at the same time attack the
government for its failure to sufficiently uphold commitments to the national categories that are
shared between the majority and the minority. Their speech is thus an excellent source of
information on both national categories supported by only a plurality of the electorate as well as
those that are most broadly shared across the voting public.
Opinion editors in the largest media groups face a mixture of the above incentives.
Unburdened by electoral pressures and driven to distinguish themselves from competitors, they
are more likely to entertain alternative or emerging national categories than their political
counterparts. On the other hand, opinion editors also want to maximize sales to the public and
advertisers, a mission that is at odds with the promotion of national categories that offend the
majority. It is thus unlikely that a major media group would adhere for long to a national
category that failed to resonate with at least some relatively large segment of the general public.
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The end result of these competing incentives is that major media groups are more likely than
leading politicians to engage in the trial-and-error search for new national categories but are not
likely to sustain efforts to promote those their readers or viewers broadly reject.
Focusing on the discourses of these three institutionally-constrained sets of players is
thus one way to capture the contours of a country's nationalist discourse at any one moment in
time. However, prime ministers and presidents communicate to the public on almost a daily
basis, giving formal addresses, answering questions at press conferences, and issuing press
releases and official statements. Opposition leaders likewise generate steady streams of public
statements, while a large media group usually offers multiple editorial commentaries every
single day. Yet, only a fraction of this enormous volume of speech and text involves rhetoric
relevant to the construction of national categories. The vast majority of political discourse
deals with the details of policy-making, the mundane aspects of day-to-day governance or
partisan contestation. References to national categories are generally designed to provide
emotional backing for policy or political positions that are spelled out in far greater detail (i.e.
using many more words) than is devoted to the categorical appeal itself. Even in cases where a
major purpose of the communication is the refining or redefining of a national category,
references to everyday policy matters or political situations will almost certainly outnumber
those relevant to nation-state narratives. How does one then find a representative sample of the
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rhetoric of the key players in the construction of these categories even though it is obvious that
not all incidences of their political speech are equally likely to be informative?
When prime ministers or presidents reference national categories, they often abandon
the rhetorical role of a leader speaking to the nation and instead present themselves as a
surrogate who speaksfor the nation.
the narrator of a "story of the nation."
It is here when he or she is most likely to transform into
This rhetorical personification of the nation in the person
of the apex leader most often occurs at ceremonial occasions, such as inaugurals,
commemorations, and annual speeches. The link between ceremonies and epideictic speech
telling "stories of peoplehood" is at least as old as Aristotle, but has more recently been
elaborated on by scholars studying modem political rhetoric.1 73 The point is that ceremonial
occasions involving the apex leader are highly likely to prompt the recitation of nation-state
narratives. Even though critics often dismiss this rhetoric as "platitudes," the presentation of
national categories with which none or only a known minority are expected to disagree is exactly
the kind of speech that is most instructive for the purposes of assessing the status quo of
nationalist discourse. 7 4 Still further, it is likely that the apex leader's attempt to define national
categories will elicit a response from the other key players in the national category construction
game. If so, a "national conversation" results in which government, opposition and media
173 Aristotle, 1952; Smith, 2003; Vivian, 2006; Stuckey, 2004; Carter, 1991; Edelman, 1985 & 1988; Loraux, 1986.
174 Stuckey, 2004, p. 9.
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competing nationalist narratives. Examining the
employed in such debates, particularly ones that occur at regular intervals, is one way to isolate
the state of nationalist discourse at any given time. 175
Are there instances of such "national conversations" in postwar Japan? It is argued
here that such debates occur on a regular basis, prompted by the highly institutionalized
ceremony of the Diet inaugural. These debates involve all of the key players discussed above,
and even bring them into face-to-face contact in the days surrounding the inaugural ceremony.
But why is this ceremony, more than any other, a good place to look for status quo accounts of
nationalist discourse in postwar Japan?
The prime minister opens each session of the national legislature, whether ordinary
(tsijd), extraordinary (rinji) or special (tokubetsu), with an inaugural speech. Since Japan
regained its sovereignty in 1952, this has occurred on average nearly two and a half times a year.
Diet inaugurals come in two forms: declarations of principles (shoshin hydmei enzetsu) and
administrative plans (shisei hoshin enzetsu). Declarations of principles are performed at the
beginning of extraordinary and special sessions as well as the first Diet session (no matter what
type) following the ascension of a new prime minister. They are generally shorter than
administrative plans, running around twenty to thirty minutes, and are designed to express the
m7 Stuckey (2004) largely relies on this sampling strategy in her examination of the American presidency and
national identity, although she also refers to other forms of presidential rhetoric.
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validate, invalidate or ignore rhetoric
general principles that will animate the prime minister's tenure or the reasons for the opening of
an extraordinary or special session. Administrative plans, on the other hand, are given at the
start of ordinary sessions and tend to run about forty minutes. Ostensibly, they are designed to
offer a detailed account of the prime minister's plans for the upcoming Diet session. In practice,
however, they also tend to include significant discussion of political principles, and even a
participant in the creation of these speeches concedes there is little difference in content across
the two types of inaugurals.176 For the purposes here, both types of speeches will be treated
simply as Diet inaugurals.
The production of a Diet inaugural is a relatively arduous process. The speech is put
together in the prime minister's office (naikakfu) with extensive cooperation from other
government ministries. Preparations begin about a month before the date of the speech and
usually involve between five and six meetings of the principals involved: the prime minister;
chief cabinet secretary (naikaku kanbdchokan) and vice cabinet secretaries (naikaku
kanbdfukuchdkan), who are political appointees; the cabinet general affairs counselor (naikaku
sdmukan), who is usually a secondee from the internal affairs ministry; and a small group of
other career bureaucrats attached to the prime minister's office, including the cabinet vice
general affairs counselors (naikakufukus~mukan), prime ministerial secretaries (shushdhishokan),
176 Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (sanjikan) in charge of economic policy and finance,
prime minister's office (naikakufu), 19 January 2006.
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and counselors (sanjikan) and vice-counselors (fakusanjikan) responsible for specific policy
areas. 177 The initial drafts of individual sections are typically generated by the ministries with
jurisdiction in the relevant policy area and submitted to the prime minister's office for review.
By all accounts, the level of prime ministerial involvement in the finalization of the
speech draft has varied dramatically depending on the person occupying the office. Some
prime ministers, such as Sat6 Eisaku and Koizumi Junichiro, appear to have been intimately
involved in the planning and finalization of Diet inaugurals, while others, such as Obuchi Keizo,
seemed content to accept language generated by ministerial officials. 178 However, the
assigning of priorities to topics and the style of presentation are generally determined in the
principals' meeting.
Unique among all prime ministerial addresses, the Diet inaugural requires a vote of
approval from the full cabinet. Once the principals have an approved draft, it is presented to
the cabinet for comment on the day before its scheduled performance. Although major changes
at this stage are rare, cabinet members nevertheless occasionally offer suggestions for
changes.1 79
the Diet session.
The final draft is then put before a cabinet vote on the morning of the opening of
Following this vote, the prime minister delivers the speech first before a
177 Eda & Ryuzaki, 2002, p.56; Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (sanjikan) in charge of
economic policy and finance, prime minister's office (naikakufu), 19 January 2006.
178 Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (sanjikan) in charge of economic policy and finance,
prime minister's office (naikakufu), 19 January 2006; Asami, 1998.
179 Ibid.
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general session of the House of Representatives and then again before a general session of the
House of Councillors later the same day.
Following a Diet inaugural, the opposition parties are allowed an opportunity to respond
in general session. Early in the postwar period, these responses usually came during the same
session in which the Diet inaugural was delivered. However, over time, it became accepted
practice for the opposition to respond during the next general session, which is usually held
within three days of the inaugural session. These responses are most often delivered by the
head of each opposition party and sometimes run even longer than the prime minister's address.
The responses directly challenge points made in the Diet inaugural and also present the general
principles of the opposition party in question.
The media also plays a major part in the Diet inaugural ceremony. Concerned with
how the media will react, the prime minister holds a briefing for editors and other political and
opinion journalists on the day before the speech is delivered in the Diet. During the briefing,
the prime minister reads through the speech and answers questions for about an hour.
Attendees are also provided with a copy of the speech text. 180 Almost without fail, the major
media outlets offer editorial responses on the day after the speech. In addition, the major
newspapers publish full or abridged versions of the speech. This combination of such
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prominent editorial and news page treatment has made the Diet inaugural the most covered
prime ministerial address over the course of the postwar period. Although some question the
impact the speech ultimately has on the public, it is impossible to name another regular prime
ministerial address that receives the same level of media coverage. 81
Focusing on Diet inaugurals is useful for observing changes in nationalist discourse for
several reasons. First, the ceremony brings together all the key players involved in the
construction of national categories cited above. Once the prime minister has delivered the
address, opposition party leaders and the opinion editors of the major media groups are certain to
respond. Other than election day, it is difficult to find another instance in national political life
in which the direct interaction of these actors is so universal. Second, the Diet inaugural is a
ceremony, which, as Aristotle notes, calls for speakers to adopt the "ceremonial oratory of
display," or epideictic speech. 182 The nationalist narrative is an important form of epideictic
discourse and Diet inaugurals are thus likely places to find them. In addition, the inaugural
ceremony is general in nature, with no formal constraints on topics, especially which national
categories or narratives may be discussed. Ceremonies that are held to commemorate events
that are irrevocably tied to particular national categories or narratives, such as the annual
ceremonies commemorating the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are likely to limit
181 For a skeptical view of the ultimate impact of the Diet inaugural, see Eda & Ryuzaki (2002, p.56).
182 Aristotle, 1952, p. 5 8 7 .
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the range of national categories given voice. This is not the case with the Diet inaugural.
Finally, Diet inaugurals are held regularly and often, sometimes three times in a single year.
This has generated a sufficiently large sample of discourse that is relatively evenly dispersed
across time. All of these features make the Diet inaugural an ideal source for assessing the state
of nationalist discourse at a given point in time as well as how that status quo has changed across
the postwar period.
A data set of Diet inaugural discourse was assembled based on the following criteria.
First, texts of the declaration of principles and administration plan speeches of postwar prime
ministers were downloaded from the collection maintained by Professor Tanaka Akihiko of
Tokyo University.183  This collection was then augmented by incorporating the most recent
inaugurals through 2007, yielding a total of 136 speeches.
The selection process for opposition responses was more complicated. Since each
opposition party usually offers a lengthy rebuttal, including them all would flood the data set
with opposition voices, including those that represent very small portions of the electorate. To
avoid this, the opposition sample was limited to the statement offered by the largest opposition
party during the first general session in which such responses were allowed. This method
183 The inaugurals are reproduced from originals gathered from the National Diet Library. The collection, entitled
"Prime Ministerial Address to the Imperial and National Diets (teikokugikai/kokkainai no s5ridaijin enzetsu), is
available online. Accessed at: http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/-worldjpn/documents/indices/pm/index.html (July 23,
2012). Please note that several speeches were rejected from this list because they were not directly tied to a Diet
inauguration ceremony.
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yielded 134 opposition responses, including addresses by prominent opposition leaders such as
Suzuki Mosabur5, Doi Takako, and Ozawa Ichir6.
Throughout the period under review, the primary method of media response to the Diet
inaugural has been the newspaper editorial. Even in today's age of television journalism,
Japan's daily newspapers remain in a class by themselves. The five largest national dailies
(godaishi) serve as the flagship vehicles for the five largest media groups, all of which own
television networks.184 The circulations of these papers are truly gargantuan in comparative
terms. As of 2005, Japan's largest paper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, boasted a higher circulation
than the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and
New York Daily News combined.'8 The Yomiuri Shimbun remains the largest newspaper in the
world with a daily circulation of nearly ten million in 2012, followed closely by the Asahi
Shimbun at nearly eight million in 2010 and then by the Mainichi Shimbun, with its circulation
of nearly three and a half million in 2011 (a figure still larger than the circulation of the largest
paper in the United States). 186 Not surprisingly, Japan has one of the highest newspaper
circulations per capita (adult population) in the world, more than twice that of the United
184 These media groups are Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Sankei.
185 Jh6 Media Hakusho, 2006, p. 3 8 .
186 See current circulation figures available online for Yomiuri at http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/n-busu/index.html
(July 23, 2012); Asahi at http://adv.asahi.com/2011/004.pdf (July 23, 2012); and Mainichi at
http://macs.mainichi.co.jp/now/section03/01.htm (July 23, 2012).
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States."' In addition, nearly 80% of the public say they read the paper more than five days a
week and report their combined reading time for morning and evening editions of newspapers is
over forty minutes per day.' 8 8
When considering how to sample media commentaries, there are many reasons to focus
on newspaper editorials. First, there can be little doubt that, especially during the bulk of the
Cold War period, newspaper editorials were the most broadly disseminated form of media
commentary. Until the early 1980s, NHK (Nihon Hos6 Ky6kai), a public broadcasting
corporation similar to the British Broadcasting Company, was the only television station to offer
a regular news program.189 It was the mid-1980s before the private television networks began
producing news programs that contained editorial commentary on politics. It should also be
noted that the private broadcast networks all have financial ties to the newspaper media groups:
Nippon Television Network (Yomiuri); Asahi National Broadcasting (Asahi); Tokyo
Broadcasting System (Mainichi); Television Tokyo (Nikkei); and Fuji Television Network
(Sankei). 190 Although financial connections do not necessarily bring with them editorial
control, it is difficult to imagine a media conglomerate allowing its flagship newspaper and
187 See data on circulation per capita (adult population) for various countries on the Nihon Shimbun Kyokai website
accessed at: http://www.pressnet.or.jp/data/circulation/circulation04.html (July 23, 2012).
188 See data on reading time per day and reading days per week on the Nihon Shimbun Ky6kai website accessed at:
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/dataOI/07.htm ( July 23, 2012) and
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/dataOI/06.html (July 23, 2012), respectively.
189 Freeman, 2000.
190 Ibid.
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television commentaries to differ to an extraordinary degree. An editorial from a major daily
may thus be viewed as a concise sample of a media group's views. In addition, polling shows
that the public places higher levels of trust in newspapers than in almost any other form of
media. 191 All things considered, newspaper editorials seem the most logical place to look for
the most influential media response to Diet inaugurals.
In gathering editorial responses to Diet inaugurals, only those from the top three
newspapers by circulation were selected: Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi. The combined sales
of these three papers represented about 80% of the total newspaper market in 2005.19 In
addition, although these papers began the Cold War period offering similar editorial lines
opposing the LDP-led government, this changed in the 1970s, when Yomiuri adopted a more
conservative stance.193 By the 1990s, the three major papers spanned the mainstream political
spectrum, with Yomiuri on the center-right, Mainichi in the middle, and Asahi on the center-left.
The selection of these three papers thus helps guarantee a measure of balance in the political
orientations applied to criticism of the Diet inaugurals, while at the same time keeping the
commentary firmly in the mainstream. Since these papers almost always offer an editorial
191 See polling data on public trust levels in the quality of information across different media types on the Nihon
Shimbun Ky6kai website accessed at: http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/data01/15.html (July 23, 2012).
Newspapers are second (44.1%), just the behind the public broadcasting network NHK (47.3%).
192 Dentsa Soken, 2005, p.3 8 .
193 McCargo, 2000, p.52.
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response within two days of the Diet inaugural, employing this selection rule generates 408
editorials, or approximately three editorials per speech.
The results of the quantitative content analysis conducted on the Diet inaugurals,
opposition responses and editorials are reported in Chapters Five through Seven. In addition, a
detailed explanation of the coding schedule, inter-coder reliability measures and coding rules
appears in the appendices. Finally, this section concludes with a brief comment about how the
method of analysis used here differs from that of previous works.
The approach to content analysis utilized here is different both from other studies that
have used these methods to examine social processes and ones that have specifically analyzed
Diet inaugurals. First, the use of complex linguistic algorithms such as those employed by
Takafumi Suzuki was avoided because they were found to be underdeveloped for the Japanese
language and frankly of questionable value in recovering meaning from Japanese nationalist
discourse. 194 The focus here is also squarely on message meaning rather than other aspects of
the discourse, such as the modes of presentation highlighted in Moberg's rhetorical analysis.' 95
One of the most important distinctions between this approach and those of other scholars using
content analysis is the effort to preserve context wherever possible. Most quantitative content
194 Suzuki, 2009. In particular, the author questions the reasoning of limiting comparisons to just nouns. This
seems an arbitrary distinction and is particularly distorting when one considers that norms, which are most often
expressed grammatically as verbs, are central links between nationalist claims and state policy, the area of
nationalism that should surely be the focus of political science inquiries into the subject.
195 Moberg, 2002.
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analyses utilize software that allows the coder to "parachute" into the middle of a text using a
key word in context (KWIC) function that shows them a certain number of words on either side
of a key word match.196  In this instance, the context evaluated is at best a sentence and at worst
a mere fragment, with the coder having little or no knowledge of what comes before the selected
passage. As the discourse sample here constitutes a genuine "conversation," in which a prime
minister speaks and opposition and media voices respond, all effort possible was made to
maintain as much of that context as possible in the coding process. The use of content analysis
software was thus rejected in favor of the more traditional approach in which trained coders read
all parts of the speeches and editorials and evaluated each sentence across more than sixty
possible codes.197  In doing so, they were able to keep the preceding context in mind, coding as
a set the prime ministerial speech, opposition response and editorials from each inaugural
occasion. Although taking this approach has had costs in both terms of expenses and time
required, it produced a more complete and accurate picture of the nationalist discourse involved
in the Diet inaugural ceremony.198
196 For an example, see Lyall (2006).
197 For a description of the various methods of content analysis, see Neuendorf (2002).
198 This attention to context locates the approach here closer to studies such as Edstrom's simple content analysis of
the prime ministerial speeches and Takekawa's discourse analysis of New Year editorials in major newspapers,
although neither used coders nor calculated inter-coder reliabilities. Edstrom, 1999; Takekawa, 2007.
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IV. Narrative Change, Discursive Strategies, and Institutional Association
A few additional conceptual and methodological points are in order. First, interpreting
change in prominence scores requires a conception of narrative change. "Narrative change" is
primarily conceived of here as variance across the two dimensions of content and contestation. 199
Using the results of the content analysis, change in the content of a narrative group (e.g. peace
state narrative, organic state narrative, etc.) is measured by change in the relative frequencies of
references to the narrative's individual components (i.e. the individual cognitive and normative
claims of a nation-state narrative) over time. The relative frequency of a narrative component
is the number of references to the component as a percentage of total references to the narrative
group. It is thus an indication of how central an individual component is to a narrative group at
any given time. The level of contestation is measured by the percentage of a narrative
component's total references that are coded as negatively-valued. These two measures can be
combined to evaluate changes at the narrative component level over time. Simultaneously
comparing change in the relative frequency and level of contestation of an individual narrative
component across two time periods yields four categories describing the status of the component
in the second time period:
199 This conception of the different dimensions that may change for concepts such as a nation-state narrative is
drawn from Abdelal, et. al. (2006).
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Table 3.2: Categories of Change in Narrative Components across Two Time Periods
Content
(percentage change in component to total narrative group references)
Contestation Increase Decrease/No Change
(percentage change in Increase Major Contention Minor Contention
negative to total Decrease/No Change Major Consensus Minor Consensus
component references)
The categories in Table 3.2 are summarized as follows. A narrative component is
understood to be a major point of contention for the narrative in a time period if its relative
frequency and level of contestation both rise in comparison with an earlier period. This means
that the component has become both more salient in portrayals of the narrative and more
contested at the same time. Similarly, a component is a minor point of contention if its relative
frequency falls while its level of contestation increases. Here, the component is more contested
but is also less salient in portrayals of the narrative. Alternatively, components that see
decreases or no change in their levels of contestation in the second time period are categorized as
points of consensus, with major points of consensus seeing rises in their relative frequencies and
minor ones experiencing decreases. 200
240 In evaluating change in both relative frequency and level of contestation, the result of no change is categorized
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Evaluating the content analysis data in this way thus allows one to categorize the
changes in all the components of a single narrative for particular time periods as well as to see
how the status of these components change over time. Viewed this way, a clear picture of
dynamism at the narrative component level emerges. For example, comparing the results of
consecutive, chronological five-year blocks for the peace state narrative's normative claim to
"restrain war potential" locates it as a minor point of consensus in 1963-1967, a major point of
consensus in 1973-1977, a major point of contention in 1983-1987, and a minor point of
contention in 1998-2002. In addition, as will be shown in the chapters to follow, this
conception of change provides snapshots of the location of all of a narrative's components at
particular points in what is the ongoing process of contention and consensus that constructs and
reconstructs nation-state narratives. In addition, these snapshots can be useful in uncovering
the linkages between political struggles over institutions associated with particular narrative
components and changes in the narrative as a whole.
Next, scholars working on the role of discourse and the construction of conceptions of
national identity have identified a number of patterns in which participants in nationalist
together with decreases both for simplicity's sake and because this result tends to indicate consecutive periods in
which the measure remained zero, thus providing a "no change" result but at the lowest possible relative frequency
or level of contestation. For example, there is only one non-zero "no change" result for relative frequency scores
("Peace State" between 1993-1997 and 1998-2002) and only one non-zero "no change" result in comparisons of
changes in level of contestation for components of the peace state narrative between consecutive, chronological
five-year blocks ("Restrain War Potential" between 1998-2002 and 2003-2007).
116
discourse leverage their relative autonomy from discursive conventions both to respond to
perceived efforts to change the discursive status quo and to develop new ways to talk about the
relationship between the nation and the state that accommodate their political and policy
agendas. 20 1 Applied to nation-state narratives, these "discursive strategies" generally take four
major forms: constructive, transformational, perpetuating, and destructive. A "constructive"
strategy is one in which the actor seeks to establish a new nation-state narrative "by promoting
unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation." 202  Such strategies are
observed in the first few postwar decades in Japan, when political elites cooperated to establish
and shape newly-emergent nation-state narratives such as the peace and democratic state
narratives.
A "transformational" strategy aims to transform an existing nation-state narrative into a
one that better matches the "contours of which the speaker has already conceptualized." 203  In
its most comprehensive form, a transformational strategy attempts to replace an existing
narrative by offering a fully-conceived "counter-narrative" that occupies the same "domain" as
204the existing narrative. This new narrative challenges the cognitive components of the
targeted narrative and likely some or all of its normative claims as well. Since cognitive
201 Wodak, et. al, 1999, pp.33-35; Wodak, 2006, pp.112-115; Allen & Faigley, 1995.
202 Wodak, et. al, 1999, p. 3 3 .
203 Ibid.
204 McVeigh (2004, p.9) defines domains as "the various linkages between national culture and political structure"
or "spheres of social life (territorial, state, military, economic, cultural, linguistic, racial, ethnic, gendered, etc.)."
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components of nation-state narratives tend to contribute elements that form the major premise of
the narrative's normative components, this strategy undermines the legitimacy of these
normative claims and, if successful, would replace the claim with another. 2 05 For example,
reactionary narratives of the extreme rightwing in early postwar Japan, which manipulated
prewar nationalist discourse to challenge the cognitive elements of postwar nation-state
narratives, such as the democratic and peace state narratives, exemplify this type of
"comprehensive" transformational strategy.206
A more "partial" transformational strategy designed to affect change in a nation-state
narrative can take the form of what has elsewhere been called "tinkering." 207 Here,
change-agents focus on altering one or more normative components of the nation-state narrative
rather than transforming the entire discursive formation. Specifically, the focus is on adding an
exception to the minor premise of the targeted claim in order to exempt some sphere of social
action from its proscription or prescription. 208 If successful, the targeted normative claim's
range of coverage is narrowed, but the cognitive and other normative claims of the relevant
nation-state narrative remain unchanged. It is argued in the Chapter Six that Ozawa Ichiro
205 This conception of using the three-part, syllogistic structure (major premise, minor premise and conclusion) of a
norm to identify specific types of normative change is borrowed from Goertz (2003).
206 Morris, 1960; Brown, 1955.
207 Cruz, 2005, p.2 3 . Please note that Levi-Strauss' conception of bricolage, which Samuels (2004) applies to
national identity construction, encompasses both transformational and tinkering strategies.
208 Goertz, 2003.
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adopted this strategy when he referenced the "normal nation" (futsfi no kuni) standard in an effort
to create an exception to the peace state narrative's normative claim proscribing the Japanese
state from using force in international affairs to allow for the contribution of Japanese forces to
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKOs). This case is also shown to be an example
of how intentional efforts to change the nationalist discourse can result in unintended
consequences that transcend the original goal of the rhetorical innovation.
A third strategic option available to participants in the discourse of nation-state
narratives is perpetuation, the "attempt to maintain, support and reproduce" the narrative in
question when it is perceived to be threatened. 209  This strategy typically calls for the adopter to
"refer to controversial events of the past, which may influence the narratives of national
history."210 With regard to the peace state narrative in the postwar period, the use of
perpetuating strategies is especially apparent in the response of the Socialist opposition to
Ozawa's transformational gambit cited above.
The final types of discursive strategies are referred to as destructive strategies. These
aim to "dismantle or disparage" part or all of a nation-state narrative. 2 1 What makes
destructive strategies different from transformational ones is their failure to provide a new
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component or narrative to replace the targeted one. 212  A finding of widespread use of
destructive strategies by participants in Japan's discourse of nation-state narratives would thus
constitute evidence supporting the view that postwar Japan has experienced a general decline in
the salience of nationalist rhetoric.
This section concludes by considering the relationship between nation-state narratives
and state institutions. First, state institutions are defined as the "formal or informal procedures,
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure" of the modem
territorial state. 2 13  As is apparent here, institutions can be and often are seen either to
encompass or be synonymous with norms, which were defined earlier as "idealized rules of
social life" and are important components of nation-state narratives.2 14  Further, scholars
studying norms have argued that "institutionalization" in the state enhances the capacity of
normative claims to shape political outcomes by creating "a degree of stability and uniformity
which otherwise would be lacking" and commanding the "formal sanctioning mechanisms" of
the state. 21 They generally describe "institutionalization" as the transformation of a "social"
212 Ibid.
21m This definition is adapted from Hall & Taylor (1996, p.938, emphasis added). In keeping with Mahoney &
Thelen (2010, p.10), this definition excludes the issue of compliance, leaving it as a variable for the analysis of
institutional change. Examples of state institutions defined this way in the case of postwar Japan include the 1947
constitution, laws passed by the Diet, official interpretations of these laws by state bureaucracies, international treaty
commitments, judicial rulings, cabinet decisions, and executive orders, among others.
214 Goertz, for example, sees "norms" and "policies" as synonyms (e.g. foreign policy, Monroe Doctrine, etc.).
Goertz, 2003, p.4 3 . For other definitions of institutions, see Hall & Taylor (1996).
215 Katzenstein, 1996, p.2 1. More broadly, Somers (1994, p.625) also notes that narratives that constitute
"identity" are composed of "rules," "practices" and "institutions," and that "[i]dentity formation takes place in these
relational settings of contested but patterned relations among narratives, people and institutions."
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norm into a "legal" one.216  "Norms do not float freely in political space," writes Katzenstein of
this process in postwar Japan, "They acquire particular importance when they crystallize,
through institutionalization, as in the Japanese polity." 2 17
If the same normative claims that comprise nation-state narratives can also be
"embedded" in state institutions, what does that mean for efforts to understand how these
narratives change? The account above would seem to favor the view that incorporating the
normative component of a nation-state narrative in a state institution enhances the component's
stability and thus the prospects for the nation-state narrative to endure in the nationalist discourse.
Although the development of a commonly-cited association between a state institution and the
normative component of a nation-state narrative can have these effects, it is argued here that the
simple fact of such an association is not sufficient to do so. This judgment is based on the
following three observations.
216 Social norms are generally distinguished from legal norms (law) as follows: "Legal norms are created by
design-usually through some kind of deliberative process, precisely specified in written texts, linked to particular
sanctions, and enforced by a specialized bureaucracy. Social norms, by contrast, often are spontaneous rather than
deliberately planned (hence, of uncertain origin), unwritten (hence, their content and rules for application are often
imprecise), and enforced informally (although the resulting sanctions can sometimes be a matter of life and death)."
Hechter & Opp, 2001, p.xi (emphasis added). The approach here emphasizes the italicized regarding the norm's
relation to state institutions. More specifically, a norm is here considered legal when a version of the norm from
the nationalist discourse is codified in writing in the text of a law, cabinet decision, executive order, outstanding
court order or ruling, or other regulation (such as standard operating procedures or interpretations of laws by state
bureaucracies) that specify the content of a state institution for which a specialized bureaucracy is assigned to
enforce compliance. It should be emphasized codified (legal) norm may be (and is likely) at odds with the content
of other versions of the normative claim in the nationalist discourse.
217 Katzenstein, 1996, p.21. Please note that Katzenstein is not implying here that all or even most social norms
make this transition nor that those that do not will not endure or be able to shape political outcomes.
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First, as will noted in subsequent chapters, the organic state narrative has by far the
lowest number of associations with state institutions among the five nation-state narratives and
thus should receive the least stabilizing benefits from such associations. One way to assess
narrative stability is to view it as a narrative's level of contestation relative to that of other
nation-state narratives. However, on this measure, it is the trading state narrative, whose
normative components have far more institutional associations than those of the organic state
narrative, that saw the highest level of contestation (as measured by the percentage of
negatively-valued references to total references) in cumulative terms for the entire period (the
organic and peace state narratives are second and third, respectively) as well as on average
across the eleven five-year blocks (the peace and organic state narratives are second and third,
respectively).218 Another way to assess narrative stability is to examine the degree to which its
quantity of positive references varies over time. If level of institutionalization is linked to
narrative stability, then this quantity should vary less over time the more institutionalized a
narrative is. Yet, as shown in Table 3.3 below, the organic state narrative confounds this
expectation, proving to be the most stable of the three contested narratives despite its lower
number of institutional associations.
218 Calculated for the entire fifty-five year period, the trade state saw the highest level of contestation (6.4%),
followed by the organic state (2.9%) and peace state (1.5%) narratives. When averaged over the five-year blocks,
trading state narrative is also the highest (6.2%), with peace state (3.5%) and organic state (3.3%) narratives second
and third, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Standard Deviation in Positive References, Three Narrative Group
% Negative Narrative Group Standard Deviation
% Negative Organic State 0.7
% Negative Trading State 1.2
% Negative Peace State 2.4
Unit: standard deviation calculated for positive (non-negative) references per 100 sentences across I1 five-year
blocks
Second, the content of some normative claims in nation-state narratives are more
ambiguous and thus more open to interpretation and contestation over their meaning than that of
others. For example, as noted in the next chapter, the claims of the peace state narrative
limiting both the acquisition of military capabilities and their use by the Japanese state can be
advanced at various points within the spectrum between state non-violence and state
non-aggression. This wide room for interpretation thus creates many possibilities for
contestation over meaning and thus fights over associated institutional configurations. In this
regard, the degree to which a normative claim affords opportunities for interpretation would
seem to mitigate the stabilizing impact of association with a state institution.2 19
2 As noted above, "institutionalization" is generally viewed as the process by which social norms becomes
codified in formal (legal) or informal practices. However, the flow can also go in the other direction, as an
institution (legal norm) may be imposed by an exogenous actor and then become associated with the normative
claim (social norm) of a narrative that emerges only later in the nationalist discourse. This is arguably what
happened with regard to narrative components for which proponents find justification in specific parts of Japan's
postwar constitution, a major formal institution that was drafted with considerable involvement from the United
States and ratified and enacted under foreign occupation. To allow for this disparity in origin as well as the fact
that most legal norms codify only one version of a normative claim whose content can continue to be contested, and
thus exist in different variants, in the nationalist discourse over long periods of time, the term "institutional
association" is preferred here over "institutionalization."
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Third, once a normative component of a nation-state narrative has become associated
with a state institution, it is exposed to the same forces that promote both stability and change in
that institution. Indeed, the assumption that the association of a normative component with a
state institution will decrease its level contestation and thus help sustain the nation-state narrative
in the nationalist discourse is predicated on the assumption that the institution in question
remains stable. Although the association of an explicit "validity-claim" such as the normative
component of a nation-state narrative is theorized to enhance the binding nature of the associated
institution, institutions face pressures for change from various factors independent of ideational
conflict, including changes in the domestic power distribution and relevant policy
environment.22 0 For example, Oros argues that changes in Japan's international environment
after the Cold War "necessitated changes in Japanese security policy and practice, despite similar
ideas held by most Japanese."22'
Thus, as exogenous and endogenous factors press for change in such an institution and a
public debate ensues, the association with the nation-state narrative will likely be cited in both
the perpetuating discursive strategies employed by those opposed to change
transformational or tinkering discursive strategies adopted by would-be reformers, who may be
seeking to reinterpret or even dissolve the association. In this way, assessments of the timing,
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and the
220 Kratochwil, 1989, p.55 .
221 Oros, 2008, p.2 5.
causes and outcomes of efforts to reform institutions associated with a narrative's normative
components can yield information vital to interpreting the meaning of the a decline in the
narrative's prominence over time.
Employing these conceptions of narrative change, discursive strategies, and institutional
associations aids in the generation of hypotheses to understand how and why narrative
prominence changes in particular periods. The next section uses these conceptions to develop
three hypotheses for understanding changes in the prominence of nation-state narratives.
V. Understanding Changes in Narrative Prominence
A central premise of the methodological approach taken here is that prominence scores
by themselves cannot generally be interpreted as a rating of a narrative's "strength" (relative
level of consensus) vis-a-vis other nation-state narratives in the same period or as a clear
indicator of its potential to endure in the nationalist discourse in future periods. Although a
decline to zero over a sustained period of time represents decisive evidence of a narrative's
break-up as a recurring convention, no such finding is present here. Rather, what prominence
scores reveal are changes over time in the degree to which political elites agreed that particular
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The reasons behind these shifts in the "focal points of
concern" vary, as does their meaning for the narrative in question. 222
Consider, for instance, the example of a narrative whose prominence score falls while
also seeing a large increase in negatively-valued references. Alternatively, how should one
evaluate a case in which a narrative's prominence score falls and thereafter remains steady at a
lower level with no contestation for a long period of time?
declines in prominence be assessed?
How should these instances of
The answer adopted here is that interpreting changes in a
narrative's prominence score requires that they be contextualized. Changes can be placed in
context by utilizing the analysis of narrative change outlined above, examining the discursive
strategies employed and the status of institutional associations in the periods in question, and
considering the change in prominence score as an event in a sequence of events.
The narrative change analysis described above creates a map of the internal changes in a
narrative across two time periods. This map can be used to evaluate a change in prominence in
a number of ways. First, the location of the cognitive components of a narrative can indicate if
the narrative is facing existential threats. For example, if the cognitive components of a
narrative, especially the "naming conventions" (heiwa kokka, bunka kokka, etc.), are all major
points of consensus, then an overall decline in the narrative's prominence is unlikely to be
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narratives were worthy of discussion.
evidence of its impending break-up as a discursive formation. The location of all cognitive
elements as minor points of consensus in the context of an overall prominence decline indicates
that an opportunity is present for a direct challenge to the narrative. If cognitive elements
become points of contention, especially major ones, then a decline in prominence takes on a
darker meaning for the narrative's future prospects. If this location persists over consecutive
periods, it is likely that the decline in prominence indicates a trajectory toward a break-up of the
narrative as a recurring convention and an unwinding of any associations it may have with state
institutions.
Second, the location of normative elements of nation-state narratives as points of
contention in the context of a decline in narrative prominence is not itself a clear indicator of
coming narrative break-up. However, the location of particular normative elements as points of
contention, especially as major ones and/or over consecutive periods, does point to a change in
the normative component's salience to the narrative and, in cases of sustained periods of major
contention, even its continued inclusion in the narrative. This also has implications for the
relationship between the narrative and any state institutions associated with the contested
normative component, such as the loss of any stabilizing impact provided by the institution if the
association is weakened or dissolved. Finally, the location of multiple normative components
as points of contention for consecutive time periods during which prominence is continuously
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declining should be seen as a strong indication that the narrative is under threat, albeit not one
that rises to an existential level regarding its future as a discursive convention in the nationalist
discourse.
A second type of indicator useful in interpreting the meaning of changes in prominence
is the presence or absence of particular discursive strategies for changing part or all of the
relevent narrative during the periods in question. For example, the advance of a major
transformational strategy to develop a new narrative occupying the same domain as an existing
narrative during periods in which it is experiencing a sustained decline in prominence and
sustained increases in contention in its cognitive components and/or large numbers of its
normative elements is indicative of a narrative facting an existential threat with poor future
prospects of remaining a factor in the nationalist discourse. Likewise, the presence of a
destructive stategy targeting an existing narrative facing the same conditions would also call into
question is future prospects. However, the presence of perpeuating strategies operating in
response to transformational or destructive strategies in this example might mitigate the severity
of this judgement.
Finally, as is already apparent from the discussion above, the sequence in which
locations in the consensus/contestation quadrants and the presence or absence of different
discursive strategies occur matter for assessments of changes in narrative prominence. For
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example, consecutive, chronological periods of contention for a normative element is a strong
sign that the element's future relationship with the narrative will be altered. A perpetuating
strategy outlasting a transformational strategy targeting the same domain across consecutive time
periods is evidence of the latter's failure to achieve its discursive goals. The significance of
sequence in other ways will be elaborated further in the case study chapters.
The different types of observations introduced above may be applied to develop and
distinguish between hypotheses explaining how and why changes in narrative prominence occur
and their consequences for the narrative in question. They are chiefly distinguished by their
differing predictions regarding observations of their designated causal factors as well as
predictions about other aspects of the case, especially those that specify the causal process
theorized to be at work, such as "predictions about the events that can be expected to occur, the
sequence of those events, and the public and private positions actors are likely to take, as well as
many other features of the relevant causal chain. 223 Thus, in practice, comparing hypotheses
that make contrasting predictions about the shape of causal processes entails examining not only
data on outcomes, but also on "the specific actions expected from various types of actors,
statements that might reveal their motivation, and the sequences in which actions should
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occur. To provide concrete examples of use later in the study, three hypotheses that explain
declines in narrative prominence are developed below.
The first hypothesis accounts for the decline in prominence as a consequence of the
successful "banalization" of an existing nation-state narrative.2 2 5  The argument here is that
once a narrative emerges, is contested, and achieves a certain level of recognition among
relevant political elites and the general public as well as the association of its normative
components with uncontested state institutions, its relative success actually mitigates against its
frequent reference at ceremonies like the Diet inagural. In short, such a narrative may enter the
realm of "goes without saying" and thus cease to be a frequent topic of debate as a consequence
of the fact that it is largely uncontested, although it remains a well-known option in the toolkit
available to participants in the national discourse. 226  Viewing prominence declines in this way
yields several predictions. First and foremost, prominence may decline compared with earlier
periods, but it will not go to zero. As Billig argues, "Nationalism, far from being an
intermittent mood in establshed nations, is an endemic condition."227  In this sense, discursive
formations that reproduce strands of nationalism, such as nation-state narratives, are part of
224 Ibid., p.394. Due to ontological considerations, especially the likely presence of multiple and persistent
interaction effects, the methodological orientation adopted here is one of "systematic process analysis." See Hall,
2003.
225 "Banalization" is coined from Billig's conception of "banal nationalism" or "the ideological habits"--in this case
understood to include nation-state narratives-- through which conceptions of the nation-state are reproduced on a
day-to-day basis in places where these narratives have already been established and adherents are reasonably
confident in their perpetuity (e.g. stable states with advanced economies in peace time). Billig, 1995, p.6 .
226 Swidler, 1986,2001.
227 Billig, 1995, p. 6 .
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everyday life and cannot disappear for long periods of time without consequences. Second,
during periods of the decline in prominence, there will be no contestation over either the
cognitive or normative components of the narrative in question. Third, political elites
participating in the nationalist discourse should not be observed offering transformational,
tinkering or destructive strategies vis-d-vis the narrative in the period in which it is experiencing
the fall in prominence. Fourth, there should be no evidence of efforts to reform institutions that
have come to be associated with components of the narrative during the period of the
prominence decline in question.
In addition, although not decisive tests for the banalization hypothesis, the location of
the period in question in a sequence in which it is preceded by a period in which there also is no
contestation over the narrative and for which political elites eschew transformational, tinkering,
and destructive stragies toward it should also be taken as adding support for the conclusion that
the narrative has become "banal." Further, since discursive formations are viewed as having
extended impacts over time, the absence of reform efforts targeting institutions associated with
the narrative's components in the period immediately preceding the one in question should be
seen as additional, albeit weak, support for this explanation.
A second hypothesis explains declining prominence over time as
"transformation" of all or part of the narrative into alternative components or even a
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completely new narrative. When a narrative is wholly superseded by a counter-narrative, it
is no longer referred to as an ideal or even viable view of the relationship between the nation
and the state and will not endure as a distinct convention in the nationalist discourse. This
hypothesis is thus consistent with the following sequence of observations. In the first period,
increased contestation over the narrative's cognitive components, the carriers of its naming
conventions, internal logics and justifications for its normative claims, is observed and then
followed by continuing contestation and a major decline (zeroing out in extreme cases) in the
prominence score for the narrative as a whole in the next and subsequent periods. 228
Increased contestation in one or more of the narrative's normative components during the first
period followed by a sharp decline in or complete absence of references in the second period,
appearing in conjunction with the above pattern, is also expected.
Alternatively, a finding of increased contention confined to a narrative's normative
components in the first period followed by a decline in or complete absence of references to
these components in the second period is consistent with the partial transformation variant of
this explanation. In the context of declining prominence for the narrative as a whole, this
228 The period preceding the beginning of the decline is included in this prediction because the initiation of a
transformational strategy is expected to prompt supporters of the targeted narrative to adopt perpetuating strategies
in response. This initial combination of the transformational and perpetuating strategies in the period preceding the
decline is thus predicted to initially raise the prominence score of the narrative targeted for transformation. A
decline in prominence accompanied by continuing contestation is later periods is thus seen as evidence that at least
partial transformation is taking place.
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indicates that the normative component in question faces the possiblity of either new
exceptions being added to its contested normative components or having the contested
components excluded from the narrative completely, as well as the corresponding changes in
its relationship with any state institutions associated with the contested components. In the
case that an exception is added, the normative component will be located as a major point of
contention in the first period and then return to some form of consensus in the second. In the
case of an exclusion, the component should appear as a major point of contention in the first
period and then largely or totally disappear in the second. In either case, however, absent
contestation over cognitive elements, declining narrative prominence is not a clear indication
that narrative dissolution is in progress.
The transformation hypothesis also naturally predicts the presence of actors adopting
particular discursive strategies. As noted above, in the context of declining narrative
prominence, these strategies may take two forms. The emergence of an alternative narrative
that occupies the same domain as the targeted narrative and runs counter to at least some of its
cognitive claims and likely some or all of its normative claims as well is evidence that efforts
to affect comprehensive transformation are underway. On the other hand, the presence of
"tinkering" strategies that apply new rhetorical standards to reformulate or challenge
normative elements of the targeted narrative is evidence of a drive for partial transformation.
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In addition to the patterns of increased contestation and declining prominence
describe above, the transformation hypothesis differs from the banalization hypothesis in three
other ways. First, it predicts the presence of change-agents who are capable individually of
engaging in intentional innovation and collectively of affecting unintentional innovation in the
nationalist discourse. Second, this hypothesis also predicts the presence of efforts to reform
at least one state institution associated with a normative component facing increased
contestation in periods immediately preceding and during the decline in narrative
prominence. 229 In this way, identifying which actors are pursuing which strategy as well as
the orientations of those actors and their strategies toward state institutions associated with the
normative claim in question is essential to confirming this hypothesis. Finally, the
transformation hypothesis predicts that if changes occur in the relevant state institutions
targeted for reform in one period, the association between the institution and the nation-state
narrative will be dissolved in subsequent periods in the case of comprehensive transformation,
but maintained in the case of partial transformation.
A third explanation, referred to here as the "denationalization" hypothesis, also asserts
that relevant nation-state narratives decline in prominence because they are no longer viewed as
ideal or viable and are headed toward break-up as discursive formations. However, in this case,
229 The period preceding the beginning of the decline is included in this prediction following the same logic laid out
in the previous footnote.
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suitable counter-narratives linking nation and state in the relevant domains have yet to emerge to
take their places. If confined to a single domain, this may indicate that the domain is becoming
"denationalized," or ceasing to be a sphere of social life where participants in the nationalist
discourse are concerned about the relationship between the nation and the state. If, however,
denationalization is observed across multiple domains, the decline in prominence scores indicate
a broad-based decline in nationalist discourse itself and a corresponding weakening of the bond
between nation and state. Thus, wider in its implications than the other hypotheses, the
denationalization hypothesis can only be fully confirmed by examining the nationalist discourse
in multiple domains.
Applying the denationalization hypothesis to analysis of declines in a single nation-state
narrative yields the following predictions. First, in contrast to the banalization hypothesis, the
fall in prominence of a narrative due to denationalization is predicted to be accompanied by an
increase in the percentage of negatively-valued comments directed at both its cognitive and
normative components. The requirement that both cognitive and normative components face
contestation thus also distinguishes the denationalization hypothesis from the partial form of the
transformation hypothesis. Second, although the time frame is unspecified, the prominence
score is predicted eventually to reach zero and remain there in subsequent periods, also a
prediction at odds with those of partial transformation. Third, although
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both the
denationalization and transformation hypotheses predict the presence of change-agents who are
opposed to the narrative in question, denationalization predicts these agents will adopt
destructive strategies and that the periods immediately preceding and during the decline in
prominence will see an absence of transformative or constructive strategies, a prediction that
distinguishes it from all forms of the transformation hypothesis. Finally, although the
denationalization hypothes makes no clear predictions regarding the timing and shape of efforts
to reform state institutions associated with normative components of the targeted nation-state
narrative, it does predict the association between these institutions and the nation-state narrative
will be dissolved in subsequent periods, again at odds with the partial transformation hypothesis.
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Chapter Four: Five Nations, Five States, One Country
Of course the question of what 'defines us as a nation' is not a matter of brute fact, but of public
narratives, of self-understandings shaped and reshaped by stories. There is a rich repertoire of
such storied self-understandings, some very widely shared, others less so, and these shift over
230time.
Rogers Brubaker, 2004
I. Introduction
Five nation-state narratives-trading state, organic state, peace state, civilized state and
democratic state-have occupied central places in the nationalist discourse of postwar Japan.
Each narrative depicts a social category that places the emphasis on different links between
nation and state by using different combinations of normative and cognitive elements. To
understand how the most prominent forms of nationalism-viewed as discourse-change in the
unfamiliar empirical terrain of a peaceful, wealthy, and stable democracy, it is necessary first to
elaborate on the content of these key nation-state narratives and before considering how they
change over time.
This remaining sections of this chapter addresses the same issues with regard to each of
these five narratives: 1) translations of archetype examples; 2) the key elements of the narrative,
including its naming conventions, related cognitive elements, normative claims on state policy,
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and sub-narratives; and 3) the grounds for its inclusion in the study, including references to
scholarly support.
11. Trading State (Merchant State, Technology-based State)
In March 2004, during a routine meeting of a budget subcommittee of the House of
Representatives, the more powerful chamber of Japan's bicameral Diet, then Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry Nakagawa Shoichi, a conservative member of the Liberal
Democratic Party, was asked to clarify his government's future plans regarding bilateral free
trade agreements (FTAs). He rose and prefaced his response with the following summary of
Japan's modern history:
I think the current question is an extremely important one that touches on the foundational
element, shall I say Japan's fundamental way of life. I think that Japan, since the Meiji
modernization, with few natural resources, started out by exporting tea and raw silk as
products for export and importing industrial goods from the advanced countries of Europe
and the United States; further, although one of the tragic outcomes of the development of
economic blocks was World War Two, when our nation subsequently got back on its feet, it
was, after all, through our forefathers' efforts exporting textiles and light industrial products
while earning what little foreign currency they could. As a result, we were able to become
a great trade-based state (bdeki rikkoku) with global reach, an economic great power; after
all, in a Japan with few natural resources, we import from all over the world and export
excellent products made from the technological skills and knowledge of the Japanese
people; I thus think that this, rather than a choice, is what we as a country must be.23 '
21 Nakagawa Shoichi, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Liberal Democratic Party, 7th Sectional Meeting,
Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 2, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 2,
2011).
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Nakagawa then went on to declare that Japan had fallen behind other major countries,
especially the United States, in negotiating FTAs, and that Japan, in order to continue to exist as
a "trade-based country" (bdeki rikkoku), should actively pursue opportunities for such
agreements in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. Three years
later, when asked a similar question in a full budget committee meeting in the House of
Councillors, Japan's upper house, then foreign minister and future prime minister As6 Tar6 gave
a response that differed somewhat on policy, but framed the issue, and the stakes involved, in an
identical way:
Fundamentally, as you know, in Japan's case, because it is not a country with natural
resources, in order for Japan to continue as a trade-based country (bdeki rikkoku), the
present situation is that it is difficult to avoid continuing to rely on the soundness of WTO
and its core of multilateral trade negotiations, although there are various types of FTAs and
EPAs.232
The point here is not to highlight differences in policy but to show how, in the course of
routine policy discussions, two prominent politicians approached an international economic issue
by first referencing, either in passing or in some detail, what is called here the trading state
narrative. In this narrative, purportedly inherent qualities of Japan's people and territory are
cited to characterize the nation-state in a way that makes demands on the state to conform to
particular norms. First, Japan's territory is confined to a few small islands with little or no
m As6 Tar6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors,
March 8, 2007. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 2, 2011).
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natural resources. Second, the Japanese people as a nation are distinguished by certain innate
abilities, in particular their mercantile acumen and technological prowess. In combination,
these two cognitive claims are wielded to categorize Japan as a nation-state whose people must
utilize natural gifts to overcome natural deficits. Specifically, for Japan to survive in a world of
nations with better access to natural resources, its people and state must find ways to add value
to imported raw materials and export finished goods. This is the crux of the trading state
narrative, which is referred to variously as "trade-based state" (boeki rikkoku), "trading state"
(tsisho kokka or boeki kokka) "merchant state" (shonin kokka or chonin kokka), and, as will be
highlighted below "technology-based state" (gijutsu rikkoku). 33
The act of characterizing the nation-state as a trading state places certain normative
demands on the state in general and government policy in particular. For one, state legitimacy
is linked to continued or increased access to foreign markets for the nation's exports. As can be
seen in the example above, in practice, this claim is generally made in the form of calls for the
government to support or pursue improvements in aspects of the international trade system that
maintain or expand access to foreign markets, including such institutions as the General
233 The elements described in this paragraph, including key words, were modeled in the following codes for the
content analysis. "Trading State" includes all references to "trade-based state" (b5eki rikkoku), "trading state"
(tsisho kokka or boeki kokka) and "merchant state" (shonin kokka or chonin kokka); idealized treatments of Japan,
its people and/or state as merchants or tradesmen, and note or praise for the abilities of the nation or its members to
excel in foreign trade. "Few Resources" includes all references to Japan or Japanese territory being small,
insignificant, or lacking natural resources. "Technology-based State" is explained below.
140
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and numerous
bilateral trade arrangements. 234  Second, the trading state narrative declares that the nation must
export to survive and therefore the state is bound to support this fundamental endeavor. In
practice, this may appear as general demands that the government promote exports as well as
specific arguments in favor of adopting government policies that will aid exporting industries to
expand their sales overseas.2 35  Third, this narrative tends to include demands that the state
encourage the expansion of the nation's investments overseas, including direct state involvement.
This last claim involves both the use of foreign aid to encourage domestic firms to expand their
business overseas and open new trade networks as well as the important role of foreign
investment in easing currency appreciation under the floating exchange rates of the latter part of
the period reviewed here. 236
The trading state narrative has an important technological dimension, one which also
makes normative claims on state behavior. Japan is often referred to as a "technology-based
234 This is modeled as "Support World Trade Regime," a code that includes all references to maintaining,
strengthening or improving key aspects of the postwar world trade regime, including but not limited to GATT, WTO,
individual FTAs, international currency regime agreements, etc.
235 Modeled as "Increase/Maintain Exports," this code includes all calls for the government to aid in helping exports
with the following exceptions: measures included in "Support World Trade Regime" above, measures related to
export of domestic technology (knowledge-based assets, intellectual property rights, tacit knowledge about
manufacturing process, etc.), which are covered in "Support Technological Cooperation" below, measures to
promote foreign sales of "cultural products," which are counted in "Support Cultural Exchange" as is explained
below, and measures related to expanding overseas investment for the purposes of promoting exports, which are
covered in the next code introduced.
236 This is modeled as "Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments," which includes calls for the nation to expand its
investments in foreign countries, including government programs, such as the Official Development Assistance
(ODA).
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state" (giutsu rikkoku), or a nation-state that survives through continuing technological
achievement.237 For example, speaking before the upper house in 1978, Ota Atsuo, a member
of the opposition KOmei Party, declared, "Firstly, this, our country, is referred to as a so-called
"country with few natural resources," but after all, it is also said that our country's greatest
natural resources are the intellectual powers of the people; I think, for Japan, we must aspire to
be a technology-based state (gijutsu rikkoku) that applies its human resources to raising the level
of its technological capabilities." 238
In addition to drawing on the same cognitive assertions (a lack of natural resources, a
highly-skilled people) that underscore the trade elements above, the link between technology and
trade is made explicit, both in the importance of technological achievement in improving
manufacturing processes and product quality as well as in the constant need for the technological
capabilities to develop new and innovative products that the world's consumers will buy. As
Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka Rokusuke stated in 1981, "Because Japan is
a trade-based state (bdeki rikkoku) and, after all, behind the words "trade-based state" are the
m As a code, "Technology-based State" includes all references to "technology-based state" (gyutsu rikkoku),
idealized treatments of Japan, its people and/or state as scientists, engineers or technicians, and note or praise for the
technological capabilities or achievements of the nation or its members.
238 Ota Atsuo, Komei Party, 2"nd Sectional Meeting, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1978.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (March 25, 2011).
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words "technology-based state," if we cannot win in technological competition, our trade and
future development is in doubt." 239
The trading state narrative thus places additional normative demands on the state. First
and foremost, the state must strive to protect and nurture the nation's technological
capabilities.240 In practice, references to Japan as a "technology-based state" are usually
followed by demands that the government facilitate the availability of foreign technology for
indigenization (kokusanka), calls for subsidies linked to research and development, and pleas for
more public investment in science and engineering education. For example, following his
words quoted above, Ota Atsuo immediately demands to know why the budget of the Science
and Technology Agency has not increased as much as the public works budget. 24 1 Second, a
related normative claim demands that the state encourage technological cooperation with other
countries. Although this may sound too internationalist for a nation-state narrative, the reality
is quite different. In this instance, the "cooperation" called for is almost always the provision
of goods to developing countries whose domestic technological capabilities fall far short of
Japan's. In other words, it is a demand that the government help secure new export markets for
239 Tanaka Rokusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 12, 1981.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 3, 2011).
240 This is modeled as "Improve Domestic Technology," which includes all calls for the government to improve the
domestic technology base, including general investments in education and basic research and in specific interactions
with domestic firms and foreign countries or firms.
241 Ota Atsuo, KOmei Party, 2 nd Sectional Meeting, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1978.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (March 25, 2011).
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the finished goods of Japan's high-technology firms rather than a call for joint development
projects or technology-sharing.242
As the examples cited above reveal, the trade and technological dimensions of the
trading state narrative are extremely difficult to separate in practice and are thus examined as a
single narrative group. However, analytically, it is possible to isolate codes that predominately
relate to either the trade or the technological dimension. In this way, the trading state narrative
may be viewed as two tightly-linked "sub-narratives" (i.e. major narrative components). Codes
viewed as predominately related to trade may be treated as the "Merchant State" sub-narrative,
while those related primarily to technology may be treated as "Technology-based State"
sub-narrative. 243 The purpose of dividing this grand narrative into its two major components is
purely analytical: it allows one to see at a glance how dependent the trading state narrative is on
its trade and technological dimensions at any given time.
The trading state narrative was selected here not only due to its prominence in postwar
nationalist discourse, but also for its relevance to scholarship on nationalism in Japan. In
242 This is modeled as "Support Technology Cooperation," which includes all calls for the government to facilitate
the provision of domestic goods with high-technological content to developing countries. This does include calls
for joint-development projects or the export of technologies presented primarily as military use, which are covered
under a different code "Support International Disarmament." Please note that the term "technological cooperation"
can also be a euphemism for negotiating licenses for advanced technologies from the US or Europe, especially
during the Cold War period. This latter use of the term would thus be counted toward the code for "Improve
Domestic Technology."
2 For the purposes of this sub-narrative analysis, references to Japan as a "trade-based state" and its variants cited
above, "Support World Trade Regime," "Increase/Maintain Exports," and "Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments"
are grouped together as the "Merchant State" sub-narrative, while references to Japan as a "Technology-based State"
that has "Few Resources," "Improve Domestic Technology," and "Support Technological Cooperation" are grouped
as the "Technology-based State" sub-narrative. Each sub-narrative is thus made of four individual codes.
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particular, elements of this narrative are central to academic work on "economic" and "techno"
nationalisms, and also relevant to long-standing debates about the role of the postwar Japanese
state in the country's economic development and the origin and effectiveness of Japan's trade
and technology policies. 244 In addition, this narrative has deep roots in prewar nationalist
discourse and thus serves as an important point of comparison for narratives, such as peace state,
whose prominence is almost entirely a postwar phenomenon. An important question to ask is
thus whether or not longer pedigree makes a narrative more resistant to changes in either
prominence or content.
I. Organic State
On May 15, 2000, Mori Yoshiro of the LDP, having just taken over as Japan's prime
minister when Keiz6 Obuchi suffered a serious stroke in early April, rose to make a brief
statement commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the formation of the Diet Members
Conference for the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (SAS) (Shint5 seii renmei kokkai
giin kondankai), a collection of Diet members aligned with the SAS, a conservative political
244 Amaya, 1980; Berger, 1998; Gao, 1998; Heginbotham & Samuels, Johnson, 1982; Koizumi, 2002; McVeigh,
2004; Morris-Suzuki, 1989, 1998; Noguchi, 1976; Okimoto, 1989; Samuels, 1994; Trevor, 2001; Yamada, 2001.
Please note that some of these scholars treat the elements identified as part of the trading state narrative as
ideologies or policy strategies rather than as nationalism per se, but the claim here is simply that these elements have
been central to key scholarly debates about not only Japanese nationalism, but also Japan's modern politics and
economy.
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Early in his comments, Mori uttered a phrase that would prove controversial:
"It has now been thirty years since we began our activities around the thought of making our
citizens thoroughly aware that Japan is a divine country (kami no kuni) centered around the
Emperor."245 From the mouth of a sitting prime minister, this use of pre-war rhetoric seemed
to contradict the postwar constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and freedom of religion
and elicited criticism from inside the LDP and even Mori's own cabinet, united the opposition
parties in calling for his resignation, and caused major newspapers to openly question his
suitability to lead the country. 24 6 Subsequently, Mori made matters worse, first by refusing to
withdraw the comment, and then by referring to Japan using the pre-war term "national polity"
(kokutai) in a speech a few weeks later. 24 7
Reviewing the context of these comments provides a concise picture of the dominant
nation-state narrative of the postwar right-wing in Japan. Mori made his original kami no kuni
remark at a meeting of politicians aligned with the SAS, the political arm of the peak association
for Shinto religious organizations, the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja honch5). According
to the SAS website, the group has five major goals: to build a society that holds the Imperial
household and Japan's culture and traditions in high esteem, to establish a new constitution
245 Asahi Shimbun, 16 May 2000 (evening edition). (emphasis added).
"country of the gods."
246 Asahi Shinbun 17 May 2000, Nihon Keizai Shimbun 17 May 2000.
247 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 4 June 2000.
Kami no kuni may also be translated as
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advocacy group.
based on Japan's history and national character, to establish Yaskukuni shrine as the site of state
ceremonies to honor the spirits of those who gave their lives for the country, to realize an
education system capable of producing spiritually-rich children who can feel hope about the
country's future, and to establish a moral state that the world will both revere and benefit from
its contributions. 24 8
While these are the goals of a political advocacy group, they are also demands that state
policy reflect a particular nation-state narrative, one that asserts that the Japanese people are a
common-descent group whose political bond is symbolized by the Imperial family and
manifested in a common moral code and set of religious traditions. 249 This narrative is referred
to variously as "homogenous nation-state" (tanitsu minzoku kokka), "divine country" (kami no
kuni), and "national polity" (kokutai), and is here given the summary term of organic state, as the
nation-state is presented as an organic outgrowth of a pre-existing group whose unquestioned
homogeneity is primarily attributed to common descent as well as to the associated factors of a
common history and collective dedication to unique cultural and religious traditions and
values. 250 Although, as noted in the previous chapter, the discourses of ethnicity and
248 Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership website accessed at: http://www.sinseiren.org/ (July 19, 2011).
249 It is interesting to note that foreign scholars have reinforced the notion that modem Japan is a rare case of an
ethnically or racially homogenous polity or "true" nation-state, although they sometimes couch this assertion in
comparative language. For example, Edwin Reischauer wrote of postwar Japan that "[n]o other major industrial
society has anything approaching the racial homogeneity of Japan." (1988, p.33) With regard to prewar Germany
and Japan, Walker Connor more directly declares that "these two states are among the very few that are ethnically
homogenous." (1994, p.41)
250 The naming conventions described in this paragraph were modeled in the following codes for the content
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nationality generally overlap in some way and can be said to do so here in all five nation-state
narratives depending on the understanding of ethnicity employed, the organic state narrative is
the only one of these narratives that is completely dependent on a descent-based claims to
uniqueness.
Four key elements comprise the organic state narrative, most of which are referred to
directly or indirectly in SAS's list of goals: the assumption of ethnic homogeneity (i.e. claims of
common descent), emphasis on the unifying role of the Emperor, assertions of spiritual unity
sometimes expressed as historical claims, and appeals to a civic morality that prioritize duties (to
state, Emperor, elders, family head, etc.) over individual rights. First is the assertion that Japan is
a unique combination of people and state in which "ethnic" and "civic" boundaries completely
overlap. 251 Although this view is neither supported by the historical record nor the reality of
ethnic identifications among groups such as naturalized citizens, Ainu, Burakumin, and
analysis. "Japanese as Ethnicity" includes all references to Japan as an ethnic nation-state or the postwar Japanese as
a single, homogenous ethnic or racial group of common descent. "National Polity" includes all references to
prewar nationalist rhetoric such as kokutai or kami no kuni as well as incidences in which words with less prewar
resonance, such as "national character" (kunigara), are used in ways that evoke a natural organic or spiritual unity
indistinguishable from other "national polity" rhetoric.
251 Broadly construed, the term "ethnic" could be applied to claims related to the conception of the nation advanced
in all the nation-state narratives examined in this study. Here, it is used only to refer to the assertions that 1) the
present-day Japanese people share a common biological descent and/or mythical origin; and 2) as a result, share a
common spiritual sensibility (e.g. devotion to the Emperor, awareness of and respect for the kami) and social values
(e..g deference to elders, family authority figures, the Emperor, etc.). Whatever other "ethnic" claims that advocates
of the organic state narrative may include in their statements, these two assertions are always either implied or
explicitly stated when they claim "ethnic" or "cultural" homogeneity. In other words, the use of "ethnic" in this
narrative is largely congruent with many conservative right-wing manifestations, although it is important to note that
claims of common ancestral lineage and shared culture (understood in broader terms) as defining characteristics of
the Japanese nation have been made by members of a variety of political stripes over Japan's postwar history,
including the progressive left. Gayle, 2001; Doak, 1997; 200 Ia. This point will be explored further in Chapter
Seven regarding the use of racialized ethnic claims by members of the JSP in the debate over the reversion of
Okinawa.
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Okinawans (who, despite their status as full citizens, still see themselves as ethnic minorities),
the ideal of an ethnically homogenous nation is central to the organic state narrative. 2 5 2 It was
voiced most prominently in 1986 by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who, after being
criticized for arguing that the level of knowledge was lower in the United States than in Japan
due to the presence of ethnic minorities in the former, elaborated on his reasoning as follows:
"The United States is a conglomerate state of multiple ethnic groups, which has its strengths,
but does not make it easy when it comes to education, and there is the case that educational
efforts do not reach the entire population. On this point, because Japan is an ethnically
homogenous nation (nihon wa tanitsu minzoku de), education reaches the entire
population." 253
Although this episode became widely seen a gaffe in which Nakasone insulted Japan's
most important international partner, he also received criticism from groups representing
self-identified ethnic and religious minorities in Japan. 254 Nakasone's response was instructive.
He first allowed that contemporary individuals who identify themselves as Japanese are
descended from a mixture of peoples, including the Ainu, who first populated the Japanese
archipelago. However, he went on to assert that, over the long history of human occupation of
the islands, these inhabitants mixed and became the unique homogenous nation of today. When
it was pointed out that he was in fact denying the very existence of minorities in contemporary
252 For work on contemporary ethnic minorities in Japan, see Chapman (2008); Fukuoka (2000); Lie (2001 &
2008); and Weiner, ed. (2009).
253 Asahi Shimbun, 25 September 1986.
254 For examples, see Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 1986 (Catholics), 18 October 1986 (Ainu), and 30 October 1986
(Buddhists).
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Japan, Nakasone then retreated slightly on to legal ground by clarifying that he meant only that
there are no internal groups that meet the legal definition of minorities to be protected under the
United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 25 5  The key point here is
the assertion that, whether originally descended from multiple groups or a single founding one,
the citizens of today's Japanese state share a cultural, linguistic and historical homogeneity
because they are the progeny of people who have continuously occupied the relatively isolated
Japanese archipelago since pre-historic times. In this view, it is this common genetic legacy
that serves as the basis for claims of a level of "ethnic" homogeneity that is extremely rare or
even unique among the populations of modem states.256
255 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, November 4, 1986.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (February 10, 2008). Article 27 of this treaty reads: "In those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language." At the time of Nakasone's comments, the Japanese government had
declared to the United Nations that no such minorities existed in Japan. Today, the government recognizes one
minority, the Ainu, under Article 27. Lie, 2001, p.9 3 .
256 The sociologist Oguma Eiji (2002a) has done important work on this narrative. However, his main
argument--that "mixed nation" was the dominant nation-state narrative during the Imperial or prewar period but was
replaced by the "homogeneous nation" narrative in the postwar period--is heavily dependent on a particular
analytical move. First, he defines "homogenous nation" as the assertions that 1) the "Japanese" have been a unique
homogenous nation from time immemorial (the origins story), and 2) the "Japanese" are today a unique homogenous
nation (the status quo story). Second, although he concedes that one might view "homogeneous nation" simply as
the status quo story, he argues that defining it that way would make the narrative too broad to analyze. (Oguma,
2002a, p.xxx) By thus focusing on only the origins story, Oguma is able to show that "mixed nation" narratives,
which assert that contemporary Japanese share ancestors in the very distant past with those of neighboring peoples,
predominated in the prewar period, when it was in the interest of supporters of expanding the Japanese Empire to
assert an (ancient) common ancestry with newly conquered peoples in order to facilitate colonial rule and the
domestic support for the imperial project. Yet, changes in the origins story do not always (or even often) correlate
with changes in the status quo story. His own analysis shows that many who he counts as "mixed nation"
advocates during the prewar and postwar periods still held on to the notion that contemporary Japanese were an
homogenous nation (i.e. the status quo story), whatever their actual origin was in prehistory. Since any position
that does not include a claim of eternal racial purity automatically becomes "mixed nation" in his treatment, this
allows him to claim that the "mixed nation" narrative predominated during the prewar period. If, for example, one
were to focus instead only on the status quo story, it seems likely that a different conclusion might result, even for
the prewar period. During that period, as Oguma's own research reveals, the dominant discourse may have been
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The remaining aspects of the organic state narrative specify individual elements in
support of the above general claim. The most prominent of these is the positioning of the
Emperor as the centerpiece of the union between the people and the Japanese state. In practice,
this takes the form of strong endorsements of the Imperial institution as a necessary unifying
force combining the nation (as an ethnic group) and the state. For example, speaking before
Diet in 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone described the Emperor's role in postwar Japan as
follows:
At such times (when rebuilding a country after defeat in war), as you might expect, ethnic
solidarity is most important and a good basis upon which to construct a social order. Here,
citizens consider together what is needed at the center in order to achieve ethnic solidarity
and unity. In (postwar) Japan's case, that was of course the Emperor system.257
It should be noted that some who advance the organic state narrative go further by
advocating revising Article One of the postwar constitution to change the legal status of the
Emperor from "symbol of the state" to "head of state" (genshu).258 Although advocates of this
change, such as Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, usually emphasize that it would not alter the
commitment to popular sovereignty, others see it as a reactionary nod to the prewar Emperor
"mixed nation" on the origins aspect but appears divided on the status quo aspect. If anything, "homogeneous
nation" notions seem more prevalent on this latter dimension. As noted above, the account of the "homogenous
nation-state" narrative modeled in the content analysis here focuses on the status quo dimension, and thus includes
both assertions that the Japanese are and have always been an ethnically homogenous nation and ones like
Nakasone's above, which only claim a contemporary ethnic homogeneity.
257 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, July 17, 1987.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (February 10, 2008).
2 For examples of this advocacy, see Boyd (2003, pp.102-103).
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system. 259 For the purposes of this study, the emphasis on the centrality of the Imperial
institution, whether viewed as symbolic or otherwise, is regarded as a key underpinning of the
organic state narrative.260
A related element of the organic state narrative is the assertion of a spiritual unity
linking the Japanese people and their state. In the postwar period, claims of this type resonate
strongly with prewar nationalist discourse, especially the rhetoric of State Shinto, the
state-sponsored religion of the prewar period that sought to unify the populace through the
common observance of rituals at Shinto shrines and the worship of the Emperor as the supreme
deity and direct descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu, the purported common ancestor of all
present-day Japanese. 26 1  Although the U.S. occupation authorities and the newly-ratified
postwar constitution abolished state support for religious activities and guaranteed freedom of
religion, the decision to retain the Imperial institution while denying its divinity nevertheless
maintained a space for continued claims of spiritual unity between people and state. However,
due to the negative association between State Shinto and the war effort in the minds of everyday
Japanese as well as the constitutional separation of church and state, direct appeals to this
259 Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 8, 1957.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 201 1):"If we only change the word to "genshu" or whatever from
"symbol," which it is now, it is not my thought to expand the Emperor's political mandate, but, from the perspective
of representing the country in international relations, all other countries, including democracies, use a president or
other personage as head of state, so there is absolutely no contradiction with democracy here.
260 This element was thus simply modeled as a code for positive references to the Emperor, Imperial family or the
Imperial institution.
261 For an excellent review of the long-term relationship between Shinto and the Japanese state, see Hardacre
(1989).
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spiritual unity became both politically and legally controversial in the postwar period.262 As a
result, when such appeals are made, they are often couched in references to Japan's history as a
nation-state. For example, in defense of his kami no kuni statement, Prime Minister Mori
explained he was merely "expressing the country's permanent history and traditional culture"
rather than treating the Emperor as a figure of religious reverence. 263 Nowhere is this
conflation of claims of spiritual unity with assertions of historical continuity more apparent than
in references to the relationship between the postwar state and the Yasukuni shrine.
The facility at the current site of Yasukuni shrine was originally established in 1869 by
the Meiji Emperor to honor those who had died fighting in support of Imperial forces during the
Meiji Restoration. In 1879, a new imperial decree renamed the site Yasukuni jinja ("Shrine of
the Peaceful Country") and placed it under the direct administrative control of the ministries of
the Army and Navy. In 1901, all local shrines honoring the spirits of war dead were made
subsidiaries of the Yasukuni shrine, a relationship that was fully institutionalized in 1939, when
the priests of these local shrines became public officials. 264  Throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, Yasukuni shrine was the only national site in which all the spirits of Japan's
262 Article Twenty of the postwar constitution reads: "Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. 2) No person shall be
compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. 3) The State and its organs shall refrain
from religious education or any other religious activity."
263 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 17 May 2000.
264 Seraphim, 2006, p.2 3 3 .
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ever-accumulating number of war dead were enshrined and the primary ceremonial location
where the Emperor himself honored those who died for him. According to Shinto practice,
individuals enshrined at Yasukuni join to form a collective spirit that reflects the ideal of
national homogeneity at the heart of prewar kokutai ideology.265 In this way, Yasukuni became
an important symbol cementing the spiritual relationship between the Emperor, the military,
whose ranks were filled by ordinary subjects and thus served as a proxy for the people, and the
state. 266
Despite the claim of spiritual unity that Yasukuni embodies, the issue of its relation to
the state in the postwar period increasingly came to be expressed using the language of history
rather than religion. Following the defeat in 1945, Yasukuni was stripped of its status as an organ
of the state by occupation authorities and the enactment of the new constitution with its
prohibition of state involvement in religious activities. Rebuilding the link between the shrine
and the state thus became a major goal of the postwar right-wing. Right-wing advocacy groups,
such as the previously mentioned SAS and Association of Shinto Shrines, doggedly pursued this
goal for decades, an effort that initially culminated in an unsuccessful legislative drive in the late
1960s to mid-1970s. 26 7 To avoid constitutional issues, the supporters of this legislation argued
265 Ibid.
266 In addition to Seraphim (2006), recent scholarly accounts of the Yasukuni issue include Tanaka (2002a);
Shibuichi (2005); Takahashi (2005a); and Breen, ed. (2008).
267 Powles, 1976; Seraphim, 2006, pp.2 3 8 -2 39 . Other major right-wing political advocacy groups who have
supported official roles for Yasukuni include Japan Association of Bereaved Families (Nippon izoku kai), Military
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that the use of "shrine" in the site's name was merely an artifact of its long history and thus did
not reflect its current "non-religious" purpose, which was to conduct ceremonies and rituals to
express the citizenry's gratitude and reverence for those who had died in their country's service,
a function similar to that of Arlington Cemetery in the United States. 268 Thus, as with Mori's
defense of his kami no kuni comment above, a rhetorical shift occurred in which matters
previous imbued with a strong spiritual significance were now portrayed as historical practices
and traditions with no religious importance. It should be noted that this rhetorical move
continues to be utilized today, most recently in the constitutional revision proposal approved by
the LDP in 2005, which proposes to weaken the language prohibiting state involvement in
religious practices by allowing exceptions for "social ceremonies and folk practices," a clear
reference to Yasukuni.269
The final element of the organic state narrative is the call for a more thorough adherence
to "traditional" civic morality. Although the specifics are often left somewhat vague, in
practice, rhetoric of this sort emphasizes that citizens have duties as well as rights vis-d-vis the
Pensions Federation (Gunjin onkyu renmei), Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) and the Association to Commemorate
the Spirits of Fallen Heroes (Eirei ni kotaeru kai). Shibuichi, 2005.
268 For an example of these arguments, see Sato Bunsei's comments introducing the bill before the Cabinet
Committee of the House of Representatives on May 24, 1971. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 27, 2011).
Incidentally, Sato was a model used in Gerald Curtis's Election Campaigning, Japanese Style (1971).
269 Liberal Democratic Party, 2005. References affirming or encouraging visits by Japanese leaders as well as calls
to return Yasukuni to government control were thus counted under the code "Support Yasukuni Shrine" in the
content analysis.
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state. These duties include to love and protect the country (territory and state), to respect the
Emperor, and to refrain from allowing individual pursuits to damage the public interest or order.
In addition, the organic state narrative, which offers the family as the natural model for
the state, also incorporates calls for citizens to respect their elder family members. Although
this last exhortation may seem more personal than civic, it evokes images of the prewar "family
system," in which households (ideally composed of grandparents, their son, and his wife and
children) were treated as the basic unit of Japanese law. In this household system (ieseido), a
usually male head (koshu) was given special legal rights over other household members,
including the right to allow or to forbid legal contracts concerning matters such as marriages or
adoptions. In fact, households were considered the relevant parties in most civil and criminal
matters. Following the war, a major reform of civic law abolished this system due to its
oppressive impact on women and inconsistency with new constitutional protections of individual
rights. Although advocates of the organic state narrative in the postwar period almost never
directly call for a revival of this prewar system of social control and institutionalized male
dominance, they often evoke or idealize aspects of it through references to "traditional" Japanese
family morality, particular appeals to filial piety and Confucian notions of respecting and
obeying elders. 270
270 For more on the prewar family system and its postwar influence, see Garon (1997); Shimizu (1987).
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In this way, the morality emphasized in the organic state narrative is one in which the
dutiful citizen simultaneously loves, respects and obeys two levels of authority based on familial
claims: the state, which rules a homogenous nation of common descent with the Emperor as the
symbolic father figure, and the household head, an ideally male figure who plays the same
fatherly role in managing the affairs of other family members. 27'
The decision to include the organic state narrative in this study was an obvious one.
First, the mere mention of the term "nationalism" with regard to postwar Japan will almost
certainly evoke a linkage to at least one element of this narrative. In fact, much of the
journalistic and scholarly treatments of nationalism in postwar Japan actually focus either
exclusively or at length on this narrative alone. Second, like the trading state narrative, this
narrative has strong roots in the prewar nationalist discourse and can thus serve as an important
point of comparison in analysis with the other narratives examined here, which have far less
demonstrable ties to prewar nationalisms. Finally, it is important to note that elements of the
organic state narrative continue to be relevant to the national visions promoted by conservative
politicians and right-wing political advocacy groups. For example, Abe Shinz6's "beautiful
country" agenda incorporated educational reforms to encourage patriotic education as a
271 References of support for these moral values were counted under the code "Enforce Traditional Values" in the
content analysis.
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compulsory subject as well as measures to facilitate the revision of the constitution at a time
when his party's revision proposal called for the Emperor to be made "head of state."
IV. Peace State (Peace-loving State, Anti-Nuclear State)
In July 2005, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a short fact sheet entitled "60
Years of Progress as a Peace State" (Heiwa kokka toshite no 60-nen no ayumi). The document,
which is directed mainly at Japan's Asian neighbors, begins by linking the country's past with its
present:
At one time in the past, our country, following a mistaken national policy of colonial
occupations and invasions, inflicted great damage and pain to many countries, especially to
the people of the countries of Asia. Humbly accepting these historical facts and keeping
feelings of deep remorse and sincere apology in our hearts, throughout the sixty years since
the end of the war, our country, as a peace state supported by a strong democracy, has
maintained an exclusively defensive defense policy, has avoided furthering international
conflicts, and has made the maximum commitment of our national resources to
international peace and stability.272
The fact sheet then highlights Japan's efforts based on the "ideals of the peace state."
These include its "exclusively defensive defense" posture, which refers to the maintenance of
military capabilities at the "minimum level necessary to defend the country" and the banning of
"offensive weapons," the complete absence of the use of force in international affairs in the
postwar period, the maintenance of the defense budget at 1% of national GDP, and the "three
272 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website. Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/ayumi.html
(August 29, 2011).
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non-nuclear principles" (a ban against having, producing or introducing nuclear weapons into
Japan). The document goes on to list national efforts to avoid the furthering of international
conflicts, such as Japan's ban on arms exports and its work as the "world's only victim of a
nuclear weapon" to promote disarmament and non-proliferation in the world, especially with
regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The sheet concludes by referencing Japan's
postwar efforts to actively contribute to international peace and stability, including its support for
the United Nations, official development assistance programs, especially the controls in place to
ensure these funds are not diverted for military purposes, and contributions to international
peace-keeping operations. 273
This fact sheet represents a fairly recent example of the official government-approved
version of what is here referred to as the peace state narrative. According to this narrative, the
Japanese people are proclaimed to be a fundamentally peace-loving nation that regrets the
actions of the Japanese state during World War Two and vows never again to allow its state
freely to use violence as a means of settling international disputes. In this way, claims about
both the fundamental nature of the nation and its historical experiences place demands on the
state and its policies. Although, as will be shown below, there is considerable variation in the
extent and severity of these demands across different proponents of this narrative, the essential
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273 Ibid.
common denominator is that unique qualities and experiences of the Japanese nation place
restrictions on the Japanese state's conduct of security and foreign policy that do not apply to
other countries and thus distinguish Japan as a "peace state."274
Two factors comprise the essential link between the nation and the state in the peace state
narrative. First, the Japanese are asserted to be a uniquely peace-loving people. For some,
this essential quality derives from the rare historical situation of relative isolation in antiquity
combined with the early adoption of agriculture, while others point conversely to the Japanese
nation's "traditional character of tolerance and adaptation," which hones a peaceful outlook by
easing the tolerance and even adaptation of aspects of foreign culture, exemplified by the
long-standing co-existence of Shinto beliefs with Buddhism in Japan. 275  Second, the events of
the wartime period are presented both as a tragic and regretful betrayal of this fundamental
nature and as the recent, shared experience that rededicated the nation to its natural peaceful
pursuits.
References to this correction by historical fire are common and span the political
spectrum. For instance, in 1999, Norota Hosei, then director-general of the Japan Defense
274 References to Japan as a peace state (heiwa kokka) were counted under the code "Peace State." References to
Japan as a "nuclear victim country" (hibakukoku) or the "world's only victim of a nuclear weapon" (yuiitsu no
hibakukoku) were counted under the code "Nuclear Victim State." For discussion of this narrative and its element,
see Orr (2001); Yamamoto (2004); Berger (1998); Boyd & Samuels (2005).
275 For an example of the former view of the origin of this fundamental nature, see Oguma (2002a, p.322), while the
analysis of New Year's Day editorials by Takekawa (2007, pp.65-66) provides a good example of the latter view.
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Agency for the LDP-led, center-right government of Obuchi Keizo, declared before the Diet,
"[I]t is a fact that our country's actions in the last war took a high toll on the citizens of our
neighboring countries and, as a consequence, it is necessary that we remain determined to follow
the road of the peace state and never again go to war." 276  In the 1960s, the center-left daily
Asahi Shimbun argued in its editorials that wartime experience, especially the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were transformative, granting Japan a unique moral authority to lead
in the quest for international peace.2 7 7  In this, the paper's editorialists argued, the Japanese
people should find a new sense of national pride. 2 78
A key institutional referent for the peace state narrative is Article Nine of the postwar
constitution. Article Nine, along with the rest of the postwar constitution, was enacted in May
1947 and has never been amended. It reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a
means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not
be recognized.
276 Norota Hsei, Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee,
House of Representatives, February 18, 1999. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).
277 Takekawa, 2007, p. 6 6 .
271 Such references to the wartime experiences and their consequences are thus the essential cognitive schema of the
peace state narrative. In the content analysis, these have been grouped under the codes "War Regret" for general
expression of regret for Japan's wartime actions and "Atomic Bombings," for specific references to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and their meaning for postwar Japan.
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Appeals to the constitution as the legal manifestation of the peace state narrative are
common and span the political spectrum from all corners of the left to what has been called the
pragmatic right and even further. 279  For example, speaking before the Diet in 1955, Katayama
Testsu, who had become the first socialist to serve as prime minister during the occupation
period, lectured then Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichir6 on the importance of Article Nine and the
"Peace Constitution":
We have a state with the great responsibility to secure the peaceful lives of its citizens,
ensuring that the calamities (of the war) never occur again, along with the fear and poverty;
and from that point, we built a democratic state to realize the people's sovereignty, while at
the same time established a peace constitution commensurate with this (new democratic
state) and have since progressed as a peace state, the peaceful Japan; it was under this
conception, under these ideals, that Article Nine was established.280
Although often associated with leftist politics in general and the Japan Socialist Party in
particular, this emphasis on the connection between Article Nine and the peace state narrative is
also common among those of other political stripes. For example, in 1987, Aoshima Yukio, an
independent member of the House of Councillors, addressed Prime Minister Nakasone in a
similar way: "In the general citizen's view, after that abhorrent Pacific War, our country began
down the new path of the peace state under the "peace constitution." 28 1 More importantly, the
1 For an extensive discussion of the place of Article Nine debate in postwar politics, see Boyd (2003); Boyd &
Samuels (2005).
280 Katayama Tetsu, Rightist Socialist Party of Japan, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 26,
1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).
281 Aoshima Yukio, Independent, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, May 20, 1987. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).
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constitutional foundation of the peace state narrative is also referred to by leaders on the political
right. One interesting example of this occurred during the debate over Japan's response to the
Gulf crisis in October 1990, when future prime minister and defense hawk Koizumi Junichir6
declared:
Given the Constitution, Japan has no choice but to pursue an independent pacifist policy
(ikkoku heiwa shugi). This is the experiment, whereby Japan has been trying to develop
such a policy as an integral part of its people's way of life for the past fifty postwar years, no
matter whether the international community understands such a policy or not."282
Despite the widespread emphasis of this integral relationship between Article Nine and
the peace state narrative, it is important to note that different proponents of this narrative
interpret the connection in different ways. Across much of the left during the postwar period,
Article Nine was seen to mandate a doctrine of state non-violence. In this view, the
constitution forbids the state from participating in any type of war, aggressive or defensive, and
from maintaining any type of military capabilities whatsoever. 283 For example, during the
public unrest over the Kishi government's efforts to renew the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960,
Suzuki Tsuyoshi of the JSP attacked Kishi's plans before the Diet declaring, "I believe our
country, which just fifteen years ago suffered a calamitous defeat due to the reckless politics of
military factionalism, should move forward by establishing a peace state, a civilized state, that,
in accordance with the peace constitution, abandons all armaments."
282 Quoted in Yamamoto, 2004, p.2 .
283 Boyd, 2003; Shidehara, 1951, pp.210-15; Schlichtmann, 1995, pp.5 1-3.
He then went on to
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declare both Japan's newly-founded Self-Defense Force and the security treaty with the United
States to be in violation of the constitution and this vision of the peace state. 284 In this view, the
peace state can thus neither have arms nor use them for any purpose, even self-defense.
On the other hand, proponents of the peace state narrative on the right, as well as successive
governments from the 1950s to those led by the Democratic Party of Japan today, hold that the
central ideal behind Article Nine, and thus the peace state, is state non-aggression. According
to this interpretation, aggressive war and the possession of armaments for that purpose are
renounced, but the state retains the right to possess military capabilities and to use them as
necessary to preserve its existence as a sovereign entity. This view of Article Nine and the
proper limits of the peace state, therefore, allowed early proponents on the pragmatic right, such
as Yoshida Shigeru and Sat6 Eisaku, to employ the peace state narrative to argue for an elaborate
set of restrictions on the Japanese state's abilities to maintain and use military capabilities.
Over time, this less extreme take on the relationship between Article Nine and the peace state, at
least as a general principle, became the official position of all postwar governments. So, for
284 Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Japan Socialist Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1960. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
285 These restrictions include many of the detailed items mentioned on the MFA fact sheet above, such as the
exclusively defensive posture, ban on offensive weapons, 1% GDP ceiling for defense spending, as well as others,
such as the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. For more on these restrictions, see Chapter
Six.
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example, it was this version of the peace state narrative to which Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro was referring when he stated before the Diet in 1985:
The very purpose of protecting the constitution is to make Japan a peace state; however, to
do this, we must make it at least a country that has the minimum necessary self-defense
capabilities to avoid tempting foreign countries to invade; in this way, I think of myself as
the greatest supporter of the current constitution. 286
Considering these different usages, it is thus important to note that the peace state
narrative, often with the exact same language, was utilized across the political spectrum by
proponents who positioned themselves at various points between the poles of between state
non-violence and state non-aggression. In addition, it should be noted that over the course of
the postwar period, different individuals and political parties shifted their positions on this scale,
usually to move closer to the state non-aggression position. 287 However, the common
denominator uniting all of these usages is the assertion that the qualities and experiences of the
Japanese nation place restrictions on their state's security and foreign policies that other
nation-states do not have. Although these restrictions may range from complete bans to
qualified allowances, the idea that the Japanese state must conduct its security and foreign policy
under a set of unique restrictions is at the heart of nearly all references to the constitution in the
peace state narrative.288
286 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, Budget Committee, February 5, 1985.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
287 Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Hook, 1996.
288 References to these restrictions were coded in the content analysis as follows. First, general references to
Article Nine or the constitution in the context of security policy were coded under "Support Peace Constitution."
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The peace state narrative also makes claims on the Japanese state's conduct of foreign policy,
although in this area the claims are more prescriptive than proscriptive. For instance, the
Japanese state is to conduct its foreign affairs following the principles of "peace diplomacy"
(heiwa gaikd), a somewhat ambiguous term that generally refers to both 1) the use of every
non-violent means available to forward the national interest in dealings with other countries; and,
more specifically, 2) the leveraging of Japan's image as a "peace state" to enhance friendly ties
with international partners, who will be naturally predisposed to cooperate due to Japan's
non-threatening posture. With regard to this second point, especially in dealing with Asian
neighbors, publicly expressing regret for Japan's past invasions and colonial occupations in the
region is an oft-repeated requirement.289 For example, in 1998, Kijima Hideo of the Japan
Communist Party, in criticizing the Japan's recent foreign policy towards Asia before the Diet,
chastised then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo as follows:
References to special restrictions in the area of personnel, equipment and budget for military capabilities were coded
as "Restrain War Potential." These include restrictions on both the type and quantity of equipment, personnel and
funding that may be applied to the state's military capabilities. References to special restrictions in the area of the
actions the Japanese state may take with regard to the use of force in its international dealings were coded as
"Eschew Use of Force." These include references to restrictions on the overseas deployment of military personnel,
restrictions on what actions may be taken by military personnel once deployed overseas, and related limitations on
the Japanese state's exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In addition, references to Japan's non-nuclear
policy (i.e. "Three Non-nuclear Principles) were coded under "Support Non-Nuclear Principles." Please note that
only the first code above is a direct reference to Article Nine or the postwar constitution. The other three codes
count references to restrictions that may or may not be explicitly linked to Article Nine in the broader context of a
particular speech or editorial but are definitely part and parcel of the peace state narrative as a whole.
289 Due to the ambiguity with which this term is sometimes used and its potential overlap with codes such as
"Eschew Use of Force" and "War Regret," references to this proscription were coded as "Implement Peace
Diplomacy" only in instances in which the key word heiwa gaik5 appeared and either referred to the concept only in
general terms or specifically mentioned the leveraging of Japan's image as a peace state in foreign affairs.
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It is my belief that the starting point of postwar politics is that Japan can only conduct its
peace diplomacy (heiwa gaikd) in Asia if the cabinet is united around the stance that the
country deeply regrets the last wars of invasion and is advancing its diplomacy by strictly
adhering to the principles of the peace state.2 9 0
Finally, the peace state narrative also calls on the Japanese state to pursue peace outside
of its borders, especially through efforts to further international disarmament and fight the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 29 1 The linkage between Japan's commitment to being a peace
state and these activities is explicit in this construction. For example, in Diet testimony in 1981,
then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenk5 summed up this normative claim succinctly:
Both a peace state and the world's only victim of a nuclear weapon, Japan, having
experienced the misery of war's calamities and the great tragic sacrifices of those atomic
bombings, must face the world and strongly call for the reduction and elimination of
nuclear arms. 29 2
As with the trading state narrative above, the different components of the peace state
narrative deeply intertwined in practice and should be treated as a single narrative group.
However, for analytical purposes, it is possible to identify two "sub-narratives" within these
tightly-wound components. The first, referred to as the "Peace-loving State" sub-narrative,
emphasizes the trajectory from the overall failures of wartime Japan's actions to the "peace
constitution" to a "peace state" that is uniquely constrained in its capacity to use force and
290 Kijima Hideo, Japan Communist Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, August 19, 1998.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
291 References to the assertion that Japan should make efforts in arms control and the reduction of conventional
weapons in other countries were coded as "Support International Disarmament." This included references to
specific policies such as Japan's arms export ban and efforts to keep official development assistance funds from
being diverted to military use. References to the assertion that Japan should contribute to reduce and even
eliminate nuclear weapons globally were separately coded as "Support International Nuclear Disarmament."
292 Suzuki Zenk6, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Concillors, March 8, 1981. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
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dedicated to pursuing the reduction of conventional weapons overseas. 293 The second, referred
to here as the "anti-nuclear state" sub-narrative, stresses the connections between the horror and
loss of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's unique status as the only victim of a nuclear attack, and
its resultant moral mission to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, both
by refraining from pursuing nuclear weapons at home and promoting nuclear disarmament
abroad. 294 As with the trading state narrative, dividing this narrative into two major
components allows for easy comparisons when considering changes within the narrative group
over time.
The peace state narrative was selected for inclusion in this study for the following
reasons. First, the narrative and its individual elements are often addressed in academic work
on Japan's postwar nationalism and national identity. These include both histories of the period
and work in political science and sociology about analyzing the origin and impact of national
identities on security policy. 295  Second, although pacifism and related thought have a longer
history in Japan, the peace state narrative itself is a creation of the immediate postwar years and
thus provides a contrast with narratives such as those of the trading and organic state, which
293 The "peace-loving state" sub-narrative includes the following seven codes: "Peace State," "Support Peace
Constitution," "Implement Peace Diplomacy," "Eschew Use of Force," "Restrain War Potential," "Support
International Disarmament," and "War Regret."
294 The "anti-nuclear state" sub-narrative includes the following four codes: "Nuclear Victim State," "Atomic
Bombings," "Support Non-Nuclear Policy," and "Support International Nuclear Disarmament."
295 McVeigh, 2004; Orr, 2001, Yamamoto, 2004; Seraphim, 2006; Dower, 1999; Oguma, 2002b; Katzenstein, 1996a,
Berger, 1998; Samuels, 2007; Doak, 2007.
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Finally, it is important to understand how a narrative that repeatedly
calls for state restraint in security policy develops and changes, especially in a region plagued by
nuclear proliferation and ever-increasing military spending.
V. Democratic State
Today, some ten odd years after the war, the democracy that at the time was relatively
unfamiliar to us, has at last spread its roots into Japan's soil. I feel that this democracy
constitutes the spiritual foundation of the new Japan, and it is my intention to defend it, no
matter what difficulties are encountered, and nurture it.297
It may come as a surprise to some that the man who uttered these words in June 1959
was Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a former member of General Tojo's wartime cabinet who
spent the immediate postwar years in Sugamo Prison as a suspected Class A war criminal. At
the time of his death in 1987, Kishi was accused by at least one obituary writer of having been "a
reactionary determined to move Japan away from an alien-imposed democracy back towards the
authoritarian state of the prewar years." 298 During his tenure as prime minister, this staunch
conservative called for the abrogation of Article Nine and only six months before making the
above statement had tried but failed to pass a law granting the police greater powers of search
and seizure, a move widely seen as a means of cracking down on political dissent. 299 That such
296 For a brief account of postwar scholars' efforts to assert prewar roots for pacifism in Japan, see Benfell (1998,
pp. 14 -1 5).
297 Quoted from Kurzman (1960, p.373).
298 Obituary, The Times, 10 August 1987; Cited in Kersten (1996, p. 1 99).
299 Watanabe, 2002, p. 5 9 0 - 59 3 . Although a long-standing supporter of revision, Kish and his interpreter argue that
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have deep prewar roots. 296
a leader felt compelled to use his bully pulpit to further what is here called the democratic state
narrative is thus indicative of the extent to which even the right-wing "firmly embraced the
overwhelmingly popular rhetoric of democracy" in the postwar period.300
The democratic state narrative is somewhat different from the other nation-state
narratives examined here in that it can be voiced in both universalistic and particularistic
ways.30 Kevin Doak has called this "the problem of democracy and 'identity,' or as it is
expressed at times, 'universalism' and 'tradition.,,, 302 On the one hand, democracy is portrayed
as a home-grown feature of the Japanese nation-state that is deeply rooted in the Japanese
people's historical experiences, culture and traditions. In this way, the democratic state
narrative depicts a uniquely Japanese form of the regime type with roots that stretch back into
the prewar period. On the other hand, democracy is also treated as a set of universalistic ideals
as well as a regime type that Japan shares with other countries. In this light, as in Kishi's
statement above, democracy is sometimes portrayed as relatively new to Japan, a foreign import
(or imposition, depending on the context), and a point of commonality with other
the reporter to which Kishi supposedly made this statement about Article Nine misunderstood his meaning. See
Kishi (1983, pp.439-440). On the police duties bill, see Hara (1988, p.245).
300 Seraphim, 2006, p.4 5 .
301 All references to Japan as a "democratic state" (minshushugi kokka), "liberal state" (jiyaishugi kokka) or related
variants were coded under "Democratic State" in the content analysis.
302 Doak, 1999, p.523.
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nation-states. 303 It is thus important to note the democratic state narrative incorporates both
particularistic and universalistic claims.
The particularistic aspects of the democratic state narrative often include the claim of
the historical continuity of the political community across the prewar and postwar political
orders. Some such assertions are grounded in references to Japan's constitution. In one rather
extreme example, Yoshida Shigeru, the first postwar prime minister, emphasized continuities
between the postwar and prewar constitutions, even going so far as to state, "I have no hesitation
whatsoever in declaring that the political character of Japan as shaped by the constitution
authorized by the Emperor Meiji is, in the language of the present day, preeminently democratic,
pre-eminently un-militaristic." 304  Yoshida then concluded that the postwar constitution would
not transform "the political character of the Japanese people" because "democratic government
is not being established for the first time by the new constitution, which does no more than
express again in different words what the country has always had." 305 Other forms of this claim,
however, locate the continuity directly in the Japanese people, whose love of consensus and
303 It should be noted that the assertion that democracy was new to postwar Japan is historically inaccurate. As
Dower (2003, p.6) concludes, "What pre-1945 Japan experienced was not the absence of democracy, but its failure."
In this way, as with the trading and organic state narrative, the democratic state narrative has considerable roots in
the prewar period.
304 Dower, 1979, pp.3 2 2 -3 2 3 .
305 Ibid., pp.324-325.
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social harmony and prewar experience with democratic institutions makes them a natural fit for
the popular sovereignty unambiguously granted them by the postwar constitution. 306
More tempered takes on the particularism of the democratic state narrative usually allow
that defeat in the war and foreign occupation played roles in the development of Japan's
democratic state but nonetheless prioritize the essential contributions of Japan's own history,
culture and traditions. A good example of this somewhat nuanced approach is offered by Prime
Minister Kaifu Toshiaki's testimony before the Diet in 1990:
It is true the changes in Japan during the years immediately following the end of the
war-being defeated in the fight and then choosing the road of the democratic state
(minshushugi kokka)-in a certain sense might be seen as the result of external stimulus or
foreign pressure (gaiatsu). However, it was we (the Japanese people) who resolved to live
under liberty and democracy and, in the process of making the continuous and
single-hearted efforts to build the nation in that direction, although using the word
"Japanese-style" (nihon gata) may be overstating it, I believe we all worked to establish a
democracy that befits Japan's own history, culture and traditions. 307
The universalism of the democratic state narrative is expressed in varying degrees.
Perhaps the most expansive is the vision promoted in the early postwar period by the philosopher
Maruyama Masao as kokuminshugi, sometimes translated as "civic nationalism" but what he
referred to as "healthy nationalism" (kenzen na kokuminshugi).308 Building on the work of
306 As with proponents of the peace state narrative, advocates of the democratic state narrative thus point to the
postwar constitution as a legal foundation for their national vision, especially Article One, which relegates the
Emperor to symbolic status and assigns sovereign power to the people.
307 Kaifu Toshiaki, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, June 4, 1990. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
308 Maruyama, 1995 [1961]; Doak, 2007, p. 2 0 6 -2 0 6 .
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Meiji-era scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi, Maruyama developed conceptions of personal and social
autonomy based on appeals to universal ideals of individualism and explicitly rejected
nationalisms premised on ethnicity or other particularistic claims. 309  Although Maruyama was
primarily concerned with how the individual retains autonomy in relations with both society and
the state, his influence helped make universal appeals to democratic ideals a distinguishing
aspect of Japan's postwar nationalist discourse.3 1 0  This can be seen in the numerous instances
in which the democratic state narrative is used to introduce ideal models of democracy to justify
the more thorough enforcement of democratic principles in Japan. 3 1  To give just one example,
Ueda K~ichr6 of the Japan Communist Party, in a 1989 debate over campaign finance reform
with Prime Minister Kaifu, began his argument by referencing the democratic state narrative:
"Although there is much current debate, as long as Japan is a democratic state based on the
principles of the constitution, I think we should realize the ban on political donations from
corporations and organizations with the utmost speed."m
A final expression of the democratic state narrative occupies a middle ground between
the particularistic and universalistic poles. Although perhaps properly viewed as a form of
309 Maruyama, 1963, p.1 5 1-15 2 .
340 Kersten, 1996, pp. 2 3 1-233.
311 All references to the need for more thorough enforcement of democratic principles in Japan were coded under
"Enforce Democratic Principles." This includes such matters as calls for fairer elections, closer adherence to
"democratic rules" "democratic politics," and "parliamentary rules," stricter implementation of "civilian control,"
and the guarding of individual freedom at home.
312 Ueda Koichr6, Japan Communist Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, October 24, 1989. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
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universalism, the exclusionary nature of these claims can approach particularism.313 For
example, particularly during the Cold War, the democratic state narrative was often employed to
emphasize Japan's uniqueness from its neighbors. In one such common usage, Japan is
asserted to be either the only or the leading democracy in Asia. "Japan itself, as a member of
Asia, has developed as a dignified, superior, rich democratic state," began Foreign Minister
Ohira Masayoshi in 1964, "I think this is clearly the basis for us to be the guiding post for
Asia." 314
An additional, somewhat less exclusionary type of claim involves identifying Japan as a
member of the community of democratic states. During the Cold War, this claim was
sometimes made to signal Japan's allegiance to the side of the United States and its allies,
although it was also used to distinguish Japan from the non-democratic Communist Block.
Following the end of the Cold War, this appeal has often been used to emphasize bilateral ties.
For example, in 2006, Nukaga Fukushir6, then director-general of the Japan Defense Agency,
argued that shared values of liberalism and democracy between Japan and the United States
provide a good example for why creating a broader community of democracies in Asia would
contribute to the peace and stability of Japan, the region and the world.m In 2007, Prime
313 All references to Japan as a member of the community of democracies, the free world or bilateral identifications
with fellow democratic states were coded under "Member of Free World" in the content analysis.
314 Ohira Masayoshi, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 4, 1964. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
315 Nukaga FukushirO, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 17, 2006.
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Minister Abe Shinzo used similar rhetoric of shared values when he reached out to India calling
the pair "the two great democratic states of Asia." 316
The democratic state narrative thus operates, sometimes simultaneously, on both
particularistic and universalistic levels. In the former, it establishes a social category in the
same way as other nation-state narratives in this study, in this case by emphasizing how the
Japanese are a "civic" nation born of a unique history, culture and traditions and thus demand a
state that reflects this fundamental nature. In the latter, it appeals to universal ideals to establish
a social category that is an "external-origin entity" that, while still doing the work of establishing
a necessary link between nation and state, also transcends this link by facilitating identifications,
however partial, with the nation-state narratives and resultant social categories of other
countries.3 17  In this appeal to universal ideals, some variants of the democratic state narrative
thus challenge narrow views of what nationalism can be and, in doing so, bear a likeness to what
some scholars refer to as "liberal nationalism."3 18
The democratic state narrative was included in this study for several reasons. First,
concerns with democracy usually occupy the central place in studies of postwar Japanese
nationalism. These include both work that emphasizes the generation and change of
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndI.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
316 Abe ShinzO, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 13, 2007.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
317 Kersten, 1996, p.2 3 1 .
318 Gayle, 2001, p. 7 .
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democratic aspects of Japanese nationalism and those mainly concerned with the relationship of
nationalism and the health of postwar Japanese democracy. 319  Second, the democratic state
narrative is also an example of a postwar nation-state narrative with prewar roots, although
perhaps not to the degree of the trading and organic state narratives. Finally, the universalistic
aspects of the democratic state narrative provide a somewhat unique opportunity to examine a
nation-state narrative that can draw a link between nation and state while still leaving open the
possibility for linkages at even higher levels across national borders. This aspect allows for
contrast with more purely exclusionary discursive forms, such as the organic state narrative.
VI. Civilized State (Cultured State, Welfare State)
[A]nd still further we went on to build a cultural great power (bunka taikoku), a cultured,
civilized state (bunka bunmei kokka) and, in my view, is this not the constant goal to which
we all must aspire? In so doing, I think the thing for us to be proud of is our people, of
course. Japan's fortune is its people. Although from now we will see the arrival of the
world's greatest aging society, I say, is it not our role to send the world a message by
showing it a Japanese society in which the young and old alike can lead fulfilling, vital
lives?3 20
The above words, uttered by the LDP's Nukaga Fukushiro in Diet questioning of Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro in 2003, references prominently the civilized state narrative,
arguably the most complex narrative examined in this study. In this narrative, the Japanese are
319 Oguma, 2002b, Doak, 2007, McNeil, 2004, Bowen, 2003; Dower, 1999 & 2003.
320 Nukaga FukushirO, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, January 23, 2003.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndI.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).
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asserted to be a highly civilized nation in the sense that they place great weight on ensuring both
their own cultural development and basic welfare. This fundamental nature of the people must
thus be reflected in their state, generally by prioritizing cultural and welfare policies.m The
somewhat unique linkage between culture and welfare in this formulation is explicit. "When I
think of the tremendous amount of work that must be done from here in order to rebuild Japan as
a cultured state (bunka kokka), a welfare state (fukushi kokka)," said Director-General of the
Home Affairs Agency Aoki Masashi in 1959, "as local governments will actually be managing
the requisite cultural and welfare facilities (of this new state), we must reinforce them and, in
addition, I think, with regard to their ties to the national government, it is necessary to maintain
routine links with them." 322
The simultaneous emphasis on cultural development and basic welfare is grounded in
both postwar legal developments as well as the prewar origin and lingering ambiguity of the key
term "culture" (bunka). Regarding the former, as with proponents of the peace state (Article
Nine) and the democratic state (Article One, among others) narratives, advocates of the civilized
321 General references to the Japan as a civilized or cultured state (bunka kokka, bunka bunmei kokka) were counted
in the content analysis under "Civilized/Cultured State." Please note the discussion of the ambiguity of the term
bunka below.
322 Aoki Masahi, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 20, 1958. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011). Explicit references to Japan as a welfare state (fukushi kokka) were
coded in the content analysis as "Welfare State." Although culture and welfare are tightly linked in this narrative, to
the extent possible, references explicitly emphasizing one or the other were separated in the coding to facilitate
analysis at the sub-narrative level. See the discussion of the "cultured state" and "welfare state" sub-narratives
below.
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state narrative locate a legal foundation for their national vision in the postwar constitution, in
this case Article Twenty-Five, which reads:
All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome (kenkd de)
and cultured (bunkateki na) living.
In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of
social welfare (shakaifukushi) and security (shakai hoshd), and of public health.
Although perhaps less dramatic than the parts of the constitution cited by advocates of
other narratives, Article Twenty-Five nevertheless serves as an central institutional support for
both the link between culture and welfare and the demand that the state prioritize the
advancement of both. For example, Haseo Yukihisa of the Komei Party succinctly declared
before a Diet subcommittee in 1980 that "Article Twenty-Five of the constitution prescribes
'wholesome and cultured living' and makes it a duty of the state (to achieve). And the nation
(kokumin) asks for the realization of the welfare state (fukushi kokka) set out by the constitution
without further delay."323
A second factor linking culture and welfare involves the origins of the term bunka
(commonly translated today as "culture"). Although imported from Chinese during the
pre-modern period, bunka did not come into popular use in Japan until the Meiji period, when
pro-Western modernizers dubbed their project of social transformation "civilization and
323 Haseo Yukihisa, Komei Party, Third Budget Subcommittee, House of Representatives, March 5, 1980. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndi.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).
178
enlightenment" (bunmei kaika) and sometimes used it as an abbreviation of the longer slogan.324
At that time, the term was thus strongly associated with the achievements of Western civilization,
especially scientific and industrial development, and more generally with the concept of a
universal trajectory through which all societies achieve progress. It was not until the 1920s that
bunka came to take on the meaning of the particular values, practices and traditions that
distinguish one society from another. More specifically, the term became associated with
interest in art, architecture and literature and was seen as a contrast to the earlier emphasis on
material aspects of civilization. 325
Perhaps as a consequence of these evolving and contrasting usages of key terms, the
phrase bunka kokka, which can be translated as "civilized state" or "cultured state," takes on both
universalistic and particularistic forms in the postwar period.326 In its universalistic forms, the
term refers to a category of nation-state that has achieved either advanced levels of material
progress or high levels of cultural refinement, especially in artistic fields or on aesthetic terms.
The unifying theme is that such nation-states are able to guarantee a high quality of life for their
people. In its particularistic forms, however, bunka kokka emphasizes unique and superior (as
least in some ways) aspects of a particular nation-state's (in this case, Japan's) material progress
324 Morris-Suzuki, 1998, pp.63-65 .
325 Ibid.
326 McVeigh, 2004, pp. 18 8 -1 89 . Please note that McVeigh translates these alternatives as "civilized nation-state"
and "cultural nation-state." In the translations here, the fact that the "state" in question is a "nation-state" is
implied.
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or cultural development, with the implication again being that these features enhance and enrich
the lives of its people. In this way, as was the case with the democratic state narrative, the key
terms involved in the civilized state narrative exhibit features of both universalism and
particularism, but this time with regard to social welfare and culture.
In practice, whether in its universalistic or particularistic forms, the civilized state
narrative is regularly deployed to make claims on the state regarding either cultural or social
welfare policy. Regarding the former, the term bunka kokka, which in this case is perhaps best
translated as "cultured state," was defined in 1988 Diet testimony by then foreign minister and
future prime minister, Uno S~suke:
A cultured state is a country with many cultural assets (bunkazai) and many citizens
(kokumin) who protect these assets. In addition, I would say that a cultured state is also a
country in which there are many citizens who are capable of creating cultural assets, both
those handed down from the past and new ones that look to the future. 32 7
In this universalistic formulation, cultured state is thus an elite category to which Japan
can belong, presumably along with other nation-states. However, "cultured state" is also used
in particularistic ways that stress Japan's unique (and sometimes superior) culture and the
demands of its nation for the state to foster and protect this valued national asset. For example,
the LDP's Yoshida Minoru drew on this vein of the narrative in 1977 when he argued Japan still
had far to go in advancing its cultural policies in order to be a "true cultured state" (shin no
327 Uno SOsuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Second Budget Sub-Committee, House of Representatives, March 9,
1988. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6,2011).
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bunka kokka), including addressing cultural assets in child education and dealing with the
outflow of Japanese antiquities to foreign countries. 328  It was also to this strand of the narrative
which Takizawa K~suke, an artist-turned-politician, appealed when he complained in Diet
debate about the increased use of "strange foreign loan words" (hen na gairaigo) and its
deleterious impact on Japan's aspirations to be a "cultured state."329
Both forms of the narrative are commonly introduced to argue for increases or
improvements in the government's educational and cultural policies, especially the budget and
operation of the Agency of Cultural Affairs.33 0  This agency manages six policy areas with
"varying degrees of impact upon national identity formation: religious affairs, copyright,
language, arts, international exchange, and the protection of cultural assets." 33' In debates over
cultural policy, both the universalistic and particularistic variants are employed and sometimes
intermingled. For example, in a 2001 Diet exchange between the New K6mei Party's Sait6
Testuo and Prime Minister Koizumi, Saito began by asserting that a "cultured state" (bunka
kokka) that is respected for its unique culture and cultural contributions is the ideal to which
328 Yoshida Minoru, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, April 4, 1977. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
329 Takizawa KOsuke, Democratic Socialist Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 25, 1985.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
330 These claims are model in two different codes in the content analysis. "Support Japanese Culture" includes all
calls for Japan to foster and protect its domestic culture, including both traditional and innovational endeavors in
areas such as cuisine, theater, handcrafts, calligraphy, literature, film, music, art and sports, especially Japan's
traditional martial arts. This includes efforts to establish or improve national cultural facilities such as theaters or
museums , to improve cultural education, to establish and maintain national cultural prizes, and to protect domestic
cultural assets. References to cultural exchange (bunka k~rya) with other countries were counted under "Support
Cultural Exchange."
33 McVeigh, 2004, p. 16 6 .
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Japan should strive in the twenty-first century.3 3 2  Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro then
responded to Sait6's subsequent proposal to increase cultural policy spending by declaring his
desire to draft a "cultural budget" (bunka yosan) that would "leave Japan in no way inferior to
the world's other advanced cultural countries" (sekai no senshin bunka shokoku).m
A similar dichotomy of uses can be observed in debates over Japan as a "civilized state,
a welfare state" (bunka kokka toshite, fukushi kokka toshite). On the one hand, this narrative is
often utilized to highlight the Japanese nation's demands that its state guarantee basic welfare for
it citizens. 334  For example, testifying before the Diet in 1952, Waseda University Professor
Suetaka Makoto argued that since all members of the nation had suffered for the war effort, "as a
civilized state or a welfare state" (bunka kokka toshite, arui wa fukushi kokka), the state had to
honor these sacrifices by guaranteeing a minimum standard of living for all its nation's members,
both soldier and citizen alike. 3 35  Later in the postwar period, stronger particularistic assertions
were advanced, including some proclaiming a "Japanese-style welfare state" (nihongatafukushi
kokka) or a "Japanese-style welfare society" (nihongata fukushi shakai), although what exactly
was "Japanese-style" about the patterns of welfare provision in Japan was the subject of
332 Sait6 Testuo, New KOmei Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, May 14, 2001. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
33 Koizumi JunichirO, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, May 14, 200 1.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
34 References to improving Japan's social welfare programs, including pensions, health insurance, unemployment
insurance, family assistance, and support for the disabled were coded under "Improve Domestic Welfare Programs."
335 Professor Suetaka Makoto, Waseda University, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, December 6, 1952.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
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debate. 336 The most common assertion in support of this claim drew a link between a purported
preference among the Japanese for three or more generations to live in the same household and a
resultant reduced need for state provision for pensions and elderly care in comparison with that
of other countries. 337  On the other hand, such particularistic claims often sit side-by-side with
references to the welfare state as a general category of a nation-state that guarantees the basic
welfare of the members of its nation. This more universalistic usage occurs most often in the
form of comparisons between Japan's social welfare policies and those of the welfare states of
Europe and North America. In many cases, these comparisons are intended to be unfavorable
to Japan and spur renewed effort to achieve the ideals of the welfare state at home. For
example, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato told the Diet in 1960:
[T]he politicians in every country hope to realize a welfare state (fukushi kokka). However,
among some eighty countries, only seven or eight have. And these are in Europe and
Northern Europe, where social welfare systems took off extremely early. I am therefore
moving forward with the goal of building a social welfare state (shakaifukushi kokka). 338
As is apparent in Ikeda's quotation above, it is important to note that although universal
concepts such as progress are referenced and Japan is placed in categories that include other
nation-states, the actual associations being made are to extremely exclusive groups, the small
336 B6and & Lecours, 2008, p.211; Peng, 2006.
m See, for example, Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryfltard's comments to this affect before the Budget Committee,
House of Councillors, May 14, 1990. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011). It should be noted
that this alleged link may be disputed on both positive and normative grounds. See Peng (2006).
338 Ikeda Hayato, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, December 16, 1960.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
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number of Western countries that have achieved modern welfare states or boast supposedly
highly developed cultures. In this way, uses of the "universalistic" forms of the narrative
actually place Japan in more exclusive company that the universalistic form of the democratic
state narrative and is sometimes accompanied with self-laudatory appellations such as "advanced
country" (senshinkoku) or "modern state" (kindai kokka). For example, addressing Prime
Minister Takeshita in 1988 to support an exhibit on humor in art at the National Diet Library,
Miyachi Shosuke of the Komei Party argued:
As our era is emphasized to be one of moving from material to spiritual affluence, I believe
our government should be actively engaged in this type of humorous art, art more generally,
and culture as the very proof that we are an advanced country (senshinkoku), a civilized state
(bunka kokka)...339
As is the case with the universalistic form of the democratic state narrative, the act of associating
Japan with the other nation-states here is always itself at least an indirect form of self-praise as
well as self-definition.
As with the trading and peace state narratives, the different components of the civilized
state narrative are interwoven in practice and must therefore be treated as a single narrative
group. However, for analytical purposes, it is possible to identify two "sub-narratives" in its
culture and welfare components. The first, referred to as the "cultured state" sub-narrative,
emphasizes both the unique cultural achievements of the Japanese nation-state state and the
339 Miyachi ShOsuke, Komei Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 23, 1988. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndi.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).
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argument for Japan to be counted among the group of states that have achieved high levels of
cultural development. 340  The second, referred to here as the "welfare state" sub-narrative,
highlights the link between nation and state with regard to the guarantee of basic welfare as well
as Japan's place among the relatively small number of countries that have established modem
welfare states. 34 ' Again, the purpose of dividing this narrative into its two major components is
to facilitate comparisons when considering changes within the narrative group over time.
The civilized state narrative was included in this study for several reasons. First, aspects
of this narrative, particularly what has been called "cultural nationalism" (bunka nashonarizumu),
have been a continuing area of concern in studies of postwar Japanese nationalism. This
includes both work that examines Japan's cultural policies as well efforts to understand the
impact of popular discourse about Japan's cultural uniqueness (nihonjinron).342 Second, the
340 The "cultured state" sub-narrative includes the following three codes: "Civilized/Cultured State," "Support
Japanese Culture." And "Support Cultural Exchange." Please note that although "Civilized/Cultured State" (bunka
kokka) is sometimes used in reference to the welfare state, it is here treated as part of the "cultured state"
sub-narrative.
341 The "welfare state" sub-narrative includes the following two codes: "Welfare State" and "Support Domestic
Welfare Programs."
342 Yoshino, 1992, 1997a & 1997b; Befu, 200 1; McVeigh, 2004. Please note that "culture" includes various
elements in these different treatments, some of which may intrude on aspects of other nation-state narratives. For
instance, claims of shared culture (variously defined) have been used by the conservative right to advocate the
organic state narrative (see above) as well as by the progressive left to support of a vision of the democratic state
narrative Gayle (2001). Similarly, a speaker may cite Japan's status as a civilized state (bunka kokka) as justification
for enhancing state finance for science and engineering education, a policy which was coded here under the trading
state narrative in the content analysis. The coding scheme used here was designed to deal with the issue of overlap
as follows. First, in each case , the level of importance of the individual claim to each nation-state narrative, both in
terms of the frequency of its presentation as part of the narrative and how essential it is to the narrative's overall
story and internal logic, was considered in assigning claims as components of specific nation-state narratives.
Second, although nationalist rhetoric is highly ambiguous, coding rules in content analysis require clear,
non-overlapping distinctions; it must thus be acknowledge that there is an inherent methodological trade-off
between accuracy and (inter-coder) reliability, although the sacrifice of accuracy in this case is deemed relatively
small.
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relationship between nationalism and welfare policy is a severely underexplored topic in
nationalism studies. As Bdland and Lecourrs note, "Specialists in nationalism rarely discuss
social policy issues."343  Considering the welfare state link here thus provides an opportunity to
consider what factors may alter this relationship. Finally, as with the democratic state narrative,
the combination here of particularistic and universalistic usages allows for contrast with the
more purely exclusionary discursive forms of nationalism in the study.
Having introduced the key content features of all five nation-state narratives, the
discussion now turns to analyzing and interpreting how and why these features have changed
over the course of the postwar period. The next chapter will begin this task by analyzing
change at the aggregate level, where all five nation-state narratives are considered together.
34Bdland & Lecours, 2008, p. 1 . The authors also note that a 2001 book commissioned by the Association for the
Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism intended to highlight important avenues of research in the field "overlooks the
welfare state entirely." Ibid.
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Chapter Five: Five Roads through the Long Postwar
[W]e still have little understanding of the full dimensions of the postwar period as a period of
contestation over what the nation is and especially how nationalism should be resituated in the
context of the new Japanese state. 344
Kevin Doak, 1997
I. Introduction
In the more than half-century since Japan regained its independence, Diet inaugurals
have taken place an average of nearly two and half times per year. Examining the rhetoric from
nearly sixty years of these ceremonial occasions reveals interesting snapshots of the state of
nationalist discourse at particular times and provides a broader picture of how enduring
rhetorical conventions such as the five nation-state narratives introduced in the previous chapter
have persisted and varied in their content. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is the
aggregate level, where the five nation-state narratives are viewed in combination. Examining
changes at the this level-where the prominence and valence scores of these narratives are
considered cumulatively-is vital to mapping the contours of the period's nationalist discourse
and uncovering changes that occur simultaneously in other corners of this discursive landscape.
In addition, comparing resultant findings to existing scholarship on postwar Japanese
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114 Doak, 1997, p.30 0.
nationalism and politics, other commonly-used measures of nationalist phenomena, and prior
expectations provides a check on the validity of the results of the content analysis method
employed. Finally, viewing the discourse from the aggregate level also suggests areas that
require further analysis, including changes that manifest within individual narrative groups as
wells as the linkages between them.
The next section analyzes the aggregate results of the quantitative content analysis of
the Diet inaugural speeches and editorials. It then assesses their validity by comparing them to
the results of prior scholarship on Japanese nationalism and politics in the postwar period. This
discussion uncovers several key findings, chief among them the question of why all five
nation-state narratives have experienced long-term declines in prominence over the entire period
under review. The third section highlights two additional findings of interest, including the
strong correlation between the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives
and the relatively low level of prominence of the organic state narrative throughout the entire
period of the study. The final section summarizes the major conclusions of analysis at the
aggregate level.
The major findings of this chapter include: 1) Nationalist discourse
nationalism) can show dynamism even in the context of a wealthy, stable democratic regime at
peace such as postwar Japan; 2) There is a long-term trend toward decline in the numbers of
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(and thus
references to all narratives; 3) The peace state narrative, which is primarily associated with the
political left rather than the nationalist right, is the most referenced narrative of the entire period;
4) The trading state narrative is the most contested narrative during the two periods of peak
nationalist discourse and received by far the largest total number of negatively-valued references
for the postwar period as a whole; 5) There is a strong and positive correlation between changes
in the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives; and 6) Despite being
sometimes viewed as synonymous with Japanese nationalism, the organic state narrative is
actually the least referenced of all the narratives examined in this study.
Before moving to the analysis, a few words about the techniques employed in the content
analysis are in order. First, the coding scheme here is valence-sensitive; each code has a
positive and negative version. A positive reference is one in which a declarative or imperative
statement concerning a relevant cognitive or normative element, social purpose or relative
comparison is made without reservation. The presence of a reservation thus indicates a
negative valence, and reservations take different forms depending on the type of element
modeled by the code. 346  Second, the number of negative and positive references combined is
3 For more discussion of coding for positive references, see Appendix C.
346 For example, a reservation for a cognitive element usually takes the form of questioning in part or in total the
accuracy of the element as a fact or valid observation (e.g. Japan is NOT a country with few natural resources).
For a normative element, statements that advocate behaviors for the norm target that violate the norm in question or
challenge the validity of the norm in general are coded as negative (e.g. Japan SHOULD acquire nuclear weapons or
there is NO valid reason why a country threatened by other nuclear powers should not acquire such capability in
defense). The negative versions of other code types are explained in appendices
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counted toward each code's, and in combination, each narrative group's prominence score. 34 7
A prominence score is thus an indication of the extent to which the code or group of codes in
question appears in the nationalist discourse. Interpreting the meaning of this score and its
changes over time is one of the primary objects of this study. Third, the ratio of negative
references to total references is viewed here as an indication of the level of contestation for each
individual code or narrative group. Finally, all coding has been tested for inter-coder reliability
and found sufficient for making inferences. 348
II. Surveying the Narrative Landscape
The total number of references for each of the five narratives over the entire period
under review is summarized in Chart 5.1 below:
347 The units for prominence scores are "hits/100 sentences," which means that number of sentences containing at
least one reference to the code per one hundred sentences examined. This allows for comparisons across time
periods in which the number of sentences in the speeches and editorials varies.
348 Two measures of inter-coder reliability were employed in this study, percent agreement and Cohen's Kappa, with
the cutoff line set at .9 for the former and .4 for the latter. For more about these measures and their application, see
Banerjee, et al. (1999, p.6), Neuendorf (2002, pp.142-144). Inter-coder reliability scores for each code in this
study appear in Appendix C.
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Chart 5.1: Total References per Narrative, 1952*-2007349
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Although aggregate data calculated for such a long period are not necessarily indicative
of the contemporary state of affairs at any given point in time, viewing the narratives in this way
makes three things clear. The first is the overwhelming numerical dominance of the peace state
narrative during the postwar period. Although, as will be shown below, this dominance is
challenged from time to time and evaporates in recent years, it is important to note that in the
period taken as a whole, references to this narrative outnumbered those to others by about
two-to-one for the civilized, trading and democratic state narratives and more than six-to-one for
the organic state narrative. Second, the trading and democratic state narratives share near parity
349 Because the occupation did not officially end until April 1952, there is only one post-independence Diet
inaugural from that year. As the data is organized here into eleven five-year blocks, this single 1952 speech set
was added to those examined for the five-year period of 1953-1957. This is why there are six years in the first
five-year block. This adjustment is signified here and in all subsequent analysis by including an asterisk after the
first year (1952*).
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in the middle ground of this frequency distribution.
uniformity of their results also holds as a secular relationship that merits further exploration.
Finally, perhaps the most striking aggregate finding here is the relative infrequency with which
major political and media figures raised elements of the organic state narrative. In this case as
well, the comparative rarity of references to the narrative is consistent across the entire period
and is thus not a mere artifact of viewing cumulative results.
Before beginning to unpack these aggregated numbers, some initial observations are
merited. First, despite the dominance of conservative parties over the Diet and national
government for the bulk of this period, the most commonly cited narrative is one most famously
championed by the political left. Viewed in contrast to the relative infrequency with which
elements of the organic state narrative, the one most often associated with rightwing politics, are
referenced, the importance of examining the nationalist discourse associated with the left in
order to develop an accurate picture of how nationalism may have changed during this period
becomes clear. Second, even in aggregate form, this data hints at the strong and positive
correlation between the trading state narrative, which specifies the means to improve economic
welfare of the citizenry, and the democratic state narrative, which focuses on maintaining the
political rights of citizens.35 0 In view of their significance for theories that link the level of
350 The correlation co-efficient here is 0.869 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The aggregate
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With an important exception, the relative
economic security among the citizenry to the level of legitimacy of democratic regimes, this
finding is explored further in Chapter Seven.351
Chart 5.2 below summarizes prominence scores across eleven five-year blocks to show
how the frequencies with which the five nation-state narratives were referenced changed over
time:m
Chart 5.2: Prominence Scores for Individual Narratives, 1952*-2007
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This chart reveals a picture of a dynamic nationalist discourse that has constantly changed
even while taking place within a stable and wealthy democratic state in peace time. Although
data also suggest a similar relationship between the trading and civilized state narrative, although this correlation is
smaller at 0.723 and only significant at the 0.05 level (2-talied).
351 On the general question of a causal link between the level of economic development and the legitimacy and
stability of democracies, see Przeworski, et al. (2000) and Robinson (2006). With regard to how this issue may be
applied to postwar Japan, see Johnson (1995) and Fouse (2002).3 2 As each five-year block contains a varying number (between 10 and 14) of Diet inaugural ceremonies and the
speeches and editorials associated with these inaugurals vary in length, the data has been standardized as references
per 100 sentences. Since all speeches and editorials were divided into sentences by their authors, using the
sentence as the basic unit of analysis proves the easiest means to allow for clean comparisons across time periods.
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movements of the scores of individual narratives do not necessary correlate in all cases, the
overall picture is one of two "peaks" and two "troughs." The first peak, which occurred
roughly between 1952 to 1972, saw the highest recorded prominence scores for all five
narratives.3 5 3  In fact, three narratives (trading, peace, and civilized state) registered their
highest prominence scores in the entire study during the five-year period between 1958 and 1962
alone. 354 This vibrant period was then followed by a pronounced decline that bottomed out in
the period bewteen 1973 and 1977. This five-year block saw the lowest cumulative prominence
score for the five narratives in the Cold War era. Prominence scores then began to move
upward until they peaked again in the mid-1980s, returning to levels not seen since the 1960s,
with the peace state narrative scoring near its highest mark of the entire period. After 1988,
however, a second decline began that reached its nadir in the post-Cold War period, when four of
the narratives, excluding only civilized state, recorded their lowest scores in the entire study.
Although the last five-year block (2002-2007) saw a slight increase in the scores of four of the
five narratives, the changes were relatively small.
m Averaging the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives during these first four five-year blocks yields a
figure (18.15) that greatly exceeds the average for the entire period (11.63) and is more than twice the average of the
remaining seven five-year blocks (7.90).
354 The highest score for the organic state narrative came in the next five-year period, 1963-1967, while the highest
score for the democratic state narrative came in the previous five-year period, 1952*-1957.
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Chart 5.3: Cumulative Prominence Scores, All Narratives, 1952*-2007
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The cumulative results in Chart 5.3 above tell the story of a group of narratives that reached
their highest level of prominence in the first two decades of the period and then declined
dramatically only to experience a partial revial in the 1980s that was in turn followed by postwar
lows after the end of the Cold War.355 At the aggregate level, this represents a repeated waxing
and waning of prominence within the context of a long-term decline. Thus, understanding how
nationalist discourse has changed in postwar Japan is partly a task of explaining how and why
these changes took place at the macro level.
3 Comparing the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives for the period 1958-1962, the five-year block
that contains the highest such scores recorded in this study for three of the five narratives, and 1973-1977, the
five-year block immediately preceding the upturn in the 1980s, shows about a 73% decline. A similar comparison
for the period 1983-1987, the five-year block that contains the highest post-1972 prominence scores for three of the
five narratives, and 1998-2002, the five-year block that contains the lowest prominence scores recorded in this study
for two of the five narratives, reveals a similar drop from peak to trough of nearly 69%.
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In accessing the general validity of these results, it should be noted that the timing of the
two "peaks" is consistent with much of the scholarship on postwar Japandese politics.35 6  First,
both political scientists and historians point to the 1950s and 1960s as a period of prolonged
ideological conflict between the political right and left over differing national visions of the
postwar state.3 57  These conflicts touched on virtually all aspects of politics, athough they were
perhaps most prominent in debates over security policy and constitutional revision. In addition,
other scholars have pointed to the late 1970s through the 1980s as an important period in which
Japan's peaking economic might, increasing military power, and the leadership of Nakasone
Yasuhiro, who perhaps more than any other postwar prime minister consciously attempted to
revise the nationalist discourse status quo, generated interest in reconsidering the relationship
between the nation and the state. 358 Thus, with regard to the "twin peaks" in prominence scores
witnessed at the aggregate level, the resuts of this content analysis are broadly consistent with
the observations of existing scholarship on Japan's history and politics.
356 The brief comparison between the results of the content analysis and those of existing scholarship offered from
here is an example of a check of "criterion validity," or "the extent to which a measure taps an established
standard.. .that is external to the measure." Neuendorf, 2002, p. 1 15. To the degree that such relevant standards
exist in the form of scholarly consensus on the course of postwar nationalism in Japan as well as associated policy
issues, they are applied here to evaluate the validity of the content analysis results. However, efforts to develop
explanations for the changes observed will follow in subsequent chapters. For a similar use of existing scholarship
to assess the general validity of content analysis results, see Suzuki (2009).
357 Dower, 1999; Hara, 1988; Otake, 2005 [1988], Kataoka, 1991; Katzenstein, 1996; Tanaka, 1997; Pyle, 1992;
Berger, 1998, Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
358 Pyle, 1987; Watanabe, 1994.
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The changes culminating in the Cold War lows recorded in the mid-I 970s also resonate
with the findings of scholarship on postwar Japan. In Japan's international relations, the 1970s
were marked by increased stability in the security arena due to such developments as the renewal
of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1970, the emergence of detante in the Cold War, and the end
of the Vietnam war, as well as by increased instability in the international economy as a
consequences of the oil shocks. 359 Domestically, although the Japanese economy had become
the second largest in the world in 1968, the period of high-speed growth ended during this
decade. 360 In addition, expenditures related to pensions, healthcare and other welfare programs
began to increase during this period, with 1973 declared the "first year of welfare" due to the
introduction of free health care for the elderly and price-indexing for national pensions. 36 1
Politically, the normalization of parliamentary practices and the emergence of a numerically
stronger but more fragmented opposition that despite having increased bargaining power "would
not be able to mount an effective challenge to LDP dominance" contributed to the further
institutionalization of LDP rule and a reduction in partisan conflict across parties.362
The 1970s may thus be characterized as a time in which the central focus of politics
shifted away from the past decades' conflicts over defining the new postwar Japan and its place
359 Samuels, 2007, pp.38-59; Berger, 1998, pp.87-123; Nakamura, 1995, pp.2 13-242; Dore, 1986.
360 Nakamura, 1995, pp. 19 7 -2 3 5 .
361 Takegawa, 2005, p.l177; Estdvez-Abe, 2008, pp. 1999-223.
362 Curtis, 1988, p.35; Estevez-Abe, 2008, p.210.
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in the world to quality-of-life issues and the domestic economic situation. This is perhaps best
exemplifed by the development of national welfare programs and environmental protection
regimes during this period, as well as Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's plan to "remodel the
Japanese archipeligo" by promoting the construction of highways and high-speed rail and the
industrialization of regional areas. 363
The results of the content anlaysis are generally consistent with these shifts in the
national political agenda. For example, between the periods of 1968-1972 and 1973-1977, the
prominence score of the peace state narrative fell nearly 78%, a shift that was responsible for
more than 81% of the decline in the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives between
these two periods (and thus the first "trough"). This decline might thus be interpreted as
indicative of a decreased level of concern with issues areas related to the peace state narrative,
including the peace constitution, mililtary procurement, use-of-force restrictions and nuclear
weapons policies. 364 Across these same two periods, the prominence scores of the trading and
civilized state narratives actually increased (22% and 1%, respectively), while those of the
democratic and organic state narratives also saw declines (31% and 78%, respectively). In
short, the changes recorded in the content analysis of the five narratives roughly correspond to
363 Masumi, 1995, pp.123-157; McKean, 1981.
364 Declines in references to the codes for these four components represented nearly 80% of the total decline in
references to the peace state per 100 sentences across the periods of 1968-1972 and 1973-1977.
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scholarly accounts of this period as one of less concern for issues of history, security and
democracy and more focus on the economy and social welfare.
As was the case with the first "trough" in the 1970s, roughly two-thirds of the decline in
cumulative prominence scores from their high point in the 1980s (1983-1987) to their post-Cold
War low (1998-2002) is attributable to declines in references to the peace state narrative.
However, in this instance, the assessment by scholars of Japan's security environment during
this period is more ambiguous, with the end of the Soviet threat obviously lessening security
concerns on the one hand while the emergence of new threats in the form of China's increased
military spending, North Korea's nuclear program, and global terrorism as well as increased
pressure from the United States for Japan to play a larger role in the US-Japan alliance raising
them on the other. 365 In addition, although at a glance, the protracted downturn experienced by
the Japanese economy during this period might be cited as congruent with the more than 50%
decline in references to the trading state narrative from mid-1980s highs, similarly large declines
in other narratives do not have such obvious points of congruence in scholarship about post-Cold
War Japan. Understanding the general decline in references to all five narratives during these
last two decades (i.e. the second "trough") is thus a major focus of this study.
365 For pessimistic views of Japan's security environment in the post-Cold War period, see Friedberg (1993-94) and
Christensen (1999); For a more sanguine view, see Twomey (2000), Lind (2002) and Boyd (2003).
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Moving from prominence to valence scores, the picture of the 1950s-1960s,
late-1970s-1980s, and the post-Cold War decades as major periods of contestation over the
direction of postwar Japanese nationalism is generally supported by the aggregated valence
results for the five narratives. Due largely to the particular context of the Diet inaugural
ceremony, negatively-valued comments are expected to be relatively rare, and thus their
prescence, even in small quantities, should be seen as strong indicators of contestation.366
Chart 5.4 below summarizes the aggregated contestation levels for all narratives (measured as
negatively-valued references as a percentage of total references per 100 sentences per period):
Chart 5.4: Cumulative Contestation Levels, All Narratives, 1952*-2007
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Although these results are generally consistent with the view that the 1950s-1960s,
late- 1970s-1 980s and the post-Cold War years were contested periods in postwar nationalist
366 For further discussion of this point, see the appendices.
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discourse, they also raise some new questions. First, the period between 1952-1972 saw very
high levels of cumulative negative references in two of the five-year blocks (1952-1957,
1963-1967) but the lowest and third-lowest recorded levels for this measure in the other two
five-year blocks (1958-1962 and 1968-1972, respecttively), thus raising the question of what
explains the zig-zag pattern in negatively-valued rhetoric during these early postwar decades, a
period in which all five narratives registered their highest prominence scorces of the postwar
period? 367  Second, aggregate contestation begins to peak prior to the rise of aggregate
prominence in the 1970s, with the period 1973-1977 seeing the second highest level of
contestation recorded in the study. 368  Finally, a third "peak" of contestation that exceds even
that of the immediate postwar decades appears in the period from 1998-2002. Unpacking this
aggregated data can provide clues to understanding these deviations from initial expectations.
Chart 5.5 shows the same data for individual narrartive groups:
367 1952-1957 and 1963-1967 had contestation lelves of 1.7% and 3.3%, respectively, the latter of which exceeds
the average for all five-year blocks (2.3%) and was the third highest recorded cumulative contestation level for the
narratives in this study. The other two periods (1958-1962, 1968-1972) were two of the three five-year blocks in
which negative-valued references were negligible or very small percentages of total references to the five narratives,
ranking 1 1th and 9 th highest, respectively.
368 The contestation from this period (3.1%) was also higher than the average for all periods (2.3%).
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Chart 5.5: Contestation Levels, Three Narratives, 1952*-2007
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This chart yields some interesting findings. First, the democratic and civilized state
narratives are not included here because the former was not the target of a single
negatively-valued reference over the entire period and the latter was contested in only one
five-year period at a miniscule level (0.8% in 1998-2002). This may seem a remarkable result,
but it is consistent with accounts of postwar politics that show how all major players in the Diet
and media enthusiasitacally
occpuation.369
embraced the democratic process from the time of the
Indeed, as the Diet inaugural ceremony is in part intended to celebrate Japan's
democracy and its participants are themselves mostly democratically-elected officials, the lack
of anti-democratic agitation is not surprising. Further, as the key components of the civilzed
state narrative essentially idolize Japanese artistic endeavors on the one hand and the Japnese
369 Seraphim, 2006; Dower, 1999; Oguma, 2002b.
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welfare state on the other, harsh criticism or condemnation seems unlikely within the context of
the Diet inaugual ceremony.
Second, Chart 5.5 makes clear that the trading, peace and organic state narratives were
the most contested of the poswar period. Although this is consistent with scholarly analysis of
postwar politics with regard to the peace and organic state narratives, the degree to which the
trading state narrative proved contentious is somewhat surprising, as the components of the
trading state narrative are often positioned as the favored vehicles of pragmatic politicians that
achieved broad support across the political spectrum. 370 Indeed, Chart 5.5 reveals that
increased contestation over the trading state narrative was the main cause of the second "peak" in
contestation, which begin just prior to the second overall rise in prominence.
Third, the disaggregated data in Chart 5.5 show that the overwhelming causes of the
third peak in contestation seen in Chart 5.4 are increases in negative rhetoric targeting the peace
and organic state narratives. As both these narratives experienced postwar lows in total
references during the period after the end of the Cold War, this increase in negatively-valued
comments means that negative hits as a percentage of total hits reached postwar highs of more
than 16% and 19% for the peace state and organic state narratives, respectively. Although
neither of these findings is necessarily unexpectected in light of the decade's rightward shift in
370 Morris, 1960; Hara, 1988; Otake, 2005[1988], Kataoka, 1991; Katzenstein, 1996a; Tanaka, 1997; Pyle, 1992;
Berger, 1998, Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
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security policies and the succession of LDP leaders, including Mori, who hailed from the faction
most devoted to organic state rhetoric, understanding the exact nature of these rhetorical changes
as well as the context with which they occurred are essential to explaining how nationalist
discourse changed during this period.
Returning to the aggregated results in Chart 5.3, a final question about change at the
macro level stands out: What explains the secular decline over time across all narratives?
As already noted above, one obvious explanation for the large differences between the
prominence scores of all narratives in the earlier and latter periods emphasizes the foundational
experience of Japan's defeat in World War Two. 37' In this view, the defeat and devastation
fundamentally reworked the nationalist discourse landscape, forcing advocates of existing
nationalist narratives to alter their content to better suit the new political and ideological
environment (as seen in the cases of the trading and organic state narratives) and encouraging
others to endorse new means of linking the nation and the state (as seen in the cases of the peace
and democratic state narratives). Scholarly work on both the ideological history and political
outcomes of the occupation period as well as the first decades following independence provides
broad support for this explanation. 372 In this way, it seems apparent that the 1950s and 1960s
371 Comparing the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives for the peak period of 1958-1962, which contains
the highest prominence scores recorded in this study for three of the five narratives, and the low point of 1998-2002,
which features the lowest prominence scores recorded for two of the five narratives, reveals a decline of more than
82%.
372 In addition to authors cited above, Snyder (1991) and Oguma (2002b) strongly emphasize the experience of the
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saw unusually high levels of nationalist discourse due to relatively rare historical circumstances
for an emerging democracy. However, what explains the continued long-term trend of declining
prominence scores in the subsequent periods, especially the years following the end of the Cold
War, which saw historical lows for four of the five narratives? Understanding the meaning of
this decline in prominance is a central focus of the remainder of this study.
It should be noted that the content analysis results provide some evidence in favor of the
broader form of the denationalization hypothesis. In addition to the five nation-state narratives,
the Diet inaugurals were also examined for other aspects of nationalist discourse, including
social purposes and references to neighboring countries, which may be viewed as a proxy for
relational comparisons. 373 Chart 5.6 summarizes these results for the period in question and
reveals a strong similarity in the pattern of change among these three elements of nationalist
discourse: a peak in the 1980s followed by a steep decline to postwar lows, with only a slight
improvement in the last five-year period for narratives and relational comparisons. A similar
pattern of long-term decline among different kinds of nationalist discourse is thus consistent with
one of the predictions of the broadest form of the denationalization hypothesis.
war in their accounts of postwar Japanese national identity construction.
m As previously noted, "social purposes" are the ultimate goals assigned to the nation-state, here understood as
prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy. Relational comparisons are comparisons between Japan and
Others, with data on references to neighboring countries (US, USSR/Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and
Taiwan) used here as a proxy. Abdelal, et al., 2006.
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Chart 5.6: Prominence, Narratives, Social Purposes & Relational Comparisons, 1968-2007
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Desipte the above evidence, however, the picuture of general decline is far from clear.
First, as noted above, two of the nation-state narratives in this study, the civilized and democratic
state narratives, experienced secular declines in prominence without facing meaningful levels of
contestation, a finding that runs counter to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis.
Second, one would expect such a major change to be reflected in other types of data. However,
there is no evidence of such a broad-based decline in nationalist sentiments as expressed in
public opinion polls taken over the same period. For example, polls taken by the Japanese
government as well as the World Values Survey over this period reveal no major changes in such
sentiments as "love of country" and "pride in being Japanese."
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Chart 5.7: Do you think your feelings of love for your country are strong, weak or you
can't say which (don't know)? 374
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Chart 5.8: How proud are you to be Japanese?375
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37 Cabinet Office (Naikakufu daijinkanb6 deifu kahashitsu), Shakai Ishiki ni kansuru Yoron Ch6sa (Public Opinion
Survey on Social Consciousness), 2007. Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h18/hi 8-shakai/index.html
(November 10, 2008).
37 World Values Survey. Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/hl 8/hi 8-shakai/index.html (November 10,
2008).
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In view of this mixed evidence, the position adopted here is that the broader form of the
denationalization theory can only be confirmed through a close examination of cases of
prominence declines in individual nation-state narratives. A major goal of the case studies in
subsequent chapters is thus to understand how and why individual narratives declined in
prominence and to determine if this change was the result of banalization, comprehensive or
partial transformation, or denationalization. The possibility that different narratives may have
experienced a similar decline due to different reasons or combinations of factors is also
considered.
III. Different Journeys, Different Ouestions
In addition to the common decline in prominence across narratives over time, the results
of the content analysis also point to a number of puzzles regarding individual narratives that
merit further exploration in the detailed case studies to follow. First, one such issue to be
investigated at the narrative level is the strong and positive correlation in prominence scores
between the trading and democratic state narratives. This correlation is due mostly to a similar
pattern of change during the Cold War that breaks down during the post-Cold War years.
Exploring this relationship is especially important because it will contribute to the debate over
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the ultimate basis of legitimacy for democracy in postwar Japan as well as show how
nation-state narratives occupying different domains may interact over time. 376
Second, another point crying out for clarification is the long-standing relative weakness
of the prominence scores of the organic state narrative vis-a-vis those of other narratives
throughout the period. The darling of the postwar right-wing in Japan, the organic state
narrative is perhaps the best known of the five nationalist narratives examined here and arguably
has the longest history in the nationalist discourse of modem Japan. In addition, multiple
generations of conservative politicians have continuously striven to promote and institutionalize
elements of this narrative throughout the postwar period. 7 Against this background,
explaining the reasons behind the consistent but relatively poor showing of this narrative over
time is imperative to understanding how narratives may persist for long periods in nationalist
discourse at relatively low levels of prominence. More specifically, the case of the organic
state narrative in the postwar period provides an opportunity to specify the factors that hinder the
elevation of a particular nation-state narrative within the greater nationalist discourse despite the
presence of concerted efforts to do so.
3 Johnson, 1994; Fouse, 2002. For the first eight five-year blocks (1952-1992), which are here used as a proxy for
the Cold War period, the correlation co-efficient for the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state
narratives is .836, which means nearly 70 % of the variance is in common. This result is also statistically
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). However, during the post-Cold War, represented here by the last three
five-year blocks (1993-2007), the correlation co-efficient declines dramatically to .307, which means less than 10%
of the variance is in common. This second result is also not statistically significant.
377 Boyd & Samuels, 2005, 2008.
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IV. Conclusion
Perhaps the most important aggregate finding here is that nationalist discourse, an
essential manifestation of nationalism, can prove dynamic in the context of a wealthy, peaceful,
and stable democratic regime such as postwar Japan. In addition, the analysis shows that major
changes may occur at the aggregate level. According to the results here, there are two periods
in which the references to all narratives peak, three periods in which measures of contestation
peak, and a secular trend toward decline in the numbers of references to all narratives over the
entire period.
Among individual narratives, the peace and civilized state narratives the most total
references over the period here. The trading state narrative, however, proves to be the most
contested narrative during the two periods of peak nationalist discourse and received by far the
largest total number of negatively-valued references for the postwar period as a whole. In
addition, there is a strong and positive correlation between changes in the prominence scores of
the trading and democratic state narratives, although this relationship breaks down in the
post-Cold War period. Finally, despite being sometimes viewed as synonymous with "Japanese
nationalism," the organic state narrative is actually the least referenced of all the narratives
examined in this study. Subsequent chapters further explore these findings by examining how
changes occur at the individual narrative level.
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Chapter Six: All in the Name of Peace
'What defines us as a nation' at any given moment is no more than a temporary equilibrium in an
ongoing argument about what defines us as a nation. Critics of current policies advanced in the
name of the nation need to participate in this ongoing argument; they need to tell stories and
articulate self-understandings of their own. 378
Rogers Brubaker, 2004b
I. Introduction
Although the most cited of the five narratives examined here, the peace state narrative
exhibits large swings in prominence at various stages in the more than half-century since Japan
regained sovereignty in 1952. Of particular interest are the twin declines in this measure in the
1970s and again after the end of the Cold War. Why did the peace state narrative experience its
first major postwar dip in prominence in the middle years of the 1970s? Why did this measure
reach a postwar low in the late 1990s, falling below the average for the five narrative groups for
the first time in the period of this study? 379  What do these changes in prominence mean for the
peace state narrative as a recurring convention in political discourse as well as its continuing
association with numerous security institutions?
378 Brubaker, 2004b, p.123.
379 The second postwar peak period of 1983-1987 was followed by steady declines over the next two periods
underscored by a decline between the periods of 1993-1997 and 1998-2002 of more than 70%.
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This chapter develops answers to these questions.
addressed are how and why political elites in Japan changed the frequency and manner with
which they referenced the peace state narrative during the two periods of pronounced decline in
prominence. The challenge is thus to develop an understanding of the causes and significance
of declines in narrative prominence in different periods.
The answer arrived at here identifies distinctive patterns of change across the two
periods. In the 1970s, the decline in prominence for the peace state narrative did not coincide
with contestation over its cognitive or normative components, the emergence of transformational,
tinkering or destructive strategies targeting the narrative, nor significant efforts to reform
institutions associated with the narrative in ways counter to its normative claims. The first
major period of decline in prominence for the peace state narrative is thus concluded to fit the
"banalization" hypothesis introduced in Chapter Three.
The sources of the decline following the end of Cold War, however, are firmly located
in political struggles to alter security institutions associated with the peace state narrative.
From the beginning of these struggles in the 1980s, reformers such as Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro launched a sustained transformational effort that would eventually target most of the
normative components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative and ultimately lead to exceptions
being added to many of them. In this way, both the narrative components and their associated
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In practice, the main questions to be
institutions followed a pattern of change that allowed the associations, albeit in less robust forms,
to remain intact. The evidence for this second case is thus most consistent with the partial
transformation hypothesis but suggests that the process of transformation is still ongoing.
In addition, the exact pattern of change witnessed in the peace state narrative during this
period appears contingent on a number of factors, including the number of institutional
associations of individual normative components and sub-narratives, the level of specificity of
normative claims' institutional associations, and the discursive strategies employed, especially
by those advocating institutional reforms. Finally, the thirty-year time frame of this still
ongoing pattern of partial transformation underscores the difficulty of affecting change in
nation-state narratives once they have become highly prominent in the nationalist discourse.
The next section begins by establishing a baseline for comparison by summarizing
results of the content analysis for the peace state narrative during the period preceding its first
steep decline in the early 1970s. This baseline is then completed by analysis of the discursive
strategies employed vis-A-vis the peace state narrative during this period and a description of the
institutions associated with the normative claims that comprise the narrative. To keep the
discussion manageable, the institutions examined here and in subsequent sections are limited to
those associated with the most commonly-cited normative claims of the peace state narrative,
which include institutions restricting the size and composition of Japan's military, institutions
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limiting the uses of this military in international affairs, institutions promoting state involvement
in international disarmament efforts, and institutions governing Japan's non-nuclear policy.
The third section again utilizes the content analysis data to compare this established
baseline with the results for the period 1973-1977, the five-year span in which the prominence
score for the peace state narrative first fell steeply. The speeches and editorials are also
examined to evaluate the discursive strategies of participants and an assessment is made of
changes from the baseline in relevant associated institutions. After also considering issues of
sequence, it is concluded that the linkages between changes in the narrative, discursive strategies
adopted by participants in the nationalist discourse and changes in associated institutions
indicates a pattern of banalization at work.
The fourth section considers the mid-1980s through to the post-Cold War period, with
particular attention given to the patterns of change in content analysis results, discursive
strategies and associated institutions observed in the periods up to and including 1998-2002,
when the peace state narrative's prominence achieved its postwar low. After the Cold War, in
particular, political struggles over security institutions associated with the peace state narrative
became more frequent. In addition, reformers generally sought institutional changes that
exceeded previous assertions of the normative constraints on these institutions claimed in the
peace state narrative. The resulting increased level of contestation over these normative claims
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accelerated a process of narrative change that has narrowed the scope of many of the narrative's
normative claims, particularly those associated with the peace-loving state stub-narrative. After
considering the alternatives, it is concluded that the changes in the peace state narrative's
prominence in the post-Cold War period are best described as a partial transformation that is still
ongoing.
The fifth section concludes the chapter by evaluating the domestic and external factors
that shaped this pattern of change after the Cold War and considering what these changes mean
for both the present and the future of the peace state narrative.
II. Constructing Peace: Heiwa Kokka through Defeat and Independence
By the time the occupation formally ended in April 1952, the peace state narrative was
already a prominent part of the nationalist discourse in Japan. 380 As John Dower concludes of
the immediate postwar years, "Defeat, victimization, an over-whelming sense of powerlessness
in the face of undreamed-of-weapons of destruction soon coalesced to become the basis of a new
kind of anti-military nationalism." 3 8 ' Although grassroots movements promoting pacifist
notions were active from the early postwar years, some of the first major public expressions of
380 The peace state narrative (6.0248) was a close second in prominence behind the democratic state narrative
(7.2671) in the content analysis for the period 1952-1957 and was more than 30% higher than the average
prominence score for all five narratives (4.0373) during this period.
81 Dower, 1999, p. 4 9 3 -4 9 4 .
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peace state rhetoric came from politicians. 3 82  For example, the goal of transforming Japan into
a "peace state" (heiwa kokka) is mentioned in the inaugural sessions of both houses of the 88th
Imperial Diet in early September 1945.383 Indeed, one of the first major public debates
involving elements of the peace state narrative took place when the last Imperial Diet considered
the ratification of Article Nine in 1946.384 During this debate, the head of the Japan Socialist
Party (JSP) voiced strong support for the clause and asked that it be strengthened with a
"declaration of devotion to world peace." 385  After the JSP voted unanimously for the final draft,
its party policy statements "harped on this pacifist theme and attacked Japan's imperialist
past." 386
Building on the debate over Article Nine, intellectuals crafted early forms of the peace
state narrative from the state non-violence position. In particular, the Peace Issues Discussion
Group (Heiwa danwakai), a group of progressive intellectuals formed in 1948 and including
Murayama Masao, was influential in codifying peace state rhetoric by declaring peace to be a
"supreme value" and emphasizing "that it was Japan's unique mission to demonstrate how world
382 For accounts of early postwar grassroots groups and pacifism, see Yamamoto, 2004, pp. 4 0 -4 2 .
383 Duke Tokugawa Kuniyuki, General Session, House of Peers, and Uchigasaki Sakusabur6, General Session,
House of Representatives, September 4, 1945. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 3, 2011). The
phrase heiwa kokka was used in an Imperial Rescript read into the record of both houses of the Imperial Diet
384 It should be noted that when the JSP voted unanimously in favor of the final draft of Article Nine
385 Stockwin, 1968, p.3 3 .
386 Ibid.
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peace could be achieved, a mission that fell to Japan as a consequence of its wartime suffering
and "natural" pacifist tendencies." 387
In concert with these developments on the left, politicians on the right also adopted
peace state rhetoric during the occupation years. Perhaps the most notable of these was
Yoshida Shigeru, who served as prime minister for most of the occupation. In a Diet inaugural
address to the House of Representatives in November 1949, Yoshida began by declaring that the
only path to security for Japan was as an "unarmed state" (hibus5 kokka) that renounced war and
dismantled its arms as per the new constitution. After severely condemning Japan's wartime
actions as both having "dirtied the nation's history" (waga rekishi wo yogoshi) and brought on
"unparalleled calamity" (kaizen nofukd) in the loss of so many citizens' "children, husbands and
parents," he stated," "I am certain, as a peace state (heiwa kokka), Japan will again obtain its
pride of place in the world., 388  It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of the peace state
narrative from the state non-violence perspective, and this one came from a sitting prime
minister.389 In fact, from the time of the Article Nine ratification debate until after Japan's
387 Samuels, 2007, pp. 30-3 1. Although accompanied at times with reasoned arguments about Japan's strategic
situation and the inadvisability of conflict in the nuclear age, appeals for "peaceful coexistence" and a call for Japan
to assume a security posture of "unarmed neutrality" were essentially justified as normative principles whose time
had come to be realized. This had direct and specific implications for the group's positions on Article Nine and
national security policy. Hook, 1996, pp.226-41. Murayama made particular efforts to unearth a tradition of
pacifism in Japanese culture and history. Maruyama, 1963, pp.2 9 0 .
388 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, General Session, House of Representatives, November 8, 1949. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 3, 2011).
3 Dower (1979, pp.378-381) notes that such idealistic statements were invariably accompanied by the pragmatic
observation that pacifistic affirmations were necessary to dispel foreign suspicions and hasten the end of the
occupation. This was true in the case cited above as well. The address begins by calling for a peace treaty to end
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return to sovereignty, Yoshida was one of the strongest advocates of this version of the peace
state narrative, and his control of government during this time also allowed him to popularize
this vision, with all of its stringent implications for constitutional interpretations and national
security institutions, through various channels, including the public education system and
university law schools. 390
Following the end of the occupation, Yoshida, still prime minster, and his followers,
referred to in Chapter Four as the pragmatic right, continued to use peace state rhetoric, but now
famously tacked toward the non-aggression pole. 391 For example, when asked in a meeting of
the lower house budget committee in early 1954 if he had plans to establish a committee to study
the possibility of revising the constitution, Yoshida began his response by noting the unforeseen
emergence of Cold War conflicts and then declared bluntly, "Much has changed [since the
constitution was ratified] and it may now be dangerous for Japan, as a peace state (heiwa kokka),
to continue without armaments." 392  It should be noted that, after repeatedly using the term
"peace state" during the occupation in his addresses to Diet general sessions, including Diet
the occupation and the quoted statement was uttered to brush aside calls for Japan to consider nuclear power. The
sentence preceding the one quoted referencing "peace state" reads: "It is disarmament that will guarantee our
nation's safety and well-being and will lead to us again gaining the world's trust."
390 See Dower, 1999, p.528; Takayanagi, 1969, p.8 3 .
391 Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Samuels, 2007.
392 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 1, 1954. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011). As will be noted in the discussion of institutional associations below,
Japan already had "armaments" at this point, having established the National Police Reserve in 1950, the National
Safety Agency in 1952, and Yoshida had already reached an agreement with the conservative opposition Progressive
Party to reform into a military force dedicated to external security at the time of this statement. Tominomori, 1994,
p.82; Nakamura, 2001, p.12 4 .
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inaugurals, Yoshida stopped referring to Japan by this naming convention in the Diet inaugurals
following the return to sovereignty. 393
During this time, however, Yoshida continued to refer to other aspects of the peace state
narrative, but now consistent with the state non-aggression perspective. Although he continued
to defend the "peace constitution" as representative of the peace-loving nature of the Japanese
nation, he now interpreted the "war potential" (senryoku) banned in Article Nine as referring
only to equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare. In this
interpretation, some military capabilities were thus constitutional .
Following Yoshida's rhetorical shift, the main remaining political bearer of the
narrative's state non-violence perspective became a group of left-wing socialists led by Suzuki
Mosabur5. Having opposed the war and consequently suffered under the militarist regime,
many members of the Suzuki faction enthusiastically endorsed Article Nine as a mandate for
state non-violence. 395  Also influenced by the ideas of the Peace Issues Discussion Group, the
Suzuki faction became the leading proponent of the peace state narrative on the left.396
3 For examples of his uses of "peace state," see Yoshida's comments to general sessions of the following houses
on the following dates: House of Representatives (November 8, 1949 (quoted above); January 24, 1950,; November
24, 1950), House of Councillors (November 8, 1949; November 27, 1950). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/
(December 4, 2011).
39 See, for example, see his defense of the "peace constitution as well as his argument that the love for the "peace
constitution" and the notion that war was improper would not preclude the nation's youth from defending Japan if
attacked. See Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, General Session, House of Representatives, February 2, 1953 and
Budget Committee, House of Councillors, November 7, 1953. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4,
2011).
395 Stockwin, 1968, p. 3 6 -7 .
396 Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, 1985, pp.54-97; Igarashi, 1985, p.3 4 9 .
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Between December 1949 and January 1951, they incorporated the narrative into the party's
"principles of peace," which, as a consequence, called for neutralism and opposed
rearmament. 397
Although there was dissent from right-wing factions that culminated in a split in 1951,
the Suzuki faction regained its dominance once the socialists reunited in 1955. As a result, the
party's platform and rhetoric continued to utilize the peace state narrative. 398  For example,
addressing newly-minted Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro for the first time in a Diet inaugural as
head of the now largest opposition party, Suzuki wasted no time in offering a full-throated
defense of the "peace constitution" (heiwa kenp5) and positioning this stance as a central
difference between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and his JSP. 399  In later years,
other opposition parties on the left would come to endorse this rhetoric as well.400
Although the peace state narrative is commonly associated with the political left, it is
important to note that conservative politicians continued to use peace state rhetoric even after
397 The four principles of peace were; 1) a peace treaty with all participants in WWII; 2) permanent neutrality; 3) no
military bases given to a foreign ally; 4) opposition to rearmament (support for Article Nine). Stockwin, 1968,
pp.31; 46.
398 Stockwin, 1968, pp. 7 0 - 9 4 . It is important to note that concern with status or prestige, the core of Weber's view
of nationalism, pervades the statements of those who advocated peace state from the state non-violence perspective.
The emphasis here is almost always placed on the Japanese nation's unique mission to spread the lessons of its
wartime suffering and realize its inherent peaceful nature.
399 Suzuki MosaburO, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, December
2, 1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
400 After abandoning its paramilitary activities and returning to a parliamentary focus in 1956, the Japan Communist
Party began to work with the JSP in opposing the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. By the 1960s, the JSP,
JCP, Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, a right-wing splinter group of the JSP) and the KOmei Party all supported
adherence to Article Nine, opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty, and reduction and/or eventual elimination of
domestic armed forces.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below show the percentage of references
made to the peace state narrative for each of the types of source materials examined in the
content analysis across the time periods 1952-1955, when only one (December 1955) opposition
response was made by the a leftist party (JSP), and 1956-1972, when all opposition responses
were made by members of the left-of-center JSP. In both periods, the prime ministerial
addresses were made by politicians hailing from conservative parties, albeit their conservatism
ranged from Yoshida's pragmatism (6 speeches) to Hatoyama's revisionism (3 speeches) as the
leaders of different parties in the first period, and Hatoyama's (2 speeches) and Kishi's (9
speeches) revisionism to Ikeda's (II speeches), SatW's (21 speeches) and Tanaka's (1 speech)
pragmatism as the leaders of the right-of-center LDP in the second period. Although the results
show a passing of the torch for peace state advocacy from the editorialists of the three major
daily newspapers to the representatives of the JSP, they also show a surprising level of continuity
in the degree to which conservative prime ministers were responsible for generating references to
the peace state narrative.
Table 6.1: Peace State References by Source
Peace State 1952-1955
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP) 18%
Opposition Responses (Non-JSP*) 40%
Editorials 42%
* I opposition response from JSP
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Yoshida left office in late 1.954.
Table 6.2: Peace State References by Source
Peace State 1956-1972
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP) 11%
Opposition Responses (JSP) 74%
Editorials 15%
It should also be noted that no negatively-valued references were made to the peace
state narrative in the documents examined here from the Diet inaugural ceremonies between
1958 and 1972, so the vast bulk of peace state rhetoric offered by conservative prime ministers
during this latter period was either positive or neutral in tone. For the early 1950s and the
period from 1960-1972, this is a somewhat expected result, as the addresses were given either by
Yoshida himself or one of his proteges, Ikeda Hayato and Sat6 Eisaku. Due to the numerical
superiority of their members within the party, pragmatic conservatives were also widely known
as the "mainstream" during this period.
What is surprising, however, is the degree to which the peace state narrative continued
to be positively referenced in prime ministerial addresses even when the office was occupied in
the mid-to-late 1950s by "anti-mainstream" "revisionist conservatives," such as Hatoyama Ichiro
and Kishi Nobusuke, who had openly sought for the revision of Article Nine to allow for the
unencumbered rebuilding of autonomous defense capabilities and a reciprocal security
commitment in Japan's alliance with the United States. 4 0 For example, in announcing his plan
401 For more on the enduring three-way split between pacifist progressives, pragmatic conservatives and revisionist
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to establish a commission to consider constitutional revision to make the document more in line
with Japan's cultural and social background (kokujd), Hatoyama took pains to emphasize his
"firm commitment to the principles of pacifism (heiwashugi) and democracy (minshushugi),"
and went on to endorse "peace diplomacy" (heiwa gaikd) in every Diet inaugural speech he gave
subsequently. 402 Shortly before becoming prime minister himself in February 1957, Kishi
Nobusuke, then acting prime minister for the ailing Ishibashi Tanzan, argued in Diet general
session that because the United States loved peace and democracy it was the ideal ally from the
standpoint of building a "democratic state (minshushugi kokka), a peace state (heiwa kokka)" in
Japan.40 3 He then went on to make approving references to "peace diplomacy" (heiwa gaikd)
in five of his nine Diet inaugurals. 404
The dominance of pragmatic conservatives, the elevation of the left-wing dominated
JSP as the largest opposition party, and the pattern of revisionist conservatives adopting peace
state rhetoric when becoming prime minister all contributed to the high prominence of the peace
state narrative during this period. As shown in Table 6.3, after narrowly ranking second behind
the democratic state narrative in the first five-year period, peace state was the most-cited
conservatives and its role in constitutional and security politics, see Boyd & Samuels (2005), Samuels (2007), and
Boyd (2003).
402 Hatoyama Ichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, General Session, January 22, 1955; April
25, 1955; December 2, 1955; January 30, 1956; November 16, 1956. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/
(December 4, 2011).
403 Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Councillors, General Session, February 6, 1957. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
404 Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, Diet Inaugural (General Session),
November 1, 1957; June 17, 1958; September 30, 1958; January 27, 1959; February 1, 1960.
223
narrative in all subsequent five-year periods and for the first two-decades after independence as a
whole. The prominence score for this narrative exceeded the five-narrative average for every
five-year period and was more than forty percent higher than the combined average for the two
decades.
Table 6.3: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1952-1972
Narrative 1952*-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 Average
Trading State 3.2919 4.9425 3.6684 1.2968 3.2999
Organic State 1.9876 0.8891 2.0010 1.1222 1.5000
Peace State 6.0248 7.4268 4.9309 6.0973 6.1200
Civilized State 1.6149 3.3996 2.5012 2.0823 2.3995
Democratic State 7.2671 7.0084 3.3587 1.6958 4.8325
Average 4.0373 4.7333 3.2920 2.4589 3.6304
Units: References per 100 sentences per period
Table 6.4 shows the number of references to each narrative component as a percentage
of the total references for the peace state narrative group. Not surprisingly, four of the five
most referenced components are normative, with only "war regret" representing a substantial
percentage of references for a cognitive component in this period. As behavioral norms
targeting the state, the normative components of nation-stat narratives are expected to receive
more references due to their direct relevance to day-to-day policy-making. Here, the
components related to Article Nine, including opposing its revision and recognizing restrictions
in the areas of state force levels and the use of force by the state, as well as the normative claims
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on the state to oppose nuclear weapons combine to represent nearly 80% of the references to the
peace state narrative during this period.
Table 6.4: Relative Frequency, Peace State Narrative Components, 1952-1972
Component 1952*-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 Average
Peace State 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.6% 0.6%
Nuclear Victim State 0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 0.0% 0.7%
Support Peace Constitution 9.3% 7.7% 6.2% 10.3% 8.4%
Implement Peace Diplomacy 10.8% 5.3% 1.4% 2.4% 5.0%
Eschew Use of Force 11.9% 16.2% 10.0% 13.3% 12.8%
Restrain War Potential 30.4% 9.2% 6.2% 21.5% 16.8%
Support International Disarmament 2.1% 7.0% 4.8% 1.8% 3.9%
War Regret 21.6% 11.3% 7.7% 5.8% 11.6%
Atomic Bombings 0.5% 0.7% 2.4% 1.6% 1.3%
Support Non-Nuclear Principles 5.2% 14.8% 27.3% 31.8% 19.8%
Support International Nuclear Disarmament 8.2% 27.5% 30.6% 9.9% 19.0%
Units: % of total references for narrative per period
As for the relative level of contestation over the peace state narrative during its
formative years, Table 6.5 reveals it to be the most contested of the three narratives that received
negatively-valued references in the period between 1952 and 1957. At the component level, the
most disputed were the normative claims to "eschew the use of force" and "restrain war
potential," at 13.0% and 8.5%, respectively, during this first five-year period. However, as
Table 6.5 shows, the level of contestation dropped to zero in the next and subsequent five-year
blocks, narrowly making the peace state narrative the least contested of the three for the entire
two-decade period.
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Table 6.5: Contestation Levels, Three Narratives, 1952-1972
Narrative 1952*-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 Average
% Negative Trading State 0.9 0.0 14.3 8.7 6.0
% Negative Organic State 3.1 0.0 1.2 1.1 1.4
% Negative Peace State 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Average 2.7 0.0 5.2 3.3 2.8
Unit: % negative/total references per narrative per period
Perhaps the most notable dynamic here is best viewed by breaking the peace state
narrative down into its two sub-narratives, peace-loving state, which links war regret to
constitutional principles and restrictions on conventional military capabilities and their uses, and
the anti-nuclear state, which links the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to normative
claims on the state to oppose nuclear weapons both at home and abroad.
summarized in Chart 6.1 below.
Chart 6.1: Sub-Narratives in Motion, 1952-1972
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The results are
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The period began with an overwhelming concern for shaping cognitive claims about the
meaning of the Japanese state's actions in the wars of the 1930s and 1940s into normative ones
limiting the postwar state's capacity to repeat them, especially with regard to the acquisition of
conventional military capabilities, although the extent of this constraint was contested. The
focal points of concern then began to shift at the sub-narrative level, with concerns for the
anti-nuclear state story increasing and then eventually exceeding those of the peace-loving state
for the period 1963-1967. The two then switch places again for the five-year period 1968-1972,
which immediately precedes the first major decline for the peace state narrative in the postwar
period.
The remainder of this section turns to consider the peace state narrative's associations
with state institutions in three security policy areas: conventional force capabilities (size and
composition) and roles (use of force), international disarmament and nuclear strategies (both
nuclear development and nonproliferation policies). 0 As noted in Chapter Four, when
political elites name Japan a "peace state" and then reference the nation's wartime experiences to
advance a normative claim on the state, they may do so from various positions on the scale
between state non-violence and state non-aggression. This means that, depending on the
405 These policy areas were chosen because they track closely with the different normative claims of the
peace-loving state (conventional force capabilities and roles) and anti-nuclear state (unconventional capabilities)
sub-narratives. It is impossible to cover all the associations between the peace state narrative and postwar security
institutions in a chapter-length treatment.
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speaker or the period in question, a particular state institution can be associated with the peace
state narrative in different ways. The idea here is not to make causal claims about the impact of
the peace state narrative on the formation or pattern of change in state institutions during this
period but rather to establish a baseline of institutional associations for comparison with later
periods by cataloging the ways in which state institutions in the above areas of security policy
were associated with the peace state narrative by different participants in the Diet inaugurals,
with particular attention paid to the end-of-period (1968-1972) status of these associations. 406
Article Nine of the postwar constitution was the first state institution to be associated
with the peace state narrative, especially the components of the peace-loving state
sub-narrative. 407 The article is positioned as the main affirmation of the realization of the
relationship between nation and state demanded by the peace state narrative. As noted in
Chapter Four, the protection of Article Nine from formal amendment is thus an important
normative claim of the narrative. 4 08
Examples of how this association is made between Article Nine and the peace state
narrative have already been introduced above from the speeches of political elites on the left (the
406 It should be remembered that the focus of this chapter is to understand why the peace state narrative declined in
prominence in the 1970s and post-Cold War periods. Arguments explaining the origins and development of some
of the state institutions considered here, particularly Article Nine and its interpretations, have been advance
elsewhere. Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Boyd, 2003.
407 It is asserted here that Article Nine actually preceded the peace narrative as it is framed in this study.
408 As per Table 6.4 above, "Support the Peace Constitution" was the sixth most referenced component of the peace
state narrative during the period covered in this section, representing just under 10% of total references to the
narrative.
228
JSP's Suzuki above and Katayama in Chapter Four). On the right, this association was also
made, especially by pragmatic conservatives later in the period. For example, in the November
1970 Diet inaugural, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku cited "our constitution" (waga kenp5) to justify
his call for all international conflicts to be resolved through peaceful means made earlier to the
United Nations general assembly, before going on to refer to postwar Japan as "a grand
experiment (idai na kokoromi) due to its dedication as a peace state (heiwa kokka)."409 Two
years later at the same ceremony, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was more succinct: "In the
quarter century since the end of the war, our country has sought to develop through cooperation
and reconciliation with international society and by consistently standing firm as a peace state
(heiwa kokka) born of the peace constitution (heiwa kenp5)."4 10
Although Article Nine has never been amended, it has been the subject of
interpretations by the executive branch, rulings by the courts, and debate among political elites
over its meaning and significance. These produced a number of institutions limiting the
capabilities and roles of Japan's military in the two decades summarized here.41 ' Some of these
409 Sato Eisaku, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), November, 25, 1970.
410 Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), October 28, 1972.
4" The institutions covered below have elsewhere been referred to as "buffer policies." Past governments have
sometimes augmented necessarily vague interpretations of Article Nine with less ambiguous policy guidelines that
provide objective and measurable constraints on state institutions and mitigate the relativisms of the government's
interpretations. In this regard, they serve as buffers between the logical constructions of the interpretation level
and the slippery slope of the implementation level. In doing so, these "buffer" policies exchange over-compliance
with the government interpretation for political and operational viability. Politically, they have helped the
government acquire the support of opposition parties as well as the public for particular security policies.
Operationally, buffer policies have served to reduce the conflicts between constitutional constraints and battlefield
imperatives. Boyd, 2003.
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institutions were not formalized until later in the period or after, but most drew from 1954
interpretations of Article Nine by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), an office supporting the
cabinet staffed by elite bureaucrats with legal expertise on loan from Japan's top ministries.4 2
These set the conditions under which Japan could exercise the right of self-defense under Article
Nine: 1) The country must face an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression; 2) There must be
no other means of countering this act; and 3) The use of force in self-defense must be limited to
the "minimum necessary level" (hitsuy5 saishdgen)4 13  They also defined the concept of
self-defense narrowly so that Japan could not utilize force in any way to resolve international
disputes, defined as any potential conflict not directly related to the defense of national
territory. 41 4
These interpretations served as the basis for a number of state institutions limiting the
capabilities and roles of the Japanese military, including a ban on the overseas dispatch of
military forces, increasingly specific understandings of how the military budget should be
limited so as not to exceed the "minimum necessary level" standard, and a ban on "offensive
412 For a detailed discussion of the role of the prime minister, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and Diet deliberation of
security-related legislation in the development these institutions. Samuels, 2007; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Boyd,
2003; Nishikawa, 2000; Nakamura, 1991.
413 Nakamura, 2001, p. 142. The CLB reinforced this position by defining the "right of belligerency" (kdsenken)
renounced in Article Nine. In his view, this concept included not only internationally accepted wartime rights,
such as the right to seize enemy ships or to govern occupied territory, but also the right of the nation to pursue a
wartime strategy of obliterating the enemy homeland in order to prevent any future threat. The renunciation of
these rights thus limited Japan's defensive use of force to the "minimum necessary level." Ibid., pp. 145-6.
414 For more on the role of the CLB as an institutional constraint on constitutional interpretations and this security
policy, see Samuels (2007, p.49-52); Samuels (2004); Boyd (2003).
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Whereas the first two focus on conventional roles and capabilities, the last
institution also has implications for Japan's nuclear posture, although their extent is muted in
government interpretations and statements.
Of the above institutions, the ban on overseas dispatch was one of the few formalized in
domestic law during this period: It was incorporated into laws establishing the Self-Defense
Force (SDF) and Defense Agency in 1954.4' In addition, the 1954 interpretations sanctioned
the use of force only for self-defense in the narrowest sense-to defend the nation against
attack-and thus constituted a de facto ban on Japanese participation in collective self-defense
arrangements.4 16 This understanding was fortified in 1960 during the Diet debate over revising
the US-Japan Security Treaty, when the Kishi administration, having adopted the interpretations
was forced to deal with their implications for alliance policy. Under Diet
questioning, CLB Director-General Hayashi Shiazo followed the reasoning of 1954 to its logical
conclusion in the following interpretations: 1) "Collective self-defense" is the act of defending
another nation as if defending one's own nation; 2) The activity of engaging in collective
self-defense is understood narrowly as the use offorce on the behalf of an ally and thus does not
include other types of wartime cooperation, such as the leasing of bases or the extension of
economic aid; and 3) The exercise of the right of collective self-defense, while granted under
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unrevised,
415 See Keddell, 1993, p.6.
416 Kataoka, 1991,p.l18-120.
weapons."
Article 51 of the UN Charter, is denied Japan under Article Nine. 417  Bolstered by the Supreme
Court's reticence in the Sunakawa decision of December 1959, Kishi and Hayashi adhered to
these interpretations throughout the treaty debate. 418  The lack of mutuality in the resulting
treaty is thus directly attributable to these understandings of Article Nine. In 1972, the CLB
repeated that the use of force by Japan on the behalf of an ally under attack by a third party was
unconstitutional.419
Interestingly enough, the socialists, who at the time held the SDF itself to be
unconstitutional, were the ones who most often associated the ban on overseas dispatch with the
peace state narrative in the Diet inaugurals of this periods. For example, the JSP's Asanuma
Inejiro argued that Kishi's plan to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty on more equal terms
would result in the situation where the US demands Japan to send the SDF to defend US bases in
Okinawa in an "unconstitutional overseas dispatch that would be taken as Japan's full
participation in the war effort." 42 0  Less than a year later, Katayama Tetsu stated bluntly, "As
long as Article Nine continues to exits, concluding a security treat with another country that, in
417 Nakamura, 2001, pp.181-5.
418 In the Sunakawa case, the Supreme Court again ruled in favor of the government's interpretation of Article Nine,
overturning a district court ruling that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 was unconstitutional. The Grand
Bench found the right of self-defense was not denied by Article Nine. However, it also argued that questions of a
"highly political nature" (kWdo no seijisei wo yi suru mono), such as the constitutionality of the security treaty, fall
outside the authority of judicial review absent evidence of obvious constitutional violations. Maki, 1964, p.30 5 .
Maki (1964) provides an English translation of this decision on pp.298-361.
419 Nishikawa, 2000, p. 4 4 . Here, collective self-defense was again narrowly defined as the use of force on behalf of
an ally, a position that freed Japan to engage in other forms of security-related cooperation, such as the extension of
economic aid or participation in economic sanctions regimes.
420 AsanumalInejiro, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural) September 30, 1958. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)
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the name of self-defense, forces Japan to dispatch troops overseas to defend another country and
participate in their war is a clear violation of the constitution."421 In 1969, Narita demanded
that Prime Minister Sat6 promise to the Japanese people that he would never violate the
constitution by engaging in joint military operations with the United States in the name of
cooperation with the United Nations. The issue was, continued Narita, whether to chose "the
road to conscription and the overseas dispatch of the SDF" or the path of "peace diplomacy"
(heiwa gaiko).42
Accordingly, the "minimum necessary level" standard was also applied to the overall
size of the defense budget, and the Diet saw vigorous debate over spending levels specified in a
series of five-year defense plans and their accompanying appropriations legislation. 423
Although an agreement over an exact quantitative standard was not formalized during this time,
spending as a percentage of GNP had steadily fallen from a high of 2.8% in the early 1950s to
less than 1% in the late 1960s, and a consensus began to form within the ruling LDP and the
Ministry of Finance around this figure as an appropriate limit for peacetime defense spending.
In negotiations with China over reestablishing diplomatic relations in 1972, Prime Minister
Tanaka cited this "One Percent Limitation measure to show Japan's defense buildup would be
421 Katayama Tetsu, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), June 25, 1959. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)
422 Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), December 1, 1969. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)
423 Keddell, 1993, pp.3 5 -52 .
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restrained." 424  In testimony before Diet in October 1972 regarding the Fourth Defense Plan,
Tanaka proposed 1% of GNP as the appropriate standard for limiting defense expenditures for a
country under the "constitution's constraint" (kenp5 no seiyaku) with a policy of "exclusively
defensive defense" (senshu bdei).42
The understanding that Article Nine made certain weapons unconstitutional actually
preceded the above interpretations, first appearing in Diet deliberations as early as 1952.426
Since that time, the government was pressed by the opposition to offer concrete examples of
weapons systems it considered banned under Article Nine's constraints. Between 1969 and
1971, the government (CLB and Defense Agency) defined "offensive weapons" banned under
Article Nine as weapons whose sole purpose was to inflict "wholesale destruction" (kaimetsuteki
hakai) on foreign territory and thus cause other countries to feel threatened (kydi wo kanzuru you
na).4 7 In this way, the government interpretation argued the constitutionality of weapon
systems had to be assessed using both quantitative and qualitative criteria. At this time, due to
this qualitative criteria, the government argued that it was unconstitutional for Japan to possess
weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missile
424 Keddell, 1993, p.50.
421 Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, November 10, 1972.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
426 When forced by tenacious questioning to elaborate on the boundaries of the constitution's constraint on force
composition, Kimura Tokutar6, then director-general of the National Safety Agency, argued that maintenance of
howitzers fell within these limits, while jet fighter technology did not. Auer, 1973, p. 119. Although this
statement may have resulted more from the pressures of extemporaneous debate than from careful forethought, it
nonetheless became an important precedent. Nakamura, 200 1, p. 103.
427 Asagumo, 2005, pp.6 13 -6 14 .
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(IRBMs), and long-range bombers such as the B52. 428  Although the contents of this list
changed over time during this period, the conception that some weapons systems were
unconstitutional under prevailing technological and international conditions due to their
particular design and/or capabilities remained.429
Again, it was the socialists who most attached these quantitative and qualitative
restraints to the peace state narrative in the Diet inaugurals during this period. For example, at
the January 1969 inaugural, in a standard presentation of the JSP's state non-violence position,
Narita Tomomi declared the SDF to be "clearly in violation of the constitution" and argued that
it is "peace diplomacy based on neutrality and the solidarity born of the patriotic pride of the
citizens" that will ensure Japan's security. Three years later, the same Narita argued that the
quantitative increases in the Fourth Defense Plan would both "exceed the bounds of the
self-defense limit" (jiei no hani wo koe) and "give the SDF an offensive character (kogekiteki
seikaku)" that would "threaten neighboring countries." He then went on to liken this policy to
the "rich nation, strong army" rhetoric of the prewar period, reminding his audience how this had
this both harmed the peoples of Asia and left the Japanese nation in a "calamitous abyss." He
42 JDA, 2001, p. 63. It should be noted that the government's understanding of which weapons are banned by this
interpretation has changed over the years. Samuels, 2007, p.4 7 .
429 For example, the contention that jet fighters were banned was dropped during this period. Ibid..
430 Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 27,
1969. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
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concluded by calling for the abandonment of the Fourth Defense Plan and the adherence to
"peace diplomacy" (heiwa gaik5).4 '
Also associated with the peace state narrative are institutions governing the Japanese
state's promotion of conventional disarmament around the world. Although Japan exported
varies types of weapons and dual-use items employed by foreign militaries after the end of the
occupation, such items were approved for export on an individual basis in a process that drew
criticism from the socialist opposition, which argued that a Japan that could export weapons was
in defacto violation of the "minimum necessary limit" standard on force levels.43 2 In addition,
Japan had become a member state of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) in 1952, which banned arms exports to Warsaw Pact countries, and had also agreed
to restrictions on trade with China that also included controls on weapons sales. 433 Facing
pressure over the backlash over the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam conducted by Japan's
alliance partner as well as well as related difficulties in negotiating the return of Okinawa, which
was then used as a major staging ground for American operations in Southeast Asia, Prime
Minister Sato responded in April 1967 by weaving together the above threads of arms export
4" Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, October 28,
1972. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
432 Scholars have documented that the socialists had powerful allies in the effort to limit arms exports, including the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), both of which fought to
have scarce resources such as foreign exchange and domestic investment funds directed toward industries outside of
defense production. Samuels, 1994; Green, 1995; Oros, 2008.
43 Oros, 2008, p. 94 .
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policies into the "Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports (buki yfishutsu sangensoku), a
policy statement declaring Japan would not export arms to 1) the communist countries; 2)
countries under an arms embargo ordered by a United Nations (UN) resolution; and 3) countries
were either already engaged in international conflicts or appeared likely to do so. Although the
first two were covered by Japan's existing COCOM and UN commitments, the third represented
a new standard for export approval decisions. 434
The state's disarmament policies were associated with peace state rhetoric throughout
this period. In addition to the interpretation of Article Nine mentioned above, the JSP argued
that Japan could promote disbarment around the world by leading by example at home, as "a
shining pioneer in total disarmament," thus linking normative calls to restrain domestic force
levels with disarmament goals abroad.435 Following Sato's unveiling of the "Three Principles,"
LDP prime ministers began to present the issue of promoting disarmament using the language of
the peace state narrative. For example, in only his second Diet inaugural after taking over from
Sato, Prime Minister Tanaka calling Japan a "peace state" (heiwa kokka) with a "peace
constitution without precedent in the world" (sekai ni rei no nai heiwa kenp5), he immediately
when on to assert it to be Japan's duty (sekimu) to promote "the creation of a new peace"
43 Samuels, 1994, p.169.
43 Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September
28, 1961. Accessed at: http://kokkai.nd.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
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(atarashii heiwa no sdz5) and contribute to "an overarching international disarmament"
(zenpanteki na kokusai gunshuku). 36
A final set of institutions commonly associated with the peace state narrative, especially
the anti-nuclear sate sub-narrative, are those governing Japan's nonnuclear posture. The first are
interpretations of Article Nine and the ban on "offensive weapons." Although government
officials have repeatedly insisted that nuclear forces maintained for the purpose of self-defense
are constitutional, these interpretations include the acknowledgment that Article Nine constrains
strategic forces in the same manner as conventional ones. 437  Accordingly, with three types of
delivery systems associated with nuclear weapons, ICBMs, IRBMs, and long-range bombers,
explicitly banned in the government interpretation, no administration explained publicly exactly
what a constitutional strategic force would entail.438 Further, few weapons systems fit the
definition of an offensive weapon-armaments whose sole purpose is to inflict "wholesale
destruction" and thus threaten other countries-better than nuclear forces. For these reasons,
436 Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January
27, 1973. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
437 The government argued for the constitutionality of nuclear weapons both before and after the declaration of the
non-nuclear policy. In 1959, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke told an Upper House committee, "The Government
intends to maintain no nuclear weapons, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the Constitution, there is
nothing to prevent maintaining the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense." See Auer
(1973, p. 123). In 1970, the CLB director-general argued in the Diet that "when it comes to nuclear weapons, there
are those that may be maintained, and those that may not... it depends on whether they fall within the limit required
to preserve our nation's existence and security." See Nishikawa (2000, p. 41). It is important to note that Kishi's
comments included an affirmation of the government's intent to maintain non-nuclear status, indicating his
awareness of the controversial nature of the constitutional argument.
438 The most detailed such explanation provided so far is from the Defense Agency, which stated in 1970 that it was
"possible to possess a small-yield nuclear weapon without violating the constitution if it was within the minimum
force level required for self-defense and is not an offensive threat to other countries." Hughes, 2007, p.8 4 .
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many Japanese have viewed Japan's non-nuclear policy as a logical result of Article Nine's
constraints. 4 39
Second, in 1967, Prime Minister Sat6 Eisaku declared a cabinet policy prohibiting the
possession, production, or introduction of nuclear weapons by Japan. These "three nonnuclear
principles" largely diffused the above dispute over the "offensive weapons" interpretation by
establishing clear limits on nuclear policy. Once again, the government traded what it
considered over-compliance with Article Nine for political goals. 440 Initially offered in
response to opposition pressure in the Diet, these principles were elevated to the status of a Diet
resolution in 1971 as part of deal to gain centrist support for the LDP position on the reversion of
Okinawa.44'
Although resolutions, like cabinet policies, are non-binding, two institutions with legal
force that are particularly associated with peace state narrative are the Basic Law on Atomic
Energy and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The former "establishes that the research,
41 For example, the Asahi Shimbun (22 May 1995) included the non-nuclear policy as one of the "results of Article
Nine." Cited from a translated version of this article in Hook & McCormack (2001, p.143).
440 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, The Three Nonnuclear Principles Diet Resolution (Hikakusangensoku
kokkaiketsugi). Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/gensoku/ketsugi.html (December 5, 2011).
Two things should be noted here. First, cost concerns were like important factors in the development of this policy.
Prime Minister Satw commissioned a secret government study to examine the possibility of developing an
independent nuclear capability. The study downplayed technical obstacles but argued developing nuclear weapons
independently would be too expensive. Kase, 2001. Second, the third principle forbidding introduction into
Japan "was probably broken during the Cold War." Hughes, 2007. However, as noted above, compliance is not a
central concern here.
441 Keddell, 1993, pp. 44-46.
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development and utilization of atomic energy must be limited to peaceful purposes" 442  In
addition to representing a legal obstacle to potential changes in Japan's nonnuclear stance, the
law also established the Atomic Energy Commission, which is mandated to make policy and
coordinate budgetary issues across all bureaucratic organs relevant to nuclear policy and "defines
its roles as making sure that Japan continues to limit its use of nuclear energy to peaceful
purposes." 44 3  In addition, Japan's signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 would result
in a reinforced legal apparatus supporting Japan's nonnuclear posture and significantly enhanced
Japan's efforts to promote nuclear disarmament internationally. 444
Associations between these institutions and the peace state narrative are widely made
across both the political and media participants in the Diet inaugural debates. For example, as
early as 1956, in a speech in which he made the pursuit of "peace diplomacy an unshakable
plan," Prime Minister Hatoyama also pledged to advance the "peaceful use of nuclear power" as
a major goal of his administration. 445  In multiple Diet inaugurals, Prime Minister Sat6 declared
his commitment to a nonnuclear posture, including his government's efforts to pursue
442 Hughes, 2007, p.8 8 .
441 Ibid.
444 The treaty did not acquire legal force until Japan ratified it in 1976, a point discussed in the next section. In
addition, estimates of the level of constraint this places on Japan "vary widely." Hymans, 2011, p. 17 2 . However,
once ratified, it is clear that involvement in this and other arms control multilateral regime later strengthened the
institutional position of bureaucrats dedicated to nonproliferation issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Hughes, 2007, p.74 .
445 Hatoyama IchirO, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), January 30, 1956.
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international nuclear disarmament and the return of a "nuclear free" Okinawa.44 6
on the other hand, at first repeatedly criticized the LDP-led governments for failing to take up
their party's call to declare a nonnuclear posture and allowing nuclear weapons to be brought in
to Japan in contradiction with the spirit of the constitution and peace diplomacy.447 In addition,
editorialists from the major newspaper also criticized the government for allowing visits to
Japanese ports by nuclear-powered (and likely armed) ships while preaching the virtues of the
peaceful use of nuclear power. If this is a ruse to alleviate that people's "nuclear allergy," then
it is an unforgivable betrayal, declared a Mainichi editorial from January 1968.448
The analysis so far has established that, in the first two decades after Japan regained its
postwar independence, the peace state narrative was the most prominent nation-state narrative in
this study, was broadly and continuously referred to across the political spectrum, including by
revisionist conservatives who had reasons to oppose some of its cognitive and normative claims,
was heavily contested in the 1950s and then treated largely consensually thereafter, and saw the
ratio of it references increasingly dependent on the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative but ended the
period with roughly equal weight given to its two sub-narratives. In addition, the peace-state
narrative was associated with state institutions governing both the roles and capabilities of
446 For examples, see SatO Eisaku, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), Marcy 14, 1967;
January 27, 1968; January 29, 1972. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
447 See for example, Asanuma Inejir6, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural) , November 1, 1957.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
448 Mainichi Shmnbun, 28 January 1968.
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The socialists,
Japan's conventional military as well as the its nuclear strategies by political elites arguing for
different positions in the spectrum from state non-violence to state non-aggression. The next
section will compare this baseline with the period 1973-1977, when the peace state narrative
registered its first major decline in prominence in the postwar period.
III. Flag in the Ground: Heiwa Kokka in the 1970s
Although the period of 1968-1972 saw the third highest prominence score for the peace
state narrative (6.097) recorded in this study, this figure fell to 1.3451 for the period 1973-1977,
a decline of nearly 78%, the largest decline between consecutive five-year periods in the first
twenty-five years of the study. 449 In comparison with the prominence scores of the other
nation-state narratives, peace state was ranked third behind civilized state and trading state
narratives and just above the democratic state narrative. As shown in Table 6.6 below,
although its prominence score for the five-year period remained above average for the five
nation-state narratives, it was considerably below the average for the peace state narrative to
date.
449 The next largest is the 34% decline between 1958-1962 and 1963-1967.
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Table 6.6: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1952-1977
Narrative 1952*-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 1973-1977 Average*
Trading State 3.2919 4.9425 3.6684 1.2968 1.5831 2.9565
Organic State 1.9876 0.8891 2.0010 1.1222 0.2381 1.2476
Peace State 6.0248 7.4268 4.9309 6.0973 1.3451 5.1650
Civilized State 1.6149 3.3996 2.5012 2.0823 2.0950 2.3386
Democratic State 7.2671 7.0084 3.3587 1.6958 1.1784 4.1017
Average 4.0373 4.7333 3.2920 2.4589 1.2879 3.1619
Units: References per 100 sentences per period; *Averages are for the period to date, 1952-1977.
However, despite the large decline in both absolute and relative terms, the prominence
for the peace state narrative does not go to zero either for the period 1973-1977 or in subsequent
periods. On the contrary, prominence actually begins to increase in the next five-year period
and then approaches a postwar high between 1983 and 1987. This pattern is in clear
contradiction to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis.
Changes in the relative frequencies of the components of the peace state narrative are
depicted in Table 6.7 below. The five normative claims that combined to represent nearly 80%
of peace state references for period between 1952 and 1972 continued to amount to four-fifths of
narrative references between 1973 and 1977.450 In addition, three of the four cognitive
components in the narrative registered an increase in relative frequency during this period. In
particular, references to Japan as a "peace state" and to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
450 These five normative components for claims opposing Article Nine's revision, recognizing restrictions on state
force levels, limiting the use of force by the state, banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and promoting nuclear
disarmament.
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Nagasaki saw large increases and combined to represent nearly 13% of total references to the
narrative during this period.
Table 6.7: Relative Frequency, Peace State Narrative Components, 1952-1977
Component 1952*-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 1973-1977 Average
Peace State 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.6% 5.0% 1.5%
Nuclear Victim State 0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 0.0% 0.8% 0.7%
Support Peace Constitution 9.3% 7.7% 6.2% 10.3% 5.9% 7.9%
Implement Peace Diplomacy 10.8% 5.3% 1.4% 2.4% 4.2% 4.8%
Eschew Use of Force 11.9% 16.2% 10.0% 13.3% 8.4% 12.0%
Restrain War Potential 30.4% 9.2% 6.2% 21.5% 28.6% 19.2%
Support International Disarmament 2.1% 7.0% 4.8% 1.8% 1.7% 3.5%
War Regret 21.6% 11.3% 7.7% 5.8% 0.8% 9.4%
Atomic Bombings 0.5% 0.7% 2.4% 1.6% 7.6% 2.6%
Support Non-Nuclear Principles 5.2% 14.8% 27.3% 31.8% 21.8% 20.2%
Support International Nuclear
8.2% 27.5% 30.6% 9.9% 15.1% 18.3%
Disarmament
Units: % of total references to narrative per period; *Averages are for the period to date, 1952-1977.
There is no contestation of either normative or cognitive component of the peace state
narrative between 1973 and 1977. In addition, there was no contestation in the preceding
decade. The relative frequency and contestation results are combined in the narrative analysis
in Table 6.8 below. The key findings are that, although the narrative as a whole declined in
prominence on a period-on-period basis, there was no contestation recorded targeting either
cognitive or normative components in either this period or the previous one and thus no
components appear as points of contention in Table 6.8. In addition, as noted above, three of
the four cognitive components, including both naming conventions ("peace state" and "nuclear
244
victim state"), saw increases in their relative frequency, which locates them as points of major
consensus between 1973 and 1977. These results, especially the absence of contestation, run
counter to the predictions of both the transformational and denationalization hypotheses.
Table 6.8: Narrative Analysis, 1973-1977*
Content (Relative Frequency)
Increase Decrease
Increase Major Contention Minor Contention
N.A. N.A.
Decrease
*Based on comparison with previous
Major Consensus
Peace State,
Nuclear Victim State
Implement Peace Diplomacy,
Restrain War Potential,
Atomic Bombings,
Support International Nuclear
Disarmament
Minor Consensus
Support Peace Constitution,
Eschew Use of Force,
Support International Disarmament,
War Regret,
Support Non-Nuclear Principles
five-year period, 1968-1972
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Contestation
(% Negative)
In addition, analysis of the speeches and editorials during this period reveals no
evidence of participants in the Diet inaugurals employing transformational, tinkering or
destructive discursive strategies toward the peace state narrative during this period or in the
preceding five-year period, a finding that again runs counter to the predictions of the
transformational and denationalization hypotheses. In addition, of particular note is the
increased in the percentage of references generated from the prime ministerial speeches during
this period. As Table 6.9 makes clear, the percentage nearly doubled in comparison with the
period of 1956-1972, the preceding period for which the right-of-center LDP also continuously
held the prime minister's office and the largest opposition party was also the left-of-center JSP.
This indicates an increased level of endorsement of the peace state narrative by successive
conservative governments and thus helps explain the absence of contestation during this period,
as both conservative and progressive forces advanced arguments using the established logics and
discursive conventions of the peace state narrative. This finding is also consistent with general
appraisals of views of security policy held by the three LDP prime ministers who gave Diet
inaugurals during this period, Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, and Fukuda Takeo.4 5 1
451 Although among the three, Miki is most associated with "dovish" views on security policy in concert with the
claims of the peace state narrative, it has also been noted that the most "hawkish" of the three, Fukuda Takeo, a
protege of Kishi Nobusuke and ostensibly a "revisionist" conservative, nonetheless adhered to security policies in
line with the peace state claims during this period. Otake, 1988, pp.147-158; Samuels, 2007, p.44.
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Table 6.9: Peace State References by Source, Two Periods
Peace State 1956-1972 1973-1977
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP) 11% 21%
Opposition Responses (JSP) 74% 73%
Editorials 15% 5%
Table 6.10 summarizes the changes observed during this period to the state institutions
associated with the peace state narrative. Most saw no significant changes during the period.
However, the 1% of GNP Ceiling and the Nonproliferation Treaty saw increases in their level of
institutionalization, both in ways consistent with the associated normative claims of the peace
state narrative. The I % Ceiling, which at previously only attained the status of a policy
suggested and approved of by a prime minister in Diet debate, was formalized in state policy by
an order of the Miki Cabinet in November 1976.452
participation in the NPT, thus giving the treaty the force of law.4 53
Also in 1976, the Diet ratified Japan's
In addition, in February of
that same year, Prime Minister Miki "reaffirmed and strengthened" Sat5's Three Principles
Restricting Arms Exports.454  Although the status of these principles remained that of an
official policy statement, Miki made three changes of note. First, while maintaining the
restrictions on exports to the three types of countries in the original principles, he added to this a
statement that it was the government's intention to "restrain arms exports to other areas."
452 Keddell, 1993, p. 5 7
45 Hymans,201 1, p. 172 . For analysis of the added level of restriction the treaty places on Japan's nuclear posture,
see Rublee (2009).
454 Oros, 2008, p. 10 9 .
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Second, he extended the restriction to also include "arms production-related equipment." 455
Finally, he infused the new policy statement itself with peace state rhetoric, something Sato had
not done when he announced the original policy before the Diet in 1967. "From the standpoint of
our country as a peace state (heiwa kokka)" is the second phrase following "with regard to arms
exports" in Miki's statement, which then goes on to announce the new areas of restriction as "in
line with the spirit of the constitution." 456 With this restatement, the government's policy thus
simultaneously became both more restrictive and more closely associated with the peace state
narrative.
Table 6.10: Changes in Associated State Institutions, 1973-1977
Associated State Institution 1973-1977
Article Nine (law) No Change
1954 Interpretation No Change
Ban on Overseas Dispatch (law) No Change
US-Japan Security Treaty (law) No Change
1% of GNP Ceiling Made Cabinet Order (1976)
45 For analysis of the importance of these first two points for Japan's arms exports, see National Diet Library, 2011;
Oros, 2008.
456 Miki Takeo, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 27, 1976.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011). For Sat6's original statement, see Sat6 Eisaku, Liberal
Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, April 21, 1967. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndi.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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Ban on Offensive Weapons No Change
Three Principles on Arms Exports Miki Expansion (1976)
Three Nonnuclear Principles (resolution) No Change
Basic Law on Atomic Energy (law) No Change
Non-proliferation Treaty (signed) Ratified (1976)
Based on the assumptions of the model here, association with these institutions, if
anything, were a stabilizing force for the peace state narrative during this period, "flagging" its
components without serving as sources of controversy that might lead to reevaluation,
denigration or the emergence of counter-narratives. The findings on associated institutions thus
also do not support the predictions of the transformation or denationalization hypotheses.
Based on the above findings, it is concluded that the decline in prominence in the peace
state narrative observed in the mid-I 970s is a case of "banalization." The evidence supports the
predictions of this hypothesis as follows. First, although the decline is steep, prominence does
not become negligible in this or subsequent periods. Second, there is no contestation observed
in either the period in question or the periods immediately preceding it. Third, no
transformational or destructive discursive strategies targeting the peace state narrative are
observed in this or the immediately preceding period. Finally, the only reforms observed in
state institutions associated with the peace state narrative during this and the preceding period
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are ones that either strengthened the level of institutionalization, the association with the
narrative or both. The decline in prominence during this period should thus not be taken as an
indication of a decline in salience or of an increased likelihood of the break-up of the narrative as
a discursive formation in the future.
IV. Peace Transforming: Heiwa Kokka after the Cold War
The peace state narrative saw its second highest postwar peak in prominence in the
period between 1983 and 1987. However, this achievement was immediately followed by
steady declines of about 40% on a period-on-period basis for the next two five-year blocks and
was punctuated by a 70% decline between the periods of 1993-1997 and 1998-2002. Overall,
the prominence scores of the peace state narrative fell 90% from the peak in the 1980s to the
trough of 1998-2002, the lowest recorded score for the narrative in this study. Is this decline
yet another example of the banalization of the peace state narrative? The focus here is on
interpreting the decline in prominence in the period 1998-2002, although indicators from both
preceding and subsequent periods will also be considered.
The period-on-period prominence declines for the peace state narrative following the
second postwar peak are large but not unprecedented in size. However, as shown in Table 6.11
below, these declines do distinguish the period in the following ways. First, prior to 1988-1992,
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the peace state narrative had never seen consecutive period-on-period declines in prominence.
However, following the peak in 1983-1987, the peace state narrative declined in prominence
across three consecutive five-year blocks (1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002). Second,
the extent of the decline measured from the nearest peak (1983-1987) to the trough (1998-2002),
or 90%, is the largest such difference in the study. The previous record on this measure was
82% (between 1958-1962 and 1973-1977). Third, in the period 1998-2002, the peace state
narrative fell to fourth place in prominence among the nation-state narratives and registered a
prominence score below the average for the five nation-state narratives, both unprecedented
occurrences.
Table 6.11: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1978-2007
Narrative 1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 Average
Trading State 2.0812 2.2169 1.9779 1.3559 1.0619 1.2279 2.2459
Organic State 0.4186 0.6764 0.1900 0.1427 0.2862 0.3976 0.7590
Peace State 4.7553 6.7886 4.0340 2.3244 0.7018 0.9706 4.1272
Civilized State 2.5113 2.2545 1.3409 1.3457 1.3481 1.7425 2.0215
Democratic State 1.1627 1.5907 1.6315 1.1112 0.8310 0.3742 2.4736
Average 2.1858 2.7054 1.8349 1.2560 0.8458 0.9426 2.3254
Units: References per 100 sentences; *Averages are for the entire period of the study, 1952-2007.
However, contrary to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis, prominence
scores do not decline to negligible levels during any of the periods of the downturn. In addition,
following the nadir in 1998-2002, prominence rises in the subsequent period (2003-2007).
Although only about a quarter of the narrative's average for the entire study, prominence was
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higher than the five-narrative average and sufficient to return the peace state narrative to third
place during this last five-year period. None of these findings are consistent with an on-going
process of denationalization.
Table 6.12 shows changes in the relative frequencies of the components of the peace
state narrative between 1978 and 2007.
things are apparent.
Focusing on the trough period of 1998-2002, several
First, only one of the four cognitive components, the nuclear victim state
naming convention, rose on a period-on-period basis, reaching a level that far exceeded its
average for the entire fifty-five year period. Second, the five normative components previously
observed to be responsible for the lion's share of references to the peace state narrative for the
periods 1952-1972 and 1973-1977 continue to play a similar role for both the five-year period in
question and the entire study. 4 7 The combined relative frequencies of these five normative
components for period 1998-2002 was 82%, slightly above the corresponding figure for entire
period (77%) and in line with those observed in the earlier periods. Third, one cognitive
component, references to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is not referred to
during this period. Although only the second time this occurred in the study, the significance of
this absence is diminished by the above-average performance of the naming convention for the
457 These five normative components for claims opposing Article Nine's revision, recognizing restrictions on state
force levels, limiting the use of force by the state, banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and promoting nuclear
disarmament.
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anti-nuclear state sub-narrative as well as the similarly above-average relative frequencies of the
normative components in this sub-narrative.
Table 6.12: Relative Frequency, Peace State Components, 1978-2007
Component 1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 Average*
Peace State 4.9% 3.2% 7.7% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 2.6%
Nuclear Victim State 1.9% 0.9% 0.3% 2.1% 2.6% 1.2% 1.1%
Support Peace Constitution 13.3% 8.8% 16.6% 16.7% 11.5% 20.5% 11.5%
Implement Peace Diplomacy 3.3% 0.9% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7%
Eschew Use of Force 10.2% 10.5% 16.6% 14.1% 16.7% 20.5% 13.5%
Restrain War Potential 28.8% 32.9% 21.2% 9.4% 5.1% 4.8% 18.0%
Support International
11.9% 15.4% 15.6% 9.8% 3.8% 3.6% 7.0%
Disarmament
War Regret 2.8% 2.7% 7.7% 14.1% 9.0% 7.2% 8.2%
Atomic Bombings 1.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
Support Non-Nuclear
5.1% 9.6% 5.6% 2.1% 14.1% 0.0% 12.5%
Principles
Support International
16.0% 14.5% 6.9% 28.6% 34.6% 42.2% 21.3%
Nuclear Disarmament
Units: % of total references to narrative per period; *Averages are for the entire period of the study, 1952-2007.
In stark contrast with the 1970s, the period from 1983 to 2007 has seen contestation that
is unprecedented in its level of intensity and protraction at both the narrative and component
level. At the narrative level, as shown in Chart 6.2 below, the contestation is unprecedented in
that is sustained over six consecutive five-year blocks and reaches the highest level (nearly 16%
458 This component is also not present in the Diet inaugurals held between 2003-2007. However, the extremely
strong performance of the "support international nuclear disarmament" normative component again maintains the
anti-nuclear state sub-narrative's relative frequency within the peace state narrative during this time. In addition,
although not examined in the content analysis here, the "nuclear victim state" cognitive component is repeatedly
referenced in the Diet inaugurals of the next period (2008-2012), including in prime ministerial addresses by
Hatoyama Yukio (October 26, 2009; January 29, 2010), Kan Naoto (January 24, 2011), and Noda Yoshihiko
(September 13, 2011). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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in 1998-2002) recorded for this narrative in any five-year period. Previously, the peace state
narrative had not been contested for two consecutive five-year blocks and its highest level of
contestation had reached just over 4% for the period 1952-1957. With regard to interpreting the
meaning of the prominence decline during the period 1998-2002, these findings decisively refute
the banalization hypothesis, which predicts negligible levels of contestation in the period in
question and those immediately preceding it. They are, however, broadly consistent with the
predictions of the transformation and denationalization hypotheses, which both expect increases
in contestation to precede and then accompany a major decline in prominence.
Chart 6.2: Contestation Levels, Peace State Narrative, 1952-2007
% Negative Peace State
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Units: % of negatively-valued references to total references for the narrative
Table 6.13 below shows that contestation was also unprecedented at the narrative
component level in multiple ways. First, at least one of four normative components of the
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peace-loving state sub-narrative ("support the peace constitution," "eschew the use of force,"
"restrain war potential," and "support international disarmament") was contested in each of the
last six five-year blocks of the study, with one, the claim to restrain war potential, contested in
five of the six blocks. Second, the level of contestation for each of these components exceeds
its average for the entire study at least once over these three decades. Finally, the period
1998-2002 saw the second-highest level of contestation recorded for any narrative in this study
and is the only five-block in which four different components are contested simultaneously.459
In addition, each of these contested components saw their highest individual levels of
contestation during this period.
Table 6.13: Contestation Levels, Four Narrative Components, 1978-2007
Component (% Negative) 1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 Average
Support Peace Constitution 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 33.3 29.4 6.4
Eschew Use of Force 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 46.2 29.4 8.2
Restrain War Potential 4.0 0.5 0.0 13.6 50.0 50.0 11.5
Support International
0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 33.2 0.0 3.1
Disarmament
Units: % of negatively-valued references to total references for each narrative component; *Averages are for the
entire period of the study, 1952-2007.
The narrative analysis results for the period 1998-2002 are depicted in Table 6.14 below.
This is a picture of a relatively highly contested narrative. Three of the five normative
components of the peace-loving state narrative are minor points of contention ("support the
459 The highest recorded level of contestation (19.4%) was for the organic state narrative in this same five-year
period.
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peace constitution," "restrain war potential," and "support international disarmament"), one
("eschew the use of force) is a major point of contention, and the fifth ("implement peace
diplomacy") received no references for the second five-year period in a row. In addition, three
key cognitive components ("peace state" naming convention, "war regret," and "atomic
bombings") are minor points of consensus. Importantly, however, the "nuclear victim state"
naming convention is a major point of consensus, and thus went uncontested while representing
an unusually large percentage of the narrative's total references for the five-year period.
Table 6.14: Narrative Analysis, 1998-2002*
Content (Relative Frequency)
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Major Contention
Eschew the Use of Force
Major Consensus
Nuclear Victim State,
Support Non-Nuclear Principles,
Decrease
Minor Contention
Support Peace Constitution,
Restrain War Potential,
Support International Disarmament
Minor Consensus
Peace State,
Implement Peace Diplomacy,
256
Contestation
(% Negative)
Support International Nuclear War Regret, Atomic Bombings
Disarmament
*1Based on comparison with previous five-year period, 1993-1997
The failure to find contestation over cognitive components in this period or the ones
immediately preceding it runs counter to the expectations of both the
transformation and denationalization hypotheses.
comprehensive
However, the overall pattern of changes in
relative frequencies and contestation observed here is consistent with the predictions of the
partial transformation hypothesis, albeit with one important caveat. As Table 6.15 reveals, the
prominence scores of all four contested components rise in the subsequent period of 2003-2007.
Although these prominence scores remain far below the averages for the period from the second
peak, the facts that increases are observed over this period (including in the relative frequencies
of both the claims in support of the constitution and eschewing the use of force) and that three of
the components (support the constitution, restrain war potential, and eschew the use of force)
continued to face high levels of contestation in this subsequent period are indications that the
partial transformation is still an ongoing process.
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Table 6.15: Prominence Scores, Four Contested Components, 1983-2007
Contested Component 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 Average*
0.4039
Support Peace Constitution 0.6137 0.7263 0.3976 0.0831 0.1988
_________(0.4405)
0.4241
Eschew Use of Force 0.7390 0.7264 0.3364 0.1200 0.1988 (0.5447)
0.7080
Restrain War Potential 2.3046 0.9275 0.2243 0.0370 0.0468 (0.8675)
Support International 0.4112
1.0771 0.6816 0.2345 0.0277 0.0351
Disarmament (0.3337)
Units: References per 100 sentences per period; *Averages are for the period depicted, 1983-2007. (Averages for
entire period)
Analysis of the speeches and editorials from the peak period in the 1980s until the
trough in 1998-2002 show the presence of both transformational and perpetuating discursive
strategies. Despite at times appearing to take on broader implications, the transformational
strategies observed all failed to directly challenge any of the cognitive components of the peace
state narrative, although, over the twenty-year period, they did target nearly all of the normative
components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative for exceptions. Perpetuating strategies
tended to be employed in response to these partial or tinkering transformational strategies,
especially during the first decade of this period by members of the socialist opposition but also
afterwards by less experienced opposition parties.
The first transformational strategy, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's call for Japan
to become an "international state" (kokusai kokka), represents one of the most sweeping, if
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sometimes vague, discursive formations in this study. It appears to be a conscious attempt by a
single participant in the national discourse to construct a new nation-state narrative. However,
rather than the product of a purely constructive strategy, this new narrative combines or touches
on elements of the trading state, organic state, peace state and civilized state narratives. For the
purposes here, it is best regarded as a transformational strategy, albeit one that either
incorporates or attempts to partially transform the components of multiple narratives studied
here.
"International State Japan" (kokusai kokka nihon) is composed of several components.
First, it advances a cognitive claim placing "Japanese identity in a global context": the Japanese
have a strong sense of appreciation for the strengths of their own culture and traditions, while
also at the same time having an innate capacity for appreciating the qualities of foreign
cultures.460 These inherent traits of the nation are then called on to support a set of normative
claims. Among these are the call for Japanese to appreciate their history and culture, especially
recent postwar achievements, as a source of pride and a product to be promoted to other nations
(and state education and cultural policies to reflect these claims), a demand that the state
implement welfare policies that take into account these cultural traditions while following
organizational reform and economic policies that are open and responsive to the international
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460 Pyle, 1987, p.263.
environment. More generally, the narrative calls on the state to always consider ways to reform
"Japan's institutions to harmonize them with international expectations."4 6' For example, as
introduced in Nakasone's February 1984 Diet inaugural address, chief among these were reforms
of the government bureaucracy, including the national rail sector, and the tax and educational
systems, with the intent always being to move away from developmental state institutions to
foster more openness in the economy, society and schools. 4 62
The call for Japan to become an "intemational state" can potentially relate to the peace
state narrative on both cognitive and normative grounds. With regard to the former, while
acknowledging the debt of history in making the nation what it is today, including
negatively-valued episodes such as the Pacific War, this narrative calls on present-day Japanese
"to establish Japan's identity by judging the past achievements of Japan in terms of the universal
nature of world history." 463  Put differently, the narrative calls on the nation to value and take
lessons from its entire history, rather than focusing excessively on recent negative episodes.
461 Pyle, 1987, p.2 56.
462 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), January 25, 1985. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
463 Pyle, 2007, p.275. Nakasone's own personal view of the meaning of the war is often obscured in his rhetoric.
For example, the following statements precede the quoted line above: "so that Japan may progress toward becoming
an international state (kokusai kokka), it is important that Japan once again reconsider it identity... .After we lost the
war, the Pacific War view of history emerged, it is called the Tokyo [War Crimes] Tribunal view of history. The
allied countries, acting on their own, made [international] laws, made Japan the defendant, and in the name of
civilization, in the name of peace and humanity, judged Japan. History will have to make the final judgment of the
justice of those procedures and judgments."
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Depending on one's interpretation, this second point could thus be taken as
downplaying a key cognitive claim of the peace state narrative-the assertion that the Japanese
state's wartime actions were regretful. However, far from questioning this assertion, Nakasone
at times seems to confirm it in his Diet inaugural speeches. For example, three sentences after
his call for Japan to be an "international state" quoted above, Nakasone traces the nation's
present-day dedication to peace and democracy to reflections over the failings of the prewar
period.
After the war, we [Japanese] have deeply inculcated the values and meanings of
democracy (minshushugi), such as respect for liberty, peace (heiwa), fundamental
human rights, and legal order, and have worked to put them in practice strongly resolute
in the determination to protect and establish them even further based on our regrets over
what happened before the war (senzen no hansei no ue ni tatte).4 64
In addition, Nakasone's Diet inaugurals are replete with peace state rhetoric. In fact, in
his nine Diet inaugural address, Nakasone refers to "peace state" (heiwa kokka), "peace
diplomacy" (heiwa gaik5) or the "peace constitution" (heiwa kenp5) in a positive manner at least
once in eight of them, while he mentions his own "international state" narrative in the same
manner in only six. For example, continuing in the same speech quoted above, Nakasone later
refers to Japan as a "peace state" (heiwa kokka) and declares:
Above all, there has not been the slightest wavering in our traditional policy of not
threatening neighboring countries militarily, strictly adhering to the three nonnuclear
464 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), January 25, 1985. He also
makes a near identical point in the Diet inaugural address given on January 27, 1986. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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principles and civilian control, and, on the basis of our peace constitution (heiwa kenp5),
maintaining our exclusively defensive defense posture." 465
Taken in tandem, these observations of Nakasone's rhetorical habits reveal far more
nuance to his revisionism, and his call for Japan to become an "international state," than is
sometimes appreciated. Despite his life-long pursuit of constitutional revision and public views
that Japan should consider going nuclear if certain conditions obtain, Nakasone, particularly as
prime minister, not only failed to challenge the key cognitive claims of the peace state narrative
but often reinforced them.466 Noting this pattern earlier in Nakasone's career, the political
scientist Soeya Yoshihide argues that Nakasone's rejection of traditional great power aspirations
and his embrace of Japan's nonnuclear posture were partially based on his own reflection
(naisei) on Japan's wars of invasion in Asia.467 Although this point will be explored further in
the discussion of his 1985 visit to the Yasukuni shrine in Chapter Seven, its main relevance here
is in distinguishing his approach to the peace state narrative as a partial transformational
discursive strategy. Nakasone deploys "international state" arguments to challenge the range of
application of particular normative claims in the peace state narrative. This classification is
further supported by consideration of the rhetorical techniques Nakasone employed when calling
465 ibid.
466 Asahi Shimbun 14 October 2006, p.13 . The conditions Nakasone cites are "such extreme cases as the United
States renouncing the protection of alliance partners under its 'nuclear umbrella' or the complete collapse of the
US-Japan alliance." He then argues that the 2006 nuclear test by North Korea "does not qualify as one of these
extreme cases."
467 Soeya, 2005, p.145.
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for reforms to two state institutions associated with normative claims of the peace state narrative:
the Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports and the 1% of GNP ceiling on military spending.
The first rhetorical practice of note is Nakasone's explicit insistence that disarmament
and force limitation measures were important and appropriate parts of Japan's foreign policy.
Often framed in the context of East-West relations, he repeatedly called for Japan to play and
active role in promoting disarmament and force level limitations in international talks between
the superpowers.468 Sometimes these calls were directly linked to the claims of the peace state
narrative. For example, after claiming it was only "natural" (tozen da) that Japan avoid
becoming a "military great power" (gunji taikoku) and instead adhere to policies such as the
Three Nonnuclear Principles and "exclusively defensive defense" (senshu b~ei) under its "peace
constitution" (heiwa kenpd), Nakasone noted the need to promote disarmament and force
limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and concluded, "a country like
Japan, which has no nuclear weapons and only the moderate defense capabilities of an
exclusively defensive defense, is able to make such calls for peace and disarmament from the
beginning." 4
69 In this way, he both links the policy of encouraging such measures abroad with
their proper implementation at home and positions their promotion as a national mission.
468 The word "disarmament" (gunshuku) is used at least once in all nine of Nakasone's Diet inaugural speeches.
469 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
February 6, 1984. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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Second, Nakasone laced discussion of his proposals for reforming state institutions
associated with the peace state narrative with declarations of fealty to prominent elements of the
same narrative. For example, in his January 1983 inaugural address, Nakasone explained his
decision to bypass the Three Principles for Restricting Arms Exports to allow sharing of
military-use technology with the United States by first noting additional restrictions that would
be put in place to avoid the spread of these technologies to a third country or conflicts with the
UN Charter and then concluded: "Therefore, this measure will be implemented in line with our
fundamental principles as a peace state to avoid the furtherance of any international conflicts." 470
Continuing directly, he then declared that there was not the slightest change in his government's
intention, in the future as well, to adhere fundamentally (kihonteki ni) to the Three Principles
Restricting Arms Exports. Similarly, in the January 1987 Diet inaugural, Nakasone prefaced
discussion of his decision to revise the Miki Cabinet's order setting the 1% of GNP ceiling on
defense spending with a repetition, almost to the letter, of the quotation cited above from the
January 1985 inaugural speech in which he declared "there has not been the slightest wavering"
from the principles of the peace constitution.4 71
470 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
January 14, 1983. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
471 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
January 26, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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Finally, Nakasone also showed a capacity for rhetorical innovation. For example, in
justifying his decision to participate in the joint-development of military-use technology in
cooperation with the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program to develop a
space-based defense against ICBM attacks, he argued that a program "based on the fundamental
principle of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world" was in perfect agreement with "our
country's position as a peace state" (wagakuni no heiwa kokka tosite no tachiba ni gacchi
472
suru). Here, Nakasone shifted the normative claim in question from a narrow focus on
immediate actions (i.e. restraining exports of military-use technology) to those of a broader
mission (i.e. contributing to efforts that might realize a world free of nuclear weapons) and
highlighted the congruence of the latter with the principles of the narrative. In addition,
perhaps sensing that the novelty of this move might prove problematic for his audiences to
accept, he went on to note the potential of the agreement to improve the domestic technological
base, a key normative claim of the trading state narrative. 4 73 In this way, Nakasone justified
reform of a state institution associated with the normative claim of one nation-state narrative by
asserting a new link between the reform and the normative claim and then "naturalized" this
472 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
September 12, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
47 Ibid.
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novel argument by also aligning the reform with a claim of another, and in this case
unchallenged, nation-state narrative. 4 74
In a second innovation, he explicitly called on Japan to be an "international state" that
will "take responsibility for the world's peace and prosperity as a Japan in the world, with the
world, and, still further, a contributor to the world." 475  Here, he inserted the idea of
"international contributions" to peace as both a requirement of an international state and a role
Japan was expected to play by other countries. 476  He then leveraged these new value standards
of the need to meet international responsibilities and expectations in his justifications for his
reforms of security institutions. For example, he called for the realization of an "International
State Japan" that "strongly promotes world peace and disarmament," thereby linking the
"international responsibilities and expectations" claims of his "international state" rhetoric with
the normative claims of the peace state narrative.477 As will be seen below, these rhetorical
innovations were repeated by reformers seeking to challenge other normative components of the
peace state narrative after the end of the Cold War. 478
474 This thus appears to be clear example of bricolage. Levi-Strauss, 1974 [1966]; Samuels, 2004.
47 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
September 12, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
476 Naksone's move here, to be replicated by reformers in the 1990s, is consistent with the pattern observed by
David Leheny in which Japanese politicians cite international norms in order to justify changes they want to make in
domestic norms and institutions. See Leheny (2006, pp.147-180).
47 Ibid.478
478 In a sign of things to come, Nakasone comes close to extending this argument to question the normative basis of
the ban on overseas dispatch in his last Diet inaugural. After noting the problems created by the Iran-Iraq War for
shipping in the Persian Gulf and Japan's dependence on oil from that region, he stated "I think, from the
fundamental standing of a peace state (heiwa kokka) and fulfilling our role as an international state (kokusai kokka),
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In this way, despite the broad contours of Nakasone's discursive strategy, at least with
regard to his approach to the peace state narrative, it is properly understood as a partial
transformational or tinkering strategy. Nakasone emphasized how relevant normative claims
are met in his foreign policies, such as efforts to encourage international disarmament, repeatedly
asserted his reforms of state institutions associated with the peace state narrative were consistent
with its principles, and engaged in rhetorical innovation but limited his targets to normative
components.
Viewed this way, the connection between Nakasone's "international state" rhetoric and
the tinkering strategies employed by reformers in the 1990s and beyond becomes clear. In
1993, echoing Nakasone's "international expectations" standard, Ozawa Ichir6, a former LDP
secretary-general and deputy head of the largest LDP faction (Keiseikai) who went on to
participate in the Diet inaugural ceremonies as the leader of two different opposition parties,
famously called for Japan to becomefutsFi no kuni, a phrase which is often translated as "normal
nation" but is better understood here as "normal state." 479 He defined a "normal state" as one
that behaves in a responsible manner according to the common expectations of other states and
to the extent the constitution will allow (kenp5 noyurusu haninal ni oite), I want to consider an appropriate form of
international cooperation (kokusaiteki na kydryoku) as is possible depending on conditions, and make an appropriate
contribution (5bun no kdken wo hatashite mairitai)." Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session
(Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, July 6, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
479 It should be noted that Nakasone had previously used similarly-meaning phrases that can be translated as
"normal state" or "conventional state," such as seijd na kokka and zairaigata kokka. Soeya, 2005, p.165; Samuels,
2007, p. 3 5 .
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cooperates with them to resolve shared global problems.480 He applied the concept to argue
that Japan play a larger role in actively contributing to international efforts to foster peace and
stability under the auspices of the United Nations.
Ozawa developed this standard largely to challenge the "eschew the use of force"
normative component of the peace state narrative. This effort emerged from the difficulties he
faced in his attempts to reform the 1954 interpretation of Article Nine and the ban on overseas
dispatch, especially his frustration at Japan's failure to send the SDF to the Persian Gulf in 1990
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the immense difficulties encountered when he
subsequently managed to shepherd legislation through the Diet allowing the SDF to participate
in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in 1992. 481 In both cases, Ozawa sought
unsuccessfully to get the government to change the 1954 interpretation to allow Japan to
,,482participate in what he called "international secunity. Wielding this new interpretation to call
for reform of the ban on overseas dispatch, he argued that the SDF could be sent overseas to use
force in the service of UN operations. In this view, since the SDF would be serving under the
command of a multilateral organization, the use of force in this context would not constitute
collective self-defense, which is defined narrowly as rendering military support to a partner in a
480 Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp. 104-105.
481 Ozawa, 2006[1993], p.104; Samuels, 2007, p.9 1 .
482 Ozawa Committee, 1992, p.57.
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mutual defense relationship.483 Finding justification for this interpretation in the constitution,
Ozawa argued, "If we 'desire to occupy an honored place in... international society,' as written in
the preamble of the Constitution, we need to decide that active cooperation is required. And
one form of cooperation we have not yet employed is the dispatch of SDF troops." 484  As the
1990s progressed, Ozawa continued to support his proposals to reform Article Nine and the
institutions restricting overseas dispatches by referring to lines in the preamble and even Article
Nine itself. 485
Although "normal state" may be seen as a rhetorical innovation, it is does not represent
anything approaching a "counter-narrative" targeting the peace state narrative. First, "normal
state" arguments lack any particularistic component. There is no story linking the unique
nature of the Japanese nation to corresponding claims that its state reflect this nature. To the
extent "normal state" arguments even pertain to the Japanese nation, it is exclusively through
indirect and external validation, by its state meeting the expectations of other states. Especially
483 This distinction is important since it maintains the ban on collective self-defense in bilateral relationships, thus
preserving Article Nine's capacity to serve as an "entrapment shield" in the US-Japan alliance. However, more
recently, Ozawa appeared to backtracked somewhat from this original approach. From the other end of the
spectrum, Hatoyama Yukio, in offering a more standard revisionist counter proposal, critiqued Ozawa for not being
clearer on the collective self-defense question. See Itoh (2001, p.320). In 2000, Ozawa's Liberal Party released a
constitutional revision proposal that allowed the use of force in cases of 1) self-defense from attack; and 2) UN
collective security operations. However, this proposal lacks specific draft language and is cryptic on the
all-important collective self-defense question. For a critique on this point, see Tokyo Shimbun, 18 December 2000.
484 Chama, 1991, p.144.
485 Ozawa Ichir6, New Frontier Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 24,
1996. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011). In his original formulation, Ozawa proposed that
Article Nine be revised by adding a third paragraph to clarify Japan could participate in UN-sanctioned operations
and that the SDF be reorganized to fulfill this purpose. Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp.118-126.
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in Ozawa's hands, the concept is applied as a "logic of consequence," one which he almost
immediately justifies through cost-benefit analysis. 486  Second, "normal state" rhetoric is
simply not employed to target the cognitive components of the peace state narrative, by Ozawa
or any other participants in the Diet inaugural ceremonies. For example, as head of the New
Frontier Party, Ozawa's response to Prime Minster Hashimoto Ryiitar6's January 1997 Diet
inaugural address included the following affirmation of a key cognitive component of the peace
state narrative:
Based on the principles of the UN Charter and Japan's constitution, Japan will only use
force to protect its citizens' lives and property when our country faces an imminent and
illegitimate invasion and will never use force or intimidation through force in any other
circumstances. In accordance with the will of our citizens, we will not accept the
[state's] use of force as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In addition,
we will absolutely not allow creeping, vague, and expansive reinterpretations of the
right of individual self-defense to invite military expansion and a repetition of the
mistakes of the past.487
Third, "normal state" rhetoric is generally used in concert with references to nation-state
narratives, rather than as a substitute for them. For example, after first introducing the concept,
Ozawa argues that Japan needs to follow its logic in order to continue as a "trading state"
(shonin kokka, tsfishC5 kokka). Surveying world history, he notes other states that attempted to
operate in a similar way and cites the Venetian Republic as a favorable case that succeeded not
486 Ozawa, 2006[1993], p.105. For the "logic of consequences," see March & Olsen, 2006.
487 Ozawa Ichir6, New Frontier Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 22,
1997 (emphasis added). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
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only due to its people's mercantile acumen but also because of their military contributions to
maintaining peace in the Mediterranean, its major trading zone.48
Use of this standard was picked up by others who sought to challenge the normative
components of the peace state narrative. However, as some scholars have already observed,
these other "normal nation-alists" did not always share Ozawa's policy priorities, especially with
regard to his interpretation of Article Nine and UN-centrism. 489 For example, Watanabe
Tsuneo, a one-time chief editorial writer and current chairman of the Yomiuri Shimbun Group,
the media conglomerate that publishes Japan's largest daily newspaper, has declared, "If a nation
is 'normal,' it has a military." 490 However, Watanabe did not agree with Ozawa on exactly
what Japan's being "normal" meant. In particular, beginning in 1994, Watanabe's Yomiuri
newspaper developed and promoted a series of proposals to revise the constitution in order to
allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense and thus strengthen military
cooperation with the United States rather than with the United Nations.49' These ambitions
were reflected in the newspaper's editorial line. When editorializing about prime ministers'
performances during the Diet inaugural ceremonies, the Yomiuri repeatedly praised any
movement toward constitutional revision and chided prime ministers who failed to give
488 Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp.105-106.
489 Samuels, 2007, p.124; Oros, 2008, p.214, f.
490 Samuels, 2007, p.125.
491 Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005. For English translations of these proposals, see Winkler (2011, pp.77-80,
94-97, 111-114).
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sufficient treatment to the topic in their addresses. 492 In addition, Yomiuri editorialists took
clear positions in favor of allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as
necessary measure for strengthening the US-Japan alliance. 493
Others who appropriated the "normal state" argument generally agreed with the Yomiuri
on the need to challenge the "use of force" restraints of the peace state narrative and also about
which institutional reforms were necessary but differed with both Ozawa and the Yomiuri in their
commitment to components of the organic state narrative. In the period up until 2002, the
participant in the Diet inaugural ceremony who most fit this type of "normal nation-alist" was
unquestionably Prime Minister Koziumi JunichirO. As prime minister, Koizumi restarted
Nakasone's aborted visits to Yasukuni shrine beginning in August 2001, a move that proved
extremely damaging to Japan's relations with its neighbors. 494 He also presided over the largest
changes in the institutions governing the overseas dispatch of the SDF since the PKO legislation
was passed in 1992.
Although at first glance this combination might suggest Koizumi had designs on
comprehensively transforming the peace state narrative, the actual discursive strategy he adopted
was far less ambitious. First, despite his continued practice of visiting Yasukuni, as prime
492 Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 November 1998; Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 January 2000; Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 April 2000.
493 Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 May 200 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 September 2001.
494 Koizumi was criticized for his Yasukuni patronage by erstwhile conservative allies, including in editorials from
Watanabe's Yomiuri. Samuels, 2007, p. 12 4 .
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minister, Koizumi not only failed to challenge the "war regret" cognitive component of the peace
state narrative, he at times explicitly affirmed it. For example, in a Diet inaugural given a little
over a month after his first prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni, Koizumi declared, "With regard
to relations with South Korea and China, we must build a future-oriented, cooperative
relationship while making clear that our country's fundamental thinking is to look directly at our
past history, leave behind war and value peace."495  On the sixtieth anniversary of the end of
World War Two, the Koizumi Cabinet issued a cabinet order affirming the Murayama statement
issued ten years before apologizing for Japan's wartime actions to its neighbors and "again
expressing deep remorse and heartfelt feelings of apology." 496  Accordingly, Koizumi never
directly challenged the cognitive components of the peace state narrative in his Diet inaugural
addresses.497
Second, in focusing his challenge on the normative constraint on the "use of force" to
justify his institutional reforms expanding the roles of the SDF in international operations,
495 Koizumi Junichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
September 27, 2001 (emphasis added) .Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011). In 2004,
Koizumi defended his dispatch of the SDF to Iraq by stating "while thinking within the constitution's framework
(kenpo no wakunai), we have engaged in debate upon debate about how to harness war regret into actual
peacekeeping (senso no hansei wo ika nijissai no heiwa ji ni ikashite iku ka to iu giron). Koizumi Junichir6,
Liberal Democratic Party, Special Committee, House of Councillors, February 9, 2004. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
496 Asahi Shimbun, 15 August 2005.
497 Even though Koizumi continued his Yasukuni visits throughout his tenure as prime minister, he was criticized by
the right in much the same way as was Nakasone, who had discontinued his visits. The major complaint against
both was the same-neither had challenged the cognitive claims about the war that serve as the foundation of the
peace state narrative. Nishio, 2005, pp.225-226; Samuels, 2007, p. 12 1 . Interestingly, scholars on the left have
also criticized "Koizumi's nationalism" as "more pose than substance." McCormack, 2004, p.4 3 .
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Koizumi adopted Ozawa's constitutional argument: he repeatedly referred to the quotation from
the preamble of the constitution cited above whenever facing questions on the constitutional
justification for his policies. For example, in a Diet inaugural speech given a few weeks after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and in the midst of ongoing
negotiations within the ruling coalition regarding the dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense
Force (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean to aid allied operations in the developing war in Afghanistan,
Koizumi concluded his address by quoting the above passage from the preamble in full and then
stating "we have made this determination clear to the world. Shall we not now face this crisis
by giving our utmost as a country to protect the peace and liberty of world's humanity based on
the spirit of international cooperation (kokusai kydchd)? 498 In this way, Koizumi, like
Nakasone and Ozawa before him, chose a discursive strategy that engaged with the peace state
narrative only on its normative grounds.
It should also be noted that Koizumi, among others, also challenged the "restrict war
potential" normative claim with talk of introducing spy satellites during this period. In addition,
the period also saw contestation over the "support international disarmament" normative claim in
498 Koizumi Junichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
September 27, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
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the form of talk of joint development of ballistic missile defense technology with the United
States.4 99
Perpetuating strategies are also observed during this period. Although they are readily
apparent in the 1980s as the socialist opposition responded to Nakasone's transformational
strategy, they are also present in the 1990s, sometimes offered from interesting quarters. For
example, in 1987, Doi Takako responded to Nakasone's "international state" rhetoric with a
perpetuating strategy easily predicted to emanate from the JSP:
How can you call a country that drops it limit on military spending, proceeds with
military expansion, and creates mistrust and apprehension among its neighbors an
'international state contributing to peace' (heiwa ni koken suru kokusai kokka)?
Resolutely proceeding with disarmament is the mark of a Japan that will not make or be
complicit in war and the road to becoming an 'international peace state' (heiwa kokusai
kokka) that will retain trust as an economic country. 500
However, as the LDP moved into the opposition in the mid-1990s, it is interesting to
observe similar perpetuating strategies from the mouths of the leaders of the traditional
conservative party. For example, in a 1993 response to Hosokawa Morihiro's Diet inaugural
address, LDP President K6no Y6hei explicitly rejected the call for Japan to become a "normal
state" (futsi no kuni ni naru) on the grounds that it would violate "constitutional principles
499 For examples, see Obuchi Keizo, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of
Representatives, January 19, 1999; Koizumi Junichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural),
House of Representatives, January 31, 2003; Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural),
House of Representatives, July 31, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
544 Doi Takako, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, February 2, 1987.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
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meaning the pursuit of national interest by means other than military ones" and also because of
"the fear that it might lead our citizens again to a calamity in the end."50' Responding to the
next Hosokawa inaugural, future LDP prime-minister Hashimoto Rytitar6 questioned whether
the Hosokawa administration's coordination with the United States and South Korea over missile
defense issues constituted a violation of the ban on the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense. 502 The continuity here with the past rhetorical habits of the socialist opposition
thus indicates peace state rhetoric retained at least a measure of its appeal for opposition parties
in the 1990s.503
The presence of multiple tinkering discursive strategies amidst perpetuating ones
offered in response immediately preceding and during the period of steep decline in prominence
(1998-2002) fits the predictions of the partial transformation hypothesis and further weakens the
case for balkanization. In addition, the absence of destructive strategies targeting both the
cognitive and normative components of the peace state narrative without offering an alternative
way of linking the nation and the state within the same domain runs counter to the predictions of
the denationalization hypothesis.
501 Kono Y6hei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, August 25,
1993 (emphasis added). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
502 Hashimoto Ryitar6, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives,
September 22, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
503 Although Kono was known for his general support for the institutions associated with peace state narrative,
especially Article Nine, Hashimoto was not.
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Table 6.16 summarizes changes to the previously-introduced state institutions
associated with the peace state narrative observed between 1998 and 2002, with some references
to important changes from preceding periods. 504  The examination of discursive strategies
above has already referenced some of these reforms. Key changes during the period of the
second postwar peak in peace state prominence included Nakasone's 1983 decision to allow the
sharing of military technology with the US outside of the Three Principles Restricting Arms
Exports, his pledge of Japan's participation in the SDI program in 1985, and his 1986 decision to
relax the 1% of GNP Ceiling on the defense budget. 505  In the next five-year period, when
peace state's prominence began its post-Cold War decline, Ozawa achieved the first change in
the ban on overseas dispatch in nearly forty years, although the new so-called PKO law (1992)
attached new constraints that placed limitations on the government's deployment decisions as
well as the actions permissible for SDF participants in UN peacekeeping operations. 506 Finally,
5 Due to space limitations and the large number of changes involved, it is impossible to catalog and consider every
change in the institutions associated with the peace state narrative in the treatment here. For a more thorough
accounting of these changes, see Samuels (2007, pp.86-108).
505 It should be noted that Nakasone's decision to revise the Miki-era cabinet order actually generated "breaches" in
defense expenditures in 1987, 1988, and 1989 that are so slight they disappears under any rounding operation. In
addition, defense expenditures after 1989 have conformed to the 1% of (now) GDP ceiling, even though Japan's
GDP grew far slower during this subsequent period. See Green, 1995, p. 2 1; Takao, 2011; p.2 3 . When asked in a
1986 interview to categorize the achievements of the Nakasone administration as either "successful" or
"problematic," Fujinami Takao, the chief cabinet secretary in Nakasone's second cabinet, placed the effort to breach
the 1% of GNP barrier (and Nakasone's Yasukuni visit) in the latter category. See Muramatsu (1987, pp.3 12-313).
It should also be noted that the actual extent to which Japan has shared military technology with the US has been
fairly limited: "[B]etween 1983 and 2005, there were only fourteen cases of formal defense technology exports by
Japanese firms to the United States." In addition, Japan also ended up playing a negligible part in the SDI program.
See Samuels (2007, pp.9 0 -9 1).
506 The centerpiece of these new constraints was the Five Principles. Developed by the CLB based on their earlier
interpretation that the SDF could not use force as part of a UN army, these principles require the Japanese
government to withdraw its troops at the first sign of hostilities while denying the SDF the right to use force to
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in the period in which peace state prominence reached its postwar nadir, LDP-led coalition
governments under Obuchi Keizo and Koizumi Junichiro agreed to joint development of ballistic
missile defense technologies with the United Sates (1998), passed the so-called guidelines
legislation (1999), which expanded the role of the SDF under the US-Japan alliance in the event
of a military emergency in the region, established committees in both houses of the Diet to
consider constitutional revision (2000), unfroze measures in the PKO law allowing SDF
participation in peacekeeping forces (PKFs) (2001), and passed the Anti-Terrorism law (2001),
which dispatched the MSDF to the Indian Ocean under more expansive rules of engagement to
aid, albeit from a great distance and in a non-combatant role, the allied war effort in
Afghanistan.507
Table 6.16: Changes in Associated State Institutions, 1998-2002
Associated State Institution Status (1998-2002)
Article Nine (law) No Change to Text,
accomplish the mission of the UN operation. Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
507 The freezing of SDF participation in PKFs was a result of a deal made between the LDP and the small K6mei
Party, which represents the Buddhist lay organization Soka Gakkai, in order to pass the PKO bill in 1992. Until
undone in December 1992, this PKF freeze kept the SDF from performing such duties as cease-fire monitoring,
weapons collection and disposal, and buffer zone patrols. Passed in May 1999, the three bills that implemented
new guidelines agreed on with the US to govern the bilateral alliance committed Japan to provide only "rear area
support" (k5h5 chiiki shien) for U.S. forces in the event of a regional emergency involving Japan's security. The
new SDF roles under the laws included the provision of food, water, and fuel; the transport of material (excluding
weapons and ammunition); and medical support. Finally, the Antiterrorism law, passed in October 2001, allowed
MSDF ships to be sent to the Indian Ocean to engage in medical, transportation, and refueling activities in support
of US-led forces fighting in Afghanistan. The law also relaxed weapons use restrictions, although these continued
to be quite restrictive. Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
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Diet Review Committees Established (2000)*
1954 Interpretation No Change
Ban on Overseas Dispatch (law) PKF Unfrozen, Anti-Terror Law (200 1)*
Previous Changes (PKO Law 1992)
US-Japan Security Treaty (law) Guidelines Laws (1999)
1% of GNP Ceiling (cabinet order) No Change,
Previous Change (Cabinet Order 1986)
Ban on Offensive Weapons No Change?
[New force projection capabilities]
Three Principles of Arms Exports BMD Joint-Development (1998)*
Previous Changes (1983, 1985)
Three Nonnuclear Principles (resolution) No Change
Basic Law on Atomic Energy (law) No Change
Non-proliferation Treaty (ratified) Additional Protocol (1998),
Previous Changes (CTB Treaty 1997)
*Additional changes in subsequent period (2003-2007)
In contrast to the 1970s, there were many changes in the institutions associated with the
peace state narrative in both this period and those preceding it. Based on the assumptions of the
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model here, associations with institutions targeted for reforms (and thus serving as sources of
potential contestation) increase the likelihood that relevant narrative components will be subject
to reevaluation, denigration or the emergence of counter-narratives. The finding of a large
number of changes to associated institutions thus further frustrates the expectations of the
banalization hypothesis. In addition, with the exception of those relating to the anti-nuclear
state sub-narrative, all successfully implemented institutional reforms required the adding of an
exception to a relevant normative component in order for advocates to maintain the association
between the institution and the narrative. However, as was clear in the examples of discursive
strategies examined above, those advocating reforms in these institutions continued to associate
them with the peace state narrative, both during the process of making the changes and after they
were implemented. This finding is consistent with what one would expect to see when a
process of partial transformation is at work.
Analysis of data from the Diet inaugurals and changes in associated institutions here
thus paints a very different picture than the one observed in the 1970s. Based on these
findings, it is concluded that the decline in prominence observed in the late 1990s and early
2000s represents an ongoing process of the partial transformation of nearly all the normative
components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative. The final section considers the factors
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driving this process as well as what it means for the future of the peace state narrative and the
overarching question of the secular decline in all five nation-state narratives.
V. Conclusion
Viewed as a life-cycle model, the changes observed in the peace state narrative over the
postwar period might be described as a disputed and uncertain youth yielding to an unchallenged
and stable middle age that in turn cedes to a contentious yet tenacious old age. Across these
periods, the prominence of the narrative shifted wildly, with the driving forces in this process
being political fights over institutions associated with the narrative, first over the creation and
early operation of Japan's key external security institutions and then later over their reshaping
just prior to and after the end of the Cold War. This section begins by evaluating the domestic
factors that shaped this pattern of change, including the presence or absence of associations
between the narrative and institutions targeted for reform, the level of specificity of the
normative claims in question, and the discursive strategies chosen by reformers. It then
considers the role played by exogenous factors, such as U.S. pressure, in this process and
concludes by considering what the observed pattern of ongoing change means for the peace state
narrative moving forward.
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A major argument advanced here is that the combination of institutional associations,
characteristics of the relevant normative components, and types of discursive strategies
employed played important roles in the changes witnessed in the peace state narrative. First, as
noted previously, association with a state institution can be a double-edged sword for a narrative
component. If the institution is uncontested, as were many of the peace state's associated
institutions in the 1970s, then the link can serve as stabilizing force and can contribute to the
process of banalization. However, should associated institutions become the subject of political
contestation, fights over their reform can encourage would-be reformers to adopt discursive
strategies aimed at changing either the associated component or the entire narrative itself. At
this point, the characteristic of the normative claim in question becomes relevant. How
specifically is it associated with the institution in question? What level of discretion or room
for interpretation do its claims leave for would-be reformers to adopt transformational
strategies? 508 The answers to these questions will likely affect the choice of discursive strategy
adopted by reformers. If the connection between the normative claim and the associated
institution is particularly vague or open to multiple interpretations, then reformers can more
easily adopt partial transformational strategies and defenders are more hard-pressed to develop
convincing perpetuating strategies in response. If the terms of the association are clearly
508 This point is adapted from the approach to institutional change offered by Mahoney & Thelen (2010).
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specified, then reformers have less options and defenders are more easily able to advance their
claims. It should be noted that adopting a destructive or comprehensive transformational
strategy targeting a prominent narrative can be a costly undertaking for institutional reformers, as
it will certainly require an actor both to engage in rhetorical innovation on a large scale and to
step outside the conventions of the discursive status quo.
Applying the above discussion to the case of the peace state narrative after the Cold
War helps clarify the argument. First, compared with the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, the
peace-loving state sub-narrative has the most normative components associated with state
institutions. All things being equal, it is thus more vulnerable than the anti-nuclear state
sub-narrative to facing contestation spilling over from an effort to reform one of its associated
institutions. Second, the peace-loving state sub-narrative also features components that are
more easily open to interpretation by actors seeking to affect changes in its associated
institutions than those of the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative. Here, the fact that so many of this
sub-narrative's normative claims have from the early postwar been located in a variety of
positions in the spectrum between state non-violence and state non-aggression looms large.
Reformers seeking to add exceptions to the peace-loving state sub-narrative's normative status
quo often needed only look to the recent past to find material to support their claims. Taking
these two points together, it is thus neither surprising that the components of the peace-loving
283
state sub-narrative have faced more contestation than those of the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative
nor that would-be reformers of its associated institutions adopted partial transformational
strategies targeting these components rather than taking on the more difficult task of targeting
the entire narrative with a comprehensive transformational or destructive strategy.
This logic helps explain both the vast differences in the levels of contestation faced by
the two sub-narratives and the patterns of change observed in their relative frequencies in the
post-Cold War period. While the peace-loving state sub-narrative faced unprecedented levels
of contestation in four of its five normative components during this period, the anti-nuclear state
sub-narrative faced none at all. In addition, as shown in Chart 6.3 below, during a period of
epic decline in the prominence of the peace state narrative as a whole, the anti-nuclear state
sub-narrative came to occupy an increasing percentage of the total references to the narrative and
even represented a slight majority of the references for the period 1998-2002.
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The points above help explain why certain components of the peace state narrative faced
more contestation and change than others and also why institutional reformers chose the types of
discursive strategies that they did. Viewed this way, the process of change in nation-state
narratives appears a decidedly inward-looking affair, one in which domestic elites innovate at the
margins of received conventions in order to legitimate favored positions in political fights over
institutional reforms. But what of the role of factors exogenous to this process?
scholars examining nationalism and national identity focus on images of "the Other" in their
explanations of how these conceptions develop and change. 509 What has been the role, if any,
of such external factors in producing the pattern of change observed in the peace state narrative?
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Many
509 Bukh, 2010; Clammer, 2001
1978-2007Chart 6.3:
One recent study of postwar Japanese national identity and society emphasizes the
outsized influence of the United States in shaping the development of both.5 10 Scholars also
point to pressure from the United States as a central factor behind changes in Japan's security
policies since the end of the Cold War. In particular, they argue that growing uncertainty in the
security environment of East Asia during this period has increased both perceptions of threat and
fears of abandonment by the United States, resulting in additional pressure on Japanese leaders
to meet demands made by their only alliance partner. 51' Accordingly, experts have cited the
alliance as "the mother of all catalysts" when it comes to forces driving change in Japan's
security institutions. 512
The United States' influence is apparent when one reviews the policy debates that led to
the changes in institutions associated with the peace state narrative cited above. Although for
many of these reforms the U.S. found willing domestic accomplices, especially among
revisionist conservatives, most of the above institutional changes at least began their political life
as direct or indirect requests from the United States. 513  External factors thus set the stage for
many of the domestic political fights that shaped the changes observed in the peace state
510 McCormack, 2007.
5" Kawakatsu-Ueki, 2006; Samuels, 2007; On the alliance security dilemma between fears of abandonment and
entrapment, see Snyder (1984). It should be noted that Midford (2011, pp. 146-170) has recently argued that
attitudes of the Japanese public may have started to shift back toward fears of entrapment during the last five-year
Period covered in this study.
2 Samuels, 2007, p. 8 2 .
513 For a review of the politics of many of these institutional fights, see Boyd & Samuels (2005) and Hughes (2004).
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In addition, participants in these fights looked abroad to craft standards of argument
directed at changing specific aspects of the peace state narrative. Nakasone's "international
state" and Ozawa's "normal state" are two prominent conventions that call for changes in the
peace state narrative justified by appeals to standards from abroad, with the United States as a
central role model.
To concede the importance of external factors in generating pressure for reforms in
relevant institutions and serving as resources for rhetorical innovation does not require the leap
to a purely externally-driven explanation of change. Although domestic political elites may try
to reconstruct a nation-state narrative in response to external pressures, as the examples in the
previous section show, they do not have a free hand in making changes to these narratives.
While external pressures for the reform of security institutions may have served as the initial
impetus for the debates involving the peace state narrative, these pressures were mediated
through domestic political conflicts that forced individual participants to craft rhetorical
strategies in response to a highly prominent narrative closely associated with the institutions
targeted for reform. The result has so far been a pattern in which a debate is launched by a
demand for an institutional change from the U.S., domestic advocates craft a discursive strategy
aimed at narrowly transforming a relevant normative claim to make it consistent with the reform,
and a final agreement is negotiated that includes new restrictions not part of the original U.S.
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narratives.
demand but trumpeted by Japanese supporters of the reform as evidence of its compliance with
the peace state narrative.
The effort to change the normative claim eschewing the use of force in international
affairs is an instructive example of this pattern. First, pressure to override institutional
constraints on the overseas deployment of Japanese troops began in earnest with the U.S. effort
to assemble a coalition force to counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Second, reformers
like Ozawa Ichiro cited the "normal state" standard and references to the constitution's preamble
to assert that actions taken to maintain peace were in fact consistent with the self-conception of
Japan as a peace state. As the ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF for military operations was
gradually relaxed first for UN peace-keeping operations and later for joint operations with the
United States, new restrictions were created that limited the situations and purposes for which
force could be used. Not called for by the U.S., these restrictions were then cited as evidence of
consistency with the peace state narrative. The ultimate goal of expanding the sphere of peace
was also offered to legitimate the entire reform in peace state terms.
The institutional reforms that coincide with these rhetorical strategies have been cited as
examples of a broader pattern of "reach, reconcile, and reassure" in Japanese security
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policy-making. 514  For example, Andrew Oros can see this pattern at work in the decision to
send ground troops to Iraq in 2003:
[R]each to dispatch the SDF abroad, reconcile this with SDF law by greatly limiting
rear-area support scope and simultaneously stressing the humanitarian mission of the
GSDF in Iraq, and reassure the public by limiting the duration of the enabling
legislation.5 1 5
These rhetorical strategies and institutional reforms resulted in changes in the normative
claim eschewing the use of force that can be expressed both quantitatively and qualitatively.
As Table 6.17 shows, both the level of contestation and relative frequency for this normative
claim increased in 1988-1992, a period that coincides with the major debates over reforming
institutions governing the overseas operations of the SDF.516 In the subsequent period
(1993-1997), both contestation and relative frequency decreased. This suggests that the
importance of the norm to the narrative initially increased because it became the subject of
contestation and then decreased once the point of contention was resolved. Contestation and
relative frequency then rose in 1998-2002, again indicating that the increase in importance to the
narrative was fueled in part by a large increase in negatively-valued references to the norm.517
However, although coming close, negatively-valued references do not outnumber positive ones
514 Oros, 2008, p.33 .
515 Ibid., p.34.
516 During this period, Prime Minister Nakasone advocated sending the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to
the Persian Gulf to sweep for mines following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War (1988) and the Diet considered
legislation concerning the SDF's participation in the Gulf War and its aftermath (1990-199 1) and United Nations
Peace-Keeping Operations (1992).
517 This period also coincided with major debates over reforming the restrictions on overseas dispatch of the SDF,
including the SDF's role in supporting the United States in the event of a regional crisis (1999), and the dispatch of
the MSDF to support anti-terror operations in the Indian Ocean (2001).
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during this period. This pattern is thus consistent with a process of partial transformation, in
which a norm is repeatedly subjected to contestation by reformers seeking to add exceptions to
its range of application while defenders deploy perpetuating strategies in response. Finally, the
fact that contestation fell but relative frequency continued to rise in the final five-year period
(2003-2007) indicates the emergence of a new consensus, although the continued presence of
relatively high levels of contestation points to the strong possibility that the norm will again
become a point of contention in the near future.5' 8
Table 6.17: Eschew Use of Force, Contestation and Relative Frequency, 1983-2007
Eschew Use of Force 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007
Contestation Level (% Negative) 0.0 1.5 0.0 46.2 29.4
Relative Frequency 10.5% 16.6% 14.1% 16.7% 20.5%
Units: % of negative references to total references; Relative Frequency: % of component references to total
narrative references.
Qualitatively, the stricter interpretation of this claim, exemplified by the 1969 quotation
cited above from the JSP's Narita Tomomi, namely that the overseas dispatch of the SDF was
anathema to the principles of the peace state, gave way to one in which military contributions to
the maintenance of peace within certain limits could be offered as evidence of Japan's dedication
to this righteous path. For example, the 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs fact sheet
enumerating Japan's efforts as a peace state cited in Chapter Four includes as its final category
518 The average level of contestation for this norm over the eleven five-year blocks was 8.2%. This period
encompassed major debates over institutions associated with the norm, including the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq
(2003) and subsequent renewals of this deployment as well as MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean.
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defined as "cooperation in peace-keeping,
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance."5 19 Along with the SDF's participation in various
UN peace-keeping operations, the deployment to Iraq is listed as an example of Japan fulfilling
this aspect of its peace state commitment. Although this characterization remains contested, it
is undeniable that a shift has occurred in the content of this normative claim, with political elites
now regularly citing these SDF deployments as consistent with a state fulfilling the demands of
its peace-loving nation.
What do these findings mean for present and future of the peace state narrative? First,
the decline in prominence is partly the result of a decreasing range of application, albeit one
confined to the normative components of a single sub-narrative. More specifically, the peace
state narrative is undergoing a partial transformation that has added exceptions to multiple
normative components of its peace-loving state sub-narrative, but left its cognitive core, as well
as the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, unchanged.
Second, the peace state narrative, although facing heavier and more sustained levels of
contestation over the last two decades than over the previous three, has yet to face an existential
challenge. Despite the possibility that the increase in exceptions to so many of the normative
claims of one of its sub-narratives may have opened a space for such a robust threat, to this point,
519 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website. Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/ayumi.htnl
(July 28, 2012).
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"human contributions," peace-building and
challengers have failed to capitalize on this opportunity and largely continued to present their
demands for normative exceptions in rhetoric consistent with the peace state narrative, just as
Nakasone did in the 1980s.
This pattern has held even for the period after 2000, when revisionist conservatives
enjoyed control of the prime minister's office and the JSP, the traditional carrier of the narrative
among the opposition parties, was no longer a meaningful presence in the Diet. For example,
although Prime Minister Koizumi was able to accomplish the most dramatic change to date in
the ban on overseas dispatch, the dispatch of Ground Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, he did so using
rhetoric that insisted on the deployment's consistency with the normative constraints of the
peace state narrative.52 0
This period also saw the rise (and rapid fall) of Abe Shinzo, the grandson of Kishi
Nobusuke, who came to power in 2006 calling for Japan to become a "beautiful country"
(utsukushii kuni).5 2 ' Despite being the epitome of the contemporary revisionist politician who
520 In Diet inaugurals, Koizumi repeatedly positioned the Iraq mission, both before and after the GSDF deployment,
as dedicated to "world peace" or "peace in the Middle East" and bluntly stated that "this is not the use of force." He
also assured his audience that Japanese personnel would only be active in "non-combat zones" and would be
removed immediately if their safety was compromised. Koizumi Junichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, General
Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 26, 2003; January 19, 2004. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
521 With "Beautiful Country," Abe adopted a constructive strategy, albeit one less expansive than Nakasone's
"international state." The term was shorthand for Abe's "nation-building" (kuni zukuri) agenda, which included
efforts to 1) to reform the education system to increase national pride and love of country (patriotic education); 2) to
revise the constitution to allow a freer hand to use force overseas (constitutional revision); and 3) to conduct a more
"assertive" foreign policy (shuch5 gaikb). Although 2 and 3 presented challenges to the "support Article Nine,"
"eschew the use of force" and "implement peace diplomacy" normative components of the peace state narrative,
Abe failed to challenge the narrative's cognitive core, despite his views of history expressed prior to becoming
prime minister. It should also be noted that his "patriotic education" plank essentially dovetailed with the "enforce
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took "a dim view of most accounts of Japan's imperialist past and of the war crimes trials" and
"consistently argued for a revision of what conservatives have regarded as a 'masochistic' view
of Japan's modem history," Abe lost his voice on these matters upon becoming prime
minister. 522 He refused to visit Yasukuni while in office and failed even once to challenge the
key cognitive components of the peace state narrative during his three Diet inaugural addresses.
Instead, he targeted individual normative components such as Article Nine but failed to offer a
coherent counter-narrative for the peace state narrative. In short, throughout this period,
participants in the nationalist discourse continued to use peace state rhetoric and to justify
favored institutional reforms all in the name of peace. The peace state narrative thus does not
appear in danger of disappearing from the nationalist discourse any time soon.
Third, while less prominent relative to other narratives in recent years, the peace state
narrative remains an important convention in Japan's nationalist discourse and will thus continue
to be shaped by debates over reforming institutions associated with its components. Although
the examples cited in this chapter have focused on changes that limited the range of application
of its normative claims, it should be noted that this need not always be the case. For example,
the organizers of the demonstration in Yoyogi Park cited in Chapter One are clearly trying to
expand the peace state narrative's proscription against nuclear weapons to include nuclear power
traditional values" normative component of the organic state narrative. Abe, 2006.
522 Pyle, 2006, p. 8.
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as well. This can be seen in a number of ways.
event are also founding members of the Article Nine Association, a civic action group dedicated
to preserving Article Nine and its ideals. Second, the organizers asked participants to sign a
petition calling for an end to the use of nuclear power in Japan that is replete with peace state
rhetoric. It equates those injured by the Fukushima nuclear plant accident with the victims of
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and states unequivocally that "humanity cannot
coexist with that which is nuclear" (ningen wa kaku to wa ky5zon dekinai no desu).523 Finally,
one of the organizers, Nobel Prize-winning writer Oe Kenzaburo has explicitly called for this
linkage in print:
Therein lies the ambiguity of contemporary Japan: it is a pacifist nation sheltering under
the American nuclear umbrella. One hopes that the accident at the Fukushima facility
will allow the Japanese to reconnect with the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to
recognize the danger of nuclear power, and to put an end to the illusion of the efficacy
of deterrence that is advocated by nuclear powers.52 4
Although the effort to merge opposition to nuclear weapons with opposition to nuclear power
has a long history in postwar politics, the Yoyogi event represents a new chapter in this endeavor.
Considering the rising importance of the anti-nuclear components to the peace state narrative,
this expansion, if successful, could prove central to the narrative's return to the highest levels of
prominence in the future. Thus, even after facing decades of contestation and discursive
523 The petition can be found at the following website: http://sayonara-nukes.org/ (Accessed July 22, 2012).
524 Oe, 2011.
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First, three of the nine main organizers of the
strategies designed to weaken its relevance to security institutions, the peace state narrative not
only endures but also retains the potential to once again become the most prominent story
linking the nation to the state in Japan.
A final matter involves the significance of the explanations developed above for the
question of why all five nation-state narratives have experienced secular declines in prominence.
Although this question cannot be answered by looking at just one narrative, the fact that similar
declines in prominence for the same narrative over different time periods generate different
explanations seems to strengthen the possibility that different forces may be behind the overall
declines in prominence of the different narratives in this study. The next chapter will consider
this question in more detail.
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Chapter Seven: Stories upon Stories
What is the history of a nation after all but its stories? Numerous stories.
like the many surfaces of a nation.
Stories upon stories,
Alexander Kluge
I. Introduction
While the previous chapter focused on a single nation-state narrative, this chapter
considers a number of questions concerning the relationships between different nation-state
narratives. None of the five narratives examined here exist in a vacuum. As they were
selected in part due to the linkages they assert between the nation and the state in policy-relevant
areas, such as security, trade, technology, education, social welfare, cultural and electoral
institutions, it should not be surprising that they are sometimes advanced in concert and other
times in opposition to one another, especially in the course of policy debates. This interaction
may affect their level of prominence and even their longevity in the nationalist discourse. In
addition, similar patterns of change in prominence may indicate that different narratives are
influenced by the same factors and will eventually share the same fate. Only by considering the
relationships between these "stories upon stories" is it thus possible to answer questions such as
whether denationalization is taking place across multiple domains or if changes in the
525 Quoted in Ray, 2001, p. 1 1 9 .
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prominence of one narrative have affected the status of other narratives in the nationalist
discourse.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The next section considers whether the decline in
references to all five narratives following the end of the Cold War is linked in some way. Such
a link might indicate a broader denationalization under way and the movement of Japan toward a
post-nationalist political order. However, no such link emerges, and the decline is found to
signify different outcomes across the five narratives. The third section analyzes the
relationships between the democratic, trading and peace state narratives in the context of their
significance for the debate over the sources of legitimacy for Japan's postwar democratic regime.
Although both the trading and peace state narratives are correlated to differing degrees with the
democratic state narrative, these relationships weaken in the post-Cold War period, and the
democratic state narrative assumes a more independent status. Combined with the conclusion
that democratic state narrative has become a banal strand of nationalism, this result is argued to
bode well for the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. The final section examines the reasons
behind the persistence of the organic state narrative at relatively low levels of prominence and
points to a reciprocal relationship with the peace state narrative as a factor in this pattern.
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II. Complete Banalities and Partial Transformations
The previous chapter found the declining levels of prominence observed for the peace
state narrative in the post-Cold War period to be evidence of an ongoing but still partial
transformation. However, the aggregate results reported in Chapter Five reveal a broad fall in
prominence among all narratives between the 1980s and the years following the end of the Cold
War, which saw historical lows in the prominence of four of the five narratives.s26 Aside from
the peace state narrative, what do these declines mean for the other four nation-state narratives?
Do they also indicate processes of transformation underway? Is there evidence of a general
denationaliztion across different domains in which the nation has historically been linked to the
state in Japanese nationalist discourse?
This section attempts to address the above questions, albeit with the following caveats.
First, it is impossible to examine all four remaining narratives in the same detail as the peace
state narrative was in the previous chapter. The discussion is thus limited to the post-Cold War
period, with the analysis of summary statistics and different discursive strategies necessarily
abbreviated. Second, since the issue of institutional associations is closely related to the
526 As noted in Chapter Five, comparing cumulative prominence scores for all five narratives for 1983-1987, the
five-year block that contains the highest post-1967 prominence scores for three of the five narratives, and 1998-2002,
the five-year block that contains the lowest prominence scores recorded in this study for two of the five narratives,
reveals a drop of more than 70%. The only narrative not to register its lowest prominence score between 1993 and
2007 is the civilized state narrative. However, it should be noted that this narrative did approach its postwar low
(1.3409 references/100 sentences in 1988-1992) in the five-year blocks 1993-1997 and 1998-2002, with its second
(1.3457 references/100 sentences) and third (1.3481 references/100 sentences) lowest scores, respectively.
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question of these narratives' institutional impacts, these are treated together for a sample of the
narratives in Chapter Eight.
the trading, organic, civilized and democratic state narratives all
experienced declines in prominence of nearly 50% or more in the period after 1992 compared
with their highs in the previous decade, the degree of these drops varied. For example, the
prominence scores of the trading and civilized state narratives only fell by about half (52% and
46%, respectively), while those of the democratic and organic state narratives fell by more than
two-thirds (77% and 79%, respectively). In addition, these declines placed the individual
narratives in different positions vis-a-vis their prominence averages for the entire period, with
the low points of the organic and democratic state narratives both three-fourths below their
year average and the same for the civilized and trading state narratives
underperforming at more modest levels (-33% and -53%, respectively). However, it should be
noted that some of these declines are not unprecedented. In fact, three narratives (trading,
organic, and democratic state) experienced larger declines between their high points in the first
two postwar decades and their low points in the 1970s, a history that distinguishes them from the
peace and civilized state narratives, which saw their largest such decline following the end of the
Cold War.
300
Although
fifty-five
Analyzing these shifts using the tools developed in previous chapters, the democratic
and civilized state narratives show strong evidence of banalization across nearly all measures.
First, at no point during or after the declines in prominence did either of these narratives fail to
be referenced. Further, neither faced meaningful levels of contestation either during the 1980s
or the period of the declines following 1992.527 Finally, there were no incidences in the speeches
of the Diet inaugurals or newspaper editorials in which political elites adopted transformational,
tinkering or destructive discursive strategies vis-A-vis these two narratives from the 1980s
onwards28. In short, the democratic and civilized state narratives represent the two clearest
cases of banalization in this study.
Understanding the decline in prominence after the Cold War as cases of banalization
does not mean the two narratives were frozen in amber for the last quarter-century. Important
changes can be observed during this period by considering shifts within the narratives
themselves. Such changes in the democratic state narrative will be considered in the next
section. With regard to the civilized state narrative, Chart 7.1 below shows that the relative
frequency of references to its two sub-narratives nearly reached balance for the first time in the
527 As previously noted, the democratic state narrative did not receive a single negatively-valued reference during
the entire study. The civilized state narrative went completely uncontested from 1952-1997, received minimal
contestation (less than 1%) in 1998-2002, and then went uncontested again in the final five-year period (2003-2007).
528 The only negatively-valued reference coded for the civilized state narrative was made by Prime Minister
Koizumi in February 2002. In a section in which he listed cuts in his 2002 budget, Koizumi listed his "bold
overhaul of the healthcare system." However, he not only fails to challenge the civilized state narrative but reaffirms
it in his later description of the actual reforms, including a reference to Japan's welfare state as one "of which all
Japanese should be proud." Koizumi Junichir6, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House
of Representatives, February 4, 2002. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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However, this balance quickly broke down and returned for the next two
decades to the roughly one-fourth cultured state and three-fourths welfare state split that was the
average for the entire study.
Chart 7.1: Sub-Narratives in Motion, Civilized State Narrative, 1952*-2007
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This shift almost certainly indicates yet another "Nakasone effect." In referencing the
civilized state narrative, Prime Minister Nakasone tended to give nearly equal treatment to its
cultural and welfare components. For example, in one of his first references to the narrative in
a Diet inaugural, Nakasone declared, "Standing in the burned-out rubble, liberated from the
prewar era in which Japan's military was prioritized and liberty was restricted, Japanese citizens
yearned for new values and cried out for a cultured state (bunka kokka), a welfare state (fukushi
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period 1983-1987.
In the period between 1983 and 1987, Nakasone gave all but one of the prime
ministerial addresses at the Diet inaugural ceremony, and references to the civilized state
narrative by the prime minister accounted for 62% of all such references during this period
compared with an average of 53% for the entire study. The near equalization of the two
sub-narratives in the middle of Chart 7.1 thus appears to be largely the work of a single actor, an
achievement that proved ephemeral in the sense that it failed to alter the long-term balance
between the major components of the narrative. Following Nakasone's term in office, welfare
again returned as the overwhelming point of concern of those citing the civilized state narrative
during the Diet inaugural ceremony.
Comparing Nakasone's attempt to reorder the priorities of the civilized state narrative
with his coterminous efforts to affect change in the peace state narrative reveals important
differences. Although both cases begin with a new prime minister challenging the status quo of
usage patterns for a major nation-state narrative, they differ in both means and outcomes. First,
Nakasone's references to the civilized state narrative failed to include novel challenges to any of
its normative claims. Instead, his call for Japan to become a "robust culture and welfare
country" (takumashii bunka to fukushi no kuni) worked largely within the existing rhetorical
range long associated with the narrative, staking a position that placed the emphasis on cultural
529 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), December 3, 1982. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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kokka)."s 29
fulfillment and a distinct "Japanese-style" (nihon-teki) welfare provision that centered on the
family. 530 Although the latter points to traditional conservative attitudes about maximizing the
role of the family in areas such as elderly care, Nakasone avoided directly challenging the
normative claim at the heart of welfare state sub-narrative that the state should ensure the welfare
of the nation. This contrasts with the rhetorical approach initially adopted by the newly-elected
Reagan administration, in which a top official directly challenged the legitimacy of the American
welfare state.5 3' Second, in the years after Nakasone left office, political elites failed to adopt
his equal emphasis on culture and welfare in their references to the civilized state narrative, and
previously established patterns returned. This highlights the key point that although a single
actor can initiate important changes in the nationalist discourse, enduring change can only be
achieved when political elites in subsequent years adopt these changes and perpetuate their use.
In contrast to the relatively tranquil passages of the democratic and civilized state
narratives into the post-Cold War era, the trading and organic state narratives had far more
turbulent journeys. In fact, on average, the trading and organic state narratives both saw similar
levels of contestation as that of the peace state narrative in the period between 1978 and 2007.3
530 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), December 3, 1982. Nakasone
made this call in 6 of his 10 Diet inaugural addresses. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
531 In a March 1981 interview, David Stockman, then director of the Office of Management and Budget, declared, "I
don't believe that there is any entitlement. The idea that's been established over the last 10 years that almost every
service that someone might need in life ought to be provided, financed by the government as a matter of basic right,
is wrong. We challenge that. We reject that notion." Quoted in Bartlett (2009).
132 Measured as the percentage of negatively-valued references to total references for the narrative, the average
level of contestation over the six five-year blocks between 1978 and 2007 for the trading, organic and peace state
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However, as noted above, neither narrative ever recorded a zero-level of prominence.
addition, in neither case were the core cognitive claims of the narratives challenged. Instead, as
with the peace state narrative, the contestation was limited to the narratives' normative claims,
each of which saw two challenged in the post-Cold War period. For the trading state narrative,
the claims that the state should promote the nation's exports as well as its investments overseas
were regularly challenged during period (and before), while resistance to the organic state
narrative's calls for the state to support the Yasukuni shrine appeared for the first time and
objections to enforcing traditional values resurfaced after a long period of quiescence. The
combination of these findings thus initially indicates a process of partial transformation at work
in both narratives.
As the above developments in the trading and organic state narratives are relevant to
questions regarding the former's relationship with the democratic state narrative and the latter's
with the peace state narrative, the details, extent, timing, and institutional relevance of these
transformations will be explored over the course of the remaining sections of this chapter.
However, accepting the provisional conclusion that the post-Cold War declines in the
prominence of these two narratives are instances of partial transformations completes the
narratives were 5.17%, 5.19% and 5.79%, respectively.
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assessments of the declines during this period for all the narratives in this study. These
conclusions are summarized in Table 7.1 below.
Table 7.1: Understanding Prominence Declines
Narrative Post-Cold War Period
Trading State Transformation (Partial)
Organic State Transformation (Partial)
Peace State Transformation (Partial)
Democratic State Banalization
Civilized State Banalization
The mixed picture provided by these results yields further conclusions. First, there are
no indicators of denationalization, either within a single domain addressed by one of the
narratives or across multiple domains. In other words, despite the advance of globalization and
the potential for increased trans-national ties and post-nationalist thinking during this period,
political elites in Japan did not stop elaborating links between the nation and the state across
these domains. This points to the continued relevance of nationalist rhetoric to policy debates
in these areas.
Second, as one might expect given the various external and internal pressures faced by
Japan following the end of the Cold War, the period can indeed be characterized as one of
306
transformation in the nationalist discourse. However, although the process is ongoing during
this period and some narratives faced higher levels of contestation than at any other time in the
study, the transformations so far have been limited in both scope and scale; they have occurred
in only one type of component (normative) in just three of the five narratives. Add to these
points the absence of clearly-articulated, enduring counter-narratives and the picture of the
post-Cold War as an era of "new nationalism" in Japan is further belied.
Third, it is interesting to note that the two narratives with the deepest roots in prewar
nationalisms, the trading and organic state narrative, are both highly contested and partially
transformed over the course of the postwar era. As the relatively newer peace state narrative
also received a similar treatment, the presence or absence of a prewar legacy does not appear to
have been a decisive factor in determining the outcomes in Table 7.1. At least for the narratives
in this study, longevity in the nationalist discourse thus does not appear to have provided any
particular advantage as a bulwark against contestation and change.
Finally, nationalist rhetoric continues to serve as a virtually uncontested source of
legitimacy for both Japanese democracy and its welfare state. This situation may of course
change in the future, but as of the first decade of the new century, Japanese nationalism
continued to place emphasis on democracy and the welfare state as key objects of identification.
The next section will elaborate on this point with regard the democratic state narrative.
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III. From Trade to Technology in and out of Democracy's Embrace
When viewing how the prominence scores of narratives change over time, it is
impossible not to note the tight relationship between the democratic and trading state narratives.
Although for the first twenty-five years of the study they repeatedly exchanged the position of
which was the more prominent of the two, from the late 1970s onward, the trading state narrative
established a lead. Yet, despite these shifts, changes in prominence for the two narratives have
tended to move in concert.
study.
Chart 7.2:
Chart 7.2 below shows this relationship for the entire period of the
Unit: Refernces per 100 sentences
308
Prominence, Democratic and Trading State Narratives, 1952*-2007
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The closeness of this relationship can be expressed mathematically in the form of a
correlation co-efficient. As noted in Chapter Five, the correlation co-efficient for the
prominence scores of the democratic and trading state narratives for the entire period is 0.869.
This means that more than 75% of the variance in the prominence scores of these two narratives
is in common. The presence of such a correlation may seem unusual, but in fact, all of the five
nation-state narratives are positively correlated to varying extents. For example, the democratic
state narrative also has strong correlations with the organic (0.686) and peace (0.652) state
narratives, and the trading state narrative is correlated with the civilized, peace, and organic state
narratives with correlation co-efficients all in excess of 0.6. However, what is unique here is
the strength of the correlation between the democratic and trading state narratives. As Table
7.2 makes clear, the correlation between these two narratives far exceeds that of any other
pairing and has a higher level of statistical significance.
Table 7.2: Correlation Co-Efficients, Prominence, Five Narratives, Entire Period
Trading State Peace State Organic State Civilized State
0.869** 0.652* 0.686* 0.449
Peace State
Democratic State
Trading State
Organic State Civilized State
0.694* j 0.608* J_0.723*
Organic State
Peace State
Organic State
Civilized State
0.567 0.612*
Civilized State
0.299
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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In addition to the usual caveat that correlation is not causation, it is important to
consider what correlations in this instance likely indicate. They simply mean that the number
of references (both positive/neutral and negatively-valued) to these different narratives tended to
rise and fall in the same direction and in similar proportions over time. Overall, it seems likely
that the large number of statistically-significant, positive correlations is indicative of the fact that
participants in the nationalist discourse tended to return again and again to these particular
narratives whenever periods of concern arose regarding the relationship between the nation and
the state and then likewise turned away from their use when these concerns passed. In other
words, since these narratives are different, long-standing ways to address the same subject, the
nation-state relationship, it should not be surprising that their levels of prominence should
change in relatively congruent patterns. 533 However, the correlation between the democratic
and trading state narratives stands out even in this company. In addition to the extent of the
correlation between their prominence scores, an even stronger correlation exists when only their
positive (non-negative) references are considered. Table 7.3 below shows the correlation
co-efficients for all narrative pairings when only positive references are considered. At 0.900,
the correlation between the democratic and trading state narratives is by far the strongest such
relationship; the two share more than 81% of the variance in this measure and the relationship is
5 This may also be interpreted as evidence that the narratives chosen for this study are in fact drawn from a single
strand of the broader political discourse and thus are rightly studied together as a group.
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Both the strength and direction (positive) of this
relationship thus indicates that positive portrayals of these two narratives tended to be used with
similar frequencies over the years. Put differently, this finding shows that the levels of support
voiced on the behalf of these two narratives during Diet inaugural ceremonies moved up and
down together, suggesting an affinity between support for one and support for the other in the
words of participants.
Table 7.3: Correlation Co-Efficients, Positive References, Five Narratives, Entire Period
Democratic State +
Trading State +
Peace State +
Organic State +
Trading State + Peace State + Organic State + Civilized State +
0.900** 0.639* 0.688* 0.385
Peace State + Organic State + Civilized State +
0.677* [0.574 0.563
Organic State + Civilized State +
0.575 0.673*
Civilized State +
0.357
**Correlation is significant at the 0.0 1 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
A final important aspect of this relationship is that it breaks down after the end of the
Cold War. For the first eight five-year blocks (1952-1992), which are here used as a proxy for
the Cold War period, the correlation co-efficient for the prominence scores of the trading and
democratic state narratives is .836, which means that nearly 70 % of the variance is in
common. 534 However, during the post-Cold War, represented here by the last three five-year
5 This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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statistically significant at the highest level.
blocks (1993-2007), the correlation co-efficient declines to .307 and is not statistically
significant, indicating a breakdown in the strong relationship of the Cold War period. Similarly,
if only positive (non-negative) references are considered, the correlation co-efficient is an even
stronger .876 during the Cold War (more than 76% shared variation), but falls to 0.185 in the
post-Cold War period, again indicating a very weak relationship (only 3% of variance in
common). 535
What accounts for this initial relationship as well as its breakdown in the post-Cold War
period? These questions touch on a debate among scholars over what is variously referred to as
"system support," "system stability," "regime stability," and "system legitimacy" with regard to
democracy in postwar Japan. This concept refers to the general level of support for a particular
regime type as a system of government. 53 6 In contemporary Japan, "system support" in this
view means the degree to which the postwar democratic regime as a system of government is
understood by all domestic actors (political elites, voters, etc.) to be legitimate. 537
Although much work has been done assessing democratic legitimacy in postwar Japan,
scholars remain divided over its ultimate sources. 538 Some argue that the legitimacy of Japan's
". The correlation for the Cold War period is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The post-Cold
War correlation is not statistically significant.
"3 For a review of the development of concept of "system support" and tests confirming its appropriateness when
applied to postwar Japan, see Fouse (2002).
538 For examples of work in this area, see Watanuki,(1977); White (1981); Johnson (1982, 1995), Richardson &
Flanagan (1984), and Fouse (2002).
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postwar democratic regime is in fact strongly grounded in economic nationalism. 539
traces the origins of this situation to the determination by political leaders in the immediate
postwar years that Japan would "regain its national self-respect through economic achievement
and economic leadership," the particular "history of poverty and war in Japan that established
and legitimated Japan's [developmental] priorities among the people in the first place," and
Japan's prewar history, in which the state had aggressively promoted industrialization in an
effort to ward off Western imperialism. 540 The combination of these factors with the
democratizing reforms adopted during the American occupation thus produced a democracy in
which "stability has rested on the ability of the ruling political party to forge a coalition of voters
committed to economic growth and effective management."5 4' In short, this has resulted in
system legitimacy based on economic outcomes.
In contrast, others argue that democratic legitimacy in contemporary Japan "is firmly
based in a postwar political culture that rejects a return to the militaristic form of government
that preceded democracy" and that this antimilitarism provides "roots for democratic values that
can aid in sustaining the political system during periods of economic and political turmoil."5 4 2
5 See for example, Johnson (1982, 1995). Johnson defines economic nationalism as the pursuit of "economic
activities primarily to achieve independence from and leverage over potential [international] adversaries." Johnson,
1995, p.105. .
540 Johnson, 1995, pp.103-107; Johnson, 1982, p. 30 7 .
541 Johnson, 1982, p.3 1 7 .
m Fouse, 2002, p.v.
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This view
This alternative is grounded in an historical narrative which stresses the linkage between the
simultaneous development of the peace movement and support for democracy in the early
postwar years. 54 3 This co-development established the popular understanding of "citizens'
control over decisions related to national defense as the bedrock of legitimacy in a democratic
state." 544 Democratic legitimacy is thus grounded in what has been called
nationalism." 545
The content analysis in this study can shed new light on questions regarding the
long-term sources of support for postwar democracy in Japan. Its major advantage in this
regard is in offering a systematic empirical test that allows for longitudinal analysis, a
combination not present in the works cited above. However, certain distinctions should be
noted. First, support for contemporary civilian control of the military, which is included as an
aspect of peace nationalism in the latter view, was coded in the content analysis as a normative
claim of the democratic state narrative.546 Second, prior work testing the relationship between
democratic legitimacy and economic and peace nationalisms tends to focus on a narrow set of
proxy measures, such as appraisals of the wartime authoritarian regime for peace nationalism or
an evaluation of personal and overall economic outcomes for economic nationalism. 54 7
543 Fouse, 2002, pp. 18-64.
544 Fouse, 2002, p. 13 5 .
545 McVeigh, 2004.
546 Support for civilian control of the military is one of the items coded under "enforce democratic principles."
547 Fouse, 2002.
The
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"peace
peace and trading state narratives encompass many more elements of economic and peace
nationalisms. Despite these differences, which are largely in terms of operationalizations, it is
argued here that the trading and peace narratives provide sound proxies for economic and peace
nationalisms, respectively, while and the democratic state narrative can serve as an indicator of
democratic legitimacy.
Some of the conclusions reached above touch on the opposing claims of the economic
and peace nationalism views. First, the finding that the strongest correlation among narratives
in the study is between the trading and democratic state narrative, that this relationship breaks
down following the end of the Cold War, and that the drop in the prominence of the trading state
narrative during this latter period is due to a process of partial transformation are all consistent
with the predictions of the economic nationalism view. However, the conclusion that the
democratic state narrative has become a banal strand of nationalism over a post-Cold War period
in which Japan has been plagued by economic downturns and underperforming growth rates runs
counter to the predictions of economic nationalism advocates, who argue that the stability of the
system should be called into question if state-led economic development stalled.5 48 Since the
peace state narrative is also correlated with the democratic state narrative, the failure of this
548 Such a breakdown would "signal the need for quick surgery and reconstitution of the system. Johnson, 1982,
p.317.
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prediction might be interpreted as evidence in favor of the peace nationalism view. 549  The
evidence so far thus provides some support for both views.
A thorough assessment of the economic nationalism thesis requires a detailed
explanation of the transformation taking place in the trading state narrative. The results of an
abbreviated form of narrative analysis on the trading state narrative appear in Table 7.4 below.
It shows the average values for the relative frequencies and levels of contestation for the trading
state's two contested norms over the periods 1978-1992 and 1993-2007.
Table 7.4: Contested Normative Components, Trading State Narrative, 1978-2007
Trading State Normative Component Average (1978-1992) Average (1993-2007)
Increase Exports (% Negative) 53.5% (18.9%) 9.0% (18.9)
Increase Exports (Relative Frequency) 8.1% (19.9%) 3.1% (19.9%)
Expand Overseas Investment (% Negative) 11.2% (11.9%) 8.8% (11.9%)
Expand Overseas Investment (Relative Frequency) 36.8% (25.2) 19.3% (25.2%)
Numbers in parenthesis are average values for the eleven five-year blocks.
These results indicate that high-to-average levels of contestation directed at these
normative claims in the first period were followed by declines to below-average levels of
contestation and relative frequencies in the second period. In the context of the overall decline
549 Although the peace state narrative is correlated with the democratic state narrative in both prominence and
positive references at a statistically significant level (0.05 level), it should be noted that the organic state narrative is
correlated with the democratic state narrative on these same measures at a slightly higher level.
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in narrative prominence across the two periods, this suggests first that high levels of contestation
directed at these claims have greatly reduced their significance for the trading state narrative,
likely indicating the addition of exceptions to their range of application. Still further, these
components represent two of the three normative claims of the merchant state sub-narrative.
This suggests that, as with the peace state narrative, not only was contestation limited to
normative claims but it was also directed at a single sub-narrative. In addition, as Chart 7.3
below makes clear, the importance of the merchant state narrative in terms of relative frequency
fell to unprecedented lows during this period and was overtaken by the technology-based state
sub-narrative, which achieved equally unprecedented highs on this measure in the post-Cold War
period. The prominence scores for these two-sub-narratives also reflect a similar pattern; in the
period between 1993-2007, all the prominence scores of the merchant state sub-narrative are
below their overall average, with the lowest score for the sub-narrative recorded in 1998-2002,
while the technology-based sub-narrative saw above-average prominence in two of the three
five-year blocks that make up this period.
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less exclusive since the 1980s and now contained a fair number of members located in Asia.
This is also consistent with Oguma Eiji's assertion that an important factor in recent debates over
Japan's democratic identity has been the loss of its unique status as the only industrialized liberal
democracy in Asia. s3
Chart 7.4: Relative Frequencies, Components, Democratic State Narrative, 1952*-2007
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Meanwhile, during these same time periods, the relationship between the peace and
democratic state narratives also exhibited changes. First, as Table 7.2 and 7.3 above show, the
peace state narrative has the third-highest correlation with the democratic state narrative over the
entire period both with regard to prominence (0.652) and positive responses (0.639). In
addition, these relationships are statistically significant, though less so than was the case with
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5 Oguma, 2002b, p.816.
less correlated with the democratic state narrative, while the technology-based state sub-narrative
becomes negatively correlated.
Table 7.5: Correlations with Democratic State Narrative, Various Periods
Sub-Narrative Entire Period 1952*-1992 1993-2007
Merchant State 0.904** 0.883** 0.460
Merchant State (Positive) 0.934** 0.920** 0.378
Technology-based State 0.055 0.009 -0.731
Technology-based State (Positive) 0.017 -0.028 -0.731
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
What explains this breakdown between the merchant state sub-narrative and the
democratic state narrative? Table 7.4 above suggests that this shift is largely about changing
perceptions regarding attitudes toward state efforts to promote exports. Examining the rhetoric
itself can be helpful in developing a more detailed explanation. First, in the early postwar
decades, speakers tended to connect Japan's exports and trade ties to both the project of
improving the Japanese people's livelihood and with Japan's position as member of the free
word. For example, during the early 1950s, conservative politicians then in opposition parties
repeatedly linked the state effort to expand trade with economic development and prosperity on
one hand and Japan's reentry on the international stage as an independent member of the group
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of democratic states. 550 This would continue in a slightly different form in the 1970s, when
Prime Minister Tanaka declared that "the national policy of promoting trade" had resulted in
Japan "possessing the second-largest economic power in the free world."5 5 This new pattern
survived into the 1980s when Prime Minister Nakasone also linked the strengthening of Japan's
trade capabilities with its status as the "free world's second-largest economic superpower."5 5 2
Following the end of the Cold War, however, participants in the Diet inaugural
ceremony largely dropped this link between Japan's trade and exports and its membership in the
community of democratic states. This is also reflected in changes in usage patterns among the
components of the democratic state narrative itself. Chart 7.4 below shows this in stark relief.
Whereas the claim of membership in the free world represents nearly 10% of references to the
democratic state narrative across all five-year blocks, it never reaches higher than 1.1% in the
period between 1993 and 2007. It thus seems likely that one major reason for the breakdown
between the merchant state sub-narrative (and thus the trading state narrative as a whole) and the
democratic state narrative during this period is a reduction in the association between Japan's
trade promotion and its belonging to the group of democratic states, a group that had become far
550 See for example, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Reform Party (Kaishint5), Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of
Representatives, November 24, 1952; Ogata Taketora, Liberal Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of
Representatives, January 22, 1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
551 Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January
27, 1973. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
552 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
January 24, 1983. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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less exclusive since the 1980s and now contained a fair number of members located in Asia.
This is also consistent with Oguma Eiji's assertion that an important factor in recent debates over
Japan's democratic identity has been the loss of its unique status as the only industrialized liberal
democracy in Asia. 553
Chart 7.4: Relative Frequencies, Components, Democratic State Narrative, 1952*-2007
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Meanwhile, during these same time periods, the relationship between the peace and
democratic state narratives also exhibited changes. First, as Table 7.2 and 7.3 above show, the
peace state narrative has the third-highest correlation with the democratic state narrative over the
entire period both with regard to prominence (0.652) and positive responses (0.639). In
addition, these relationships are statistically significant, though less so than was the case with
321
100.0%
80.0%0-
60.0% -
40.0%
0.0%
m Oguma, 2002b, p.816.
1
However, when viewed across the Cold War (1952-1992) and
post-Cold War (1993-2007) periods, these correlations rise but are not statistically significant in
either period. 555 Thus, although these results provide some support for the argument that
"peace and democracy" were generally linked over the course of the postwar period, they fail to
provide strong evidence that this relationship was more important than the one linking
democracy to the trading state ethos either during or after the Cold War. The mixed picture that
results of the relationship between the central elements of peace, development and democracy is
thus likely closer to reality than the individual assertions of either the economic or the peace
nationalism view.
A final point that bears consideration regarding the legitimacy of Japan's democracy in
the post-Cold War period is that it may have reached a level of consensus that allows it to endure
without depending on support generated by affinities with other nation-state narratives. Three
observations point to this possibility. First, the democratic state narrative's prominence decline
is a clear case of banalization during this period, despite the fact that it has no statistically
significant relationships in prominence and positive responses with the trading and peace state
narratives. In addition, although the cognitive claim of membership in the community of
14 Both correlations are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
"5 Whereas its correlations with the democratic state narrative for prominence and positive responses were 0.534
and 0.5 13, respectively, for the period 1952-1992, these both increased to 0.685 and 0.70 1, respectively, for the
period 1993-2007. However, none of these are statistically significant.
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trading state narrative. 554
democratic states declines during this period, the other cognitive claim associated with this
narrative, the naming convention of Japan as a democratic state, a claim independent of
universalistic or external references, as well as the major normative claim associated with this
narrative, the enforcement of democratic principles at home, both increase on average in the
post-Cold War period.ss6 These changes may indicate an internalization of the focus of the
narrative and the establishment of a corresponding independence from external pressures and
changes in the international system. Finally, analysis of public opinion in the post-Cold war
period has suggested that favorable perceptions of the efficacy of the current democratic system
were an important source of support for the legitimacy of Japan's democracy during this
period. In this way, multiple measures support the conclusion that Japanese democracy
following the end of the Cold War has achieved a strong level of legitimacy that is more
independent of alternative sources of support than during any other time in the postwar period.
556 Across the five-year blocks between 1952 and 1992, the average relative frequencies for the naming convention
and the norm to enforce democratic principles were 1.2% and 85.7%, respectively. These increased to averages of
6.3% and 93.1%, respectively, for the period from 1993-2007.
5 Fouse, 2002, p. 13 1. In Fouse's categorical regression analysis of the results of the 1999 survey, he finds that
positive perceptions of the efficacy of the Japan's contemporary democratic system is the second-largest influencing
factor (Pratt's importance statistic of.193) on support for democratic ideals, narrowly trailing behind negative
perceptions of the wartime authoritarian government (.216).
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IV. Institutional Incentives, Alternating Champions, and the Enemies of Peace
A third remaining question from Chapter Five regards the steady persistence of the
organic state narrative at relatively low levels of prominence throughout the postwar period.558
In terms of prominence, the organic state narrative scores below average for all periods, holds
the lowest prominence score in nine of the eleven five-year blocks, and was the lowest-scoring
narrative in this category between 1958-2002. In addition, it saw the second highest level of
contestation for the entire period when measured as the percentage of negatively-valued
references to total references. 559  Further, the narrative, which experienced its postwar low in
total references in the mid-i 990s, subsequently saw its level of contestation reach a postwar high
of more than 19%, the highest such figure figure for any narrative in the study. With this
background, the organic state narrative seems the most likely candidate in the study to face
break-up as a convention in the nationalist discourse. Understanding its persistance across the
decades is the subject of this section.
A unique aspect of the organic state narrative is its paucity of associations with state
institutions in comparison with the other nation-state narratives. One of its components, the
cognitive claim of national polity, has virtually no institutional associations during the postwar
558 "Steady" and "stable" are used in this section to refer to the fact that the organic state narrative has the second
lowest variance in its prominence scores over the five-year blocks among the narrative studied here: civilized state
(0.405), organic state (0.465), trading state (1.506), democratic state (5.878), and peace state (5.919).
559 Measured as negatively-valued references as percentage of total references over the entire period, the trading
state narrative is the highest (6.4%). organic state is second (2.9%), and the peace state is third (1.5%).
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period. Efforts to establish such associations with other components, such as the decades-long
drive to return the Yasukuni Shrine to state control, have failed completely. Some successes in
this regard have proven ephemeral, such as the use of the homonegnous nation claim to deny
legal recognition to domestic ethnic minorities, while others have only recently been established,
such as the 2006 reform of the Fundamental Law on Education to introduce patriotic
education.560 In addition, the drive to strengthen what is arguably the narrative's strongest
association with a state institution by changing the emperor's constitutional status from "symbol
of the state" to "head of state" has yet to produce results, despite decades of effort. 561
Although the pervious chapter showed that having more institutonal associations guarantees
neither lower levels of contestation (which may eventually contribute to lower prominence) nor
higher levels of prominence, it is hard to overlook the fact that the least prominent narrative is
also the one with the least institutional associations.562 It thus seems likely that this "outsider"
quality of the organic state narrative contributed to its lower prominence in comparison with
narratives with more extensive institutional associtions.
560 For accounts of the efforts regarding Yasukuni and domestic minorities, see Chapter Four. For an account of
the FLE reform, see Kariya & Rappleye (2010).
561 As will be discussed further in the next chapter, it should be noted that, although not necessarily reproduced in
the letter of the law, homogenous nation rhetoric has certainly been prevalent in debates over citizenship and
immigration laws, especially with regard to the treatment of Japan's large Korean minority.
562 Chapter Three demonstrated that the organic state narrative, which has the least institutional associations among
the three majorly contested narratives, has the lowest standard deviation in its positive references. A similar
comparison shows that the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, despite having fewer institutional associations, exhibited
less standard deviation in its positive references (1.0966) than the peace-loving state sub-narrative (1.8264). The
former also faced no contestation while the latter was the target of all of the contestation directed at the peace state
narrative.
325
Nothing in the above discussion, however, precludes the possibility that the organic
state narrative's institutional associations contributed to its persistance and stability. Earlier
analysis suggests a means of exploring this possibility. In the previous chapter, it was found
that the peace state narrative's associations with state institutions targeted for reform by prime
ministers did not prevent the relevant normative components from experiencing severe declines
in prominence. Reversing this logic, it is possible to assume that the benefits of an association
with a state institution accrue more readily to the narrative component when it is defended by the
head of state. Viewed this way, it appears the organic state narrative is benefiting from such
associations. First, 51% of the total references to the narrative come from prime ministers, not
a single one of which is negatively-valued.563 Next, as Table 7.6 below shows, the majority of
references to the three components with the strongest associations to state institutions in the
narrative (the imperial, ethno-nationlaist and traditional values claims) all come from prime
ministerial addresses.564 Although the national polity claim at first appears to be an exception
-- a component with no institutional association that receives all of its references from prime
ministers, this is easily explained as an artifact of its extreme rarity: references to this style of
563 Opposition responses and newspaper editorials accounted for 3 1% and 18%, respectively.
564 Specifically, these institutions include the constitutional role the emperor and the Imperial Household Law,
immigration and citizenship policies based on the jus sanguinis principle, or inclusion by descent, and a
long-standing (since 1958) program of moral instruction in the compulsory education system designed in part to
inculcate a sense of public duty and respect for family elders (which has recently been augmented by the
introduction of patriotic education through the 2006 revision of the Fundamental Law on Education).
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pre-war rhetoric represent less than 1% of all references to the organic state narrative. 565 The
relationship is confirmed by tabulating which components prime ministers typically refer to
when citing the narrative. This reveals that nearly 99% of references to the narrative made by
prime ministers regard the three components with the strongest institutional associations.566
Table 7.6: Organic State Narrative Components by Source, 1952*-2007
Component P.M. Opposition Editorials
Japanese as Ethnicity 54% 33% 13%
Emperor 70% 26% 4%
Support Yasukuni 2% 65% 33%
National Polity 100% 0% 0%
Enforce Trad. Values 57% 18% 25%
Next, it appears there may be a complex of institutional incentives behind the pattern of
support and opposition received by the organic state narrative that transcends partisanship.
Table 7.7 shows the percentages of positive (non-negative) and negatively-valued references
from each source over four periods: 1952-1955, when for the most part conservative parties
565 In addition, the two references to this claim are both fleeting and vague. Fukuda Takeo, Liberal Democratic
Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, February 6, 1984; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal
Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 21, 1978. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(August 17, 2012).
566 The breakdown is as follows: ethno-nationalist claim (48.2%), enforce traditional values (34.3%). emperor
(16.3%), national polity (0.8%), and support Yasukuni (0.4%).
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1956-1992, when the prime minister hailed from the
center-right LDP and the largest opposition party was the leftist JSP; 1993-1997, when the LDP,
center-left and leftist parties exchanged these positions; and 1998-2007, when the LDP regained
the prime ministership and the largest opposition party became the center-left Democratic Party
of Japan (DPJ). What is interesting here is that, with the exception of the first period in the
1950s, the pecentages of positive references coming from each source remain remarkably
consistent despite changes in partisan positions. In addition, references by the occupants of the
prime minister's office remain positive throughout, even during the period in the mid-1990s
when the position temporarily fell out of the hands of conservatives.
Table 7.7: Organic State Positive & Negative References by Source, Various Periods
Source 1952-1955* 1956-1992** 1993-1997*** 1998-2007**** 1952-2007
P.M. 44% (0%) 54% (0%) 57% (0%) 53% (0%) 53% (0%)
Opposition 24% (0%) 30% (50%) 36% (0%) 31% (80%) 30% (64%)
Editorials 32% (100%) 16% (50%) 7% (0%) 16% (20%) 17% (36%)
*P.M. and opposition are conservatives (except I opposition response from JSP); **P.M. is LDP/opposition is JSP;
***P.M. is LDP or JSP/opposition is center-left sometimes including JSP (except I response from JSP only);
****P.M. is LDP (JSP left governing coalition after I speech)/opposition is DPJ; All figures are percentages;
Figures in parentheses are the percentage of negatively-valued references
Still further, with the exception of the period 1993-1997, the opposition party responses
and newspaper editorials remain reliable sources of contestation, a fact that does not change,
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controlled both political positions;
indeed is amplified, when the center-left DPJ assumes the opposition position after 1998. In
this regard, it appears the old adage "where you stand is where you sit" holds true regarding
support and opposition for the organic state narrative: the consistency with which actors
occupying particular positions have referenced the narrative in the same proportion and valence
seems to indicate institutional incentives at work. This may result from the authoritarian nature
of some aspects of the narrative, which are favored by those in executive office and opposed by
those without such executive authority. At any rate, it seems likely this situation has generated
a level of built-in stability, at least at a very low level, that partly explains the overall persistence
of the organic state narrative.
Identifying a second factor that may help explain persistence at a low level begins with
the observation that a single component represents more than 50% of all references to the
organic state narrative for all but the first and last of the five-year blocks. This pattern is not
unusual among the narratives composed of five components or less. For example, normative
claims regarding ensuring basic welfare and enforcing democratic principles domestically
represent more than 50% of the references in all five-year blocks for the civilized and demoractic
state narratives, respectively. 567  However, two things stand out with the organic state narrative
567 A single component regularly representing so much of these three narrative's prominence scores is likely due to
the fact that their normative and cognitive claims are simply not as numerous or parsed at as fine a level as is the
case for the peace state narrative, which has no five-year block for which a single component represents more than
50% of total references, and the trading state, which has only 2 five-year blocks in which hits for a single
component make up more than half of its references.
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in this regard. First, in contrast to the civilized and democratic state narratives, the "champion"
component of the organic state narratives is not always the same and in fact alternates over time.
As Chart 7.5 below reveals, expressions of Japan as a homogenous ethnic nation-state
represented more than half of the references to this narrative from the late 1950s through to the
early 1980s. The ten years beteween 1988 and 1997 are dominated by referencs to the emperor
until the focus shifts to traditional values in the period 1998-2002. However, this breaks down
for the last five-year block, when the traditional values claim falls below the 50% mark. How
has this pattern contributed to narrative persistence and what does its breakdown mean for the
organic state narrative going forward?
Chart 7.5: Relative Frequencies, All Components, Organic State Narrative, 1952*-2007
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The pattern of alternating "champions" shows that the organic state narrative failed
either to establish a degree of balance in the relative frequencies of its invidual components (as
the peace and trading state narratives did) or to feaure a single component that large numbers of
participants in the Diet inaugural ceremony referenced continuously throughout the entire period
(as was the case with the civilized and democratic state narratives). Since both of these proved
successful routes to high levels of prominence for other narratives, it seems likely this
anomalous pattern is partly to blame for the organic state narrative's poor performace on this
measure. However, this constantly shifting internal dynamic seems to belie the narrative's
overall prominence scores, which, while the lowest, are among the most stable among the five
narratives. Although random chance might be at work here, another possible explanation is that
this pattern reflects the constant efforts of proponents to promote the organic state narrative as a
world view and to institutionalize its core components as they conceive them in state policies
and institutions in the face of strong opposition. In reponse to this opposition, these supporters,
comprised largely of conservative politicians, opportunistically focus on whatever aspect of the
narrative they believe most likely to further their cause at any given time. This hypothesis thus
predicts that the majority of positive (non-negative) references to the champion component of a
particular period will come from the positions controlled by conservatives, who will also not
oppose any components of the narrative. If opposition is present, it will emanate from positions
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outside the control of conservatives and be directed at the other components of the narrative.
Finally, whether or not non-conservatives oppose the champion component is indeterminate, as it
depends on whether supporters selected the right component as champion (i.e. the one that most
others support in the period in question).
Table 7.8 below summarizes the results of two periods which allow for easy
comparisons of these predictions because they both have champions, include some degree of
opposition to the narrative, and do not contain changes of government, which would obscure
actor analysis. 568 In the first period, 1958-1982, conservatives hold the prime ministership and
the ethno-nationalist claim is the organic state narrative's champion, representing on average
nearly 60% of the narrative's total references. In the second period, 1998-2002, conservatives
again control the executive and the call to enforce traditional values is the overwhelming
champion, accounting for more than 91% of the narrative's total references. The two periods
combined cover a little more than half of the total period of the study.
568 If the requirement that there be some opposition is relaxed, 1988-1992, when references to the emperor represent
more than 50% of all references to the narrative and partisan positions remain stable, can also be analyzed in this
way. The period matches the above predictions relating to positive references (92% of which come from the prime
minister), although the increased references are largely due to the transition to from Showa to Heisei Emperors.
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Table 7.8: Alternating Champions in Two Periods, 1958-1982 & 1998-2002
Ethno-Nation Trad. Values
1958-1982 1998-2002
Champion
Prime Ministers (Positive) 59% 65%
Opposition Leaders (Positive) 29% 30%
Editorialists (Positive) 12% 5%1
Champion
Prime Ministers (Negative) 0.0% 0.0%
Opposition Leaders (Negative) 0.0% 67%
Editorialists (Negative) 0.0% 33%
Others
Prime Ministers (Negative) 0.0% 0.0%
Opposition Leaders (Negative) 50% 100.0%
Editorialists (Negative) 50% 0.0%
The results for these two periods provide support for the alternativing champion
hypothesis. First, in both instances the conservative-controlled prime minister's office
produces the majority of the champion components' positive references. In addition, the
executive directs no negative comments to either the champion or any other component of the
organic state narrative. Finally, the opposition leader position, which is controlled by the leftist
JSP in the first period and the center-left DPJ in the second, is responsible for at least half of the
opposition to the other components during both periods.
opposition did not direct any negatively-valued com
With regard to the first period, the
ments at the champion, suggesting
proponents of the narrative chose their champion wisely. In the latter period, however, both the
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DPJ and the major newspaper editorialists do offer opposition to the enforcement of traditional
values, a possible indication the component was not a suitable choice to serve as the narrative's
champion at that time. These findings are further explored in brief sketches of two periods
below.
The claim of ethno-national unity proved the workhorse behind the organic state
narrative during the first period. 59% of its references came from LDP prime ministers, who
hailed from both the consevative (anti-mainstream) and pragmatic (mainstream) wings of the
party, but who all shared affinities for components of the organic state narrative, especially its
call for ethno-national unity. It should thus not be surprising that Tanaka Kakuei, considered
perhaps to have the most moderate views on issues related to the organic state narrative, was
comfortable with rhetoric such as the following statement from a 1974 Diet inaugural:
The one hundred million of the Japanese nation (nihon mizoku), as a homogenous nation
(tanitsu minzoku) in an island country, were able to mobilize their energy single-mindedly
towards recovery and construction efforts because there were no racial conflicts or religious
or linguistic struggles. 569
It should also be noted that more than a quarter of the positive references to this claim
came from the socialist opposition during this period. This should not be surprising, as Kevin
Doak has shown that the use of pleas to ethnic unity in efforts by leftists to construct national
identity discourses opposed to or independent of the state began in the pre-war period and
569 Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 21, 1974.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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continued into the postwar years.57 0  In the case of the postwar JSP, claims of ethno-national
unity were almost always advanced in opposition to the U.S. military presence in Japan and its
occupations of the Bonin islands and Okinawa. In particular, JSP officials tended to refer to the
Okinawan people with the evocative phrase ddh5 (meaning "brethren," "brothers," or
"kinsmen") and peppered their calls for the U.S. to return control of Okinawa to Japan with
colorful language such as "a tragic incident in which the blood of our [Okinawan] kinsmen,
which is bound to our blood, was shed, just as the blood flowed at Sunakawa [a 1957
demonstration against the expansion of a U.S. base outside of Tokyo]," "our [Okinawan]
kinsmen suffering under the rule of a foreign race (iminzoku)," and "retstoring our Okinawan
kinsmen to the fatherland (sokoku)." 5" In addition, the JSP sometimes utilized this
ethno-nationalist rhetoric in concert with the normative claims of the peace state narrative to
advance such policy stances as opposing the introduction of American nuclear forces into
Okinawa. 572
In the second period, 1998-2002, the call for a return to traditional values was the
overwhelming selection as champion by an increasingly conservative string of LDP prime
570 Doak, 1996; Doak, 2007, pp.2 16-264.
571 Suzuki Mosaburo, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, February 4,
1957; Akamatsu Isamu, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, October
20, 1971;Kitayama Air6, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 19,
1971. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17., 2012).
572 Suzuki Mosabur6, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 29,
1958; Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, December
2, 1969. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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ministers. Whereas the first two, Hashimoto Ryiitaro and Obuchi Keizo, hailed from a faction
within the party that had evolved from Tanaka Kakuei's grand faction of the pragmatic
mainstream, the next two, Mori Yoshir6 and Koizumi Junichiro, were members of a faction that
could trace its roots back to Ksihi Nobusuke's original band of anti-mainstream conservatives.
Accordingly, Hashimoto did not raise traditional values in his one speech given during this
period, and Obuchi addressed them only in quite general and indirect ways, asking the Japanese
people "to have pride and confidence in the country called Japan" and to pass on "the moral fiber
cultivated over many long years in the workplace, community, and family" as well as "superior
culture and traditions" to the next generation. 573  In contrast, Mori incorporated these themes
into a critique of the contemporary moral status quo to call on the Japanese to aspire to his vision
of the ideal nation-state, the "spiritually-rich, beautiful state" (kokoro no yutaka na utsukushii
kokka), a conception that is broadly consistent with what is termed here the organic state
narrative. 574  In particular, he called for educational reforms "to nuture love of country and
region, respect for Japanese culture and traditions" as an important means to achieve this ideal
state. 575 Although not packaging related themes into a single national vision, Koizumi
573 Obuchi Keizo, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, August 7,
1998; Obuchi Keiz6, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January
19, 1999. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
"4 One of the likely precursors of Abe Shinz6's "Beautiful Country" conception, this somewhat vague vision added
environmental protection and the fostering of creativity to many of the traditional concerns of the organic state
narrative. Mori Yoshir0, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
A ril 7, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
" Mori Yoshir6, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 28,
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continued the call for "educational reforms to foster human resources capable of making a new
country toward which Japanese can feel pride and self-awareness."5 76  He also joined Mori in
endorsing a major revision of the Fundamental Law on Education to accomplish this lofty
goal.577
Delivered largely by party leader Hatoyama Yukio, the DPJ addresses during this period
at first explicitly endorsed the call for more "love of country" (aikokushin) in response to
578Obuchi. However, Hatoyama soon turned critical of Mori's plans for educational reform,
arguing that the problems of Japanese children cannot be resolved by "forcing morality and
knowledge on them, destroying education aimed at fostering independence and harmonious
co-existence." 579  He then went on to advocate educational decentralization, which would give
more autonomy to localities to determine the curriculum, an approach far at odds with Mori's
appeal to a single vision of national unity.580 Thus, although the new center-left DPJ began the
period by breaking with the old leftist opposition's stance against calls for increasing patriotism
2000; Mori Yoshir6, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January
31, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
576 Koizumi Junichiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, May
7, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndi.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
577 Koizumi Junichiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, May
7, 2001; Mori Yoshiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July
28, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
578 Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
January 28, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
579 Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
January 31, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
580 Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
January 31, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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and instituting moral
conservative majority.
education, it soon returned to time-worn modes of resisting the
If an example of the "alternating champions" hypothesis at work, it
appears to be the variant in which conservative proponents select the wrong champion, and are
thus unable to use it to expand the overall appeal of the narrative. Although the narrative's
prominence did increase by nearly 39% in the next five-year period, it remained far below (only
52%) its average for the entire period. In addition, the relative frequency of the traditional
values claim fell below 50%, and no new champion emerged during this period.
A final possible source of prominence support emerges from the organic
narrative's complex relationship with the peace state narrative. Table 7.9 below lists the largest
correlations between the organic state narrative and the other narratives in various measures such
as prominence, positive (non-negative) references, and negative references (where relevant).
Table 7.9: Correlations with Organic State Narrative, Various Measures
Narrative Entire Period
Trading State 0.608*
Trading State (Positive) 0.574
Trading State (Negative) -.299
Peace State 0.567
Peace State (Positive) 0.575
Peace State (Negative) 0.823**
Democratic State 0.686*
Democratic State (Positive) 0.688*
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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state
Although the organic state narrative is less correlated with the peace state narrative than
the trading and democratic state narratives in terms of changes over time in overall prominence
(and in positive references in the case of the democratic state narrative), it is correlated with the
peace state narrative to a much higher degree in negative references. This means that both
narratives tend to face increases and decreases in contestation at the same times and in the same
proportions. One possible explanation for this relationship suggests itself immediately:
supporters of the organic state narrative overlap to a significant degree with opponents of the
peace state narrative and vice versa. In this way, although the two narratives are not positioned
as counter-narratives contesting for supremacy within the same domain, contestation over one
leads to contestation over the other in a similar dynamic to that of narrative and counter-narrative.
For example, Prime Minister Nakasone was both a prominent supporter of many elements of the
organic state narrative, including claims in support of the homogenous nation view as well as
official visits to Yasukuni shrine. However, he was also a well-known critic of some aspects of
the peace state narrative such as the normative claims related to 1% ceiling on defense spending
and the arms export ban. In the period 1983-1986, when Nakasone delivered all of the prime
ministerial addresses, his use of peace state rhetoric generated only about 21% of its positive
references, but 50% of its negative ones. It is thus not surprising that the overlap in his
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opposition to the peace state narrative and his advocacy of the organic state narrative encouraged
attacks on the latter by supporters of the former, especially in the JSP.
Table 7.10 captures this dynamic and some evidence of its change over two periods,
1958-1992, when the prime minister's office was continuously held by the LDP and the largest
opposition party was the leftist JSP, and 1998-2007, when the prime minister again hailed from
the LDP, but the largest opposition was the center-left DPJ.
Table 7.10: Organic & Peace State Narratives by Sources, Two Periods
Source 1958-1992 1998-2007
LDP P.M. (Positive) 15% 36%
JSP/DPJ (Positive) 70% 50%
Editorialists (Positive) 15% 14%
LDP P.M. (Negative) 25% 17%
JSP/DPJ (Negative) 0% 13%
Editorialists (Negative) 75% 70%
LDP P.M. (Positive) 54% 53%
JSP/DPJ (Positive) 30% 31%
Editorialists (Positive) 16% 16%
LDP P.M. (Negative) 0% 0%
JSP/DPJ (Negative) 50% 80%
Editorialists (Negative) 50% 20%
These results are consistent with the dynamic described above for the first period. The
LDP prime ministers' speeches generate both the majority of positive references to the organic
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state narrative and a significant percentage of negative references to the peace state narrative,
while the JSP opposition produces the majority of positive references to the peace state narrative
as well as half of the negative references to the organic state narrative. In addition, neither
ventures a single negative comment regarding their favored narrative. Considered as a control,
the editorialists generated commentary responsible for roughly the same percentages of positive
and negative references for both narratives.
In the second period, however, the results are less consistent with this overlap dynamic.
Although the LDP and now DPJ opposition are still responsible for more of the positive
references to the organic and peace state narratives, respectively, than any other sources, the DPJ
leaders actually generate nearly as many negative references to the peace state narrative as the
LDP prime ministers and produce only a simple majority of the positive references to that
narrative. The situation of the organic state narrative, however, changes very little, and the
control editorialists contribute the same percentage of positive comments and significant
portions of the negative ones, although considerably less so with regard to the organic state
narrative. The overlap is thus still noticeable but its contours are far less clear than in the
previous period.
Despite a blurring of the picture over time, the above analysis provides support for the
presence of a dynamic that correlates the negative references of the peace and organic state
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narratives due to an overlap between the enemies of one and the supporters of the other.
seems likely that this dynamic is partially responsible for the continued persistence of the
organic state narrative at low levels of prominence. On the one hand, its adversarial
relationship with the much more prominent peace state narrative certainly generated additional
negative references from peace state advocates than might otherwise have occurred. This likely
served to limit the appeal of the organic state narrative over time, boxing it into a low
prominence trajectory. On the other hand, however, these attacks, in addition to inviting
counter claims against the peace state narrative, also likely encouraged at least some additional
positive references to the organic state narrative in the form of perpetuating strategies. In this
way, although grounded in conflict, it seems possible that this overlap dynamic has served as a
stabilizing force for the narrative's prominence at low levels.
Having specified multiple mechanisms likely to have contributed to the organic state
narrative's peculiar pattern of stability and endurance, this section concludes by considering how
changes over the post-Cold War period may affect the narrative's future prospects.
First, although certain institutional incentives seem likely to have reinforced a particular
pattern of support and opposition to the organic state narrative with regard to the occupants of
the two political positions, there is some question about whether this will continue in the future.
Since the period examined here, the DPJ achieved a change of government for the first time in its
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It thus
existence. Although the data above include two five-year blocks, 1952-1957 & 1993-1997, in
which shifting electoral winds switched the positions of left and right with regard to control of
either the opposition leader or the prime minister position, the former is the chaotic first few
years following the end of occupation and the latter includes a left-right coalition that no doubt
muddies the results. Whether the institutional incentives of the past will continue to operate in
the same way following the forming of the first DPJ government in 2009 is thus an open
question.
Similarly, with conservatives now in opposition, will the "alternating champions"
strategy continue to work? In addition to the fact that there was no such champion apparent in
the period 2003-2007, there are other reasons to doubt this strategy's continued viability. First,
as noted in the second section, the organic state narrative is undergoing a process of partial
transformation that has seen two of its normative claims decline in prominence.581 Table 7.11
shows the average values for the relative frequencies and levels of contestation for the contested
norms over the periods 1978-1992 and 1993-2007.
5 Between the last two five-year periods in the study, the call to support Yasukuni shrine declined in prominence
by more than 45% and the call to enforce traditional values fell by more than 17%,
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Table 7.11: Contested Normative Components, Organic State Narrative, 1978-2007
Organic State Normative Component Average Average
(1978-1992) (1993-2007)
Support Yasukuni (% Negative) 0.0% (11.9%) 43.6% (11.9%)
Support Yasukuni (Relative Frequency) 21.0% (11.7%) 18.4% (11.7%)
Enforce Traditional Values (% Negative) 0.0% (2.9%) 4.3% (2.9%)
Enforce Traditional Values (Relative 15.3% (30.4%) 49.0% (30.4%)
Frequency)
Numbers in parenthesis are average values for the eleven five-year blocks.
Both norms experienced below-average contestation in the first period, but encountered
above-average contestation in the more recent period. In the face of this, the relative frequency
of the Yasukuni claim declined slightly but remained above average, while the same measure for
the traditional values claim increased by more than three-fold against a far milder level of
contestation. Despite this relatively strong performance, the fact of ongoing contestation makes
both unsuitable to be the next champion.
Could one of the narrative's uncontested components serve as the next champion?
Ruling out national polity due to its past record, only the imperial and ethno-nationalist claims
remain. Of the two, the emperor seems the most likely, as he finished the study with an
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above-average relative frequency and was uncontested for the entire period. In addition, since
the largest boom in the prominence of this component occurred during the last imperial
succession (1988-1992), it seems particularly well-suited with the next succession likely on the
near-term horizon.
In contrast to the emperor, the ethno-nationalist claim experienced a steep decline
relative to the other elements of the narrative after its period of ascendancy. Between 1993 and
2007, its relative frequency never amounted to more than 3.2% and ethno-nationalist rhetoric
was completely absent in two of these last three five-year blocks. Although it did not face
significant challenge in the Diet inaugural ceremony, this key cognitive claim did prove
extremely controversial outside of it, as the sharply negative response engendered by Prime
Minister Nakasone's use of homogenous nation rhetoric demonstrated in Chapter Four.5 8 2 In
addition, other findings from the content analysis point to signs that the severe decline may be
irreversible. First, as Chart 7.6 shows, on a comparable basis, the number of positive
(non-negative) references to domestic ethnic minority groups, such as the Ainu, exceeded those
claiming Japan to be a homogenous nation-state in the period 1988-1992 and remained higher
afterward as the latter claim fell to postwar lows.
582 Although coders did not code any negatively-valued references to this claim, the author believes there were in
fact two cases in which JSP officials were critical of this notion in their responses to Diet inaugural speeches by
Nakasone. See Tanabe Makoto, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives,
September 12, 1983; Okada Toriharu, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of
Representatives, July 8, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
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Chart 7.6: Positive Responses, Japanese Ethnicity and Domestic Minorities, 1952*-2007
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In addition, as Chart 7.7 makes clear, the overwhelmingly dominant term of address for
the Japanese people used by participants in the Diet inaugural ceremony is "citizens" (kokumin),
a word that Kevin Doak has argued distinguishes the civic or political alternative to ethnic
conceptions of the nation in Japanese nationalism. 58 3 Combining these findings with the near
zeroing out of references to cognitive claims of ethnic homogeneity and Japan's status as an
ethno-nation-state in the last years of the study leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion: ethnic
conceptions linking the nation and the state are currently in eclipse in Japanese nationalist
discourse. 584 Whether this situation will change in the future is uncertain. Given the lack of
open contestation in the Diet inaugual ceremony, it is certainly possible that a new emphasis will
583 Doak, 2007.
584 It should be noted that not a single prime minister referred to this claim in the years from 1988 to 2007.
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be placed on ethno-nationalist conceptions as a reaction to this decline, but, for the time being, it
seems unlikely that the organic state narrative will be able to depend on such claims to maintain
its prominence in the nationalist discourse. Although the consequences of this development
will be considered more fully in the next chapter, it should be noted that this claim had the
highest relative frequency over the period of the study and thus supporters of the organic state
narrative will be hard pressed to find ways to make up for its reduced contribution.
Chart 7.7: Positive Responses, Japanese as Ethnicity and Citizenship, 1968-2007
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Finally, the partial breakdown in the overlap dynamic that likely played a major role in
correlating the negative references of the organic and peace state narratives apparent in Table
7.10 above does not bode well for the prospects of this mechanism continuing to sustain the
former narrative. Thus, although the imperial institution may have the capacity to serve as a
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primary carrier going forward, there seems little on the horizon to indicate an improvement in
the long-standing pattern of low prominence and much to point to increased instability for this
narrative in the years to come.
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Chapter Eight: Narrating Politics
[N]arratives are the lifeblood of politics. 585
Mark McBeth, et al., 2007
I. Introduction
This study has examined nationalism in postwar Japan by focusing on a single, albeit
essential, dimension of the broader phenomenon: nationalist discourse among political elites.
This approach differs from treatments of the subject that limit the discussion to right-wing
nationalism and then examine changes in the tactics and capabilities of conservative social action
groups or the writings of conservative intellectuals. 586  Although important and legitimate
subjects of study, these actors influence the overall nationalist discourse from positions outside
elected national office and often advance nation-state visions that are far outside the range of
debate among political elites. In contrast, this study has attempted to specify that range,
measure changes within it, and then assess the meaning and causes of these changes, all the
while eschewing the narrow focus on rightwing nationalism. The overarching goal has been to
gain a sharper understanding of how the political uses of nationalism, in the form of a particular
set of nation-state narratives, have changed over time.
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585 McBeth, et al., 2007, p.8 8.
586 Winkler, 2011; Morris, 1960.
Such an investigation, however, is incomplete without considering how nation-state
narratives have influenced political and policy outcomes. Earlier discussion has shown that
reformers seeking to make changes in institutions associated with these narratives have so far
avoided direct challenges and instead developed rhetorical strategies that contested specific
narrative components or attempted to show how favored reforms were in fact consistent with the
overall narrative. Although the endurance of these narratives, the absence of direct challenges
to them, and the amount of time and energy devoted by reformers to developing and deploying
rhetorical strategies to navigate around or reformulate narrative claims may all be interpreted as
indicators of the importance of narratives in policy debates, what exactly are their impacts on
political and policy outcomes? More specifically, how has the existence of these nation-state
narratives influenced changes in the state institutions with which they are associated? This
chapter considers this question in two cases and concludes that narratives did have important
impacts on the courses of the institutional changes observed in them.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section develops a framework for thinking
about how narratives can shape institutional reforms. This includes considering the limitations
narratives place on the ability of political elites to advance certain arguments, the capacity of
narratives as tools to rally public opinion in favor of a particular institutional reform, and their
role in facilitating coordination among political elites, especially under conditions of uncertainty.
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The third section examines the role of the democratic state narrative in the political reform drive
of the 1990s that produced a major change in Japan's electoral institutions. The analysis
concludes that the wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by all parties in the debate
made it difficult to pursue less democratic solutions, rallied public support in favor of a
large-scale reform that deepened Japanese democracy, and helped unite political elites around
this reform despite that fact that it ran counter their own electoral incentives.
The fourth section considers the case of a single narrative component, the claim of
ethno-national homogeneity of the organic state narrative, which has started to vanish from the
lexicon of political elites. Focusing on reform in Japan's immigration institutions, the analysis
finds that despite the waning use of this cognitive claim and growing pressure for more liberal
immigration policies, it nonetheless continues to limit the scope of institutional reforms. This
somewhat surprising result is likely due to the failure of political elites advocating reform to
forcefully contest the claim or to offer alternative means of cognition. The final section
summarizes the findings of the chapter.
H1. Narratives and Institutional Reform
Viewed purely as rhetoric, nation-state narratives, like all public narratives, can serve as
rhetorical resources or obstacles, depending on the perspective and intentions of the individual
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participant in this discourse. Once having attained high levels of prominence and consensus,
they are immediately available both for the construction of emotive perpetuating strategies to
counter proposals to reform institutions associated with their normative components as well as
material that would-be reformers can refashion to create arguments for limited changes in these
same institutions. Such narratives can also become targets of scorn and derision for those
seeking their comprehensive transformation in favor of counter-narratives and major institutional
overhauls. The accounts of changes in narratives in the previous two chapters have provided
examples of most of these types of rhetorical action. But how exactly do rhetorical moves
translate into institutional changes? Constructing a framework to show how the nation-state
narratives studied here shape institutional change requires synthesizing the literature on the use
of narratives in politics with debates over the importance of elite rhetoric and public opinion in
policy-making.
Those who argue that narratives deeply affect politics generally start with the claim that
narratives are essential guides to social action because they contain elements that guide
perception and memory, help one interpret experiences, generate inferences and expectations,
and organize action. 587 Specifically, Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe locate the
587 See for example, Somers (1994) on how narratives are essential guides to social action; Brubaker (2004a) on
how "schema" guide perception and memory, help one interpret experiences, generate inferences and expectations,
and organize action; Patterson & Monroe (1998) on how narratives shape politics in fundamental ways; Cruz (2000,
2005) on how dominant discursive frames can have causal impacts on policy-making.
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significance of narratives for politics in their capacity to help one understand oneself as a
"political being" as well as their role in the "construction of political behavior."5 88  In this way,
narratives are treated as a tool of cognition that political actors rely on to interpret policy
situations and formulate policy preferences. Narratives can thus affect policy debates (and their
outcomes) by helping participants arrive at preferences for what should be done. Accordingly,
narratives are argued to be particularly important in policy debates in which there are high levels
of uncertainty regarding what the problem is and/or what will likely be the consequences of
various proposed policy changes.589
Others find the power of the narrative in politics results from its usefulness as a tool of
persuasion. For example, Sanford Schram and Philip Neisser describe the role of narratives in
politics and policy-making as follows:
Political actors use stories as scripts for engaging in political performances, from
lobbying to policy formulation, from mass mobilization to posturing by political
leadership. And since it is almost always the case that more than one story can be told to
make sense of any particular areas of concern or issue, stories are necessarily not
innocuous and disinterested but instead are potentially dangerous and interested. They
are critically constitutive elements in shaping political practice and public policy.590
Here, stories or narratives are depicted largely as tools of persuasion -- for lobbying fellow elites
and mobilizing the public around a particular policy framework -- and the choice of story is
518 Patterson & Monroe, 1998, pp.3 15-3 16 .
589 Roe, 1994.
590 Schram & Phillips, ed., 1997, p. 6 .
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argued to be critical to determining the outcome of the policy debate. Approaches to narratives
emphasizing this aspect thus tend to focus on whether there is a "dominant" narrative relevant to
the policy problem at hand or whether multiple, competing narratives are available to make the
case for different policy approaches. 591 They also argue that the type of political or policy
problem involved can be significant in determining the impact of narratives on policy outcomes.
In particular, resolutions to policy problems that involve "foundational issues," such as the
meanings of key historical events or the "basic ideas and values that guide political
communities," are considered most likely to be shaped by narratives because debates over such
problems are resistant to the appeals to rationality or science and do not require extensive
background knowledge to be understood by either political elites or voting publics. 592
Research on the relationship between elite rhetoric and public opinion is also relevant to
the question of how narratives shape politics. Over the last twenty years, researchers in this area
have variously argued that elite discourse and messaging is the dominant factor in public opinion
formation, that elite rhetoric has virtually no impact on the policy preferences of the public, and
that the relationship is complex and reciprocal. 593  In practice, there are cases in which elites
591 Cruz, 2000, 2005; Bridgman & Barry, 2002; Roe, 1989, 1994.
592 Art, 2006. See also the discussion of narratives and "wicked problems" (originally coined in Rittle & Webber,
1973) in Mcbeth, et al. (2007).
593 For the view that elite discourse dominates public opinion, see Zaller, 1992; for the view that elite rhetoric has
little impact on public opinion, see Edwards, 2003; for the view that a reciprocal relationship exists, see Jacobs &
Shapiro, 2000.
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drive public opinion, cases in which elites primarily respond to public opinion, and cases where
both occur in some kind of sequence. 594
As noted in Chapter Three, scholarship on nationalism argues that political elites play
leading roles in shaping popular understandings of nationalism, especially in contemporary
democracies like postwar Japan. However, this view need not devolve into the crude claim that
elites completely dominate public opinion. As even John Zaller notes, the way individual
members of the public react to a particular political message is partly a result of their store of
"political predispositions, especially values." 595 As these predispositions are accumulated over
the course of many years, they are not easily changed by countervailing messages in the course
of a single policy debate.5 9 6 Thus, although elite discourse as a whole may chart the course of
public opinion on policy matters over the long term, elites are likely to shape their rhetoric in
particular policy debates to avoid unnecessarily running afoul of popular predispositions so as to
maximize its capacity to mobilize the public around their favored problem-framings and policy
proposals. This is even more likely in debates over reforming institutions associated with
value-laden popular understandings of the nation and its proper relationship with the state. 597
"4 Schildkraut, 2002, p.5 18.
595 Zaller, 1992, p.267 .
596 Edwards, 2009, p. 6 4 .
597 Schildkraut (2002, pp.517-519) makes a similar point about nationalism generally.
355
The above discussion yields a rough framework for how nation-state narratives can
affect institutional change. Viewed as dominant rhetorical frames in particular policy domains,
nation-state narratives can place cognitive limits on the participants in policy debates who use
them. First, they can limit the field of imaginable possibilities or the "array of plausible
scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look," which
necessarily limits the range of potential institutional reform proposals.598 For example, as will
be seen below, politicians utilizing the democratic state narrative in a debate over reforming
electoral institutions were simply unable to conceive and advance overtly anti-democratic policy
proposals. Second, as tools of persuasion, nation-state narratives limit the choice of rhetorical
strategies "on the basis of their presumptive realism and normative sway."
599 Although it is
possible to directly challenge a nation-state narrative, once one has decided to work within its
confines, there are limitations to the degree to which it may be molded to fit particular policy
positions, notwithstanding the immense creativity of political elites.
on the specific form of institutional changes.
This can have real impacts
For example, it was only even possible for
Koizumi to justify the SDF deployment to Iraq on peace state grounds by citing geographic and
weapons-use restrictions and emphasizing its humanitarian and peace-building goals. Without
incorporating such restrictions and goals into the mission, he would have had to challenge the
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598 Cruz, 2000, pp. 277-2 78.
9 Ibid., pp.276-277.
In this way, the most obvious effect of narratives on
institutional change are the constraints their rhetorical conventions place on the range and
specifics of the policy proposals that can be offered by policy-makers seeking to work within
their cognitive and normative limits.
A second means by which narratives can shape institutional change are their capacities
to facilitate cooperation among political elites. Although this can take different forms, such as
allowing members of different political parties to conceive of a particular policy issue in similar
ways, the general point here is that once different participants in a policy debate utilize the same
nation-state narrative in support of their framings of the problem and suggested solutions, they
have a established common set of linguistic conventions with which to discuss the problem and a
common set of cognitive and normative claims with which to legitimate suggested solutions.
This naturally builds momentum towards compromise over the specifics of the final institutional
reform. An example of this effect at work will be offered in the next section.
Finally, narratives shape institutional change through their capacities to mobilize the
public around particular reform drives. Although there are likely limits to the specificity (i.e.
"tightness-of-fit") with which a nation-state narrative can be linked with a particular proposal for
institutional change, skilled elites can use prominent and long-established narratives to legitimate
600 It would not have been possible, for example, for Koizumi t0 have advanced an argument t0 the effect that "even
when not under direct threat, a peace state should sometimes go to war."
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peace state narrative directly. 600
their favored direction for institutional reforms and gain public support both for themselves and
their proposals. In a system of even minimal democratic accountability, nation-state narratives
can thus be opportune means for political elites to get a majority of the public to view a favored
institutional change as consistent with their predispositions, in this case their shared
understanding of the proper relationship between the nation and its state.
Final aspects of this framework involve the conditions under which narratives are most
likely to affect institutional outcomes. First, it is argued that narratives, as important tools of
cognition, are more likely to have a decisive role in debates over institutional change in which
there is a large amount of uncertainty about the nature of the problem, the ultimate consequences
of suggested solutions, or both. Second, as tools of persuasion, nation-state narratives are more
likely to be have a meaningful impact on debates over "foundational issues," as these have
low-information requirements for participants and inevitably involve issues that touch on sets of
predispositions already established among both elites and the public, thus creating a strong
incentive for at least one side in a policy debate to deploy a nation-state narrative.
Finally, as researchers in public opinion formation emphasize, the presence or absence
of contestation over the relevant policy issue can be the key to explain the public's response to
relevant elite discourse. 60' Put more simply, the public is more likely to accept a single
Interestingly, Roe's narrative policy analysis approach also turns heavily on the presence or
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601 Zaller, 1992.
political message when elites offer it in unison than when different elites offer competing
messages. Translated to the framework developed here, this means that a nation-state narrative
is more likely to prove effective at garnering public support for institutional reform drives when
it is deployed by all major elites in the debate over how exactly institutions should be changed.
In this situation, the use of nation-state narratives can create public pressure for change in
general and support for those elites who are most vociferous in their calls for reform, whatever
the specifics of their favored proposals. 602
Assessing the impact of nation-state narratives on policy-making is a notoriously tricky
endeavor. 603 The approach adopted here has three steps. First, a debate over a specific
institutional reform is examined to see if the outcomes are consistent with narrative claims.
absence of contestation (in the form of counter-narratives). Roe, 1994.
602 The framework utilized here is thus similar to the one suggested by Kuklinski & Segura (1995). Based on a
review of the literature on elite rhetoric and public opinion formation, they develop a sequenced and dynamic model
of opinion formation and outcome determination in which policy-makers deploy messages that present their favored
policy outcomes as consistent with their estimation of the preferences of their constituencies, the public reacts to this
messaging by forming preferences regarding the various policy options and communicating them back to
policy-makers (via opinion polls, etc.) in a dynamic process that may repeat before a final legislative vote is taken.
However, underneath this short-run dynamism is a stable distribution of predispositions among the public ("the
public mood") that policy-makers know they cannot change in the short-run and also take into account as they craft
their messages. Political elites thus design their messages both to take into account short-run determinants of how
their audience will react (level of political awareness, i.e. level of factual knowledge about present political matters,
etc.) and long-run determinants (political predispositions or values). While the former can vary over time and
issues and even by changed by political messaging, the latter is more stable and resistant to change. Kuklinski &
Segura thus argue that some aspects of public opinion formation are endogenous to the particular policy debate at
hand while others are exogenous. In such an opinion environment, nation-state narratives appear to be particularly
useful tools for persuasive communication as highly prominent ones can be adapted to favor specific policy
positions in reasoned appeals to the highly politically aware while also resonating with the predispositions of both
the politically aware and the less engaged to build popular support.
603 Two caveats are in order here. First, the enterprise of this chapter is to assess the plausibility of the notion that
nation-state narratives and their components have had meaningful impacts on change in state institutions. A
systematic investigation of this connection would require far more than the pages devoted to it here. Second, while
a narrative can influence institutional outcomes, the extent of that influence varies and determining the precise value
of its contribution is beyond difficult. This is because narratives generally both shape and are shaped by fights
over the institutions associated with them.
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Third, the content of this debate is examined to see if the narrative was actually used as the
above framework predicts. This includes consideration of how use of these narratives may
have facilitated elite cooperation and shaped public opinion. Finally, alternative explanations
are considered to assess how important the role of the narrative was in determining the final
institutional outcome.
The cases in this chapter were selected for the following reasons. First, since the
democratic state narrative is uncontested and has achieved banal status in the post-Cold War
period, one should expect to see its influence on the outcome of a debate over how to make
Japanese electoral institutions fairer. This influence should thus be relatively obvious and fairly
significant in determining the final institutional configuration. Alternatively, the case of the
ethno-national homogeneity claim and immigration reform is a more difficult test. The finding
of evidence that this cognitive claim continues to have an impact on policy outcomes even
though it is part of a highly contested narrative and has largely ceased to be voiced by political
elites at public ceremonies like the Diet inaugural would provide strong support for the assertion
that narratives can matter in shaping institutional reforms. Finally, since neither the democratic
state narrative nor the ethno-national homogeneity claim are themselves contested here, the
impact of the debate on them is considered to be minimal, thus affording a cleaner view of the
route from narrative use to institutional outcome.
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III. Narrating Democracy and Electoral Reform
The electoral reform of 1994, which significantly reduced the level of
malapportionment in the lower house of the Diet, was part of a series of reforms in Japan's
democratic institutions, many of which were realized during the first decade of the post-Cold
War period. Other achievements of this broader "political reform" (seji kaikaku) movement
included campaign finance reform (1994), which set up a system of public financing for national
elections, the non-profit organization (NPO) law (1999), which reduced the barriers to
establishing civil society organizations recognized by the government, the information disclosure
law (1999), which created avenues for citizens to demand more transparency from government
agencies, and a number of judicial reforms (2002), including the introduction of a lay judge
system, which opened up the judicial process to ordinary citizens in ways never possible before
in Japan. Although each of these reforms has been criticized as insufficient, they have
combined to form what one scholar has called a "quiet transformation" in which civil society is
strengthened, the rule of law is more strongly established, and democracy is deepened.604
Among these reforms, Gerald Curtis has called the electoral reform of 1994 "arguably
the most far-reaching political reform in Japan since those introduced during the U.S.
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604 Kingston, 2011, p.37.
Occupation after the Second World War." 605  Specifically, Curtis refers to the passage of
legislation in 1994 that converted the system used to elect the members of the lower house of the
Diet from a multiple-member district (MMD) system to a mixed system that combines
single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR). During the course of a
nearly four-year, on-again, off-again debate over electoral reform, the MMD system was, rightly
or wrongly, argued to be a major contributing factor to the corruption, factionalism and
one-party dominance thought to be behind dysfunction in Japanese democratic institutions.606
In particular, one-party dominance was linked to the malapportionment of the electoral system in
that the overvaluing of votes in rural areas advantaged the LDP, which was popular in these
areas, thus leading to a natural reluctance on the part of the ruling party to redraw districts.
Although failing to meet the established goal of limiting the maximum ratio of 2 to 1 in
representation per capita differences across districts, the 1994 election law reduced the ratio to
2.32 in 1996 from a high of 4.99 in 1972.607 Thus, in this and other measures, the 1994 reform
"significantly alleviated the overall level of malapportionment" and thus reformed electoral
60561Curtis, 1999, p. 13 7.
606 Curtis, 1999, pp. 14 0
-
14 5
.
607 lbid.,p.161. However, malapportionment in the lower house election system has not improved in the years
since. In March 2011, the Supreme Court ruled the 2009 lower house election unconstitutional, arguing that the
maximum ratio discrepancy of 2.3 violated the constitutionally-guaranteed equality of all voters. As in previous
such rulings in 1972, 1980, 1983 and 1990, the Court let the election results stand but ordered that the imbalance be
corrected before the next lower house election.
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institutions in ways consistent with the democratic state narrative's normative claim to enforce
democratic principles at home. 608
Positions in the debate over how to make Japan's electoral institutions fairer were often
justified by references to the democratic state narrative. For example, in a January 1991 Diet
inaugural address, Prime Minister Kaifu began his argument for political reform by referencing
the narrative:
I believe we must realize political reform (seiji kaikaku) because political and social
fairness is the basis of our democratic state (minshushugi kokka). Toward this purpose,
it is first and foremost necessary to entrench political ethics. Together with this, it is
necessary to reform politics and the electoral system itself to realize politics and
elections in which there is transparency in political funds, party preferences are not
based on money, and the focus is on policy. 609
Two factors stand out regarding the manner in which the democratic state narrative was
deployed in the electoral reform debate. First, the narrative was marshaled by nearly all
participants in the debate in support of various positions, including ones in opposition to each
other. It was thus cited freely both by members of the ruling party or coalition, the opposition
and the media, even when they favored different schemes for reforming the lower house electoral
system. A review of the transcripts of the Special Committee on Political Reform, the lower
house committee charged with considering electoral reform legislation, provides many instances
608 Horiuchi & Saito, 2003, p.6 7 2 .
609 Kaifu Toshiaki, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural, House of Representatives, January 25, 1991. Accessed
at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012, emphasis added).
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For example, Hamada Takujiro of the then ruling LDP prefaced
an argument in favor of his party's proposal for a pure SMD system by stating, "it goes without
saying that, as our country is a democratic state (minshushugi kokka), we must consider political
reform from the perspective of which political institutions make our democracy function more
efficiently and on a sounder basis." 610 Two months later, Watanabe Ichir6 of the K6mei Party
used the following words to support his party's plan for a mixed SMD and PR system, "I
strongly believe that this [plan] will serve as the spark for a grand change that will make the
existence of Japan as a democratic state (minshukokka nihon) known throughout the world."6 1
During the final intraparty negotiations over electoral reform in early 1994, Prime Minister
Hosokawa and LDP president K6no Y~hei agreed at least on the stakes: "If bills pertaining to
political reform are not passed, it will leave a wound on Japan's parliamentary democracy that
will be difficult to heal."6 12 Although this wide-spread use of the same narrative by actors
taking different positions in a policy debate may seem strange at first glance, it should perhaps
not be surprising given that this particular narrative had achieved such long-standing and broad
consensus.
610 Hamada Takujir6, Liberal Democratic Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives,
April 16, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
611 Watanabe IchirO, K6mei Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, June 18,
1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
612 Asahi Shimbun, 30 January 1994.
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of this broad-based utilization.
Second, use of the universalistic variant of the narrative is widely apparent.
rather than justifying particular reform schemes by arguing for its consistency with
"Japanese-style democracy," participants in the debate often argued in favor of their preferred
reforms by citing the need to bring Japan's democracy in line with those of other countries
around the world. This was particularly true for those arguing that the LDP's long one-party
dominance was anomalous and needed to be rectified to revitalize Japanese democracy. For
example, in October 1993, Ouchi Keigo, Minister of Health and Welfare in the Hosokawa
cabinet, told the political reform committee, "The MMD system's fundamental problem is, as
historical fact reveals, its role in perpetuating the LDP's one-party rule for thirty-eight years.
As you know, one does not see another example of this in any other advanced democratic state
(senshin minshushugi kokka)."6 13  Others appealed to the universal variant in support of specific
positions in the debate. In the same committee a month after Ouchi's statement above,
Takaichi Sanae, then a newly-elected independent, characterized the Hosokawa government's
call for electoral reform that allowed the realization of "party-based politics" (seit5 honi no seUi)
as "running counter to the direction of history," as "among democratic states that have already
613 Ouchi Keigo, Japan Socialist Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, October
20, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
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Thus,
become economically wealthy, even the United States, a distancing from political parties is
occurring, and this is the current tide of the world." 614
The case of electoral reform features several of the conditions introduced above
favoring the use and ultimate effectiveness of nation-state narratives. First, there was
considerable uncertainty as to both the relationship between MMD system to the problems of
Japan's political system as well as about the eventual consequences of different reform options.
With regard to identifying the source of the problems, the culpability of the MMD system was
far from clear. As Curtis notes, other countries have corruption, factionalism, and histories of
one-party dominance under electoral systems that are not "even remotely similar to Japan's." 615
Still further, the coalition government under Hosokawa Morihiro, which ultimately abolished the
MMD system, was elected under it, bringing an end to LDP one-party dominance. In addition,
the ultimate effects on both the party system as a whole as well as the electoral fortunes of
individual politicians of the different suggested reforms also involved a great deal of uncertainty.
As Curtis concludes, although sometimes oversold by political scientists, the causal implications
614 Takaichi Sanae, Independent, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, November 5,
1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
615 Curtis, 1999, p. 14 2 . For example, Italy has similar problems with corruption and factionalism and Sweden and
India have both experience long periods of one-party dominance despite the fact that their electoral systems are very
different from Japan's pre-1994 system.
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of different electoral configurations are far from definitive, and electoral system specialists are in
fact cautious in their claims about the likely consequences of particular voting systems.616
Second, as the examples above make clear, reform of the electoral system was not
portrayed as a narrowly technical matter but instead as a foundational issue that involved the
fundamental principles of the postwar political and social order. In this way, it most likely
touched among established sets of political predisposition among the public. To the extent that
such predispositions can be measured, opinion polls from around the time indicate strong
attachments to the democratic regime among the public. 6 17 The use of the democratic state
narrative and positioning of the issue as a threat to Japanese democracy can thus be expected to
force members of the public to react to the elite messaging by considering this basic
predisposition.
The wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by all participants appears to have
shaped the electoral reform debate in multiple ways.
within the narrative's
First, once everyone agreed to operate
confines, it foreclosed the possibility of anti-democratic reforms.
Whether this agreement resulted from a cognitive limitation placed on imagined possibilities or
the need to work within the normative limitations of one's strategically-chosen narrative, the
616 Ibid.,pp.138-139. For example, see Curtis's account of the claims made by Maurice Duverger about the
relationship between plurality systems and party dualism.
617 Fouse, 2002.
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democratic state narrative appears to have served as an "obstacle of first resort" to potential
anti-democratic agitation from Japan's political elites. To argue for an explicitly
anti-democratic program would have placed considerable communication burdens on potential
advocates, requiring them to contest or in the very least navigate around a nation-state narrative
with a long history of prominence that had not been strongly challenged by political elites in the
past. This would necessitate the development of new rhetorical strategies and/or
counter-narratives and a broad-based effort to convince both other political elites and the
electorate of the legitimacy of this new way of talking about how the nation should relate to the
state. 618
The extent of such a reactionary threat during this time is debatable, but several factors
make the emergence of a challenge to democracy seem plausible. First, Japan faced a massive
economic downturn at home and a shifting and uncertain power balance abroad. In addition,
conservative intellectuals had been critical of individual elements of the democratic regime
throughout the postwar period, providing the intellectual foundations for such a challenge. 6 19
Finally, as the power of a party that had ruled for a generation was seriously threatened for the
618 As witnessed in the case of the peace state narrative in Chapter Six, the process of merely partially transforming
a nation-state narrative can require years of continuous engagement and the adoption of multiple strategies before
some success is achieved at the institutional level.
619 For an overview, see Winkler (2011). In recent example, the mathematician and conservative intellectual
Fujiwara Masahiko calls for a shift to rule by a highly-educated, self-sacrificing elite in his best-selling Dignity of a
Nation (Kokka no hinkaku). See Fujiwara (2005, pp.65-94).
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first time in decades during this period, it is not unthinkable that anti-democratic sentiments
might have found a voice among members of the LDP. Thus, although appeals in the
anti-democratic direction were conceivable during this period, the position of the democratic
state narrative as a banal form of nationalism served as a frontline obstacle against the advocacy
of such a program among political elites.
Second, the fact that both those favoring stronger emphasis on majority rule (SMD) and
those arguing from stronger minority protections (PR) legitimized their claims with reference to
the democratic state narrative facilitated the development of compromise proposals, particularly
within the members of Hosokawa's coalition government. Indeed, in negotiating the formation
of that coalition following the 1993 lower house election, Hosokawa had extracted promises
from all participating parties to support an electoral reform scheme mixing SMD and PR
elements. Although having just achieved an historic electoral victory under the old MMD
system, participating parties nonetheless agreed to put that system's replacement on the top of
the new coalition government's agenda. The compromise plan served to unite the new
coalition partners, allowing them to differentiate themselves from the LDP opposition. In fact,
once electoral reform passed the Diet, policy differences and personal rivalries quickly rose to
the surface, exposing the fragility of Hosokawa's soon-to-be short-lived government. 620 Thus,
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to the extent the democratic state narrative facilitated compromise among the coalition partners
over how to go about reforming the electoral system, it also played a role in briefly sustaining
the first non-LDP government in nearly forty years.
Third, the democratic state narrative's ready availability as a means of legitimatizing
proposals for electoral reform of differing types provided political elites a common reference
point from which to criticize the MMD system. Once the MMD system was declared by
opposition parties, ruling parties and the media alike to be antithetical to Japan's democratic
essence, its wholesale replacement, rather than a less dramatic reform such as the redrawing of
district boundaries to correct apportionment imbalances, became the only legitimate form of
resolution. In this way, the wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by
differently-situated participants in the electoral reform debate served to focus popular opinion on
the need to replace the MMD system in its entirety and thus limited the range of reforms that
could be considered legitimate. This effect can be seen in public opinion polling from the
period. Although the public was initially skeptical about the importance of overhauling the
electoral system, they came to support eliminating the MMD system only after having been
exposed to elite discourse the uniformly invoked the democratic state narrative to justify a
variety of reform packages, all of which abolished the MMD system. 621 In addition, the public
621 For example, although questions and answer choices are not consistent across polls, support for reforming the
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began to link their support for the prime minister with their evaluation of his record in advancing
political reform, especially over the course of the Miyazawa and Hosokawa governments, when
critical debates took place over the issue. 622  Thus, although the shift in the public's views
appears consistent with elite-driven models of public opinion formation, as the debate over
electoral reform dragged on, the public began to demand that political elites deliver on their
rhetoric, thus placing pressure on them to achieve reform.
Perhaps the best evidence in favor of the claim that the democratic state narrative
influenced the outcome of the electoral reform debate is an evaluation of the obvious alternative
explanation. If politics really is driven purely by "interests and power" rather than processes of
deliberation, then one should clearly observe these factors at work behind reapportionment or
redistricting changes. 623  In fact, one of the most common explanations for the specific forms
resulting from such reforms is that incumbents or parties in control of the reapportionment
process design electoral institutions to their advantage. 62 4  Although various institutional checks
(court oversight, constraints due to structures of other levels of government, etc.) can limit the
MMD system grew from 13% under Kaifu to 42% under Miyazawa to a majority 53% shortly after the Hosokawa
government took office. See Asahi Shimbun, 2 April 1990; 12 March 1992; 9 September 1993.
622 Miyazawa and Hosokawa were mirror opposites in this regard. In March 1992, 33% approved of the
Miyazawa government and 56% disapproved but only 3% listed political reform as the Miyazawa government's best
point while 15% listed it as its worst point. In April 1993, these figures had changed little (Approval/Disapproval:
26%/56%; Political Reform Best/Worst Point: 4%/12%). In November 1993, 70% approved of the Hosokawa
government and 12% disapproved but 18% listed political reform as the Hosokawa government's best point while
only 3% listed it as its worst point. As the electoral reform debate approached a climax in December 1993, these
figures had changed little (Approval/Disapproval: 60%/2 1 %; Political Reform Best/Worst Point: 17%/4%). See
Asahi Shimbun, 11 March 1992; 28 April 1993; 10 November 1993; 22 December 1993.
623 Shapiro, 1999.
624 Cox & Katz, 1999; Lyons & Galderisi, 1995.
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incumbent or partisan bias of new electoral designs, incumbents and parties in powers are
generally argued to have strong incentives to use redistricting as a means to perpetuate their time
in office or their majorities in the legislative branch.
What is interesting about the electoral reform of 1994 is that this common explanation
falls flat whether one looks at initial electoral incentives, the redistricting process or the eventual
partisan outcomes in future elections. First, as Curtis notes in his careful account of this debate:
"One thing is quite clear: most party leaders and backbench members of the Diet who voted for
electoral reform did not do so because they thought it would improve their own or their party's
election prospects." 625 JSP members believed that their electoral interests would best be served
in the old MMD system, while members of small parties within Hosokawa's coalition
government (e.g. Japan New Party, Democratic Socialist Party, Sakigake, Komei Party, etc.)
knew that the introduction of the new mixed system would place pressure on them "to merge
into a larger party with uncertain consequence for their members." 626 In addition, Curtis notes
that LDP Diet members also did not see the new system as in their interests, as it would require
them to review election campaign strategies with uncertain results. 62 7
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625 Curti
626 Ibid.
627 Ibid.
s, 1999, p. 139.
Second, despite the fact that politicians in the governing coalition and LDP drafted and
passed the law creating the new electoral system, the responsibility of actually redrawing district
lines was ceded to a non-partisan commission of academics, former bureaucrats and a journalist.
Although the commission was ultimately unable to redraw districts in accordance with the law's
requirement limit the maximum difference to 2 to 1, this was due to technical difficulties in
meeting all the districting conditions in the new law (such as having at least one district per
prefecture, avoiding districts that cross prefectural lines, etc.) rather than as a result of political
interference. 628 New district lines were finalized as "an administrative chore, undertaking by
experts in the Ministry of Home Affairs." 629
Finally, viewed from perspective of future electoral outcomes, particularly for the
parties of the Hosokawa coalition government, it is difficult to see how this reform proved
advantageous. In the first election under the new mixed system in 1996, the JSP was nearly
wiped out, winning only a combined 15 seats down from 70 in the last election under the old
MMD system. In addition, the only small party from the Hosokawa coalition that was still
independent at the time of this election, Sakigake, was also nearly eliminated from the Diet.
The remaining small parties had merged into the new opposition Shinshinto, which although
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628 Ibid., p.161.
629 Ibid.
coming in second behind the LDP in 1996, proved a short-lived experiment, dissolving before
the end of 1997.
Curtis's seminal analysis of the legislative process that produced the 1994 electoral
reform, while not mentioning narratives directly, nonetheless agrees in substantial ways with the
above account of the democratic state narrative's impact. For example, he emphasizes that the
"political mood" at the time "was not conducive to rational arguments" about electoral reform
options.630 He also notes the emergence of a broad consensus among political elites identifying
the MMD system as the problem and favoring its complete replacement. 631
that the "popular mood"
By 1993, he argues
had solidified in favor of complete overhaul, "robb[ing] the
medium-size-district system of legitimacy and mak[ing] electoral reform unavoidable." 632 He
concludes that the assertion that the problems plaguing Japan's democracy could only be
resolved by comprehensively reforming electoral institutions "was transformed from a debatable
thesis to a commonly embraced assumption" during the course of this debate. 633 It is argued
here that these shifts in political and popular moods, the loss of legitimacy of existing electoral
institutions and the general acceptance of claims about capacity of comprehensive electoral
reforms to resolve the problems of Japanese democracy are all consistent with the expected
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630 Ibid., p.144.
631 Ibid..
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid., p.145.
impact of the broad use by political elites of the democratic state narrative, an uncontested
narrative with a long history of prominence.
IV. Cognitive Limitations, Ethnicity and Immigration Reform
The organic state narrative provides a case of a narrative undergoing transformation in
which one previously widely-referenced cognitive component, the claim of ethno-national
homogeneity, nearly disappears from the Diet inaugural ceremony following the end of the Cold
War. In addition, positive references (and thus the acknowledgment of the existence of)
domestic minorities came to exceed ethno-national claims during this period. However, it is
important to note that the ethno-national claim did not face significant contestation during this,
or any other period, in the study. 634 In this way, although the claim became gradually
deemphasized in presentations of the organic state narrative, this cannot be easily attributed to
the emergence of a strong opposition to and rejection of the claim among political elites.
What does this unusual combination of disuse in the absence of contestation mean for
the impact of this important cognitive component on the institutions and policies associated with
it? More specifically, this section considers how changes observed in the uses of the
ethno-national claim relate to two recent reforms in immigration institutions and whether this
634 See Chapter Seven for more details on this point.
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pattern differs from that observed in the narrative-institution relationship of the democratic state
narratives in the previous section. 635
In the period between 2004 and 2008, the Diet debated and eventually approved
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the Philippines and Indonesia that offered nurses
and elderly caregivers from those countries the chance ply their trades in Japan pending the
passing of a qualifying exam. Examining these debates is useful to see how the declining use
of claims of ethno-national unity may have influenced immigration policy. However, in order
to understand the significance of these debates and the resulting institutional changes, a brief
overview of Japan's immigration and citizenship policies is necessary.
Japan maintains one of the more restrictive immigration and citizenship regimes among
the OECD countries. For example, Japan's policy of automatically granting citizenship only to
the children of Japanese citizens places it among OECD countries with the strictest citizenship
requirements, including Austria, Greece, and Italy. Second, the rate at which foreign residents
in Japan seek to become Japanese citizens is extremely low, with only Luxembourg having a
lower rate. Finally, Japan's immigration and citizenship policies stand out in two ways: They
have produced one of the smallest immigrant populations as percentage of total population (less
635 It should be noted that establishing a strong connection between narrative and institutional change in this case is
far more difficult due to the lack of explicit references to the key narrative claim and thus the resulting conclusions,
although counter to the initial expectations of the author, are necessarily more speculative.
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than 2%) in the OECD and have made Japan the only OECD country working to incorporate
fourth-generation immigrants, who are mostly composed of families of Korean immigrants
(zainichi) originally brought to Japan before the end of World War Two. 636
In addition to the above background, an important demographic reality needs
highlighting. Due to a persistently low birthrate, demographic change has seen the Japan's
working-age population on the decline since 1995, thus creating pressure to import workers in
ever larger numbers. In fact, Japan had already faced labor shortages, initially among unskilled
positions, since the early 1990s. 637 According to a UN report issued in 2000, in order to
maintain the working-age population at its peak size (1995), Japan would need to welcome an
average of more than 600,000 new immigrants per year through 2050, at which time these
immigrants and their descendants would represent roughly 30% of the total population.638 That
same year, an advisory council to the Obuchi administration released a report calling for "an
immigration policy that will make foreigners want to live and work in Japan" and setting the
goal of "achieving greater ethnic diversity within Japan." 639 Early into the post-Cold War era,
636 Chung, 2010, pp.3 2 -5 3 .
637 Kingston, 2011, p.1 7 2 . The population did in fact begin to decline in 2005 as predicted.
638 United Nations Population Division, 2000, "Japan: Scenario IV." Accessed at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm (August 6, 2012).
639 Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, 2000, Chapter 1. Accessed at:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/index.html (Accessed June 24, 2012).
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the stage was thus set for a debate on the liberalization of Japan's immigration and citizenship
policies.
Judged from the institutional baseline established above as well as the demographic
pressure to open the system further, scholars have generally viewed the changes in Japan's
immigration and citizenship policies over the last two decade as "ad hoc, piecemeal.64
Despite a series of immigration reforms beginning in the early 1990s that doubled the foreign
resident population in Japan between 1990 and 2008, the overall increase still leaves foreign
residents representing only 1.74 % of the total population, the smallest such figure among all
advanced industrial countries.641 The rate of increase is also far below that required to stabilize
the size of the population and workforce. In other words, despite new and growing pressures to
encourage immigration, one has to acknowledge that "many things have not changed over the
past decades." 642 As Erin Aeran Chung concludes, "Japan's immigration and citizenship
policies have remained largely unchanged since their institutionalization in the early postwar
period." 643
640 Kingston, 2011, p. 183.
641 Chung, 2010, p.13; Kingston, 2011, pp. 16 6 -16 7 . The reforms included a program that encouraged people of
Japanese descent (nikeijin) to immigrate from South America (mainly Brazil and Peru), the establishment of a
practical trainee program that draws most of its applicants from China, and increases in the number of visas granted
to Chinese entrepreneurs in response to the surge in trade with China over the period, among other changes. See
Kingston, 2011, pp.1 7 1-1 76 .
642 Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p.2 4 5 (emphasis in original).
643 Chung, 2010, p.1 7 4 .
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In stark contrast to these limited changes in immigration policies, it should be noted that
the activism of foreign resident and minority communities already long-established in Japan
brought them increasing visibility with the general public and yielded some solid institutional
and political victories, especially since the 1980s. In particular, zainichi Koreans, having
endured decades of social and workplace discrimination, have become the most
politically-effective of the foreign resident and minority groups in Japan. 644 In what Chung has
called a "noncitizen civil rights movement," zainichi Koreans successfully fought discrimination
in the workplace through the courts, expanded their access to the social welfare system, removed
finger-printing requirements for foreign residency, and lobbied for and received special
permanent residency status not predicated on the requirement of eventual naturalization. 645 In
this way, foreign resident and minority groups already in Japan have mounted a sustained and
visible challenge to the notion of Japan as an ethnically homogenous nation that has grown
increasingly apparent on the national political stage over the last two decades. During this
period, these groups have focused their efforts on a campaign to obtain voting rights in local
elections. Although still an ongoing endeavor, the movement succeeded in gaining the support
of the New K~mei Party, which submitted legislation in the Diet to allow such rights six times
644 Morris-Suzuki, 2010.
645 See Chung, 2010; Lie, 2008. Although the finger-printing requirement was reinstated for foreign residents as a
counterterrorism measure in 2007, it is important to note that special permanent residents were exempt from the
requirement, further evidence of zainichi Koreans'political clout.
379
In addition, the now-ruling Democratic Party of Japan pledged its
support for extending voting rights in local elections in 2008. Thus, this increased political
visibility and the increase in the total number of foreign residents have combined in the
post-Cold War period to challenge the reality behind assertions of ethno-national homogeneity.
The overall picture here is largely one of incremental institutional change in the face of
an increasingly apparent need for reform. How does this picture compare with the pattern of
change in the use of ethno-national claims among political elites in the Diet inaugural ceremony?
It is argued here that it is consistent with the decline in the use of ethno-national claims when
one considers first that this decline was not accompanied by significant contestation. This may
be interpreted to mean that although political elites no longer felt comfortable declaring Japan to
be ethnically homogenous in a forum as wide-reaching as the Diet inaugural ceremony, neither
were they willing to openly contest this notion in that same setting. This is because, while
changes such as the increased political visibility and numbers of foreign resident groups made
the positive assertion of ethnic homogeneity difficult to defend, the idea of "Japan as a
mono-ethnic, homogenous nation persists in the collective imagination." 647 As a result, this
lingering cognitive limitation has thus left Japan "a multi-ethnic society in denial" in which
political elites avoid making sweeping ethno-national claims in venues such as the Diet
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between 2000 and 2006.4
inaugural but continue to harbor sympathies toward the claim (sometimes vocalizing them in
other settings).648
Considered against this background, the debates in the Diet over the EPA agreements
creating work visa programs for nurses and caregivers from the Philippines and Indonesia are
thus natural cases to evaluate the above hypothesis and its possible implications for institutional
change. At first glance, however, the basic facts seem to support a different kind of connection
between narrative and institution than the one hypothesized above. First, at no point in these
debates, which took place in the lower house's Committee on Foreign Affairs and the upper
house's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, did any participant directly invoked the
claim of ethno-national or cultural homogeneity. Considering the ease with which this claim
had previously been used in political discourse as recently as the 1980s and the fact that
immigration is policy area which in any country generally invites nativist rhetoric, this is an
extraordinary finding. 649 Second, in the end, the agreements become law, explicitly positioning
liberalizing immigration controls as a solution to labor shortages. These points suggest a
simple correlation between the decline in the use of the ethno-national claims by political elites
648 Kingston, 2011, p.167. Two political elites who have made such statements in recent years include the then
internal affairs and communications minister and future prime minster As6 Taro, who described Japan as having
"one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture and one race" in a ceremony at a museum in October 2005
and the then education minister Ibuki Bunmei, who referred to Japan as "an extremely homogenous country" in
comments before a local LDP chapter in February 2007. See Japan Times, 18 October 2005 & 28 February 2007.
The United Nations special rapporteur on racism later publically challenged the validity of Ibuki's statement.
649 This also shows that the Diet inaugural ceremony is not the only public political venue in which overt appeals to
exclusionary ethno-national claims have become more difficult to make.
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and liberalization of immigration institutions.
relationship between the narrative claim and the institutional changes appears to be far more
complex.
First, although these institutional reforms do liberalize immigration institutions to
address labor shortages, they and the other reforms of this period have been criticized as grossly
inadequate. 650 The EPAs have failed to attract the even the targeted number of applicants and
the entire certification process has been questioned as being too difficult. 65' At this point, it is
also almost certain that these specific reforms will have almost no effect on easing the labor
shortages in the industries they were designed to benefit. In short, although the EPAs did
become law, they do not represent anything like the kind of tidal change one would expect
considering the mounting demographic and economic pressures for reform and the sharp decline
in the use of ethno-national claims by political elites.
Second, closer examination of the content of these debates reveals evidence that
cognitive limitations inherent in the assumption of ethno-national homogeneity persist and
appear to continue to limit the scale of immigration reforms even though the claim itself is no
longer commonly voiced in public policy debates. Evidence for this view can be found by
382
650 Chung, 2010, pp.167-172.
651 Kingston, 2011, p. 17 6 - 17 9 .
However, when evaluated in detail, the
examining the different types of objections that are raised to the legislation, including by those
who eventually voted to ratify the final bilateral treaties.
Objections raised to the agreements' extremely modest and targeted relaxation of
Japan's restrictive immigration policies generally took the following forms. First, some
involved purely technical matters such as whether there was enough oversight in place to ensure
immigrant worker were not abused, especially by being forced to accept sub-standard pay and
working conditions that might generate market-distorting outcomes. 652 These are
understandable with regard to a program such as this, but other objections appear predicated on
an unspoken assumption of at least a cultural homogeneity or if not a more broad understanding
of ethno-national unity. For example, one speaker raises the fear of immigrants committing
crimes while in Japan. 653  This is an example of how the discourse on immigration policy is
"shaped by widespread perceptions that foreigners often resort to crime" while Japanese do
not. 654 Although this is not supported by national crime statistics, the perception is based on an
assumed difference between the high level of moral steadfastness fostered in those raised in
Japanese culture and the low levels of those born and raised elsewhere.
652 Machimura Nobutaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberal Democratic Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, November 2, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
653 For example, see comments by Yamanoi Kazunori, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, November 1, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
654 Kingston, 2011, pp. 16 7 -16 8 .
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Other objections to the new visa program centered on issues of language and culture.
Numerous speakers questioned the ability of applicants to the program to attain sufficient
fluency in Japanese language, especially in the short time frame made available for language
learning.655 One speaker, however, went further, positing a hypothetical situation in which an
immigrant worker would be unable to render suitable care to Japanese elderly suffering from
dementia because of insufficient language skills and an inadequate grasp of Japan's traditional
culture (nihon no dent5 bunka).se Here, the complaint moves beyond the issue of language to
cite what is presumed to be a more insurmountable barrier, an understanding of Japanese
traditions, a move which again appears predicated on an unvoiced assumption of ethnic and
cultural homogeneity.
A final indication that underlying assumptions of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the
need to protect it remain despite their lack of expression by political elites is revealed in the
cost-benefit analysis of some of the speakers in this debate. For example, Araki Kiyohiro of the
New K~mei Party declared to the upper house committee, "Although it is easy to think of
making up labor shortages generated by the dwindling birthrate and aging population with
foreign workers, I oppose this proposition. This is because I think the social costs (shakaiteki
655 For one such example, see Nagashima Akihisa, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, November 8, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
656 Araki Kiyohiro, K6mei Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councillors, November 9,
2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
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kosuto) of this policy are far too many." 657  Here, Araki expresses a willingness to shoulder the
economic costs of labor shortages rather than pay the social costs of attending to them by
bringing immigrants into Japanese society. Speaking on the topic in a different forum in 2005,
then Prime Minister Koizumi was more explicit about this calculus:
If [foreign labor] exceeds a certain level, it is bound to cause a clash. It is necessary to
consider measures to prevent it and then admit foreign workers as necessary. Just because
there is a labor shortage does not mean we should readily allow [foreign workers] to come
in.658
Both Araki and Koizumi thus favor paying the economic price of a shrinking labor force
rather than countenance bringing into Japan anything like the number of immigrants suggested
by the UN report. When one considers the economic costs involved and the dubiousness of
Japan's other options for dealing with labor shortages, the value system at work becomes
clearer. 659 In short, maintaining the current level of presumed ethnic and cultural homogeneity
and the social harmony it supposedly produces is more important than avoiding a dire world in
which eventually there will be less than two workers for each person of retirement age.660 It is
difficult to imagine that such a calculation could emerge from anything other than a cognitive
657 Yamanoi Kazunori, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
November 10, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 24, 2012).
658 Quoted in Kingston (2011, p.183).
659 It should be noted that, as Kingston (2011, p. 181) notes, some "continue to seek refuge in the reassuring scenario
of resolving the crisis through more effective uses of robots, women and elderly workers even though this would
have little more than a palliative impact." However, this cannot be said of the participants in the Diet debate over
these EPAs, as Foreign Minister Aso Tar6 clearly criticized other options, such as robots, as inadequate and, at one
point, declared opposition to such immigration agreements as being the same thing as saying "then go give birth."
Aso Taro, Foreign Minister, Liberal Democratic Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
November 10, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(May 11, 2007).
660 United Nations Population Division, 2000, "Japan: Scenario I." Accessed at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm (June 25, 2012).
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self-understanding built on the assumption of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, even if it is only
referred to indirectly.
It thus appears that the objections to the agreements raised by members of all the major
political parties derive from a common cognitive conception of Japan as a largely ethnically
homogenous nation and the problems this presents for utilizing immigration as a solution to
labor shortages and demographic change. Although, as with the democratic state narrative
and electoral reform, this likely facilitated inter-partisan coordination and broad support for the
eventual reform, in this case the narrative claim appears to have limited the scope of reform.
For example, applicants are required to have work experience in their own countries if nurses
and have graduated from a four-year university if caregivers. More importantly, they must pass
Japanese certification that are thought to be difficult for Japanese nurses and caregivers and
given only in Japanese language. Once having cleared these hurdles, including all the language
and professional training programs necessary, nurses are only guaranteed three-year work visas,
while caregivers receive four-year visas. 661 As will be explained below, these strict requirements
have greatly limited the pool of potential applicants and are a major reason behind the programs'
failure to attract the targeted number of applicants as of this writing.
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Finally, in contrast with the case of the democratic state narrative and electoral reform,
the EPA debates do not appear to have had any effect on the Japanese public's views on the
underlying policy issues involved. For example, in two public opinion surveys, NHK found
that, while 13% favored increased in the foreign population in Japan, 35% wanted to maintain
current levels, and 36% favored a decrease in 1995, these numbers shifted to 10% in favor of
increases, 29% in favor of current levels and 42% in favor of decreases in 2003, indicating a
cooling of public attitudes toward increased immigration just prior to the start of the EPA
debates. 662 Asked if Japan should broadly welcome foreign immigration as a solution to its
demographic challenges by the Asahi Shimbun in 2010 following the conclusion of the EPA
agreements, 26% responded yes while 65% answered no. Although differences in question
wording and answer choices make it difficult to compare the Asahi and NHK surveys, they do
not indicate politically significant movement in the public's enthusiasm for relying on increased
immigration to resolve demographic problems. 663 Thus, in a contrast to the debate over
electoral reform, the shift in elite rhetoric observed in the EPA debates (i.e. the exclusion of
direct ethno-national applies) failed to influence public opinion in any political significant way.
662 NHK, "Japanese Sense of Exclusivity Rears Its Ugly Head" (Atama wo motageru nihonjin no 'haitasei'), 2004.
Report is available for download at: http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/social/page_04.html (August 6, 2012).
663 Asahi Shimbun, 10 June 2010. In particular, the differences in both the affirmative and negative answers across
the two polls are likely due to the fact that Asahi did not offer respondents a neutral answer choice, while NHK did.
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The view that the organic state narrative continues to shape Japan's immigration
policies despite declines in the use of the ethno-national claim is supported by the fact the above
institutional outcome is not so easily explained otherwise. Recent work on the political
economy of labor shortages and immigration policy in high income countries combines analysis
of labor supply and demand with the effects of system-level factors such as the relevance of
public policy (e.g. social welfare, etc.) to explain the hiring patterns of migrant workers in
particular industrial and service sectors. In the case of nursing and social care, relatively high
levels of migrant workers are expected in rich countries such as Japan because increased demand
caused by demographic changes and the constraints stemming from the sector's public funding
arrangements tend to result in working conditions that domestic workers will shun: relatively
low pay, difficult working hours, and low social status. 664
It would be difficult to argue that these conditions do not prevail in Japan's caregiver
sector; reduced government subsidies since 2003 have led to low salaries, an annual turnover
rate of 20% and more than 500,000 certified domestic caregivers leaving the profession. 665 The
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) estimates that Japan will need as many as
600,000 additional nurses and caregivers by 2014.666 In addition, although health professional
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organizations will typically avoid characterizing problems in their industry as ones that might be
solved by the introduction of migrant workers, the Japanese Nursing Association conceded in
2007 that "Japan is now in the state of chronic nurse shortages in terms of both quality and
quantity." 667
Although the governments and health care industries (sometimes nearly one and the
same) of other high income countries have responded to similar pressures by encouraging
migrant workers to take these difficult-to-fill positions, Japan has not done so to anywhere near
the same extent. For example, while migrant workers made up more than 10% of the health
and social care industry in the United Kingdom in 2002, a figure that increased to more than
14% by 2008, migrant workers remain a miniscule percentage of this industry in Japan, even
after the implementation of the EPA agreements after 2008.668 Indeed, although one impetus
for the EPA debates came from reports issued by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
and the Japan Business Federation, the principle organizations of Japan's business lobby, their
overall approaches to dealing with declining population and mounting labor shortages was to call
for improved productivity through technological innovation and better integration into the
389
667 Vogt, 2007, p. 4 .
668 Ruhs & Anderson, 2010, p.8.
workforce of women and elderly workers, options one critic has dismissed as "pipedreams" that
"would have little more than a palliative impact." 669
Although the major business organizations did call for immigration reform and
specifically encouraged the relaxation of work visa requirements for nurses and caregivers, their
proposals were extremely limited, focusing on temporary guest worker programs rather than
permanent immigration. 670  Even the relatively timid demands of industry were not fully met in
the final EPA agreements, which maintained strict certification standards and failed to provide
the level of subsidies and applicant support asked for by business organizations. 671 For these
reasons, as well as the failure to offer the possibility of permanent worker status, these programs
have not even come close to their very conservative goal of attracting 1,000 applicants per
country and have so far integrated relatively few foreign nurses and caregivers into the Japanese
workforce.672
The relationship between the change in the narrative and the change in institutions is
thus quite different across the cases of the democratic state narrative and electoral reform and the
organic state narrative and immigration reform. In the former, the narrative continued to be
669 Kingston, 2 011, p.18 1.679
670 Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry., 2003. Accessed at:
http://www.jcci.or.jp/nissyo/iken/030612syoshika-teigen.html (August 6, 2012); Japan Business Federation, 2004.
Accessed at: http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/029/index.html (August 6, 2012).
671 The maintenance of strict certification standards appears to be a case in which the MHLW prevailed over
industry demands and the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy,
Technology and Industry (METI), which were both involved in the negotiations of the draft EPAs. Vogt, 2007.
672 Kingston, 2011, pp. 176-177; Asahi Shimbun, 2 November 2009.
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positively offered by all parties in the debate to justify policy proposals in ways that facilitated
elite coordination and built pressure for reform among the public. In the latter, however, the
particular narrative claim ceased to be referred to directly as a justification for policy positions
but nonetheless continued to be reflected indirectly in statements objecting to institutional reform
in ways that played down the need for more extensive changes and did nothing to shift public
opinion on the general issue involved. This seems to indicate that declining references, even
the elimination of a long-standing cognitive claim from a relevant policy debate, is not sufficient
to undo the cognitive limitations it places on participants in the policy-making process.
However, if even claims that are no longer regularly referenced in public debates can exert
influence on policy-making, what is necessary to dislodge such a claim, even a fundamental
cognitive one, from political debates in a way that ends its influence over policy outcomes?
Although, as will be addressed in the final chapter, the loss of prominence for the
ethno-national claim over the last two decades is likely not without consequences for its
institutional impact moving forward, it seems doubtful that its underlying influence on
immigration and citizenship policies can be diluted without the appearance of meaningful levels
of contestation that challenge it as both at odds with reality and normatively questionable.
Until exposed to such contestation among political elites, the current state of affairs, in which
"Japanese nationality is still commonly associated with Japanese ethno-cultural identity," is
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likely to militate against swift changes in current institutions, despite increasing pressures for
more liberal immigration policies. 673
V. Conclusion
The analysis above has attempted to establish that nation-state narrative can and do have
real impacts on the outcomes of debates over institutional change. When a narrative has
maintained relatively high levels of prominence without facing contestation over long periods of
time, such as the democratic state narrative, it can facilitate compromise among elites, help shift
public opinion and affect the scope as well as the direction of the institutional reform. In
addition, although the near absence of explicit references by political elites in public debate may
weaken a narrative claim's potential to shape debates over institutional change in the long run, it
does not necessarily indicate the end of its relevance, as seems be the case for the organic state
narrative's core cognitive claim of ethno-national unity. In this regard, prior contestation and
the construction of counter claims or narratives by political elites may be crucial to significantly
change the institutional impacts of prominent narratives and their component claims. This
point will be discussed further in the final chapter.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
Nationalism, which is not qualitatively different from patriotism, is seemingly on the rise. But
this is a misreading of the Japanese condition. 674
Tamamoto Masaru, 2007
I. Introduction
We have come a long way from the sweltering heat of the anti-nuclear demonstration in
Yoyogi Park in the effort to identify, measure and explain changes in contemporary Japanese
nationalism. While nationalism will ever remain fundamentally ambiguous, its presence is
revealed in the stories we tell each other about who "we" are and what this means for the
structures of "our" community and its place in the wider world. Born of traditions, political
struggles, and human creativity, these stories emerge and coalesce into common patterns that are
repeated by a broad range of community leaders, even as the frequency and relative importance
attached to particular story elements constantly shift over time. As these stories become
attached to our governing institutions, they legitimize them by connecting the institutions with
our self-understandings, while at the same time exposing themselves to those who would
challenge that legitimacy by revising the stories in ways that can potentially change our
self-understandings.
674 Tamamoto, 2007, p.15.
Such is the nature of the "dialectical relationship between particular
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discursive events and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are
embedded." 675
This chapter begins by summarizing the key findings of the study and concludes with an
assessment of what these findings mean for the present and future of Japan's nation-state
narratives, the state institutions associated with them, and Japanese nationalism more broadly.
Specifically, the final section considers the following questions. Will the five nation-state
narratives examined here remain at the forefront of discourse on the relationship between the
Japanese nation and state? Have the changes observed in the nationalist discourse in the
post-Cold War period opened up space for new conceptualizations of the nation-state
relationship? What do the findings here say about how this nationalist discourse will continue
to shape institutional change in Japan in the future. Finally, what do recent changes in the
usages of nation-state narratives mean for Japanese nationalism?
H1. Finding Japanese Nationalism
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that nationalism continues to
maintain a footing in the discourses and politics of contemporary, wealthy, democratic societies.
Despite predictions it will cease to operate in such societies, nationalism persists in the ways
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members of these societies imagine how they as a group relate to the territorial state in which
they live. 676 The common ways of characterizing this relationship become nation-state
narratives, stories that define the nation and make corresponding demands on the state.
Through its nation-state narratives, nationalism has continued to be constructed and
reconstructed as it is wielded by political elites in policy debates even in the richest, most
technologically-advanced, pluralistic societies.
A second finding is that far from being a stable, mono-chromatic pillar, nationalism as
viewed through the nationalist discourse of political elites is a vibrant, ever-changing tapestry,
with measurable and meaningful change evident even in the case of a stable, mature democracy
with an advanced economy. The content analysis from Japan reveals two periods in which the
references to all studied nation-state narratives peak (immediate postwar and 1980s), three
periods (immediate postwar (especially the 1960s), late 1970s-1980s, post-Cold War) in which
measures of their contestation peak, and a secular trend toward decline in the numbers of
references to all the narratives over the nearly sixty years of the study.
Among the individual narratives examined, three showed signs of undergoing partial
transformations in which normative components faced contestation and their associated
institutions underwent reform. The peace state narrative, although the most referenced for the
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entire period, has nonetheless had the normative claims of one of its two sub-narratives called
into question and their related institutional implications limited over the course of a campaign
waged for nearly thirty years by security policy reformers. The trading state narrative saw a
similar targeted contestation of its sub-narratives portraying Japan as a merchant state while its
depiction of Japan as a country based on technological achievement went almost completely
unchallenged.677 Finally, despite being sometimes viewed as synonymous with "Japanese
nationalism," the organic state narrative was actually the least-referenced and one of the most
contested narratives in the study.
The changes in the frequency and valence of references to these narratives are
heavily-driven by their involvement in debates over reforms of their associated institutions. As
noted in Chapter Six in the case of the peace state narrative, characteristics of the narrative
appear to have had an impact on these changes. In particular, the fundamental ambiguity
between the non-violence and non-aggression interpretations of the norms in the peace-loving
state sub-narrative allowed would-be reformers of institutions associated with these normative
claims to more easily develop transformational discursive strategies that targeted them, obviating
the need to mount a more extensive, and potentially politically costly, direct challenge to the
narrative's core cognitive claims. In addition, the relatively large number of associations
677 The technology-based state sub-narrative's call to support technological cooperation received negatively-valued
comments in the first five-year block (1952*-1957). The sub-narrative then went uncontested from 1958-2007.
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between security institutions governing the acquisition and use of conventional military
capabilities and the norms of this sub-narrative actually served to increase its exposure to
reformers, who simply could not avoid challenging them in order to relax restrictions in this area
of security policy. In discussion of the organic state narrative, this point was found to be
contingent on the institutional position of the reformers. In the case of the peace state narrative,
the prime minister was more often than not an advocate of reform and thus a challenger of the
normative status quo. However, in the case of the organic state narrative, where the prime
minister served as a defender of the narrative's claims, it was found that the benefits of an
association with a state institution accrued more readily to the narrative claim. In addition, this
effect appears to be amplified when institutional incentives favor such a defense from whomever
assumes the position of the prime minister, regardless of partisan affiliation.
In contrast to the three transforming narratives, the democratic and civilized state
narratives have assumed a discursive status equivalent to "banal nationalism." At no point
prior or during recent declines in prominence did either of these narratives fail to be referenced
or face meaningful contestation. In addition, there is no evidence from the Diet inaugural
ceremonies showing political elites adopting discursive strategies designed to counter or undo
either of these narratives. Although there are other similar cases, such as the peace state
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narrative in the 1970s, the democratic and civilized state narratives in the post-Cold War period
are two of the clearest cases of banalization in this study.
The mixture of partial transformation and banalization observed in the different
narratives in the post-Cold War period belies the possibility of denationalization, either within a
single domain addressed by one of the narratives or across multiple domains. Among
transforming narratives, core cognitive claims were not meaningfully contested in the Diet
inaugural ceremonies, while contestation of normative claims exclusively targeted individual
sub-narratives in the case of the peace and trading state narratives. Alternatively, among the
"banalizing" narratives, long-established nation-state narratives remain virtually uncontested
sources of legitimacy for both Japanese democracy and its welfare state. The combination of
these findings represents decisive evidence that political elites in Japan have continued to rely on
these same five nation-state narratives to elaborate links between the nation and the state across a
wide set of domains.
We also uncovered relationships among the individual narratives examined here. In
particular, the content analysis revealed a complex and changing relationship between the central
elements of peace, development and democracy. During the early decades of Japan's postwar
democracy, the trading state narrative was closely linked in the nationalist discourse with the
democratic state narrative, a relationship which dissipated following the end of the Cold War
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(and the beginning of Japan's long period of economic struggle). In addition, the content
analysis uncovered a link between negative references to the peace and organic state narratives
that is likely due to an overlap between the enemies of one and the supporters of the other. This
dynamic is likely at least partially responsible for the continued persistence of the organic state
narrative at low levels of prominence.
Finally, in the preceding chapter, an effort was made to show what some of these
changes and relationships have meant for post-Cold War politics. Although in the case of
narratives undergoing transformations, politics, particularly the contestation generated from
debates over reforming institutions associated with the narratives' claims, simultaneously
affected narrative content and frequency, there is nonetheless evidence that some transforming
narratives continued to impact policy debates during this period. In particular, despite a steep
decline in references to the claim of ethno-national homogeneity and contestation over other
parts of the organic state narrative, this claim appears to have continued to exert cognitive
limitations on participants in policy debates over immigration reform following the end of the
Cold War. The evidence that it remained on the minds, if not the lips, of a variety of
participants in these debates likely points to the importance of contestation in affecting change in
narrative components. Although it is difficult to draw any final conclusions from this one case,
the fact remains that uncontested elements of narratives undergoing transformations, such as the
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anti-nuclear state sub-narrative of the peace state narrative, can continue to represent major
obstacles for those who would seek to affect dramatic changes in institutions associated with
them.
Showing the policy impacts of uncontested narratives is somewhat easier. In the case
of the democratic state narrative, the lack of contestation and counter-narratives shaped both the
direction and the scope of possible institutional reforms. The presence of an uncontested
narrative with a long history of prominence in nationalist discourse (as well as relevance to the
electoral reform debate) foreclosed the possibility of anti-democratic proposals emerging from
those not willing to directly challenge this narrative. The near universal appropriation of the
narrative by all sides in the debate over the specifics of electoral reform both shaped the scope of
the final institutional changes and facilitated the eventual compromise that was reached.
Uncertain about the final consequences, elites across the major parties nonetheless agreed to
make a leap of faith and replace the entire lower house electoral system, even though most did
not see this change as in their long-term interests. Finally, the consistency with which the
democratic state narrative was utilized by political elites generated an intense single-message
flow to the public, which responded by gradually endorsing the view that major electoral reforms
were necessary to repair Japanese democracy. As public opinion polls began to link progress in
this area with popular support for the prime minister, political pressure for reform increased.
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III. Post-Modern Janus: Japanese Nationalism in the 2 1" Century
Nation-state narratives play a vital role in determining how nationalism shapes state
institutions and its elements are the most commonly utilized linguistic conventions in the
nationalist discourse. For example, Chart 9.1 below shows that the combined prominence
scores of the five nation-state narratives regularly outnumber the combined scores of other types
of elements commonly cited as objects of nationalist identification, including references to five
common social purposes, references to neighboring countries, again viewed as a proxy for
relational comparisons, and references to Japan's three outstanding territorial disputes. 678 This
is true for every five-year period since 1968 except the first one, when the combined total of
references to the narratives was second behind references to neighbors. Although an
examination of nation-state narratives in elite discourse does not tell the whole story of
nationalism in a case like postwar Japan, it does tell a large part of that story while focusing on
its most policy-relevant aspects. So what does the above picture of narrative change and its
678 As previously noted, "social purposes" are the ultimate goals assigned to the nation-state, and the five counted
here are: prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy. Relational comparisons are comparisons between Japan
and Others, with data on references to neighboring countries (US, USSR/Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea
and Taiwan) used here as a proxy. Japan's territorial disputes are discussed further below, but here include only
outstanding disputes. Please note that Japan's territorial disputes with the United States over the Ogasawara Islands
(Bonin Islands, Iwo Island, Chichijima) and Okinawa were coded through their resolutions in 1968 and 1972,
respectively. Including references to these disputes for 1968-1972 would raise the territorial dispute figure to
4.4015, which would not change its rank order for this period.
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changing impacts reveal about contemporary Japanese nationalism and its likely impact on
politics moving forward?
Chart 9.1: Prominence, Narratives, Social Purposes, Relational Comparisons, and
Territorial Disputes, 1968-2007
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The present state of the five nation-state narratives points to several interesting
possibilities for the future. As noted in the first chapter, many scholars and observers of Japan
have characterized recent changes as potentially dangerous turns to more insular and
exclusionary forms of nationalism. However, the findings here do not support this view. First,
the two narratives that faced no meaningful contestation and achieved banalization by the end of
the study are also the only two with universalistic variants. They both thus incorporate
comparative logics with decidedly international orientations. In debates over reforming Japan's
democratic institutions, comparisons with the institutions of other democracies were often made
402
to justify favored reforms that, once achieved, have been credited with deepening Japanese
democracy. Still further, multiple measures point to a Japanese democracy after the end of the
Cold War that is both strongly legitimate and more independent of particularistic sources of
support than during any other time in the postwar period.
Similarly, a strong tradition of uncontested appeals to the universalistic variant of the
civilized state narrative in Japan has shaped the range of possibilities in the debate over welfare
reform. Although the Koizumi administration was able to enact measures that cut benefits, the
overwhelming focus of the welfare reform debate in Japan has been the search for new revenues
to shore up existing programs. In contrast, in the United States, where the notion of the welfare
state itself is hotly contested by conservatives and some libertarians as counter to traditional
American values and a form of socialism of foreign origin, calls from political elites for
fundamental reductions in and even de facto dismantling of major welfare programs such as
Social Security and Medicare have increased as these programs have faced financial stress fueled
by demographic change.
Second, it is the three narratives based on the most particularistic claims that have faced
the most contestation in recent years, and, in many cases, the objections raised by domestic
political elites echo challenges emanating from Japan's neighbors. Examples of this pattern
include the consistently high contestation over the merchant state sub-narrative in the 1970s and
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1980s that coincided with strong criticism of Japan's export-promoting polices from its major
trading partners, especially the United States; the rise in contestation over the peace-loving state
sub-narrative from the 1980s to 2000s that coincided with calls for changes in Japan's security
policies from the United States; and the rise in contestation over the state's relationship with the
Yasukuni shrine after the end of the Cold War that coincided with objections from Japan's
neighbors, especially China.
Third, even among the components of the organic state narrative, which are most
commonly cited as "on the rise," the claim of ethno-national homogeneity has ceased to be a
center piece of the nationalist discourse among political elites in Japan. Although, as noted
above, it likely continues to influence both thinking and policy-making in important ways, its
near expulsion from this discourse seems likely to impact its future eventually. A similar
reduction in the use of overtly-racist rhetoric among political elites in the United States since the
1960s provides an instructive example. Although this decline has been somewhat mitigated by
the emergence of less overtly racist alternatives, such as phrases like "welfare queen," and the
rise of "dog whistle" politics targeting constituencies with racial animus through indirect appeals,
it nonetheless coincided with a move away from strongly ethnic conceptions of American
national identity and the most broad-based reworking of American electoral institutions to guard
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against the exclusion of non-white voters since the early years after the end of the Civil War.679
However, in the American case, this reduction occurred in the face of broad-based contestation
among political elites. This same level of contestation has simply not yet occurred in objection
to the claim of ethnic homogeneity in Japan, a fact that thus calls into question the pace and
extent in which Japanese conceptions of nationality can be expected to change in the future.
Early indications are that this change is occurring slowly but surely in the direction of
less exclusionary orientation. Immigration proposals originating from the conservative LDP
have recently included a plan from former LDP Secretary General Nakagawa Hidenao to admit
as many as 10 million foreigners in Japan by 2050 and a call by Kano Tar6, a recent candidate
for the LDP presidency, to move away from ethnically-based immigration policies such as the
nikeijin visa program to ones that admit those with needed skills and qualifications. 680 As
noted earlier, both the New K6mei Party and the DPJ have endorsed extending voting rights in
local elections to foreign permanent residents. Considering the dominance of ethno-national
rhetoric through the 1980s, it is hard not to see these developments as indicators of the beginning
of the spread of more inclusive attitudes among political elites.
679 For more on changes in American national identity over this period, see Huntington (2004) and Stuckey (2004).
It is important to note that even in the near absence of overtly racist rhetoric from political elites, racism, racial
animus, and even racial bias in state institutions, particularly the justice system, continue to be problems in
American society.
680 Kingston, 2011, p.182; Morris-Suzuki, 2010, pp. 2 4 4 -2 4 5 .
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It is thus not at all clear that Japanese nationalism is shifting in a more insular and
exclusionary direction. Instead, a move, however gingerly, in the opposite direction appears to
be underway. The most stable and uncontested narratives are now the ones including appeals to
universalistic cognitive models and norms as well as positive uses of international comparisons
while the most particularistic narratives are all currently undergoing transformations that at least
in part appear to indicate a level of responsiveness to foreign criticisms. All of this has
occurred in the background of a steep decline in the use of claims of ethnic homogeneity,
arguably the most exclusionary element examined here.
Another piece of evidence from the Diet inaugural analysis also places recent changes in
nationalist discourse in a less threatening light. Chart 9.2 shows the changing frequencies with
which political elites referenced five different social purposes (prosperity, peace, security, status,
and autonomy) since 1968. As noted in Chapter Three, status and autonomy are the social
purposes most closely associated with exclusionary aspects of nationalist discourse, while
concerns about security are also commonly linked with xenophobic strands of nationalism.
However, these three social purposes are consistently among the least referenced in the Diet
inaugural ceremony. In contrast, peace and prosperity are the most referenced in all periods,
with peace being the most commonly-cited goal assigned to the nation-state for most of the study,
although ensuring prosperity became the primary concern after 1998. Thus, at least in the way
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elites are talking to each other and the public about what should be their most valued shared
goals, there is nothing particularly alarming about these results.
Chart 9.2: Prominence, Social Purposes, 1968-2007
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Another way to consider the future direction of Japanese nationalism is to examine how
Japan's territorial disputes with its neighbors are portrayed in the Diet inaugural ceremony. As
control of territory is central to nearly all conceptions of nationalism, including the one offered
here, disputes over territory, even relatively insignificant island areas, can encourage domestic
political elites to use nationalist rhetoric to support their favored responses. Japan's
outstanding territorial disputes include the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea (with
China and Taiwan), Takeshima/Dokdo islets in the Sea of Japan (with South Korea) and the
Northern Territories, four islands/islets just north of Hokkaido (with the former Soviet Union
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As shown in Chart 9.3, the Northern Territories dispute is
by far the most referenced in the Diet inaugural ceremony, but the number of these references
has fallen significantly over the last four decades. In addition, the disputes with China, Taiwan
and South Korea, which have recently made headlines in the media, have historically rarely been
mentioned at all, although references to all disputes increased in the last five-year period.
Chart 9.3: Prominence, Three Territorial Disputes, 1968-2007
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One way to interpret these results is that the dispute over the Northern Territories has
long played a dominant albeit declining role in the nationalist discourse. Second, territorial
disputes are on the whole becoming more prominent elements in the discourse, with references
to the Senkaku and Takeshima disputes rising above averages for the period since 1968 in the
681 On the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, see Emmers (2010); On Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, see Hyun (2006); On the
Northern Territories dispute, see Iwashita (2005).
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and current Russian Federation).6
last five-year block but references to the Northern Territories dispute remaining significantly
below average in this final period. Finally, although attention is turning south, the Northern
Territories remain a staple of Diet inaugural rhetoric. In sum, territorial disputes do appear to
be becoming more significant parts of the nationalist discourse of political elites, but the changes
remain mostly within historical norms. This seems to indicate that mainstream political elites
have so far made only muted appeals to these potent symbolic disputes. Whether this pattern
will continue is unclear, but these findings are consistent with the view that Japanese elites have
generally sought "to neutralize this geopolitical consideration and to resist, rather than
exacerbate, domestic nationalist sentiments" raised by the disputes. 682
If nationalism is not "on the rise" in the way that some scholars and observers of
contemporary Japan have claimed, what can be said about the extent of the changes under way?
More specifically, are the changes observed in the nationalist discourse and associated
institutions indicative of a "Japan unbound," in which a "volatile nation" is on a "quest for pride
and purpose," or is the picture drawn here more consistent with Kingston's characterization of a
"quiet transformation." 683 Although it is difficult not to see the changes observed as evidence
of a nationalist discourse in transition, the action so far has been relatively limited in both scope
682 Emmers, 2010, p.63. Emmers refers specifically to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, but this observation can be
extended to the other disputes as well, at least through the time period examined in this study.
683 Nathan, 2004; Kingston, 2011.
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and scale. Transforming changes have occurred in only one type of component (normative) in
just three narratives, leaving the cognitive cores of all five narrative intact and unchallenged. In
addition, although politicians such as Nakasone Yasuhiro ("international state") and Abe Shinzo
("beautiful country") as well as collections of academic and political figures such as the one
brought together by the Japan Forum on International Relations ("maritime nation") have
attempted to construct new nation-state narratives, most incorporate elements of the five
narratives studied here, all have been extremely short-lived in the nationalist discourse, usually
disappearing when their initial advocates depart from the Diet inaugural ceremony, and none has
so far been clearly wielded as a counter-narrative in such a setting.684 All told, with regard to
assessments of the degree of change, this hardly seems the stuff of a "great transformation" or a
"new nationalism."
However, the clear signs of transition point to a nationalist discourse prone to further
change. The fact that three of the most prominent postwar nation-state narratives have
simultaneously and repeatedly been challenged over the last three decades certainly indicates a
level of openness to new ways of thinking about the relationship between the nation and the state
not seen since the early decades of the postwar period. What opportunities do current
684 For more on the "maritime nation" narrative, see the JFIR Maritime Nation seminar (1998-2001) accessed at:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/specialstudy/special-studyBefore.htm#e (June 28, 2011)
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conditions present to elites seeking to alter or create new national self-understandings featuring
different associations with state institutions? I will conclude by briefly considering how
present and future elites might take advantage of these conditions to alter nationalist discourse in
Japan.
The strong and sustained challenge to the entirety of one of the peace state's
sub-narratives may open space for further transformation. However, I do not think this is
possible without the development of an effective counter-narrative that directly challenges the
entire idea of Japan as a peace state. Despite the long record of rhetorical and institutional
creep in the direction of the non-aggression version of the narrative, reformers continue to utilize
peace state rhetoric and have repeatedly failed to challenge this highly prominent narrative
directly. Although achieving some tactical successes in getting the public to appreciate new
missions for the SDF, these shifts have at best divided the public and for the most part have
proven ephemeral, as the Japanese people retain relatively stable and long-standing
anti-militarist predispositions.685 In addition, the general attachment to the idea of Japan as a
peace state remains strong. For example, in January 2008, the Yomiuri Shimbun polled the
public on what kind of country they felt Japan to be. Respondents were allowed to pick
multiple answers from among nine choices. The results appear in Table 9.1 below:
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685 Midford, 2011.
Table 9.1: What kind of country do you feel Japan is today? Please choose from among
the choices below the ones that match your feelings.
Military Great Power 2.0 A Closed (Inward-looking) Country 10.1
Economic Great Power 35.9 A Country Trusted by Other Countries 8.4
Peace State (heiwa kokka) 59.7 Democratic State (minshuteki na kuni) 25.2
Cultured State (bunka kokka) 27.2 Autonomous, Independent Country 4.2
Welfare State (fukushi kokka) 9.6 Don't Know/No Answer 4.8
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 January 2008
This result is somewhat remarkable when one considers that it was obtained by a
center-right newspaper that has been in the vanguard of challenging elements of the peace state
narrative. It also comes after more than two decades of efforts by political elites to transform
the peace state narrative to make it less restrictive for security institutions. 686  This underscores
the difficulty of directly challenging a narrative that resonates strongly with the predispositions
of the public.
In addition, as noted in Chapter Six, following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant
meltdown, peace activists have actively tried to link that accident with the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by expanding the peace state narrative's normative claims to include
opposition to nuclear power. Scholars of narratives and other kinds of political messaging
686 It should also be noted that if economic great power is taken as a proxy for the trading state narrative and the
results for the answer choices of the two sub-narratives of the civilized state narrative are combined, the results are
consistent with the top three narratives by prominence for the last five-year block (2002-2007), although peace state
was third rather than first in the content analysis: Peace State (59.7), Civilized State (36.8), Trading State (35.9).
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generally agree that interpreting major events, whether domestic or international, in ways that
favor particular narratives and understandings can shift elite and public views of existing
narratives or their components. 687 Most recently, reformers such as Ozawa Ichiro followed
this strategy by interpreting the international reaction to Japan's response to the first Gulf War to
justify further military contributions to UN operations. Can it work again on the peace state
narrative, but this time to expand its restrictions on state institutions? With demonstrations of
historical size becoming more common and political parties forming around anti-nuclear power
positions, such an outcome seems at least possible.
In a recent example, at the ceremony to commemorate the 67th anniversary of the
Hiroshima bombing, Hiroshima Mayor Matsui Kazumi, with Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiro in
attendance, emphasized the similarities of those who suffered from the bombings and those
affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, even going so far as to cite one of anti-nuclear power
movement's slogans: "Humanity cannot coexist with that which is nuclear." 688 In his address,
Noda included a delicately-worded pledge to work to free Japan of its dependence on nuclear
power, while just outside of the ceremony area, protesters gathered at an anti-nuclear power rally
chanted, "Go home, Noda." 689 Whether this strategy will lead to a reinvigoration of the peace
687 Roe, 1994; Edwards, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1992.
688 Matsui Kazumi, Mayor of Hiroshima City, "Declaration of Peace" Augusts 6, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1110537278566/index.html (August 7, 2012.
689 Japan Times Online, 7 August 2012. Accessed at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120807al.html
(August 7, 2012).
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state narrative among political elites is an open question, but what is clear is that Japan is not yet
finished with this most important of its postwar stories.
On the other hand, for those who envision the future Japan as a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural society, the stage has been set for change. The organic state narrative may fall
into further decline if its essential ethnic foundation cannot be reformulated in a way that better
comports with the lived reality of large minority and immigrant groups present in Japan.
However, it seems unlikely that major movement in this direction, even at just the cognitive
level, will be possible without the construction of a counter-narrative that directly opposes the
claim of ethnic homogeneity. Fortunately for would-be challengers, such a narrative existed in
Japan during the prewar period, the claim that the Japanese are a "mixed nation," a people
descended from different groups originally occupying the Asian continent and islands to the
south. 690 Although allowing some room for continued claims of contemporary exclusivity, the
"mixed nation" story opens up space for present-day Japanese to empathize and develop a sense
of affinity with just the groups of people likely to come to Japan should immigration policies by
further liberalized.
In the cases of the peace or organic state narratives, the "canary in a coal mine" value of
this method of analysis is apparent: Large-scale change will not likely be in the offing until the
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690 Oguma, 2002a.
cognitive cores of the existing nation-state narratives are first challenged.
suitably interpreted, may provide the impetus for further changes in narratives and even their
associated institutions. However, in the end, nation-state narratives are social constructions in
which shared visions of the nation and its necessary programs for the state coexist. Any major
changes in institutions associated with nation-state narratives with long histories of prominence
in the nationalist discourse will thus be preceded by rhetorical action against their cognitive
cores. These rhetorical disputes are thus harbingers of narrative and institutional changes to
come.
In a 1975 essay, scholar Tom Nairn dubbed nationalism the "Modern Janus." 691 He
selected Janus, the two-faced Roman god who looks to both the past and the future, because
establishing links between a nation's past and its future destiny is the function that gives
nationalism much of its authenticity and appeal. The adjective "modern" was added to link
nationalism to the processes of modernization, particularly industrialization, which Nairn saw as
the driving force behind the original emergence and spread of nationalism around the world.692
In concluding this account of nationalism in postwar Japan, we should keep in mind that
a similar account can be made of nationalism in any number of contemporary, wealthy
691 Nairn, 1975.
692 More specifically, Nairn sees nationalism as a modern phenomenon that emerged from a dialectical interaction
between the peoples of core and peripheral areas generated by "uneven development," the spread of industrialization
at different rates in different regions. Nairn, 1975, 1981.
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Future events,
democracies that certainly deserve to be called "post-industrial," if not the more complicated
label of "post-modem." As noted in the first chapter, although the dangers of "rising"
nationalism in Japan are often raised, changes in nationalisms in similar cases, such as the
United States, deserve at least as much scrutiny, especially when considering their capacities to
affect international peace and stability. In these cases as well, nation-state narratives have been
shown to shape national self-understandings in ways that influence policy-making and foreign
relations.693 Accordingly, postwar Japanese nationalism should be considered neither an outlier
nor a uniquely dangerous phenomenon but rather simply one example of how nationalism shapes
and is shaped by politics in a contemporary, wealthy democracy.
693 For an example in the critical analysis tradition, see Nayak & Malone's (2009) discussion of the significance of
the narrative of "American Exceptionalism" for US foreign relations. This narrative asserts that because
Americans emerged from a revolution against European tyranny to become the first nation with a unique ideology
based on liberty, egalitarianism, and individualism, the American state has a "God-given destiny" to lead the rest of
the world according to this worldview, especially to spread liberty and democracy to other countries. Lipset, 1996.
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Appendix A: Codebook
Code Group
101 Trading State Trading State
102 Technology-based State Trading State
103 Few Resources Trading State
104 Support World Trade Regime Trading State
105 Increase/Maintain Exports Trading State
106 Improve Domestic Technology Trading State
107 Support Technological Cooperation Trading State
108 Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments Trading State
201 Japanese as Ethnicity Organic State
204 Emperor Organic State
205 Support Yasukuni Shrine Organic State
206 National Polity Organic State
207 Enforce Traditional Values Organic State
301 Peace State Peace State
302 Nuclear Victim State Peace State
303 Support Peace Constitution Peace State
304 Implement Peace Diplomacy Peace State
305 Eschew Use of Force Peace State
306 Restrain War Potential Peace State
307 Support International Disarmament Peace State
308 War Regret Peace State
309 Atomic Bombings Peace State
310 Support Non-Nuclear Principles Peace State
311 Support International Nuclear Disarmament Peace State
401 Civilized State Civilized State
402 Support Japanese Culture Civilized State
403 Support Cultural Exchange Civilized State
404 Welfare State Civilized State
405 Improve Domestic Welfare Programs Civilized State
501 Democratic State Democratic State
503 Enforce Democratic Principles Democratic State
504 Member of Free World Democratic State
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Code Group
601 Economic Great Power Great Power
602 Military Great Power Great Power
701 Prosperity Social Purposes
703 Peace Social Purposes
705 Security Social Purposes
708 Status Social Purposes
709 Autonomy Social Purposes
804 EU International Organizations
805 UN International Organizations
806 Other Int'l Governmental Organizations International Organizations
807 US Bases Neighboring Countries
808 Okinawa Neighboring Countries
809 US Neighboring Countries
810 US-Japan Alliance Neighboring Countries
811 PRC Neighboring Countries
812 Senkaku Islands Neighboring Countries
813 ROK Neighboring Countries
814 Takeshima Neighboring Countries
-815 USSR/Russia Neighboring Countries
816 Northern Territories Neighboring Countries
817 DPRK Neighboring Countries
818 ROC (Taiwan) Neighboring Countries
819 Europe World Regions
822 Oceania World Regions
823 Middle East World Regions
824 Asia World Regions
825 Central/South America World Regions
826 North America World Regions
827 Africa World Regions
901 Domestic Minorities None
902 Japanese as Citizenship None
Total: 63
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1. 100 Trading State
* 101 Trading State
References to Japan 694 as a trade-based state, a merchant state, or a trading state.
* 102 Technology-based State
References to Japan as a technology-based state, a science and technology-based state, a
technology and creativity-based state, science technology and innovation-based state,
manufacturing state, state most advanced in a particular technology sector (e.g. information
technology, environmental technologies, etc.)
* 103 Few Resources
References to Japan as a country with few natural resources that is dependent on imported raw
materials. References to Japan as having limited resources or limited territory that needs to
import raw material from overseas.
* 104 Support World Trade Regime
References that Japan should or must support, maintain or strengthen the world trade regime
(sometimes referred to specifically as components of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), networks of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs), bilateral free trade agreements, currency regime agreements, and other institutions of
free trade, etc.)
0 105 Increase/Maintain Exports
References that Japan should or must expand its trade (exports) and sell its products throughout
the world.
0 106 Improve Domestic Technology
References that Japan should or must improve and promote its domestic technology.
* 107 Support Technological Cooperation
References that Japan should or must support technological cooperation by sharing its higher
technology with other countries.
694 Here, "Japan" refers to any references to the Japanese people, nation, nation-state, or first-person plural
references to this collectivity such as "us," "we Japanese," "our country," etc.
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* 108 Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments
References that Japan should or must increase its overseas investments.
II. 200 Organic State
* 201 Japanese as Ethnicity
References to Japan as a homogenous nation-state, single ethnic state, homogenous nation or
state, ethnically homogenous state, etc. References to the Japanese people as an ethnic group or
as having a similar or the same ethnicity, being of Japanese or Yamato ethnicity, sharing our
ethnicity, or as kindred, kin or brethren (in a sentence in which they are also not referred to as
citizens).
* 204 Emperor
References to the Emperor and the Imperial family or household.
* 205 Support Yasukuni Shrine
References that Japanese leaders should make official visitations to the Yasukuni Shrine.
References that Yasukuni Shrine should or must be maintained by the state and/or receive state
support.
0 206 National Polity
References to Japan as a national polity or country with a single national character.
* 207 Enforce Traditional Values
References that Japan should or must reinforce the morals and values shared among the Japanese
people. References that commend these morals and values. The four morals and values to be
included are: love of country, love of territory, sense of public duty, and sense of filial duty.
III. 300 Peace State
* 301 Peace State
References to Japan as a peace state, peaceful Japan, or a state that practices or reveres pacifism.
* 302 Nuclear Victim State
Reference to Japan as the world's only victim of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear victim country.
* 303 Support Peace Constitution
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References that Japan should or must not revise Article 9 (including references to the
Constitution and the spirit of the Constitution in the context of security policy). References to
the postwar constitution as the Peace Constitution. References to Article 9 (including references
to the Constitution and the spirit of the Constitution in the context of security policy).
* 304 Implement Peace Diplomacy
References that Japan should or must implement a foreign policy of peace diplomacy or peace
and friendship diplomacy.
* 305 Eschew Use of Force
References that Japan should or must uniquely constrain itself from using force or the threat of
force in international affairs. References to specific such constraints (e.g. policy of
exclusively-defensive defense, ban on overseas dispatch, etc.).
* 306 Restrain War Potential
References that Japan should or must be uniquely constrained in its acquisition of military
capabilities. References to specific such constraints (e.g. policy of maintaining defense budget
at 1% of GNP/GDP, ban on acquisition of offensive weapons, etc.).
* 307 Support International Disarmament
References that Japan should or must encourage other nations to support conventional
disarmament. References to specific such efforts (e.g. the arms export ban, etc.).
0 308 War Regret
References to regret over or the need for reflection on Japan's actions towards countries it
attacked and/or occupied during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War Two.
References to views of history that validate such feelings of regret or support the need for such
reflection.
* 309 Atomic Bombings
References to Japan's experiences of being bombed by nuclear weapons. References to Nagasaki,
Hiroshima, atomic bomb victims, etc.
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* 310 Support Non-Nuclear Principles
References that Japan should or must not possess any nuclear weapons. References to specific
such constraints (e.g. "three non-nuclear principles," etc.).
* 311 Support International Disarmament
References that Japan should or must promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation around the world, including efforts to stop development and testing of nuclear
weapons technology. References to specific such efforts (e.g. support for the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), etc.).
IV. 400 Civilized State
* 401 Civilized State
References to Japan as a civilized state or cultured state.
0 402 Support Japanese Culture
References that Japanese culture (i.e. arts, traditions) should or must be spread more thoroughly
among the Japanese people or within Japan. References that this culture should or must be
honored. References that praise or express admiration for this culture.
* 403 Support Cultural Exchange
References that Japan should or must participate in cultural exchange with other countries.
9 404 Welfare State
References to Japan as welfare state.
* 405 Improve Domestic Welfare Programs
References that Japan should or must promote the welfare of either all Japanese people or a
significant subset asserted or assumed to part of this collectivity (e.g. the elderly, women,
children, etc.) by guaranteeing a minimum standard of living.
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V. 500 Democratic State
0 501 Democratic State
References to Japan as a democratic state, a country of democracy, a free state, a liberal
democratic state, a democratic country, a state governed by the rule by law, a law-governed
country, or democratic Japan.
* 503 Enforce Democratic Principles
References that Japan should or must ensure the more thorough implementation of democratic
ideals, principles, practices and politics within Japan.
* 504 Member of Free World
References to Japan as a member of the free world or group of free states or free countries.
References to this group of democratic countries. References must include one of the following
terms: free countries, democratic state or countries, group of free states or countries, liberal
democratic states or countries, states or countries that embrace freedom and democracy, or
advanced democratic states or countries.
VI. 600 Great Power
* 601 Economic Great Power
References to Japan as a great economic power, state or country with or attaining great economic
power, 2 "d (or 3 rd) largest economy, or the world's largest capital market.
0 602 Military Great Power
References to Japan as a great military power or a state or country with or attaining great military
power.
VII. 700 Social Purposes
* 701 Prosperity
References to Japan's purpose as realizing prosperity for itself, the world, the Asian or other
region of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for prosperity.
References must include one of the following terms or phrases: prosperity or growth,
development, recovery, revitalization, re-growth of the economy or increase in GNP/GDP of
Japan, the world, a particular region, and/or other countries.
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* 703 Peace
References to Japan's purpose as realizing peace for itself, the world, the Asian or other region
of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for peace. References must
include one of the following terms or phrases: peace or peace-making in Japan, the world, a
particular region, and/or other countries.
705 Security
References to Japan's purpose as ensuring the security and stability of itself, the world, the Asian
or other region of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for security
and stability. References must include one of the following terms or phrases: security, stability
of Japan, the world, a particular region, and/or other countries in the context of international
relationships.
* 708 Status
References to Japan's purpose as securing a prominent or high status in the international
community of states. References that Japan wishes for such a status. References must include
one of the following terms or phrases: maintain, increase, raise, secure, or gain status for Japan
or high evaluations from other countries or high levels of trust and respect from other countries
as well as the need to avoid becoming an embarrassment or a laughingstock or to invite mistrust
from other countries.
* 709 Autonomy
References to Japan's purpose as to be an autonomous (self-ruled, autonomous, independent)
state or country. References that Japan wishes for such autonomy. References must include
one of the following terms or terms: autonomy, autonomous, having independence, independent
(state), on its (Japan's) own accord, its (Japan's) sovereignty, equal relationship (with other
states or countries), or not being dependent on, interfered with, coerced by, or succumbing
pressure from another state or country.
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VIII. 800 Targets for Relative Comparisons
A. International Organizations
* 804 EU
References to the European Union (EU) or its predecessors, the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), or European Communities (EC).
9 805 UN
References to the United Nations (UN).
* 806 Other International Governmental Organizations
References to other international organizations for which states or countries make up the
membership such as ASEAN, NATO, APEC, etc.
B. Neighboring Countries
* 807 US Bases
References to U.S. military forces and bases in Japan.
* 808 Okinawa
References to pre-1972 territorial disputes between Japan and the U.S. (Okinawa, Ogasawara
Islands (Bonin Islands, Iwo Island, Chichijima)).
0 809 US
References to the United States.
* 810 US-Japan Alliance
References to the US-Japan Alliance (e.g. Japan-US Security Treaty, Japan-US security alliance,
etc.).
0 811 PRC
References to China (People's Republic of China (PRC)).
* 812 Senkaku Islands
References to the territorial disputes between Japan, China, and Taiwan (Senkaku Islands).
425
0 813 ROK
References to South Korea (Republic of Korea (ROK).
* 814 Takeshima
References to the territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea (Takeshima).
0 815 USSR/Russia
References to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), the Soviet Union, Russian
Federation or Russia.
* 816 Northern Territories
References to the territorial disputes between Japan and U.S.S.R./Russia (the Northern
Territories (South Kuril Island or Kuril Islands), Habomai islets (Habomai archipelago),
Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island).
0 817 DPRK
References to North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea).
* 818 ROC (Taiwan)
References to Taiwan (Republic of China (ROC)).
C. World Regions
Note: To accord with Japanese geographic perspectives, these regions (and the division of
countries) were taken from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website accessed at:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/index.html (August 11, 2012). This division thus differs
from other commonly-used conceptions of world regions and which countries belong to them.
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* 819 Europe
References to Europe or a country in Europe excluding Russia and former Soviet Union.
The following countries should be counted:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Croatia (former Yugoslavia), Cyprus, Czech Republic (former
Czechoslovakia), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (former West Germany, East
Germany), Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo (former Yugoslavia),
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova,
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia
(former Yugoslavia), Slovakia (former Czechoslovakia), Slovenia (former Yugoslavia), Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vatican
City
* 822 Oceania
References to Oceania or a country in the Oceania region.
The following countries should be counted:
Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand (Niue and Cook
Islands), Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
* 823 Middle East
References to the Middle East or a country in the Middle Eastern region.
The following countries should be counted:
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel (Palestinian Authority), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
* 824 Asia
References to Asia or a country in Asia excluding South Korea, China (Hong Kong, Macau),
North Korea, Taiwan, and Japan
The following countries should be counted:
Bangladesh (East Pakistan), Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Thai, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
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* 825 Central/South America
References to Central/South America or a country in Central/South America.
The following countries should be counted:
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kits and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela
* 826 North America
References to North America or a county in North America excluding the United States.
The following countries should be counted:
Canada
* 827 Africa
References to Africa or a country in Africa.
The following countries should be counted:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, COte d'lvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
IX. 900 Other
* 901 Domestic Minorities
References to Japan's minorities such as the Ainu, Burakumin, Korean special permanent
residents (zainichi chosenjin) as well as foreigners or immigrants living in Japan (zainichi
gaikokujin, nikkeijin imin)
* 902 Japanese as Citizenship
References to Japan as nation or state of citizens or the Japanese people as citizens. References
to Japan as a civic nation-state.
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Appendix B: Coding Rules
I. Speech Sets
A "speech set" consists of the following documents: (1) a prime ministerial address, (2) an
address delivered by the leader of the largest opposition party in response to this prime
ministerial address, and the editorials also responding to the same prime ministerial address by
Japan's three largest newspapers; namely (3) Asahi Shimbun, (4) Yomiuri Shimbun, and (5)
Mainichi Shimbun. There are 136 speech sets in total.
II. Coding Sheets
When coding the speech sets, please save the results in an Excel file, divided into five separate
worksheets. These are referred to as "coding sheets." Coders are responsible for sorting out the
coding sheets using the Excel file template provided. This process involves the following three
steps:
1. Name the Excel file (i.e., workbook) according to the following format: date of prime
ministerial speech, name of prime minister, and coder designation, all separated by periods.
Example: 1972.10.28.Tanaka.CoderA
2. Make sure that the worksheet names are identical to the names of MSWord files for the
documents coded on them.
3. Be careful to input the correct sentence (line) numbers for the relevant document in the first
column of each worksheet.
III. Scope of Coding
Unit of Sampling Speech set 136 (2.5 sets/year)
Unit of Data Collection Individual speech or 542 documents
editorial
Unit of Analysis Texts Approx. 50,000 sentences
IV. Categories
Each speech/editorial is assessed sentence by sentence utilizing the content analysis method, and
the sentences are classified into 63 (variable) predefined categories or "codes." Please use the
following procedure to assess each sentence and then code it accordingly.
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The 63 categories defined as "codes" are divided into nine groups (i.e., 1OOs~ 900s). Numbers in
the 100s, 200s, 300s, 400s and 500s represent the components of five nation-state narratives.
These include both the identity elements of "cognitive models" or "cognitive claims" and
"norms" or "normative claims." Numbers in the 600s represent views on a "great power" status.
Numbers in the 700s code five "social purposes," and those in the 800s code factors such as
international organizations and neighboring countries for "relative comparisons." Numbers in the
900s are related to references to Japanese as citizenship as well as domestic minorities in Japan.
V. Coding Values (1, -1, 0)
Code "1" : In a sentence, when one or more words falls into a coded category and is judged to
refer to this code in a positive or neutral way, input "1" in the relevant code column for the
correct sentence number. "Positive/Neutral" means that the author of the speech/editorial is
expressing his/her generally positive or nonjudgmental assessment of the content (e.g., the
normative claims, cognitive claims, social purposes, and relative comparisons) of the category.
Cognitive claims: When the author has confirmed a core concept, causal connection or historical
view, or emphasized its importance, please count it as "1".
Social purposes: When an issue that is, or should be, Japan's objective to be achieved is
mentioned, please count it as "1".
Relative comparisons: Count any references to other countries or international organizations or
their descriptions as "1", unless judged to be "negatively-valued" as explained below. The
mention of a country in this ceremony indicates that the country is attracting attention at the
time; it is not necessary for the country to be compared to Japan explicitly.
Coding "1" for normative claims may be more difficult than other types of codes because there
are two types of references classified here:
1) General references: These include statements encouraging that a norm be generally followed
generally or describing the content of the normative claim (i.e. explaining the rule). For
example, the claim that Japan must "support international disarmament" can be expressed as a
general statement without reference to a specific policy issue or state action. In such cases, the
coding is relatively straightforward.
2) Specific reference: Advocacy of a specific policy or state action made in accordance with a
normative claim can be more difficult to code. In particular, knowledge of past policy and
political debates may be required to decide whether or not the advocated policy or state action
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represents a specific manifestation of a normative claim. In order to resolve this problem,
extensive coder training will be offered. This training will include coder briefings on key
topics as well as a pilot study in which a small sample of speech sets will be test-coded in
coordination with the coding trainer. Although the content analysis method prohibits coding
trainers from giving advice to coders on how an individual sentence should be coded in the
reliability and main samples, the coding trainer is always available to answer questions about
general topics, such as postwar Japanese history or politics. Coders may also use the Internet or
other research tools during coding if they feel they lack factual information necessary to make
valid coding judgments.
Code "-1": When one or more words are thought to fall in a category and be used negatively in a
sentence, please input "-1" in the relevant category column for the appropriate sentence number.
"Negative" means that the author of the address/editorial is expressing his/her unfavourable
assessment of what the category represents or disagrees with its claims in some way. What
"negative" or "negatively-valued" means can differ in each case as details are different for each
type of code (i.e., cognitive claims, social purposes, relative comparisons and normative claims).
For cognitive claims, please count as "-1" when the author is rejecting or questioning the core
concept, causal connection or historical view inherent to the claim. Examples include:
101 Trading State, 102 Technology-based State, 201 Japanese as Ethnicity, 301 Peace State,
302 Nuclear Victim State, 401 Civilized State, 404 Welfare State, 501 Democratic State, 601
Economic Great Power, 602 Military Great Power: When the author states that Japan695 is
not or should not be represented by the above code, the sentence should be counted as "-1".
* For 602 Military Great Power, when it is stated that Japan should not become a military great
power or the author expresses his/her concern, code it as "-1".
901 Domestic Minorities 902 Japanese as Citizenship, 204 Emperor: Code as "-1" when
these groups, concepts or persons are presented in a negative light, called into question, or
explicitly criticized in any way.
504 Member of Free World: Code as "-1" when relations with other democratic countries are
denied, devalued or disrespected, such as in statements to the effect that "Japan is not a member
of the free world" or "Japan has not been welcomed into the community of democratic states."
308 War Regret: Code as "-1" statements to the effect that Japan should not reflect on or regret
its actions during World War Two or Japan's actions during World War Two were justified.
695 Here, "Japan" refers to any references to the Japanese people, nation, nation-state, or first-person plural
references to this collectivity such as "us," "we Japanese," "our country," etc.
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309 Atomic Bombings: Code as "-1" statements downplaying or denying the importance of
Japan's experience as a victim of atomic bombings.
103 Few Resources: Code as "-1" statements asserting that Japan is abundant in natural
resources, self-sufficient, or not a "country of few natural resources."
For social purposes (701 Prosperity, 703 Peace, 705 Security, 708 Status, 709 Autonomy),
Code as "-1" statements asserting that the relevant social purpose is not Japan's objective, should
not be set as Japan's goal in the future or does not need to be achieved by Japan. Incidentally,
concepts such as "prosperity," "peace," "safety," "status" and "autonomy" are generally
accepted as favourable purposes for a political community, however conceived, so they will only
rarely, if ever, be mentioned in a negative way.
For relative comparisons, the meaning of "-1" differs depending on the individual codes:
805 UN, 806 Other International Governmental Organizations: Code as "-1" statements
asserting that Japan's membership is problematic or useless, calling for Japan to leave the
organization, calling for abolishing the organization, or criticizing some specific policy or action
taken by the organization.
807 U.S. Bases: Code as "-1" statements asserting that U.S military bases in Japan are
unnecessary, should be eliminated or curtailed, increase the chance of getting Japan involved in
foreign wars, invite crime, worsen the domestic living environment, are inconsistent with the
Constitution, or violate normative claims prohibiting Japan from acquiring or utilizing force in
international affairs.
808 Okinawa, 812 Senkaku, 814 Takeshima, 816 Northern Territories): Code as "-1"
statements asserting that Japan does not wish the return of disputed territories, that they do not
belong to Japan, or that Japan should drop its claim to these disputed territories
810 Japan-US Alliance: Code as "-1" statements asserting that the alliance should be abolished,
is unnecessary, increases Japan's chances of becoming involved in foreign wars, is
unconstitutional, or violates normative claims prohibiting Japan from acquiring or utilizing force
in international affairs.
804 EU, Neighboring Countries (809 US, 811 PRC, 813 ROK, 815 USSR/Russia, 817 DPRK,
818 ROC (Taiwan)), Other Countries in World Regions (819-827):
When the author of the speech/editorial makes a critical remark about other countries or the EU
regarding the following areas, please count as "-1":
1. Threats: Country X is presented as a security threat to Japan. This may include a another
country's efforts to develop or deploy nuclear weapons, support terrorism, foment domestic
insurrection, attack or invade Japan, blockade or physically isolate Japan, etc.
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2. Competition: Country X is presented as an economic competitor in trade and technological
development or as a opposing party in a trade conflict (treated as a competitor for Japan, "trade
conflict," etc.).
3. Dictatorship: If it is noted that Country X is an autocracy, not a democracy, or a country that
oppresses its own people (i.e., is not a democratic country like Japan).
4. Complaints: The scope is limited to complaints about the opposing party in a territorial dispute,
a country where a crime was committed against a Japanese national or which was accused of
participating in or allowing such a crime, a country accused of hampering Japan's autonomy, a
country which criticises Japan (when Japan has complaints against another country)
You may find a surprisingly large number of code "-1" for 809 US. This is because some
political elites claim the United States represents a threat to Japan because the U.S.-Japan
alliance increases the risk of Japan becoming involved in foreign wars, it is a party in a long
series of trade disputes with Japan, it is the site of numerous high profile crimes against Japanese
nationals and is often criticized for interfering in Japan's politics and for criticizing Japan.
Coding"-1" is probably most difficult for normative claims for the same reason as discussed
above for coding "1" for such claims: There are two types of references:
1) General reference: Code "-1" for references that encouraging the complete violation of a norm
or a repudiation of the norm itself.
These are relatively easy to judge as the keywords for the norms are often mentioned and
references usually evoke the direct opposite of the normative claim.
2) Specific reference: Code "-1" for references advocate a specific policy or state action that is
explicitly contrary to the normative claim or statements that reject the principle behind the
normative claim in the course of advocating detailed policy changes or state actions that violate
the normative claim as framed in the codebook.
A problem here is that knowledge of policy is often required to assess the relationship between
the normative claim and policies and state actions. Information on major policy issues relevant to
this study will be presented during coder briefings. However, if further explanation is needed,
please contact the coding trainer or re, please either ask me or research the matter on your own.
- Point to note: You may find references that can be interpreted as both "1" and "-1" in the
same sentence in the case of specific reference of to normative claims or the 800s codes,
which represent other countries. For example, in a reference such as "although the U.S. is
Japan's most important alliance partner, its response to the rape of an Okinawan girl by
American servicemen was appalling," the first part of the statement mentions 809 US in a
positive manner, while the second refers to it negatively (complaint over bilateral issue).
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However, the coding rules here do not allow the same sentence to be counted both "1" and
"-1" for the same code. In such cases, code the sentence according to the relevant
reference that appears last. Thus, the example above should be coded as 809 (-1).
Code "0" (no relevant category): Do not input anything unless the sentence is counted as "1" or
"-1." (This is to save time for coders; "0" will be inserted automatically to blank cells by the
coding trainer later.)
VI. Other Coding Rules
Difference between sentence and word "hits": Each coder is responsible for determining which
specific Japanese characters in a sentence should be counted as satisfying the requirements for a
reference to a particular code, which is here called a "hit." It is possible (and often necessary) to
code the same sentence as having hits from multiple codes, but as a general rule, but avoid
underlining the same Japanese character in a sentence as counting toward more than one code.
However, although it is a general rule that the same Japanese character should not be classified
into more than one code, it should be understand that there are some exceptions, especially in the
cases of the use of pronouns and indirect references (discussed below). Specific exceptions
will be discussed during coder briefings during the pilot study.
Pronouns and indirect references: When what has been coded in a prior sentence is referred to in
a later sentence through the use of a pronoun (e.g. "this," "that," etc.) or phrase of indirect
reference (e.g." those countries," "that kind of a state action," "all the things I just listed," etc.)
the later sentence should also be coded as having a hit for the code in question. However, if the
coder judges it is not clear exactly what the pronoun or indirect reference refers to, there is no
need to code it again for the later sentence. As a general rule, do not code a pronoun or indirect
reference when you are not confident what is being referenced. When a pronoun or indirect
reference refers to references coded as more than one code in a prior sentence, count it as hits for
all the same codes in the later sentence as well (e.g. "those countries" in sentence 2 referring to
"the United States and China" in sentence 1 should be coded as 809 US and 811 PRC for
sentence 2 as well).
> Point to note: When indirect references are used, a single Japanese word may refer to the
contents of more than one code. "The U.S. and European countries" (5bei shokoku) or "the
countries of the Korean Peninsula" are two such examples. Further examples will be
discussed during coder briefings.
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Filling in the hard copy and submission: Before coding a speech or editorial, print out a hard
copy so that you have a record of it. As you code, underline the character or word that
corresponds to each code and write the number and value of the code over it (e.g. "305, 1")
above it. When you have completed coding the document, write your coder designation (e.g.
Coder A, etc.) and the date on the cover of the hard copy before submitting it to the coding
trainer.
How to code quotations from or summaries of remarks by third parties (including those cited
from speeches, publications or the texts of law, etc.): Do not code passages that are simply direct
quotations or summaries of what someone other than the speaker or author said or wrote, unless
the speaker or author expresses an opinion of this passage within the same sentence. The
purpose of this rule is to preserve as much as possible the author's or speaker's point of view.
For example, it is common for opposition party leaders and editorialists first to quote lines from
the prime ministerial address in a sentence and then comment on these lines in the next sentence.
In such an instance, only code material in the latter sentence, because this is where the speaker or
author expresses an opinion or approaches the quoted passage from his or her point of view.
Rhetorical questions: Addresses by opposition party leaders and editorials commonly include a
large number of rhetorical questions. In particular, the opposition party leaders often address
such kinds of questions to the Prime Minister in their attempt to criticize the government's
stance and policies. Sometimes, it is difficult to judge whether a question is rhetorical or genuine.
On the surface, both may appear to be simple requests for the Prime Minister to clarify the
government's stance, but in fact, the opposition party or the newspaper is often indicating its
opposition to this stance or questioning its plausibility through this device. Coders should be
careful when coding questions and consider whether they are meant to rhetorical to further a
alternative position advocated by the speaker or author.
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Appendix C: Notes on Methodology
I. Introduction
This appendix reports the results of inter-coder reliability checks and then expands the
discussion of methodological considerations related to this study's coding scheme that were
touched on only briefly in earlier chapters. These include the use of open-ended and fixed
codes, the treatment of valence and the meaning of prominence.
II. Inter-coder Reliability
Reliability in content analysis refers to "the extent to which a measuring procedure
yields the same results on repeated trials."696 More specifically, the reliability of concern here
is the degree to which different coders arrive at the same judgments when coding the same
material. Achieving an adequate level of agreement between coders is important because it
provides a degree of validation for the coding scheme. Sufficiently high levels of inter-coder
reliability are evidence that the scheme, when employed by different persons, will yield similar
results and thus is not something that can only be reproduced by a particular individual,
presumably due the person's own idiosyncratic tendencies. Evaluating inter-coder reliability is
thus essential in assessing the level to which the "relatively objective (or at least inter-subjective)
696 Neuendorf, 2002, p.14 1.
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characteristics" of content have been identified and accurately recorded in studies employing
more than one human coder. 697
Four human coders took part in this study (Coders A, B, C, and D). Coders A and B
evaluated all 136 speech sets (1952-2007) for 40 codes including all codes relating to the five
narratives (100s, 200s, 300s, 400s, and 500s) as well as codes for great power status (600s),
social purposes (700s) and Japan's domestic minorities (901). In a second pass, Coders C and
D evaluated 97 speech sets (1968-2007) for 23 codes including codes referring to international
organizations, neighboring countries and bilateral disputes (territorial, basing issues, etc.), and
references to other counties and world regions (800s) as well as the code for referring to the
Japanese people as citizens (902). A subsample of 20 speech sets was coded by both coders in
each pair to compare their coding results, representing nearly 15% of the total sample for Coders
A and B and slightly more than 20% of the total sample for Coders C and D. 69 8
Two coefficients were calculated to assess inter-coder reliability. The first, percent
agreement, the number of agreements divided by the total number of measures, is "one of the
697 Ibid.
698 Although "there is no set standard" for determining the right subsample size for calculating inter-coder reliability,
between 10% and 20% of the total sample is one "rough guideline" offered by social science research method
textbooks. Neuendorf, 2002, p. 158. Please note that inter-coder reliability for the code 902 Japanese as Citizenship
was calculated from a subsample of only 5 speech sets (5% of total sample for Coders C and D) due to cost and time
constraints. However, since this code was fixed to specific key words and was also the most referenced individual
code in the study, the smaller subsample size is not deemed problematic in judging inter-coder reliability in this
case.
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most popular coefficients" used in content analysis. 699 Although both popular and appropriate
for the type of categories utilized here, percent agreement does not have the capacity to assess
whether agreement is simply the result of chance. A second coefficient, Cohen's kappa, was
thus also calculated to assess reliability when the impact of chance agreement is considered.
This coefficient, which ranges from 0 (agreement by chance) to 1 (perfect agreement beyond
chance), compares the proportion of agreement observed with that expected to occur naturally by
chance.700 The minimum level of inter-coder reliability for a code to be included in this study
was selected for each coefficient. The standard for percent agreement was set at 90% or above,
a level that Neuendorf has noted is "acceptable to all" in the field of content analysis. 701 For
the beyond-chance measure, which is generally "afforded a more liberal criterion," the study
followed the recommendation that a Cohen's kappa of .4 or higher is sufficient to guarantee at
least "fair to good agreement beyond chance." 702
Table C.1 below shows the percent agreement and Cohen's kappa values for the
individual codes handled by Coders A and B.
in the study.
All codes tested proved sufficient for inclusion
Please note that Cohen's kappa could not be calculated for two codes (101
699 Neuendorf, 2002, p.149.
700 For specifics on how to calculate Cohen's kappa, see Neuendorf (2002, p.155). All inter-coder reliability
measures were calculated using Simstat for Windows.
701 Neuendorf, 2002, p. 14 3 .
702 Ibid. Banerjee, et al., 1999, p.6 . In introducing this standard for interpreting Cohen's kappa, Banerjee et al. cite
an earlier study by Landis & Koch (1977).
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Trading State and 206 National Polity) because neither coder recorded a reference to them in the
subsample tested for inter-coder reliability.
Table C.1: Inter-Coder Reliability Measures, Coders A & B
# Code Name % Agreement Cohen's kappa
1 101 Trading State 100.0 N.A.
2 102 Technology-based State 100.0 0.500
3 103 Few Resources 99.9 0.700
4 104 Support World Trade Regime 99.5 0.602
5 105 Increase/Maintain Exports 99.7 0.647
6 106 Improve Domestic Technology 99.4 0.664
7 107 Support Technological Cooperation 99.9 0.642
8 108 Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments 99.3 0.668
9 201 Japanese as Ethnicity 99.9 0.893
10 204 Emperor 100.0 1.000
11 205 Support Yasukuni Shrine 100.0 1.000
12 206 National Polity 100.0 N.A.
13 207 Enforce Traditional Values 99.7 0.642
14 301 Peace State 99.9 0.833
15 302 Nuclear Victim State 100.0 0.933
16 303 Support Peace Constitution 99.3 0.575
17 304 Implement Peace Diplomacy 100.0 0.750
18 305 Eschew Use of Force 99.1 0.525
19 306 Restrain War Potential 99.0 0.707
20 307 Support International Disarmament 99.7 0.701
21 308 War Regret 99.8 0.711
22 309 Atomic Bombings 100.0 0.800
23 310 Support Non-Nuclear Principles 99.4 0.707
24 311 Support International Nuclear Disarmament 99.2 0.727
25 401 Civilized State 100.0 1.000
26 402 Support Japanese Culture 99.7 0.774
27 403 Support Cultural Exchange 99.9 0.871
28 404 Welfare State 100.0 0.800
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30 501 Democratic State 99.9 0.500
31 503 Enforce Democratic Principles 98.1 0.623
32 504 Member of Free World 99.8 0.624
33 601 Economic Great Power 100.0 0.963
34 602 Military Great Power 100.0 0.963
35 701 Prosperity 98.1 0.685
36 703 Peace 98.8 0.836
37 705 Security 99.5 0.797
38 708 Status 99.5 0.748
39 709 Autonomy 99.7 0.749
40 901 Domestic Minorities 100.0 0.965
Average 99.6 0.752
Table C.2 below shows the percent agreement and Cohen's kappa values for the
individual codes handled by Coders C and D. All codes tested proved sufficient for inclusion
in the study. Please note that Cohen's kappa could not be calculated for one code (812
Senkaku Islands) because neither coder recorded a reference to it in the subsample tested for
inter-coder reliability.
Table C.2: Inter-Coder Reliability Measures, Coders C & D
# Code Name % Agreement Cohen's kappa
41 804 EU 100.0 0.909
42 805 UN 99.7 0.871
43 806 Other IGO 99.9 0.911
44 807 US Bases 99.7 0.799
45 808 Okinawa 99.8 0.862
46 809 US 98.8 0.892
47 810 US-Japan Security Pact 99.8 0.914
48 811 PRC 99.6 0.914
49 812 Senkaku Islands 100.0 N.A.
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0.73729 405 Improve Domestic Welfare Programs 98.4
51 814 Takeshima 100.0 1.000
52 815 USSR/Russia 99.8 0.927
53 816 Northern Territories 99.9 0.926
54 817 DPRK 99.8 0.911
55 818 ROC (Taiwan) 100.0 0.976
56 819 Europe 99.5 0.837
57 822 Oceania 99.9 0.958
58 823 Middle East 99.9 0.937
59 824 Asia 99.5 0.935
60 825 Central/South America 99.9 0.865
61 826 North America 99.9 0.714
62 827 Africa 99.9 0.920
63 902 Japanese as Citizenship 96.9 0.884
Average 99.7 0.900
III. Open-ended and Fixed Codes
The coding scheme includes two types of codes. "Open-ended" codes provide general
descriptions of targeted content that allow the coder some freedom in recognizing whether core
concepts are present. "Fixed" codes provide general descriptions of targeted content but also
include a list of key words with the stipulation that at least one must be present for a count to be
made. Open-ended codes, which are more difficult to implement and represent a cost in
inter-coder reliability, were employed here for two reasons. First, although the focus on
linguistic vehicles helps to demystify and specify different strands of nationalism, the subject
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50 813 ROK 99.8 0.947
remains inherently ambiguous. 703 In order to capture the full range within which different
advocates employ the same concepts in nationalist discourse, it was necessary to allow coders
the freedom to recognize this variation. Second, this study analyzes discourse over a fifty-five
year period in which both the narrative elements and their medium, the Japanese language, have
changed. In some instances, as times changed, different words came to be used to describe the
same concepts.704 In other cases, the same words did not carry the same meanings in all
periods.705 Accordingly, for some elements, it was simply impossible to assemble a list of key
words that was both of manageable length and addressed the above concerns sufficiently.
Open-ended codes were thus the logical solution, especially for normative elements, which tend
to be more complex than the other types of components examined.
Although the inclusion of open-ended codes did lower the overall average for both percent
agreement and Cohen's kappa as expected, it did not do so by much. The average percent
agreement and Cohen's kappa for the 42 fixed codes were 99.7% and .855, respectively, while
the same measures for the 21 open-ended codes came to 99.5% and .715, respectively. 706 It is
thus argued here that use of open-ended codes enriched the coverage of the coding by allowing
703 McVeigh, 2004, pp.23-39.
704 One such example is the gradually morphing of the term "technology-based state" (gijutsu rikkoku) to the
broader "science, technology and creativity-based state" (kagaku gjutsu sdz5 rikkoku), a shift whose meaning will
be discussed below.
705 On the changing meanings attributed to the word democracy during this period in Japan, see Oguma, 2002b.
706 The 42 fixed codes are 101, 102, 201, 206, 301, 302, 304, 401, 404, 501, 504, 601, 602, 701, 703, 705, 708, 709,
901, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827,
and 902. The 21 open-ended codes are 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 204, 205, 207, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309,
310, 311, 402, 403, 405, and 503.
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coders the freedom to deal with the inherent ambiguity of nationalist concepts and their shifting
vocabularies over time without proving overly problematic for inter-coder reliability.
IV. Valence
The coding scheme here is valence-sensitive; each code has a positive and negative
version. A positive reference is one in which a declarative or imperative statement concerning
a relevant cognitive or normative element, social purpose or relative comparison is made without
reservation. The presence of a reservation thus indicates a negative valence.
may take different forms depending on the type of element modeled by the code.
Reservations
For example,
a reservation for a cognitive element usually takes the form of questioning in part or in total the
accuracy of the element as a fact or valid observation (e.g. Japan is NOT a country with few
natural resources). For a normative element, statements that advocate behaviors for the norm
target that violate the norm in question or challenge the validity of the norm in general terms are
coded as negative (e.g. Japan SHOULD acquire nuclear weapons or there is NO valid reason
why a country threatened by other nuclear powers should not acquire such capability in defense).
The negative versions of other code types are explained in the coding rules including in
Appendix B. The percentage of negative references to total references is viewed here as an
indication of the level of contestation for an individual code or group of codes.
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It should be noted that both declarative and imperative statements without reservations
are coded here as having positive valence. Although some coding schemes incorporate a
"neutral" valence option for statements that, while lacking reservations, also do not explicitly
endorse or advocate for the content in question, this option was rejected here. As the
anthropologist Harumi Befu has made clear, in Japan's identity discourse, even declarative
statements about the elements of cultural models offered as observed facts "characterize an
idealized, desirable state of affairs and carry positive valence." 707 Paraphrasing Befu, the is in
Japanese nationalist discourse is always understood as should.708 In this sense, when the
elements of one of these narratives are mentioned without extensive comment or indications of
reservation, it is rightly coded as positive because the very act of citing it in the context of the
Diet inaugural ceremony and the national conversation taking place serves to further establish
the element as a defining part the nation-state narrative and the social category it helps construct.
V. Prominence
Both negative and positive references are counted toward each code's, and in
combination, each code group's prominence score. Prominence is an indication of the degree
to which the targeted content was the focus of nationalist discourse and may thus be used to
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707 Befu, 2001. P.79.
708 Ibid.
assess differences in this dimension between individual codes and code groups. In addition, the
units for prominence scores are standardized as the number of sentences containing at least one
reference to the code per one hundred sentences examined. This allows for comparisons across
different time periods in which the number of sentences in the speeches and editorials and even
the number of Diet inaugural ceremonies vary.
However, prominence is not necessarily indicative of the breadth or depth of inculcated
beliefs among the participants in the Diet inaugural spectacle or the public at large. Such a
correlation is certainly possible in some cases, but is likely a fleeting one. As noted in Chapter
Three, discourse is viewed here as a set of language or linguistic conventions with which
speakers must contend, no matter the state of their internal commitments or calculus, and
audiences will consume this language to varying effects on their own internal belief systems. It
is thus not necessary for a single speaker to be either sincere in a particular utterance or
consistent in his or her advocacy over time. To account for this, each component code of a
narrative is analyzed independently of the others. This means that a speaker or writer may
advocate for one element of a particular narrative while roundly rejecting another part of the
same narrative in the very next sentence.
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